A Zoning Battle Ignites in Fort Mill over Silfab Solar

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There is yet another hot button zoning conflict in the Palmetto state that has attracted much public attention in Fort Mill, SC. It has spawned several lawsuits, an Attorney General inquiry, and legislators filing bills up at the State House that certainly would have major impact on S.C. dirt lawyers if they were to pass. 

The controversy centers around Silfab Solar’s ongoing construction of a solar panel manufacturing factory near Fort Mill, SC. The company is renovating a warehouse in an existing industrial park there that is jointly operated by York and Chester counties. The industrial park is located near several residential developments, but most notable in recent press coverage is the elementary school located on the adjacent parcel to the proposed Silfab site.  

In 2022, in connection with recruitment by the S.C. Department of Commerce, Silfab requested zoning verification from York County that its proposed operation would be in compliance with local zoning ordinances. The York County zoning staff ultimately determined that the manufacture of solar panels fit within the permitted use of “computer and electronic productions manufacturing” which was permitted in the “Light Industrial” zoning classification assigned to the industrial park. Notably, there was no appeal of the zoning verification.

With the zoning verification in hand, Silfab decided to move forward with the project and entered into a fee in lieu of tax (FILOT) Agreement with York County. The County passed an ordinance approving the FILOT agreement in September 2023, in effect ratifying the proposed project at its proposed location. Silfab thereafter obtained building and environmental permits and started construction at the site

But at some point in the process, the public became aware of the project and that hazardous gases and chemicals would be used as part of the manufacturing process of the panels. As concerns grew, a neighboring landowner filed a request for a zoning interpretation inquiring whether solar panel manufacturing was actually a permissible use under the zoning ordinance. In 2024, the York County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) found that solar panel manufacture is not permitted within the Light Industrial zoning classification, which effectively overruled the prior determination of the zoning staff. 

Silfab appealed the BZA ruling but construction has continued under the existing zoning verification and permits. In response to growing public outcry, York County issued statements that its interpretation of state law and its ordinance is that BZA zoning interpretations only apply prospectively and that the County does not have authority to revoke previously given permits or to issue a stop work order.

But the controversy really expanded into an issue of statewide concern in March when Silfab reported two separate chemical leaks within a three day period. While the leaks were contained and were reportedly of no danger to the outside community, DHEC ordered Silfab to pause its use of previously permitted chemicals pending a review. Silfab has since entered into an agreement with DHEC not to bring any more dangerous chemicals into its site or proceed with manufacturing until the investigation is completed.

The leaks also drew the attention of Attorney General Alan Wilson who issued inquiries to York County concerning the propriety of the zoning approval and to Silfab concerning the cause and extend of the leaks. The gubernatorial candidate appears to be closely monitoring the situation as events unfold.

The South Carolina General Assembly is also involved in the debate. Local legislators have introduced proposed bills in the House and Senate that would amend the Code to give Counties the power to revoke permits and stop work on projects when the project is found to be in violation of zoning ordinances. 

While these bills are unlikely to pass before the end of the current session, there have been a number of other bills advanced in the State House in recent years that have sought to give local authorities the ability to have something of a “do-over” concerning prior approvals of development. Often these bills have been provoked by growing public outrage over major projects that were passed by local authorities without much initial fanfare.  

While the Court’s pending review of the BZA appeal may result in restoring the original zoning interpretation and making much of the present controversy moot, there is always the chance of additional appeals. Further, with the national debate over data centers expanding into South Carolina in recent months the salience of the Silfab controversy may impact future debates concerning whether government entities should be able to change their mind about prior zoning decisions even after property owner’s have formed plans and made investments relying upon them. 

The 2026 ALTA Survey Standards Are Here

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What South Carolina Real Estate Attorneys Need to Know

As of February 23, 2026, the 2026 ALTA/NSPS Minimum Standard Detail Requirements for Land Title Surveys officially replaced the 2021 standards. These updates may appear technical at first glance, but for South Carolina real estate attorneys—particularly those handling commercial transactions, development work, and lender representation—the changes carry meaningful legal and practical consequences.

The 2026 Standards reflect evolving technology, shifting risk allocation, and mounting expectations from title insurers and lenders. Attorneys who understand these changes will be better positioned to manage risk, avoid closing delays, and advise clients with confidence.

In South Carolina, ALTA/NSPS Land Title Surveys are a cornerstone of development due diligence, commercial financing and title insurance underwriting. While surveyors perform the fieldwork, attorneys are often the gatekeepers—reviewing surveys for compliance, identifying red flags, and reconciling survey matters with title commitments.

Any change to the ALTA Standards therefore ripples directly into:

  • Title objection and resolution strategies
  • Closing timelines
  • Survey exceptions and endorsements
  • Risk allocation among buyers, lenders, and insurers

The 2026 Standards were jointly adopted by ALTA and the National Society of Professional Surveyors (NSPS) in October 2025 after several years of committee work, with the stated goal of improving clarity, consistency, and adaptability.

A Clear Effective Date—with Transitional Traps

The effective date for the new standards is February 23, 2026. Any ALTA/NSPS Land Title Survey contracted for on or after that date must comply with the 2026 Standards unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. Surveys contracted before the effective date may still be governed by the 2021 Standards, even if completed later—but only if that is clearly addressed in the engagement agreement.

For attorneys, this means:

  • Engagement letters and contracts should specify which ALTA standard applies
  • “Survey updates” or revised plats may trigger new standard requirements
  • Ambiguity can expose clients—and counsel—to disputes with lenders or insurers

Technology Is Now Explicitly Embraced

One of the most forward‑looking changes is the shift from requiring information obtained strictly “on the ground” to allowing “practices generally recognized as acceptable” in both fieldwork and mapping. This expressly accommodates modern tools such as drones, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), and other remote‑sensing technologies, without tying the standards to any specific method.  

For attorneys, this reinforces the need to:

  • Review surveys for completeness, not methodology
  • Understand that aerial or remote data may now support certain depictions
  • Counsel clients that innovation alone is not grounds for objection

Expanded Documentation of Possession and Occupation

Perhaps the most practically significant change is the requirement that evidence of possession or occupation be noted along the entire perimeter of the property, regardless of proximity to boundary lines. This exceeds prior standards, which often focused only on near‑boundary features.

This change:

  • Increases the likelihood that surveys will reveal fence lines, uses, or improvements suggesting potential boundary or prescriptive issues
  • Elevates the importance of attorney review and follow‑up
  • May increase survey‑related title objections and negotiation

Parol Statements Must Be Noted

Closely tied to evidence of possession and occupation, under the 2026 Standards, surveyors must note any verbal (“parol”) statements made by landowners or occupants relating to title or boundary issues.

For attorneys, this is a double‑edged sword:

  • It may surface issues earlier in the transaction
  • It also introduces non‑record information that may complicate underwriting, disclosures, and risk tolerance

These notations do not constitute legal opinions, but they should never be ignored during diligence.

Title Evidence and Research Responsibilities Are Clarified

The 2026 Standards expand guidance on how surveyors source title evidence when a current title commitment is unavailable, and they more clearly acknowledge shared responsibility between surveyors and title professionals for obtaining certain documents.

South Carolina attorneys should:

  • Provide current title commitments early whenever possible
  • Clearly communicate expectations regarding easement depiction
  • Coordinate closely with surveyors on complex tracts or non‑fee interests

Table A Gets a Notable Update

The optional Table A items remain a critical tool for tailoring survey scope. In 2026:

  • Item 15 was clarified to allow certain depictions via aerial or satellite imagery if agreed to in writing
  • A new Item 20 requires a summary table of conditions and potential encroachments on the face of the survey—intended as a factual summary, not a legal conclusion
  • The former “catch‑all” or blank item has been renumbered as Item 21

Attorneys should carefully align Table A selections with lender and client expectations.

Practice Takeaways for South Carolina Real Estate Attorneys

The 2026 Standards raise the bar—not by radical change, but by greater disclosure and clearer expectations. Attorneys should update internal checklists, educate clients, and adjust survey review practices accordingly.

Hilton Head Dredging and the Question of Public Benefit

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Now that Rory McElroy’s repeat victory at the Masters is in the books[1], the golfing world will turn its attention to scenic Hilton Head Island. It is there that the Harbour Town Golf Links at Sea Pines Resort will host the 58th edition of the RBC Heritage golf tournament later this week. For a long time, the Heritage was the only permanent PGA event in South Carolina[2] and quite a few South Carolina residents and golf fanatics from across the world make the trek down to Sea Pines to take in the action each year.  

That makes today’s blog a particularly appropriate time to discuss the ongoing legal battle over public funding for the dredging of the waterways around Sea Pines Resort, which made news again this month. If you have ever worked or vacationed around Hilton Head Island, you are probably aware that boating culture is a significant part of overall appeal of the Island and it also figures nicely into the presentation of the televised golf tournament.

The controversy is somewhat simple. The physics of the waterways around the Harbour Town Yacht Basin and nearby Braddock Cove Creek are such that periodic dredging of the waters is necessary to allow navigation of the waters in all tides.  

For a time, the cost of the dredging was born by the South Island Dredging Association (SIDA), a coalition of various Sea Pines owners’ associations, private slip owners, and marinas located in or near the local waterways. However, recent rounds of dredgings have become controversial both for the impact on the surrounding Calibogue Sound and the Town of Hilton Head’s decision in the last few rounds to start allocating public funds towards the project.

In 2022, resident Ryan McAvoy filed suit seeking to enjoin the Town from contributing $600,000 in public funds towards the next round of dredging. McAvoy claims that the Town’s allocation of the funds to the project violated the South Carolina Constitution because it allocated public funds primarily for the benefit of private gated communities, private owners of homes and boating slips, and private marinas from which the public is barred.

While there is no doubt that that the waterways in question are contiguous to the private communities contained within Sea Pines and contain private marinas that are restricted from public use, the Town of Hilton Head argues the waterways in question are navigable waters of the United States that are themselves open to the public and that the Town and its residents benefit from the use of the improved waterways and from the resulting tourism generated from the boating community being able to use the waters to access public areas.

In 2024, a Circuit Court judge granted the Town’s motion to dismiss McAvoy’s lawsuit on the ground that the waters to be dredged are public waterways. However, the breaking news from last week is that the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ordered a new trial finding that the Circuit Court had mistakenly focused its decision on whether the waterways were public vs private. Instead, the trial court should have determined whether there is a public benefit to the Town’s action. The Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence in the record supporting McAvoy’s argument that the dredging primarily accrued to the benefit of private interests for the matter to continue towards a full trial. 

This recent case is just the latest example of the controversy that can come from using public funds in support of what some in the community may see as providing limited or tangential benefit to the public at large. The balance between determining private vs public benefit can often be tricky to quantify. Similar arguments (and lawsuits) have erupted in the past over the public benefit of beach renourishment, government funding of infrastructure for private businesses, and is not so far removed from past controversies concerning government use of the power of eminent domain to further private redevelopment. Whenever the public perceives that the beneficiary of government action is a private entity or a group of private parties, you can bet that there will be drama and oftentimes litigation.

While we will have to wait and see the ultimate outcome for the boaters of Hilton Head, real estate professionals and developers alike must consider the possible implications of public opposition whenever it brings in the government for assistance in these kinds of projects.

[1] My children’s rooting interests died with Scottie Scheffler’s parade of “near miss” pars that fell just a swing stroke short. It has been an up and down month of sports fandom for our household. 

[2] My colleague David Hicks reminds me that the third annual Myrtle Beach Classic will tee off in May.

Sullivan’s Island, Fractional Ownership, and the Limits of Zoning Law

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We all know that South Carolina has some of the most beautiful natural scenery in the nation.  As the weather gradually improves, and with Spring Break underway for many and the summer rental season right around the corner, tourists begin flocking to our beautiful beaches.

In February 2026, a legal dispute[1] on Sullivan’s Island quietly reshaped the conversation around property rights, zoning enforcement, and the future of residential ownership models in South Carolina’s coastal communities. At the center of the case was 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC, a property owner, and Pacaso, Inc., a company that facilitates fractional homeownership. On the other side stood the Town of Sullivan’s Island, determined to enforce its long‑standing restrictions on short‑term rentals.  While the case involved a single property, its implications reach far beyond one address.

Sullivan’s Island has long maintained strict zoning rules designed to preserve its residential character. Among those rules are limits on short‑term vacation rentals, which town officials argue can disrupt neighborhoods and strain local infrastructure. As new real estate models have emerged, the town has taken a close look at how these arrangements fit within existing ordinances.

That scrutiny intensified when a home owned by 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC was used in partnership with Pacaso. Pacaso’s model allows multiple buyers to purchase fractional ownership interests (in this instance, one‑eighth shares) in a single property. Each owner receives scheduled access throughout the year, and Pacaso manages maintenance and logistics. However, unlike a true rental property, occupants do not pay nightly or weekly fees to stay in the home; they are staying in a property they legally own.

Town officials concluded that the arrangement functioned like a vacation rental in practice, even if it was structured differently on paper. The Town’s Zoning Administrator issued a violation, asserting that the property was being used as a prohibited short‑term rental under Sullivan’s Island zoning laws. That decision was upheld by the Town’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).

2 SC Lighthouse and Pacaso appealed to the Charleston County Circuit Court. The court sided with the Town, effectively agreeing that the zoning authorities’ interpretation of the ordinance should stand.

The property owner and Pacaso appealed, arguing that a fractional ownership is not a rental, and that the Town was stretching the definition of “short‑term rental” beyond what its ordinance actually said.

On February 18, 2026, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision, siding with 2 SC Lighthouse and Pacaso. The ruling turned on the critical distinction between ownership and renting. The court emphasized that the individuals staying in the home were owners, not tenants. Without a rental transaction (no landlord‑tenant relationship and no payment for temporary lodging), the court found that the town’s definition of a short‑term rental did not apply.

In making its ruling, the court clarified that interpreting a zoning ordinance is a question of law rather than a factual determination entitled to broad deference. While zoning boards are given leeway in applying ordinances, they cannot rewrite or expand those ordinances. If a municipality wants to regulate fractional ownership, it must do so explicitly.

Although the ruling is an unpublished opinion and is not binding precedent, its practical impact is significant. For Sullivan’s Island, the decision places limits on enforcement under current zoning language. The town may still regulate short‑term rentals aggressively, but it cannot treat fractional ownership arrangements as rentals unless its ordinances are amended to say so.

For other South Carolina coastal communities, the case serves as a warning and a roadmap. Many towns face similar tensions between preserving neighborhood character and responding to evolving real estate practices. The decision signals that courts will closely scrutinize attempts to regulate new ownership models using old definitions.

For property owners, the ruling reinforces a core principle of land‑use law: property rights cannot be curtailed by implication. Restrictions must be clearly stated, not inferred based on policy concerns alone.

The decision does not end the debate over fractional ownership on Sullivan’s Island or elsewhere. Municipalities may respond by revising zoning ordinances to directly address co‑ownership models. Developers and property owners, meanwhile, will likely continue testing the boundaries of traditional zoning frameworks.

This case highlights the broader reality that zoning laws written decades ago are being asked to govern a rapidly changing housing market. As ownership models evolve, so too must the rules that regulate them—through legislation, not interpretation.

For now, 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC’s victory stands as a reminder that in land‑use law, words matter, and towns must play by the rules they have written.

[1] Pacaso, Inc. & 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC v. Town of Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, Appellate Case No. 2024‑000134, 2026‑UP‑078 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (unpublished).

At long last, a resolution for Captain Sam’s Spit?

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Another long‑running legal battle in South Carolina – this time over the future of Captain Sam’s Spit – may finally be drawing to a close. Developer Kiawah Partners, the Town of Kiawah Island, and several other interested parties entered into a $37 million settlement at the beginning of March that would transfer the entirety of the 170 acres of pristine coastline to the State of South Carolina and other local entities subject to a permanent conservation easement.

This blog has covered the unfolding controversy involving the Spit several times in the past. The Spit, which lay seaward of the DHEC critical line when originally conveyed in the 1980s, became the subject of numerous lawsuits after an adjustment of the critical line in the 1990s made the property developable. Following that adjustment, Kiawah Partners and the Town of Kiawah entered into a Development Agreement under which the developer planned to build more than 50 homes on certain highland areas of the Spit, while conveying and committing the remaining portions to be preserved in their natural state. However, in a series of lawsuits, appellate courts ultimately denied all the various applications to construct erosion‑control devices deemed necessary to support the proposed development plan.

Kiawah Partners has since pursued a pending lawsuit seeking compensation for what it views as a regulatory taking of its property rights, while the Town and local conservation groups have filed a separate action seeking to enforce the Development Agreement’s provisions concerning the preservation of the remainder of the land. The current settlement resolves both lawsuits.

Under the terms of the settlement, the State of South Carolina and the other participating groups agree to purchase the developer’s entire interest in the Spit for $37 million. The Spit would then be jointly managed by the State and local entities. Beachwalker Park, a popular destination for local beachgoers, is to be transferred to the Town of Kiawah Island and will remain open to the public under the management of Charleston County.

The settlement is contingent upon the General Assembly approving the State’s $32 million contribution, which may occur before the end of the current legislative session. If lawmakers do not balk, Captain Sam’s Spit will be permanently conserved for the enjoyment of the public—and for the 18 endangered species that call the area home.

To reside or not to reside, that is the question

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I struggle to think of any aspect of real estate ownership that stirs up stronger feelings than the Homeowner’s Associations (“HOAs”) and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (“CCRs”). For many buyers, HOA governance signals stability. Communities governed by restrictive covenants often promise consistent architectural standards, minimum maintenance standards, access to common areas, and protection of long-term property values. From a real estate professional’s perspective, that predictability can be a strong selling point. Buyers frequently ask whether a neighborhood has an HOA, and in many markets, that answer affects both demand and price.

However, HOAs are not universally viewed as beneficial. Besides the financial impact of paying HOA dues, restrictions on property use can feel limiting, especially when buyers discover that “residential purposes” or architectural controls mean more than they expected. Disputes over enforcement can create tension within communities and occasionally result in litigation. For agents and brokers, misunderstandings about HOA authority can lead to unhappy clients long after closing.

When I was in private practice, I made sure to make my buyer clients aware of any restrictions that had been placed on the property they were buying. While most buyers understood the purpose of HOAs and that there would be general limitations on how they used their property, occasionally I would have a buyer reach out to make sure a particular use wasn’t prohibited before they went under contract. For example, one buyer was a dog breeder, so the client needed to make sure multiple dogs would be allowed. We reviewed several sets of restrictions for various properties before we finally found a neighborhood that would allow more than 2-3 dogs at one time. 

On the non-transactional side of my practice, I handled several cases representing homeowners in disputes with their HOAs.  In SC, the deck is usually stacked in favor of the HOA in disputes, so an overzealous HOA board member or homeowner can use the covenants to make life miserable for their neighbors. In each of the cases I handled, the main issue came down to personal disputes between various personalities spilling over into the “covenant enforcement” arena.  One of my HOA cases essentially came down to one neighbor having a problem with blue-collar workers being able to afford a home in his upscale neighborhood. He filed repeated complaints against my client that were highly embellished while ignoring similar code issues on other nearby properties.  Eventually, we were able to demonstrate to the HOA board that the complaints were more about harassing my client than enforcement of the covenants, and the board agreed to not pursue their enforcement action. 

A recent South Carolina Court of Appeals decision, Hoffman v. Saad Holdings, LLC1[1], provides another example of tension between neighbors spilling into a covenant enforcement action. The parties to the litigation are property owners within a residential subdivision on Lake Hartwell in upstate South Carolina. The CCRs for the subdivision contained a use restriction that “No lot shall be used for other than residential purposes.”  A subsequent amendment placed building setback lines for each lot as well. 

Saad Holdings, LLC (“Saad”) purchased lots in the subdivision, but the shape of these particular lots made building a residence in compliance nearly impossible.  However, Saad obtained permits to construct two docks on the lake and then ran electric and water lines across the lots to the docks. Saad also used the lots to access the docks by foot. 

A group of homeowners (“Homeowners”) alleged that Saad was putting its properties to “recreational” use, which violated the CCRs restriction to use of the property for “residential purposes.” The homeowners sought an injunction against Saad using these lots to access the docks. In response, Saad argued that the lots were used for access to the docks, not recreation.  Saad further argued that the Homeowners interpretation of the CCRs would harm Saad more than it would actually benefit the Homeowners. 

Homeowners argued that picnics, camping, or even birdwatching on Saad’s lots were all prohibited by the CCRs.  Homeowners further argued that Saad’s lots could not be put to any use at all except accessing the lots to maintain them.  While the court didn’t opine on this argument, it seems awfully convenient that Homeowners were in favor of Saad maintaining the lots at the neighborhood standard, for their own benefit, but opposed any use that would benefit Saad. 

The Court begins its analysis by noting that CCRs are contractual in nature, but that South Carolina law favors the unrestricted use of property. The Court states that when there are two equally capable interpretations for a restriction, the one that is least restrictive should be adopted. 

In discussing the distinction between “residential” and “recreational” use, the Court notes that previous South Carolina cases have centered on the distinction between residential and commercial or business uses. 

Expanding its search beyond South Carolina, the Court found a set of similar facts in the North Carolina case Villazon v. Osborne[2].  In Villazon, the property owner used her lake front lot to store kayaks and hold the occasional cook out.  The Villazon court found that nothing in the subject CCRs required habitation in order to qualify as “residential use.” Since the Villazon interpretation of residential use was equally applicable and less restrictive than the interpretation proposed by Homeowners, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying the injunction sought by Homeowners.

In my personal life, I have only purchased houses in neighborhoods with CCRs and HOAs, so I do not intend to scare anyone away from buying property in an HOA neighborhood. However, the Hoffman case highlights the importance of knowing what activities may be allowed or prohibited before buying a piece of property.  Had the Court ruled in favor of Homeowners, Saad’s property values would have decreased significantly and perhaps become worthless.  After my experience dealing with HOAs as an attorney, I do appreciate a case where common sense prevails.     

[1]Hoffman v. Saad Holdings, LLC, Op. No. 2026-UP-___ (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (unpublished)

[2]Villazon v. Osborne, 922 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025)

Data Centers Raise Legal Questions for Rural South Carolina

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Across rural South Carolina, data center proposals are generating increasing controversy as residents challenge whether counties are complying with zoning statutes, comprehensive plans, and public‑notice requirements.

In Colleton County, Council amended its zoning ordinance to add data centers as a permitted use and to create a special exception within residential districts – changes that paved the way for a proposed $6 billion facility near the environmentally protected ACE Basin. In January, neighboring landowners, represented by the Southern Environmental Law Center, filed suit alleging that the county enacted these amendments without adequate notice or transparency, that the changes conflict with the county’s comprehensive plan, and that allowing an industrial special exception within a rural district is inconsistent with existing zoning classifications.

Similar disputes continue to surface statewide. In Marion County, Council recently approved a $2.4 billion data center project and a fee‑in‑lieu‑of‑tax agreement. The project appeared on the agenda only under the code name “Project Liberty” and was covered by a nondisclosure agreement, leaving the public without meaningful information until the final reading. Aiken and Berkeley Counties have faced comparable challenges.

Opponents of data centers emphasize their extraordinary electrical demand, which has already strained power grids across the country. Some estimates now place data‑center consumption at roughly seven percent of U.S. electricity use, with projections continuing to rise. In the Colleton debate, residents expressed concern that utilities lack sufficient capacity to serve the proposed facility and that ratepayers – particularly Santee Cooper customers – may ultimately bear the cost of necessary upgrades.

Water usage presents a parallel problem. Data centers generate substantial heat and rely heavily on water‑based cooling. The volume required can impose real stress on local water systems, particularly in rural areas. While newer closed‑loop cooling technologies reduce consumption, they require additional energy and higher capital investment.

Other community impacts have also drawn scrutiny. Backup diesel generators – which data centers depend on for uninterrupted service – emit gases and particulates that may pose health risks. Residents in rural counties also cite noise, light pollution, and the visual intrusion of large industrial campuses as threats to the historic and environmental character of their communities.

Yet despite these concerns, the economic incentives remain significant. Proponents of the Marion County project note that the facility could generate nearly $28 million annually for a county operating on a $25 million budget. Construction phases typically span several years, providing a substantial economic boost. And although data centers require relatively few employees once operational, they nevertheless contribute positively to local employment and tax revenue. Moreover, the facilities are essential to the growth of artificial intelligence and advanced computing – technologies many policymakers liken to a modern “space race.”

The General Assembly has taken notice. Several bills addressing data‑center siting, utility impacts, and environmental standards have been introduced this session. Developments in the Colleton County litigation, along with potential legislative action, will likely shape future permitting and zoning practices statewide.

For South Carolina lawyers, these projects are becoming increasingly complicated to navigate to completion. Title insurers are increasingly view data centers as high‑risk properties due to their scale, public visibility, and susceptibility to challenge. Attorneys may be asked to perform extended title examinations, provide more detailed zoning analyses, and secure specialized endorsements requiring careful underwriting. As counties pursue these high‑value developments and as communities continue to push back, lawyers will as always be on the front lines.

Georgia Real Estate Investor Fined for Violating OFAC Sanctions

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Imagine that you have a real estate investor client who purchased a big house in a gated community at a foreclosure sale. The client then took out a mortgage on the house, paid to make significant repairs and renovations, and ultimately signed a contract to sell it on to a third party. Then, all of a sudden, the Federal government sends your client a cease and desist order, a subpoena, and eventually fines him $4,677,552.00 for violating OFAC (Office of Foreign Asset Control, an agency of U.S. Treasury) sanctions against a family member of a Russian oligarch. Does that sound fun to anybody? Unfortunately, that is more or less what happened to one real estate investor in Atlanta who unknowingly bought a house which was, in fact, owned by a person who was on the OFAC sanctions list.  

This particular person whose name appeared on OFAC’s sanctions list is now known as Karina Rotenberg. She is a family member of a Russian oligarch who was identified for US financial sanctions after Russia invaded Ukraine. For a time in the early 2000’s, she lived and worked and owned homes in Atlanta. At the time, her name was Karina Fox. Guess which last name her Atlanta home is owned under? That’s right – it’s Fox.

Well, it just so happened that, after it added her to the sanctions list, OFAC figured out that Ms. Fox/Rotenberg owned property in Atlanta. This means that her property could not be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise transferred, since doing so would be a violation of the sanctions. OFAC sent a notice to the Fulton County Clerk of Court specifically mentioning the property’s address, and listing several names by which Ms. Fox/Rotenberg was known (including both “Fox” and “Rotenberg”), and asked the Clerk to file the notice in the county records to let the public know that the OFAC sanctions existed. And the Clerk of Court did file that notice. Unfortunately, for reasons which are not clear, the Clerk appears to have only indexed the notice under the name Rotenberg. So, a title searcher who did not know that Karina Fox and Karina Rotenberg are the same person would not necessarily know that this home was owned by a person on the OFAC sanctions list.

Now, here comes our local real estate investor, by all accounts an entrepreneurial fellow who had immigrated from India and worked to further his education and succeed in this county. He operated his real estate deals through an LLC: King Holdings LLC. Most of his past deals had been smaller single-family homes that he had bought in distress, improved, and flipped for a profit. This home would be bigger than most of his past projects. But it was being sold at foreclosure and seemed like a bargain. King Holdings buys the home at foreclosure sale in January 2023.

Around April of 2023, OFAC learns about the foreclosure, and tracks our investor down. He says that an OFAC investigator called him on his cell phone and told him that he should not be doing anything with the home, due to the sanctions. In our investor’s version of the story, the caller seemed sketchy, and he says he wondered at the time if it was a scammer trying to scare him into giving up some personal information.  

Our investor goes ahead and mortgages the property to have funds to begin renovations. The law firm which closed the mortgage says it searched title to the home and did not find the OFAC notice (which, again was indexed in a different name, Rotenberg).

By December, 2023 our investor has learned that this home has significantly more repair/maintenance problems than he’d bargained for. He is beginning to think it was not such a great deal. He signs a contract with a third party to sell the home. After initially listing the property for $2.5M, he finally signs a contract to sell it for $1.4M.

In February 2024, OFAC issues a cease-and-desist order and administrative subpoena to our investor, restating the sanctions and requiring that he immediately stop doing anything with the home. The subpoena also demands information on all dealings involving the property since January 2023. It seems that our investor certified the accuracy of a response that disclosed the renovation work but did not say anything about the property’s listing and pending sale.

In March 2024, our investor closed the $1.4 million sale of the property to the third party buyer.

OFAC took the position that pretty much everything our investor did violated OFAC’s regulations/sanctions. (I also get the sense that they were pretty mad about him not disclosing the sale, and then going ahead with the sale to the third party, after OFAC had issued their cease-and-desist order.) So, as punishment, OFAC imposed the $4,677,552.00 fine on him personally.

It is really disappointing that the Clerk of Court did not index the OFAC notice under all the names that OFAC had listed. Another possible way this could have been avoided is if our investor had checked the OFAC sanctions list before proceeding. This is a great tool that all our CTIC agents should be using too – it could even help you save a client from ending up like our Atlanta investor!

Appeals Court Upholds Ruling Nullifying Transfer of Common Elements

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The SC Court of Appeals released a new decision this week confirming that a Developer of a Horizontal Property Regime (HPR) may not remove common elements from the regime once the right to the common elements has vested in the individual unit owner. 

The facts are somewhat complicated, but I will try and simplify it as best as I can. The Developer of the fully constructed Mariner’s Cay Marina in Charleston committed the property to a HPR in 2006.  

The Marina consisted of individual boat slips, a fuel dock with a wastewater pumping station, and a two-story Ship Store. The 88 individual boat slips were converted to separate units or apartments with a designated ownership percentage of the common elements. The first and second floors of the Ship Store were designated Commercial Units 1-A and 1-B respectively. The fuel pump and the attendant wastewater pumping station were designated as Commercial Unit 2. The Master Deed stated that the Commercial Units were “common elements or limited common elements [of the Regime].”    

However, the Master Deed also provided that the Developer retained a right to “unilaterally amend the declaration for any purpose” for the earlier of 18 months or the point where it sold 90% of the unit, but not in such a way as to “adversely affect the title to any Unit unless the Owner shall consent in writing.”

In 2007, during its “unilateral” rights period, Developer amended the Master Deed by removing the language that designated the the Commercial Units as common elements or limited common elements.  At the time of the Amendment, at least 39 individual units (slips) had been sold. 

Shortly after recording the amendment to the Master Deed, Developer sold the Commercial Units to a third party, who in turn sold the property to another entity. This down the line entity borrowed money for construction at the Store, which it secured by a mortgage on the Commercial Units.  

It would not make for a good story unless the mortgage went into default. Lender filed a foreclosure action naming the HPR as a defendant by virtue of its liens for assessments. The Court indicates that the HPR participated in the proceedings without contesting the foreclosure or the right of the Developer to have transferred these units in the first place. In February 2015 the property was sold at public auction. It eventually was sold again to the two LLCs that are the defendants in the ensuing litigation.

It appears that between 2006 and 2015, the slip owners had enjoyed free use of the waste-water pumping station on the fuel docks and of the restrooms in the Ship Store. However, the new Commercial Unit owners changed quite a few things after taking possession of the units. The Commercial Unit owners took action to bar the slip owners from the use of the pumping stations, forced the dock master to vacate the Ship Store where his office had been located, and denied access to the restrooms.  

In response, several individual unit owners filed suit alleging that the Commercial Units were common elements of the HPR and that Developer did not have authority to change that status when it recorded the amendment to the Master Deed. In defense, the Commercial Unit owners argued that the Master Deed gave the Developer unilateral authority to amend the Master Deed and that the HPR waived the right (of all unit owners) to contest the Developer’s action when it acquiesced to the foreclosure proceedings. 

The Court of Appeal focused its holding on its prior ruling in  Vista Del Mar Condo. Ass’n v. Vista Del Mar Condos., LLC, 441 S.C. 223 (Ct App. 2023). In Vista Del Mar, a Developer originally committed a tract of land to a HPR pursuant to a multi-phase development plan. After construction of the initial phase, the Vista Developer changed its plan of development and determined that a portion of the undeveloped property committed to the HPR was no longer necessary to its intentions. The Master Deed had language giving the Vista Developer a unilateral authority to add or remove property from the regime on behalf of itself and as the agent for the individual unit owners.

Unit owners sued the Vista Developer arguing that common elements could not be conveyed. In issuing its opinion, the Court concluded that the Vista Developer had authority to convey the property because the unit owner’s rights in the particular property as common elements had not yet vested in the unimproved portion of the property, because the property was not scheduled to be a common element for recreation and the contemplated construction on the unimproved portion had not been commenced or completed. 

In the current opinion, the Court found that the rights of the slip owners in the common elements at Mariner’s Cay had fully vested. Once the vesting occurred, Developer’s authority to remove common elements ended regardless of the provisions of the Master Deed. The Court ruled that the Master was correct in finding the Commercial Unit owners “wrongfully held title.”

The Court was not impressed with the argument that the HPR’s participation had waived the rights of individual unit owners to contest the transfer of the common elements. The Court ruled that the individual units were not parties to the foreclosure action. Not being parties, they could not be estopped by any failure of the HPR to assert defenses in the foreclosure hearing.  Attorneys that litigate all kinds of cases against HPRs should take heed that the HPR Association does not necessarily have authority to bind individual unit owners.

While this new ruling is confirmation of prior standard concerning the vested rights of unit owners in common elements, practitioners may find that the devil is in the details concerning the point at which such rights vest. The Court was not exceptionally clear in laying out specific for determining whether a right to a common element vests, but it seems that it was important to the Court that the common elements were fully constructed, in active use by the slip owners. Perhaps too that fuel docks and pumping stations and restrooms have more obvious correlation to the expectation of slip owners in a Marina than unimproved property slated for future development might have had to unit owners in Vista Del Mar. Yet another distinction between the two case may have been what seems like much more explicit language in the Vista Del Mar Master Deed concerning the authority of the Developer in adding and subtracting property for use in future phases.

Attorney Opinion Letters – Worth the Risk?

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Have you ever been asked to provide a title opinion in connection with a real estate transaction? What does that mean? To me, it means that the client asks you to give your legal opinion as to the legal and factual validity of title ownership for a particular piece of land, and to note any matters of record that impact the title. That raises the question: Do you want to be personally responsible for that opinion?  More importantly, do you want to be personally responsible to the client or a third party if that opinion is incorrect?

What if the records are incomplete or inaccurate? Will you search title yourself or are you going to rely on a title abstractor? Will the abstractor have sufficient E&O coverage to protect you if they make a mistake?  Are you comfortable taking the risk that the abstractor did not miss anything in title? Lastly, why would you want to bear that risk when there is a national industry offering title insurance to protect parties from the same types of title risks that would be covered by a title opinion?

I think buyers and lenders look at these opinions as a guaranty that the opinion is correct. As a lawyer, you would never guarantee the outcome of litigation or settlement negotiations because there are too many factors that are outside of your control. In a perfect world, real estate or public records would contain no errors and no mis-indexing and there would be no forgery, fraud or people attempting to take advantage of the system. But we, our systems and our abstractors are not infallible. However, when lenders and buyers close a real estate transaction, they want certainty. 

In recent years there has been a push, especially with refinances and home equity mortgages, for lenders to accept an attorney opinion letter (commonly referred to as an “AOL”) in lieu of a title insurance policy.  At first, this may seem like an additional stream of revenue for your office, but you must weigh the benefits against the potential harm. 

A legal opinion is an analysis by an attorney subject to a promise of care, not an insurance contract.  If the legal opinion is wrong, the remedy is a claim of legal malpractice or negligence on the part of the attorney. 

In comparison, a title insurance policy is a contract of indemnity in which the title insurance company has certain obligations to its insureds pursuant to the terms of the policy. Coverage depends upon satisfaction of the commitment requirements and is subject to the specific exceptions as well as the conditions and exclusions of the policy jacket.   

While the perception may be that AOLs are faster and less expensive and appropriate where risk is considered low (refinances and HELOCs), The American Land Title Association (ALTA) and other industry leaders caution that an AOL does not provide the same level of protection as title insurance products. 

For attorneys, loss resulting from an inaccurate AOL could negatively impact a practice’s bottom line.  An attorney making a payout under an E&O policy may soon have an increased deductible or lose the policy altogether. A firm may see its reputation suffer in the community to a greater degree from a personal allegation of malpractice than from a claim against a title policy. 

There are companies that offer a variety of services which include AOL programs.  One such provider is Voxtur Analytics Corp.  Earlier this year Voxtur (and its 20+ affiliated entities) filed bankruptcy in Canada and has petitioned the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware to be recognized and restructured under a Chapter 15 petition. According to online information, Voxtur has been suffering large losses for the last several years: $54.3 million in 2023, $73.6 million in 2024.  Reportedly, as of March 2025, its liabilities exceeded its assets by $33.2 million. 

Many lenders have relied on Voxtur’s AOL program and others like it in lieu of title insurance. The bankruptcy should cause these lenders and their servicers to question not only the reliability of such programs but also the longevity of the remedies available under such a program. As a result of the bankruptcy, parties that utilized Voxtur’s services must be questioning whether Voxtur will be able to satisfy any claims related to its AOL program. Voxtur should be a reminder to the industry that vendor insolvency is a real risk in the AOL model of risk allocation. 

So back to my original question: are AOLs worth the risk? Is it worth the risk to an attorney’s personal, professional liability or reputation to provide an opinion of title for a fee that may not match the potential risk? Is it worth the risk to fast-track a transaction or cut costs when the result may be to weaken the lending industry’s access to reliable protections in the event of title claims, especially for those matters which may be covered under certain title policies of insurance but would not be covered under an AOL?   

…Just a little food for thought as we digest all those holiday feasts. Cheers!