Court of Appeals

It’s the little things

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Most real estate practitioners can relate to the experience of getting that call or email from a real estate agent, saying that a nice little deal is coming our way. The buyer and seller have already signed a contract and set a closing date. There may be some “little issues” that will need to be worked out before closing, but that should not be a problem. Right?

Often, a lawyer has been involved in preparing the contract or advising the parties before that call comes in. As often as not, those “little issues” turn out to be significant, and some can even derail a closing and pit the seller and purchaser against each other. The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in the case of Anderson v. Pearson, Appellate Case 2023-001897 (Ct. App., 2025) discussing a case where there were, in fact, some big issues. We are left to wonder how different the outcome might have been if an attorney had been consulted in drafting the contract and advising the parties as to its terms.

The basic facts of the case are that Pearson (together with some family members) owned acreage in Spartanburg County, on Lake Cooley. This consisted of one parcel which Anderson agreed to buy (and which the parties chose to refer to as the “twenty-acre parcel”), as well as another nine-acre parcel next to it. Anderson (who owned property adjacent to Pearson’s) and Pearson, communicating through a broker, negotiated and agreed to some basic contract terms including a purchase price and closing date. Other details, such as whether the property was to be defined in a new survey, and whose responsibility it would be to get a survey, were not included in the contract. The contract was, however, clear on the inclusion of a “time is of the essence”, merger, and non-reliance clauses. The contract included the (not very helpful) comment that “[b]rokers recommend Buyer have Property surveyed . .  .”

After depositing her earnest money, the record indicates that Anderson continued to communicate with Pearson via the broker, and that Pearson indicated multiple times that he was obtaining a survey of the 20 acres in order to address the placement of an access route that would be needed to get to and from the nine-acre parcel which he was not selling. Communications went back and forth for some time, with Pearson never providing a copy of the survey, and Anderson continuing to ask for updates. Pearson applied for mortgage financing through AgSouth, but the record indicates that she had not provided all the items (such as a title commitment or a survey) that AgSouth would require to make the loan.  Eventually, the contract closing date came and went. The broker told Anderson that Pearson was not returning her calls or texts. Eventually, several weeks later, Pearson told the broker “We are building on the property ourself. We no longer want to sell.”  Turns out the Pearsons had actually gotten a survey but chose not to share it with Anderson. And the Pearsons had determined that they could sell the property to a developer for more than twice what Anderson had agreed to pay.

Some months later, Anderson filed suit for specific performance. At summary judgment, the Master in Equity conducted a trial and entered a judgment granting Anderson’s request for specific performance. Anderson offered evidence at trial concerning communications about the survey, which were not reflected in the written contract. A significant ruling by the Master in reaching her decision was that Pearson should be equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds to exclude Anderson’s evidence of those communications. Pearson appealed, raising several issues on appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Master’s order, focusing on the Master’s application of the Statute of Frauds and equitable estoppel. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Anderson’s reliance on Pearson’s communications was not reasonable. The Court of Appeals believed that Anderson should have realized that Pearson was delaying, and gotten her own survey. Additionally, the Court of Appeals expressed its view that Anderson did not change her position in reliance on Pearson’s communications about the survey, and since detrimental reliance is an element of equitable estoppel, the Court of Appeals held the Master erred in finding that equitable estoppel should apply to Pearson in his assertion of the Statute of Frauds.

As additional grounds, the Court of Appeals opined that since the contract did not require Pearson to provide a survey, the merger and non-reliance clauses weighed in Pearson’s favor on that point. The Court of Appeals proposed that the Master should have applied the parol evidence rule to Anderson’s offer of communications outside the contract itself. Further, the “time of the essence” clause, in the Court of Appeals’ view, meant that since the contract had expired by its own terms, and Anderson had not demonstrated that she had been able to timely perform her obligations under the contract (i.e. she did not show that she had the cash ready to pay the purchase price) specific performance was not available as a remedy. 

This case may be a good example to mention to real estate agents and brokers (as well as clients) to demonstrate the value of a clearly drafted contract and of legal advice from a seasoned real estate attorney as to contract terms.

Court holds assessments are due despite alleged loan limitation violation

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Image from goupstate.com

Chandelle Property Owners Association v. Armstrong* is a South Carolina Court of Appeals case stemming from several disputes within the Chandelle subdivision, a residential aviation community in Spartanburg County.

Appellant lot owners contend the Circuit Court erred in granting Chandelle Property Owners Association’s (the POA) motion for summary judgment. They assert the subdivision’s formation documents prohibited the POA from borrowing more than $50,000 without a vote of the lot owners. They also assert that assessments can only be used for maintenance.

The formation documents are a bit unusual. In 1997, CSC Developers, LLC and James P. Brockman, Sr. agreed to develop approximately thirteen acres of Brockman’s land into a new subdivision. The original restrictive covenants referred to Lots 1-26. The original document envisioned and authorized additional properties being subjected to the restrictions, and the developer continued to expand the subdivision by recording new plats and annexing the new lots by recorded documents.

No real estate lawyer should be surprised that several disputes and questions arose surrounding the development given the confusing nature of the various sets of documents. The POA brought this quiet title action, in part to remove any uncertainty as to which properties were subject to the restrictive covenants.

The POA filed amended complaints adding a cause of action addressing negative reciprocal easements. Simply stated, that cause of action would have alleged that whether or not certain lots were technically subjected to the restrictions, the lots were included within the subdivision because the sales program and recorded documents would have put all buyers on notice that the lots were a part of the subdivision. (This is my explanation, not the Court’s.)

In the interest of simplicity and discussing only the real estate issues, this discussion eliminates bankruptcy issues and certain counterclaims and third-party claims.

The Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court had properly granted partial summary judgment to the POA. The Court discussed the nature of restrictive covenants, including the fact that they are contractual in nature and must be interpreted to give legal effect to the parties’ intention as determined by the language of the documents.

The documents did, in fact, include a provision limiting the borrowing power of the board of the POA to $50,000 without prior approval of a majority of the lot owners. The Circuit Court did not reach the merits of whether this provision had been violated, stating that such a violation would not relieve the lot owners of their obligation to pay assessments. The Circuit Court said that if the lot owners’ argument were accepted, it would mean that if the POA borrowed more than $50,000 without member approval, then the POA could never assess the lot owners to pay off that loan, forcing the POA to default on the loan.

The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that because lot owners may not exempt themselves from assessments, the lot owners’ obligation to pay their assessments exists independently of their disagreement with the POA board’s use of the assessment funds, its business judgment, or incurring more than $50,000 in debt.  Perhaps more importantly, according to the Court of Appeals, the POA has the right and likely the duty to bring legal action against owners for delinquent assessments.

The board of the POA may at some point be held responsible for the alleged violation of the loan limitation, but assessments are nevertheless obligatory, particularly for the purposes of this summary judgment posture.

It is an interesting concept and probably necessary for the proper governance of residential subdivisions.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6078 (August 7, 2024)

Court of Appeals handles complicated easement/foreclosure case

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In Maybank 2754, LLC v. Zurlo, * South Carolina’s Court of Appeals dealt with issues surrounding whether an easement was created and, if so, whether that easement was wiped out through a foreclosure.

The lawsuit centers around two properties located along Maybank Highway in Charleston County. The dominant estate, owned by Maybank, is occupied by an office building containing leased office spaces. The servient estate, containing sixty acres, was purchased by Penny Creek Associates, a company owned equally by Michael LaPlante and Respondent Zurlo Trust.

Initially, Penny Creek owned all of Maybank’s membership interests. In 2013, those membership interests were transferred to the LaPlante family. Shortly after that transfer, Zurlo Trust and others commenced a derivative and judicial dissolution action against Penny Creek. That matter settled in 2016 with an agreement for Penny Creek to wind up its business, sell its real estate, and terminate its LLC status.

The LaPlante family currently retains all membership interests in Maybank. In its complaint, Maybank alleged that as a part of the transfer of the membership interests, Penny Creek granted the LaPlante family a thirty-foot easement, and that the LaPlante family assigned that easement to Maybank. Zurlo Trust and Michael LaPlante each owned fifty-percent of Penny Creek at the time of the transfer.

In 2017, the servient estate was sold as a part of a foreclosure action Wells Fargo brought against Penny Creek. Respondent 1776, LLC, an entity Maybank alleges is owned entirely by Zurlo Trust, bought the property at the foreclosure sale and sold the portion of the property over which the alleged easement runs to Respondent Beach Fenwick, LLC.

In January 2020, Maybank brought the subject action seeking a declaratory judgment that it has an easement, or, in the alternative, that the private right-of-way is a restrictive covenant. The lawsuit also alleged civil conspiracy and requested a temporary injunction to stop development on the easement.

Respondents filed a motion to refer the 2020 action to the Master on the theory that the Master had retained jurisdiction after the foreclosure. Maybank objected on the grounds that it has requested a jury trial. Maybank also argued that it had not been a party in the foreclosure and, therefore, its rights could not have been extinguished by the foreclosure.

The matter was referred to the Master, and Maybank appealed. The Master held a status conference while that appeal was pending. Maybank objected. The Master sent the matter back to the Circuit Court, and the Respondents filed motions for summary judgment. Maybank filed a motion to amend the Complaint. Respondents then filed a motion with the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal.

The Circuit Court held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, and Maybank filed a Rule 59 (e) motion that the Circuit Court denied. This appeal followed. The Court of Appeals then issued an order denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss the first appeal.

Please refer to the 25-page case for the complicated procedural trial and appeal issues. The Court of Appeals held, for example, that Maybank was entitled to a jury trial.  I’d like to simply make a couple of points involving real estate law.

At the heart of the complaint is the alleged creation of an easement. In 2013, Penny Creek was Maybank’s then sole member. Zurlo Trust and Michael LaPlante executed a Resolution of Sole Shareholder that memorialized Penny Creek’s approval of a sale, transfer and conveyance of Penny Creek’s membership interest in Maybank to the LaPlante family.

The Resolution contained language to the effect that Penny Creek agreed to grant to the LaPlante family, their successors and assigns, a thirty-foot easement for pedestrian and vehicular access, the location and condition of which shall be mutually agreed upon at the completion of a roadway known as Pitch Fork Road. The Resolution was never recorded, and Pitch Fork Road has yet to be competed.

The Circuit Court concluded that the Resolution did not meet the essential elements required to create a property right because it lacked any identifiable location or condition, duration or scope. The Circuit Court concluded that the Resolution created only an agreement to agree. The Court also stated that, even if the Resolution created some form of an easement, it was never recorded, preventing a finding of actual or constructive notice of an easement. And if the easement did exist, it failed to survive the foreclosure.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded after Maybank successfully argued that the foreclosure did not affect its rights because it was not a party to that action. The Court of Appeals also agreed with Maybank that the Resolution clearly expressed the parties’ intention to create an easement.

The Court of Appeals discussed the character of the easement (appurtenant, in gross, or in gross commercial) agreeing with Maybank that parol evidence could be properly considered to determine the character to be an appurtenant easement. Summary judgment was held to be improper because the language of the Resolution is ambiguous as to the character of the easement.

Again, I am ignoring many trial and procedural issues. Please read the case! But one point of this litigation for real estate lawyers is the importance of careful drafting and recording documents to create interests in real estate. This case is an example of a real estate lawyer’s nightmare.

*South Carolina Court of Appeal Opinion 6081 (August 7, 2024)

Court of Appeals decides interesting conservation easement case

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The South Carolina Court of Appeals issued an opinion* on January 17 that interpreted a conservation easement as it affected two heirs of the original grantor.

In 2004, Benjamin Franklin Knott executed a will granting each of his daughters, Susan and Betsy, approximately one-half of a 371-acre parcel near Huger in Berkeley County. The property was subject to a conservation easement Mr. Knott had previously granted to Wetlands America Trust, Inc., a non-profit organization affiliated with Ducks Unlimited, Inc.

Conservation easements are creatures of statute in South Carolina and elsewhere. Such easements are defined as nonpossessory interests for the purposes of protecting natural, scenic, and open-space areas, ensuring the availability of property for agricultural, forest, recreation, educational or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining air or water quality, and preserving historical, architectural, archeological or cultural aspects of real property. The grantor of a conservation easement receives a tax benefit.

Mr. Knott died in 2009, and his daughters received deeds of distribution to their respective parcels. The only direct road frontage was Cainhoy Road, adjacent to Betsy’s parcel. There was originally indirect access to Susan’s parcel from Charity Church Road via an easement retained when Susan sold an adjacent parcel, but Susan terminated her easement in 2015.

Three years later, Susan asked Betsy if she could use Betsy’s parcel to access Susan’s parcel. According to Susan, Betsy rejected this request. Susan brought this declaratory judgment action arguing that she had an express access easement under the terms of the conservation easement. The Circuit Court granted a partial summary judgment to Susan. Betsy appealed.

The Circuit Court had concluded that under the terms of the conservation easement, Susan, as owner of approximately half of the property, had the right to use the roads crossing over Betsy’s property to access Susan’s property for all activities permitted under the conservation easement.

Among other rights reserved in the conservation easement was the right to maintain and replace existing roads and to construct new roads.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Betsy that the reservations in the conservation easement did not create rights for Susan to access her property via roads on Betsy’s property. The easement rights granted to the Ducks Unlimited entity did not translate to easement rights in favor of Susan as against Betsy. The Court reasoned that if Susan has the rights to use the roads on Betsy’s property, it logically follows that she must have all the other owner’s rights reserved for the grantor as to Betsy’s parcel.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Susan has no rights in Betsy’s property, and the conservation easement’s language does not convey any new rights to any person who is not the owner of the property over which the conversation easement lies.

The Court of Appeals reversed the partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further action by the Circuit Court.

*Floyd v. Dross, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6044 (January 17, 2024)

Court of Appeals grants DeBordieu right to intervene in Baruch litigation

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The Belle W. Baruch Foundation (Baruch) owns approximately 8,000 acres of high ground in Georgetown County. Baruch brought a declaratory judgment action* against the State of South Carolina, claiming it also holds title to 8,000 acres of adjoining marshland.

The State answered, asserting its status as the presumptive titleholder of all marshlands, and counterclaimed that the public holds a presumptive easement over the marshlands. Alternatively, the State claimed that the property had been dedicated to the public.

DeBordieu is an upscale private coastal community which shares a boundary with the disputed marshlands.

Anyone familiar with Georgetown County history knows that Belle Baruch was the daughter of Bernard Baruch, a wealthy landowner and statesman who advised President Wilson during World War I and President Roosevelt during World War II.

Baruch owned Hobcaw Barony, a former rice plantation, and surrounding real estate. President Roosevelt famously convalesced during one of his illnesses at the property. Belle Baruch inherited much of the property and donated it to the Foundation as a nature and research preserve.

Hobcaw has relationships with the University of South Carolina and Clemson University for the purposes of conservation and other research. The property is also the location for delightful Lowcountry tours and events like oyster roasts and holiday parties. I learned on one of these tours that Belle Baruch was interested in preserving the real estate, but not the buildings. The funds she left were not intended for the upkeep of the buildings. The Foundation raises money for that purpose.

I highly recommend that locals and tourists take the time to visit Hobcaw. It’s a beautiful property that reminds me of George Washington’s Mount Vernon. If funds had been left to preserve the buildings, Hobcaw would likely be as impressive as Mount Vernon.

According to the lawsuit, DeBordieu’s members have a history of using the marshland for shellfish harvesting, crabbing, wade fishing and similar recreational activities. In the early 1970’s, DeBordieu created a system of creeks and canals allowing its members access to the marshland and to the Atlantic Ocean. DeBordieu has periodically dredged its canals to maintain its access to the marshland.

DeBordieu sought intervention as a matter of right or, alternatively, permissive intervention. The circuit court denied intervention under both theories.

The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that precedent and Rule 24(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure set a liberal standard for intervention. Although the State and DeBordieu similarly claim that if Baruch owns the disputed property, the marshlands are encumbered by the States and/or DeBordieu’s easements, it is not accurate to classify those easement claims as the same interest in the property.

The State’s and DeBordieu’s claims are independent of each other and require different proof, according to the Court.

The Court also addressed the practical effect of denying the motion to intervene. A declaratory judgment must name all parties having a claim or interest in the matter and must not prejudice the rights of persons who are not parties to the proceeding. The Court concluded that a judgment valid against the State but not against others claiming an interest in the marshlands would not be an efficient use of judicial resources.

DeBordieu is allowed to intervene, and the litigation will proceed. We will keep you posted.

*The Belle W. Baruch Foundation v. The State of South Carolina, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6043 (January 17, 2024.)

Property owners win railroad abandonment appeal

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On July 12, South Carolina’s Court of Appeals issued an opinion* in favor of multiple property owners in a railroad abandonment case.

The properties at issue abutted a 24-mile railroad line extending from McCormick County to Abbeville County. In 1878, the State chartered the Savannah Valley Railroad Company (SVR) to construct the railroad.  Prior title holders granted SVR easements to allow the construction and operation of the railroad. The documents stated the easements would be void in the event the railroad was not erected and established. Each successive title holders’ deed was subject to the easements. SVR conveyed its interest to Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company.

In the late 1970’s Seaboard decided to close the track and seek permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to abandon the line. The ICC granted the request in 1970. The company wrote a letter to the ICC dated February 25, 1980, indicating the track was abandoned as of February 15, 1980.

Calhoun Falls and Savannah Valley Trails (SVT) were the ultimate owners of the railroad’s interests. When SVT began to construct a walking trail on the former line, property owners adjoining the line in McCormick County filed suit in 2016 seeking a declaratory judgment that the properties reverted to them when the track was abandoned. Abbeville County property owners filed a similar suit in 2018.

The trial court issued two orders finding (1) the railroad abandoned the line; (2) when the railroad abandoned the line, the easements were terminated, and the property rights reverted to the adjoining title holders; and (3) the doctrine of laches did not bar the property owners’ claims.

SVT argued on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the abandonment failed to follow the details of the ICC order. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that SVT had the burden of proving the railroad’s abandonment was incomplete and failed to meet that burden.

SVT also argued on appeal that laches barred the property owners’ claims. The Court of Appeals noted that SVT failed to plead laches as an affirmative defense, and that the trial court could have declined to address the issue. But, ultimately, the appeals court agreed with the lower court that SVT failed to present evidence that would equip the trial court to make a finding of prejudice to support the laches claim.

Finally, SVT argued that the trial court erred in finding the railroad had abandoned the line. The Court of Appeals noted that the railroad ceased operations, sought permission for abandonment from the ICC, removed the tracks, and transferred its property interests. Further, nothing in the record showed that the railroad failed to comply with the requirements of the ICC. Citing prior cases, the Court stated that to rule otherwise would gut the longstanding rule that an easement is extinguished when the railroad abandons the right of way for railroad purposes.

As a dirt lawyer, I like this opinion! If you run into railroad abandonment issues in your chains of title, consult your friendly, intelligent title company underwriters.

*Myers v. Town of Calhoun Falls, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5998 (July 12, 2023)

Magistrate has no jurisdiction when title is in question

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Court of Appeals reverses Circuit Court on this issue

In Rivers v. Smith*, South Carolina’s Court of Appeals reversed Orangeburg County’s Circuit Court order affirming a magistrate’s order of eviction.

Rufus Rivers and Merle Rivers have lived on property once owned by Jessie Mae Smith since 2009, although there was no record of a written lease. In 2013, Jessie Mae Smith signed a power of attorney in favor of her son, James Smith. In 2014, James Smith conveyed his mother’s property to himself by quitclaim deed using the power of attorney.

(The opinion contains no discussion of whether the conveyance of the property by the attorney in fact to himself was a valid transfer, but that would have been my first question.)

Jessie Mae Smith died in 2016. In 2018, James Smith sent the Rivers a letter demanding they vacate the property within 30 days. The Rivers refused. They asked James to cease and desist his efforts to displace them. They argued that James had an invalid power of attorney and alleged he had breached fiduciary duties. Competing lawsuits followed.

The Rivers’ lawsuit in the Circuit Court challenged James’ ownership of the property and alleged constructive fraud, unjust enrichment and other causes of action. The Rivers amended their complaint, alleging that James used an invalid power of attorney and that Jessie Mae Smith had orally given or promised the property to the Rivers.

James filed the subject case in the magistrate court, seeking eviction. The Rivers made various arguments to the magistrate opposing the eviction, including alleging that Jessie Mae Smith had promised the property to them. The Rivers also alerted the magistrate of their claims against James Smith in the circuit court.

James Smith’s main argument to the magistrate centered around the statute of limitations because the alleged gift would have occurred more than three years before the lawsuits were brought. The magistrate ruled that James Smith was the lawful owner of the property and ordered eviction.

On a motion by the Rivers to reconsider, the magistrate found that the case did not involve a question of title and that she had jurisdiction to hear the case. The circuit court affirmed, and this appeal followed.

The issue on appeal was whether South Carolina Code §22-3-20(2), which bars a magistrate from hearing a case when title to the property is in question, prohibited the magistrate from hearing this case.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Smith has defenses to Rivers’ claims, and that those defenses may be valid ones, but held that the magistrate’s jurisdiction ended as soon as it became clear that there was a challenge to title. The opinion further stated that the case may end in a second and successful eviction, but they refused to say that outcome is certain.

I will be curious to learn what the future holds in the litigation between these parties. I hope the property is worth the litigation, and I note with interest that the Rivers represented themselves pro se in the subject case.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5992 (June 21, 2023)

Murrells Inlet commercial neighbors embroiled in litigation

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Our Advance Sheet from August 10 contained two Court of Appeals easement cases involving adjoining commercial properties in Murrells Inlet. This blog will discuss the first of the two cases*. Next week, we’ll take up the second case. A footnote in the first case indicates the parties were heading to trial again immediately after oral arguments. These neighbors are obviously not getting along!

The litigation involves a restaurant property owned by Gulfstream Café, Inc. and an adjoining property containing a marina, a store and a parking lot owned by Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC. Palmetto’s predecessor in title granted four non-exclusive easements in 1986 and 1990 to Gulfstream. The easements allowed for ingress and egress and vehicular parking. It was anticipated that the marina property would use the parking primarily in the daytime and the restaurant property would use the parking primarily in the evening.

The easements included general warranties, the same language that appears in our normal general warranty deeds: “(A) does hereby bind itself and its successors and assigns, to warrant and forever defend, all and singular, the said easement unto (B), its successors and assigns, against itself and its successors and assigns, and all others whomsoever lawfully claiming, or to claim the same or any part thereof.” This language is consistent with South Carolina Code §27-7-10.

The question in this case is whether the easement holder (the grantee) is entitled to attorneys’ fees in connection with litigation against the easement grantor’s successor in title based on the easement. In many deed warranty cases, the grantee sues the grantor when a third party asserts an interest in the real estate. In this case, the only parties are the owners of the adjoining properties.

The relationship between the parties began to sour in 2016 when Palmetto demolished and started to rebuild its building. Gulfstream brought suit for interference with its easement and received a temporary injunction. Palmetto was subsequently held in criminal contempt for willfully violating the injunction.

In 2018, Gulfstream filed a complaint against Palmetto seeking a declaratory judgment based on interference with the easement and a finding that Palmetto breached its warranty.  This case sought attorneys’ fees and costs. Later in 2018, a jury found for Gulfstream on its claim for interference in the 2016 case.

Both parties moved for summary judgment in the 2018 case. Gulfstream argued that the plain language of the warranties provided for Palmetto’s obligation to defend Gulfstream. Palmetto relied on the language of the warranty provision and a 2004 South Carolina Supreme Court case, Black v. Patel**.

In analyzing the arguments, the Court of Appeals began with the proposition that in South Carolina, the authority to award attorneys’ fees can only come from statute or contract. Next, the Court stated that a warranty of title is a contract on the part of the grantor to pay damages in the event of a failure of title. Generally, when a grantor refuses to defend the title against a third party claiming title, the grantee is allowed attorneys’ fees. The general rule for cases in this context, according to the Court, is that only ‘lawful”—that is successful—claims asserted against title justify an award of attorneys’ fees where the grantor fails to defend the title.

A footnote in the Black case set out an exception to the general rule. The grantor would also be responsible for attorneys’ fees where its wrongful act causes the grantee to be in litigation with a third party.

The question in this case became whether the warranty provision in Gulfstream’s easements provide that Gulfstream is entitled to attorneys’ fees from Palmetto. The Court held that the answer is “no” because Gulfstream’s title is not in issued. Palmetto did not dispute the Gulfstream has easements over Palmetto’s property, rather, Palmetto, at worst, has been infringing upon Gulfstream’s rights. Gulfstream’s actual title was not challenged and there is not a third party involved as contemplated in Black.

The Court did not that its decision does not prevent Gulfstream from seeking attorneys’ fees in future contempt actions as a sanction if Palmetto continues to infringe upon Gulfstream’s rights. In other words, the Court seems confident that litigation between these parties will continue.

I’m going to have to go eat seafood in Murrells Inlet to check out these properties!

*The Gulfstream Café’, Inc. v. Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC., South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5935 (August 10, 2022).

**357 S.C. 466, 594 S.E.2d 162 (2004).

SC courts will overturn tax sales on the flimsiest of technicalities

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But apparently not when the claimant has no interest in the property

South Carolina courts don’t respect tax sales!

For that reason, tax sales have always been problematic for title examiners and real estate closing attorneys. Any concern about service of process or naming proper parties can result in the return the property to the owner of record. Historically, we would simply not close in the face of a tax sale in the chain of title.

In recent years, title insurance companies and real estate lawyers have attempted to take a more liberal approach. A rule of thumb might be that a tax sale that is at least ten years old where one person or entity has held title for a ten-year period since the tax sale may not result in an aborted closing. The title may not be marketable, but it may be insurable.

A recent Court of Appeals case* made me laugh. (Remember I am an easily amused title nerd.) The plaintiff, Scott, was “renting to own” the property in question under a 1998 oral agreement with her uncle, McAlister. Scott took possession of the property after making an initial down payment of $4,000 and agreeing to pay the remaining $31,000 purchase price in monthly installments of $300. That’s her story, at least. McAlister testified that Scott agreed to obtain a loan to make a second payment of $31,000.

After Scott failed to make the $31,000 payment, McAlister told Scott that her monthly payments would be considered rent only, and the parties agreed to reduce the monthly payment to $200. In 2007, McAlister began eviction proceedings, but the circuit court vacated the order of ejectment when Scott asserted that she occupied the property under a land purchase agreement. McAlister moved and changed the mailing address for tax purposes. The taxes for 2011 were never paid, and the property was sold in a tax sale in 2012.

Scott claimed she was unaware of the mailing address change, the delinquent taxes, the tax sale or the opportunity to redeem the property until the purchaser’s surveyor showed up! In 2015, Scott filed a complaint alleging that tax sale technicalities were not followed because notices were never posted on the property. The tax collector claimed her office posted the property notice on the property in August of 2012.

The circuit court granted summary judgment after it determined Scott lacked standing and that the tax authorities owed her no duties because she was not the record taxpayer, property owner or grantee. The Court of Appeals cited cases for the proposition that a tax execution is issued against the defaulting taxpayer, not against the property. The summary judgment decision was upheld on the theory that while due process is owed to a property owner, it is not owed to a person who whose only interest is based on an oral agreement.

I love it when our appeals courts answer real estate questions correctly. Overturning this tax sale would have resulted in serious consequences for title examiners and closing attorneys!

*Scott v. McAlister, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5897 (March 9, 2022)

Court of Appeals answers novel JTROS question

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In the first Advance Sheet of 2022, our Court of Appeals answered a novel question concerning the severance of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The case* involved the estate of a father who owned property in Garden City with his son, one of his five children. Father and son had purchased the property together, each owning a fifty percent interest.  

The facts are simple. The property owners entered into a contract to sell the property in November of 2013, prior to the father’s death on December 20, 2013. The transaction closed on December 27, just seven days after the father’s death. The son, who was also the personal representative, treated the sale as if he was the sole owner and claimed the proceeds of the sale individually. His siblings argued that the contract severed the joint tenancy, entitling the estate to half of the proceeds.

The Probate Court and Circuit Court agreed with the siblings, relying on South Carolina Federal Savings Bank v. San-A-Bel Corporation**, which held that a purchaser under a contract has an equitable lien on the property. The Probate Court reasoned that the sales contract entered into prior to the Decedent’s death encumbered the property, entitling the purchaser possession of the property upon payment of the purchase price and entitling the estate to one-half of the proceeds. The Circuit Court found that the Probate Court had correctly interpreted the law.

Dirt lawyers understand the San-A-Bel case sets up a trap for the unwary lawyer who fails to deal with the equitable lien that case established, but we have never understood that case to affect JTROS severance. The Court of Appeals agrees with us. Since neither San-A-Bel nor the JTROS statutes address the question at hand, the Court decided to look at rulings from other states to address the novel issue of whether a contract of sale severs a joint tenancy.

The Court cited cases from the states of Washington and Florida (citations omitted) and decided to follow the Florida court which held that severance does not automatically occur upon the execution of a contract executed by all joint tenants unless there is an indication in the contract or from the circumstances that the parties intended to sever and terminate the joint tenancy.

The Court found that the contract at issue was silent on the severance issue and no extraneous circumstances indicated severance was intended by the parties, so the joint tenancy was not severed by the contract, and the son was entitled to the sales proceeds.  

Dirt lawyers tend to hold our collective breath when our Courts address a novel real estate issue. But I believe that, this time, we can agree that they got it right. Let me know if you disagree with me!

*In the Matter of the Estate of Moore, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5887, January 5, 2022.

**307 S.C. 76, 413 S.E.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1992).