Supreme Court reaffirms longstanding rules governing tax sales

Standard

Sometimes my reaction to a court decision, even a Supreme Court decision, is just a sense of relief that the Court has reaffirmed that the law is what you have always thought it to be. The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Estate of Pung v. Isabella County is just that kind of decision. 

While the specific facts of the case contain exactly the kind of bad facts and stubborn behavior that sometimes lead Courts to fashion equitable remedies that really muddy the playing field, the Court focused on bare procedure and historical precedent to arrive at their result essentially affirming 100 years of legal procedure, but leaving the door open to the lower courts to judge the particulars concerning due process.

Scott Pung owned and occupied the home that was the subject of the case, before passing away in 2004. Several years after his death, the tax assessor for Isabella County declined to continue taxing the Pung home as a primary residence because the estate (or its heirs) did not follow proper procedure (as the assessor saw it) to file an affidavit establishing that the heir living in the property still qualified for the partial tax exemption.

The Pung estate successfully challenged the assessor’s decision for the tax years 2007-2011 before a Michigan state tax tribunal.  Despite Pung’s victory, the assessor apparently persisted in her position and denied the partial tax exemption for the 2012 assessment year.[1] The Pungs apparently failed to timely contest the tax assessor’s decision to deny the partial tax exemption again in 2012.

While the Pungs paid the 2012 tax bill assessing the home as a primary residence, but refused to pay the supplemental tax bill of $2,241.93.[2]  The County began proceedings to collect the unpaid tax through sale of the property. While there may be some question as the sufficiency of notices, the Pungs ultimately did not pay the tax, redeem the property, or otherwise take action to stop the sale. The home sold at public auction to a third party for $76,008.00. The appraised tax value of the property was approximately $195,000. 

The Pungs filed suit claiming that the tax sale did not realize the fair market value of the property. [3]  The Pungs asserted that the 5th and 8th Amendments required the state to compensate them for the fair market value if it wished to take their property to meet their tax sale. Astonishingly, the Pungs argued that the County, and by extension any government entity conducting a public sale, must make up the difference between the realized tax sale price at the auction and the fair market value of the property under ideal sale conditions. To put it more clearly, the Pungs argued that the County must pay them the roughly $120,000 dollars difference in what the tax sale actually yielded and what the Pungs asserted was the true value of the property. Essentially, they argued the County should pay them $120,000 for the privilege of collecting their $2,000 deficient tax liability.  

The Court unanimously rejected the Pung’s argument on both constitutional grounds. Citing the fact that the right of the state to liquidate property to pay tax debts dates back to colonial days and perhaps Magna Carta, the Court did not find anything compelling about the Pung’s arguments. 

While a tax sale may inevitably be a distressed sale in most real estate markets, the Court reasoned that the Pungs and any taxpayer has an opportunity to avoid such an outcome. With significant equity in the property, the Court noted that the Pungs could have borrowed money to redeem the property by paying the tax and that they alternately had ample time to market it themselves for a fair price.  

The Pungs may still have an opportunity upon remand to contest whether the County’s procedure was properly carried out and whether its actions were fair under the context of the previous litigation between the parties. But SC dirt lawyers and anxious title underwriters can rest easy knowing that what they understood was the rule forever will remain the rule going forward. Sometimes that’s a pretty good result.  


[1] Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion stated that the County’s advocate could offer no explanation for why the Assessor persisted in denying the partial exemption after the Tribunals reversal as to the prior tax years, but it apparently stemmed from the Pungs continued refusal to submit an affidavit establishing primary residency.

[2] Whether you consider the Pungs apparent refusal to submit the affidavit of residency to the assessor or pay the assessed tax over the next two years to be strongly principled or head-scratchingly foolish might depend on your readings of the facts.

[3] It is the rare foreclosure or distress sale that returns fair market value of a sale conducted under ideal conditions. There are as we know a more limited pool of bidders and title problems associated with these kinds of sales.

Cybersecurity Threats and Their Impact on Real Estate Transactions

Standard

Imagine arriving at your real estate closing only to learn that the county’s property records are unavailable. If the documents can’t be recorded, then the transaction may be left hanging in the air. Depending on lender funding requirements, the closing attorney may not be able to disburse the funds, and the buyer may not be able to receive their keys until recording is available. It sounds far-fetched, but it’s exactly the type of disruption that recent cyber-attacks on county governments have made possible.

Most people never think about their county recording office until they’re buying or selling real estate. Deeds, mortgages, easements, plats, liens, and other documents are quietly recorded every day, creating the public record that establishes who owns property and what interests affect it. It’s a system that has worked for generations because it relies on one simple principle: the public records must be accurate, complete, and accessible.

Recent events in South Carolina serve as a reminder that this system is more fragile than many people realize.

A recent cyber attack disrupted access to property records and other county services, temporarily preventing normal operations. While the details of the investigation continue to emerge, the incident highlights just how dependent modern real estate transactions have become on digital access to public records. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated event. Several South Carolina counties have experienced technology failures, ransomware attacks, or other disruptions in recent years.

Cyber security, however, is only one challenge facing county recording offices.

Many counties across the state operate with limited budgets and skeleton crews. Employees often process hundreds of documents each day while balancing increasing demands and aging technology. Even the most dedicated public servants can struggle when resources are stretched thin. Under staffing and insufficient training increase the likelihood of recording errors, indexing mistakes, or delays in processing documents – all of which can create headaches for property owners years later.

The integrity of the public record is essential because virtually every real estate transaction depends on it.

Before issuing title insurance, conducting a closing, or approving a mortgage loan, attorneys and title professionals examine the public records to confirm ownership and identify any issues affecting the property. They are looking for deeds that properly transferred title, unreleased mortgages, judgments, tax liens, easements, restrictive covenants, and countless other matters that could affect ownership rights.

If those records are unavailable because of a cyber attack, the transaction may be delayed. Buyers may not be able to close on schedule. Sellers may miss contractual deadlines. Lenders may refuse to fund loans until title can be verified. Even a short interruption can create significant inconvenience for everyone involved.

More concerning are situations where records have been altered, corrupted, or improperly indexed. The public recording system functions because people can trust that what they find is complete and accurate. Preserving that trust requires not only secure computer systems but also adequate staffing, proper training, and ongoing investment in the offices that maintain these records.

Although county governments bear much of the responsibility for protecting these systems, cybercriminals often gain access through surprisingly simple methods.

Many cybersecurity incidents begin not with sophisticated hacking tools but with social engineering. Rather than attacking computers directly, criminals manipulate people into providing passwords, opening malicious attachments, or clicking fraudulent links. These phishing emails are designed to look legitimate and frequently impersonate trusted organizations, coworkers, financial institutions, or government agencies.

While this blog focuses on real estate law, cyber attacks and scams aren’t limited to real estate transactions. Anyone, not just government employees, can become a target. A few simple precautions can dramatically reduce the risk of becoming a victim. Be cautious of unexpected emails requesting urgent action. Verify unusual requests through a separate phone call or trusted contact information rather than responding directly to the email. Avoid opening attachments or clicking links unless you are confident they are legitimate. Enable multi-factor authentication (“MFA”) whenever possible, and keep software updated to address known security vulnerabilities.

These habits protect more than your personal information. They help protect the institutions that communities depend upon every day.

County recording offices rarely make headlines when everything is working properly. Yet they perform one of the most important functions in our legal system by preserving the history of property ownership and ensuring that buyers, sellers, lenders, and attorneys can rely on the public record.

As counties continue modernizing their technology, cybersecurity must remain a priority. At the same time, we should not overlook the importance of investing in the people responsible for maintaining these records. Secure systems, well-trained staff, and accurate public records are not simply administrative conveniences: they are essential to protecting property rights and keeping South Carolina’s real estate market functioning smoothly.

HUD changes guidelines for emotional support animals

Standard

The Fair Housing Act prohibits housing providers from discriminating against individuals based on their physical handicaps. In addition, the Act requires that housing providers make reasonable accommodations to their rules and policies when an adjustment of a policy is necessary for a disabled person to have an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the offered housing.    

One fairly uncontroversial example of a reasonable accommodation is the case where a blind person has the assistance of what we might have once called a seeing-eye dog. These are trained animals that provide specific and essential services to persons with clear disabilities. A “no pets” policy cannot be applied to prevent the disabled person from having the assistance of such an animal under the Act.  

But in recent years there have been a growing number of more controversial accommodations requested where the disability of the applicant is not as easy to verify and the support animal itself is not particularly a trained animal specialized to the problem. Many people seeking these accommodations report that they suffer from mental issues such as anxiety, depression or post-traumatic stress and that their issues are much relieved when they have emotional support animals.

Landlords and management companies have had a great deal of trouble determining where the line lies between untrained “support animals” and simple pets. It’s become something of a cliché in comedy and pop culture. For instance, Homer Simpson’s emotional support pig, Plopper, who went from pet to emotional support animal in order to avoid his wife Marge’s urge to declutter.   

HUD’s previous guidance on the subject placed the housing providers in a precarious position as both medical providers and online services have made obtaining emotional support certifications for untrained animals reportedly fairly easy to obtain.  Landlords who attempted to enforce “no pets” policies were thus placed in the position of facing the cost and time of justifying their accommodation denials in HUD enforcement actions.

At the end of May HUD announced that it was amending its policy concerning reasonable accommodations for support animals.  According to the new directive, HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity will now pursue charges only in those reasonable accommodation requests involving trained support animals that perform specific tasks for disabled persons.  

While the guidance only applies to the way HUD will process complaints and does not affect the ability of individuals to pursue their own lawsuits under the Act, the change in guidance likely will significantly decrease the number of agency level actions against housing providers by the Department. Certainly it would seem likely that fewer individuals will have the resources or desire to pursue lawsuits on their own.  The change in HUD’s guidance may give some insight as to how future rulemaking may develop and it may well impact the way that Courts interpret the Act. 

A Zoning Battle Ignites in Fort Mill over Silfab Solar

Standard

There is yet another hot button zoning conflict in the Palmetto state that has attracted much public attention in Fort Mill, SC. It has spawned several lawsuits, an Attorney General inquiry, and legislators filing bills up at the State House that certainly would have major impact on S.C. dirt lawyers if they were to pass. 

The controversy centers around Silfab Solar’s ongoing construction of a solar panel manufacturing factory near Fort Mill, SC. The company is renovating a warehouse in an existing industrial park there that is jointly operated by York and Chester counties. The industrial park is located near several residential developments, but most notable in recent press coverage is the elementary school located on the adjacent parcel to the proposed Silfab site.  

In 2022, in connection with recruitment by the S.C. Department of Commerce, Silfab requested zoning verification from York County that its proposed operation would be in compliance with local zoning ordinances. The York County zoning staff ultimately determined that the manufacture of solar panels fit within the permitted use of “computer and electronic productions manufacturing” which was permitted in the “Light Industrial” zoning classification assigned to the industrial park. Notably, there was no appeal of the zoning verification.

With the zoning verification in hand, Silfab decided to move forward with the project and entered into a fee in lieu of tax (FILOT) Agreement with York County. The County passed an ordinance approving the FILOT agreement in September 2023, in effect ratifying the proposed project at its proposed location. Silfab thereafter obtained building and environmental permits and started construction at the site

But at some point in the process, the public became aware of the project and that hazardous gases and chemicals would be used as part of the manufacturing process of the panels. As concerns grew, a neighboring landowner filed a request for a zoning interpretation inquiring whether solar panel manufacturing was actually a permissible use under the zoning ordinance. In 2024, the York County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) found that solar panel manufacture is not permitted within the Light Industrial zoning classification, which effectively overruled the prior determination of the zoning staff. 

Silfab appealed the BZA ruling but construction has continued under the existing zoning verification and permits. In response to growing public outcry, York County issued statements that its interpretation of state law and its ordinance is that BZA zoning interpretations only apply prospectively and that the County does not have authority to revoke previously given permits or to issue a stop work order.

But the controversy really expanded into an issue of statewide concern in March when Silfab reported two separate chemical leaks within a three day period. While the leaks were contained and were reportedly of no danger to the outside community, DHEC ordered Silfab to pause its use of previously permitted chemicals pending a review. Silfab has since entered into an agreement with DHEC not to bring any more dangerous chemicals into its site or proceed with manufacturing until the investigation is completed.

The leaks also drew the attention of Attorney General Alan Wilson who issued inquiries to York County concerning the propriety of the zoning approval and to Silfab concerning the cause and extend of the leaks. The gubernatorial candidate appears to be closely monitoring the situation as events unfold.

The South Carolina General Assembly is also involved in the debate. Local legislators have introduced proposed bills in the House and Senate that would amend the Code to give Counties the power to revoke permits and stop work on projects when the project is found to be in violation of zoning ordinances. 

While these bills are unlikely to pass before the end of the current session, there have been a number of other bills advanced in the State House in recent years that have sought to give local authorities the ability to have something of a “do-over” concerning prior approvals of development. Often these bills have been provoked by growing public outrage over major projects that were passed by local authorities without much initial fanfare.  

While the Court’s pending review of the BZA appeal may result in restoring the original zoning interpretation and making much of the present controversy moot, there is always the chance of additional appeals. Further, with the national debate over data centers expanding into South Carolina in recent months the salience of the Silfab controversy may impact future debates concerning whether government entities should be able to change their mind about prior zoning decisions even after property owner’s have formed plans and made investments relying upon them. 

The 2026 ALTA Survey Standards Are Here

Standard

What South Carolina Real Estate Attorneys Need to Know

As of February 23, 2026, the 2026 ALTA/NSPS Minimum Standard Detail Requirements for Land Title Surveys officially replaced the 2021 standards. These updates may appear technical at first glance, but for South Carolina real estate attorneys—particularly those handling commercial transactions, development work, and lender representation—the changes carry meaningful legal and practical consequences.

The 2026 Standards reflect evolving technology, shifting risk allocation, and mounting expectations from title insurers and lenders. Attorneys who understand these changes will be better positioned to manage risk, avoid closing delays, and advise clients with confidence.

In South Carolina, ALTA/NSPS Land Title Surveys are a cornerstone of development due diligence, commercial financing and title insurance underwriting. While surveyors perform the fieldwork, attorneys are often the gatekeepers—reviewing surveys for compliance, identifying red flags, and reconciling survey matters with title commitments.

Any change to the ALTA Standards therefore ripples directly into:

  • Title objection and resolution strategies
  • Closing timelines
  • Survey exceptions and endorsements
  • Risk allocation among buyers, lenders, and insurers

The 2026 Standards were jointly adopted by ALTA and the National Society of Professional Surveyors (NSPS) in October 2025 after several years of committee work, with the stated goal of improving clarity, consistency, and adaptability.

A Clear Effective Date—with Transitional Traps

The effective date for the new standards is February 23, 2026. Any ALTA/NSPS Land Title Survey contracted for on or after that date must comply with the 2026 Standards unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. Surveys contracted before the effective date may still be governed by the 2021 Standards, even if completed later—but only if that is clearly addressed in the engagement agreement.

For attorneys, this means:

  • Engagement letters and contracts should specify which ALTA standard applies
  • “Survey updates” or revised plats may trigger new standard requirements
  • Ambiguity can expose clients—and counsel—to disputes with lenders or insurers

Technology Is Now Explicitly Embraced

One of the most forward‑looking changes is the shift from requiring information obtained strictly “on the ground” to allowing “practices generally recognized as acceptable” in both fieldwork and mapping. This expressly accommodates modern tools such as drones, LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging), and other remote‑sensing technologies, without tying the standards to any specific method.  

For attorneys, this reinforces the need to:

  • Review surveys for completeness, not methodology
  • Understand that aerial or remote data may now support certain depictions
  • Counsel clients that innovation alone is not grounds for objection

Expanded Documentation of Possession and Occupation

Perhaps the most practically significant change is the requirement that evidence of possession or occupation be noted along the entire perimeter of the property, regardless of proximity to boundary lines. This exceeds prior standards, which often focused only on near‑boundary features.

This change:

  • Increases the likelihood that surveys will reveal fence lines, uses, or improvements suggesting potential boundary or prescriptive issues
  • Elevates the importance of attorney review and follow‑up
  • May increase survey‑related title objections and negotiation

Parol Statements Must Be Noted

Closely tied to evidence of possession and occupation, under the 2026 Standards, surveyors must note any verbal (“parol”) statements made by landowners or occupants relating to title or boundary issues.

For attorneys, this is a double‑edged sword:

  • It may surface issues earlier in the transaction
  • It also introduces non‑record information that may complicate underwriting, disclosures, and risk tolerance

These notations do not constitute legal opinions, but they should never be ignored during diligence.

Title Evidence and Research Responsibilities Are Clarified

The 2026 Standards expand guidance on how surveyors source title evidence when a current title commitment is unavailable, and they more clearly acknowledge shared responsibility between surveyors and title professionals for obtaining certain documents.

South Carolina attorneys should:

  • Provide current title commitments early whenever possible
  • Clearly communicate expectations regarding easement depiction
  • Coordinate closely with surveyors on complex tracts or non‑fee interests

Table A Gets a Notable Update

The optional Table A items remain a critical tool for tailoring survey scope. In 2026:

  • Item 15 was clarified to allow certain depictions via aerial or satellite imagery if agreed to in writing
  • A new Item 20 requires a summary table of conditions and potential encroachments on the face of the survey—intended as a factual summary, not a legal conclusion
  • The former “catch‑all” or blank item has been renumbered as Item 21

Attorneys should carefully align Table A selections with lender and client expectations.

Practice Takeaways for South Carolina Real Estate Attorneys

The 2026 Standards raise the bar—not by radical change, but by greater disclosure and clearer expectations. Attorneys should update internal checklists, educate clients, and adjust survey review practices accordingly.

Sullivan’s Island, Fractional Ownership, and the Limits of Zoning Law

Standard

We all know that South Carolina has some of the most beautiful natural scenery in the nation.  As the weather gradually improves, and with Spring Break underway for many and the summer rental season right around the corner, tourists begin flocking to our beautiful beaches.

In February 2026, a legal dispute[1] on Sullivan’s Island quietly reshaped the conversation around property rights, zoning enforcement, and the future of residential ownership models in South Carolina’s coastal communities. At the center of the case was 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC, a property owner, and Pacaso, Inc., a company that facilitates fractional homeownership. On the other side stood the Town of Sullivan’s Island, determined to enforce its long‑standing restrictions on short‑term rentals.  While the case involved a single property, its implications reach far beyond one address.

Sullivan’s Island has long maintained strict zoning rules designed to preserve its residential character. Among those rules are limits on short‑term vacation rentals, which town officials argue can disrupt neighborhoods and strain local infrastructure. As new real estate models have emerged, the town has taken a close look at how these arrangements fit within existing ordinances.

That scrutiny intensified when a home owned by 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC was used in partnership with Pacaso. Pacaso’s model allows multiple buyers to purchase fractional ownership interests (in this instance, one‑eighth shares) in a single property. Each owner receives scheduled access throughout the year, and Pacaso manages maintenance and logistics. However, unlike a true rental property, occupants do not pay nightly or weekly fees to stay in the home; they are staying in a property they legally own.

Town officials concluded that the arrangement functioned like a vacation rental in practice, even if it was structured differently on paper. The Town’s Zoning Administrator issued a violation, asserting that the property was being used as a prohibited short‑term rental under Sullivan’s Island zoning laws. That decision was upheld by the Town’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).

2 SC Lighthouse and Pacaso appealed to the Charleston County Circuit Court. The court sided with the Town, effectively agreeing that the zoning authorities’ interpretation of the ordinance should stand.

The property owner and Pacaso appealed, arguing that a fractional ownership is not a rental, and that the Town was stretching the definition of “short‑term rental” beyond what its ordinance actually said.

On February 18, 2026, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s decision, siding with 2 SC Lighthouse and Pacaso. The ruling turned on the critical distinction between ownership and renting. The court emphasized that the individuals staying in the home were owners, not tenants. Without a rental transaction (no landlord‑tenant relationship and no payment for temporary lodging), the court found that the town’s definition of a short‑term rental did not apply.

In making its ruling, the court clarified that interpreting a zoning ordinance is a question of law rather than a factual determination entitled to broad deference. While zoning boards are given leeway in applying ordinances, they cannot rewrite or expand those ordinances. If a municipality wants to regulate fractional ownership, it must do so explicitly.

Although the ruling is an unpublished opinion and is not binding precedent, its practical impact is significant. For Sullivan’s Island, the decision places limits on enforcement under current zoning language. The town may still regulate short‑term rentals aggressively, but it cannot treat fractional ownership arrangements as rentals unless its ordinances are amended to say so.

For other South Carolina coastal communities, the case serves as a warning and a roadmap. Many towns face similar tensions between preserving neighborhood character and responding to evolving real estate practices. The decision signals that courts will closely scrutinize attempts to regulate new ownership models using old definitions.

For property owners, the ruling reinforces a core principle of land‑use law: property rights cannot be curtailed by implication. Restrictions must be clearly stated, not inferred based on policy concerns alone.

The decision does not end the debate over fractional ownership on Sullivan’s Island or elsewhere. Municipalities may respond by revising zoning ordinances to directly address co‑ownership models. Developers and property owners, meanwhile, will likely continue testing the boundaries of traditional zoning frameworks.

This case highlights the broader reality that zoning laws written decades ago are being asked to govern a rapidly changing housing market. As ownership models evolve, so too must the rules that regulate them—through legislation, not interpretation.

For now, 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC’s victory stands as a reminder that in land‑use law, words matter, and towns must play by the rules they have written.


[1] Pacaso, Inc. & 2 SC Lighthouse, LLC v. Town of Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, Appellate Case No. 2024‑000134, 2026‑UP‑078 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026) (unpublished).

At long last, a resolution for Captain Sam’s Spit?

Standard

Another long‑running legal battle in South Carolina – this time over the future of Captain Sam’s Spit – may finally be drawing to a close. Developer Kiawah Partners, the Town of Kiawah Island, and several other interested parties entered into a $37 million settlement at the beginning of March that would transfer the entirety of the 170 acres of pristine coastline to the State of South Carolina and other local entities subject to a permanent conservation easement.

This blog has covered the unfolding controversy involving the Spit several times in the past. The Spit, which lay seaward of the DHEC critical line when originally conveyed in the 1980s, became the subject of numerous lawsuits after an adjustment of the critical line in the 1990s made the property developable. Following that adjustment, Kiawah Partners and the Town of Kiawah entered into a Development Agreement under which the developer planned to build more than 50 homes on certain highland areas of the Spit, while conveying and committing the remaining portions to be preserved in their natural state. However, in a series of lawsuits, appellate courts ultimately denied all the various applications to construct erosion‑control devices deemed necessary to support the proposed development plan.

Kiawah Partners has since pursued a pending lawsuit seeking compensation for what it views as a regulatory taking of its property rights, while the Town and local conservation groups have filed a separate action seeking to enforce the Development Agreement’s provisions concerning the preservation of the remainder of the land. The current settlement resolves both lawsuits.

Under the terms of the settlement, the State of South Carolina and the other participating groups agree to purchase the developer’s entire interest in the Spit for $37 million. The Spit would then be jointly managed by the State and local entities. Beachwalker Park, a popular destination for local beachgoers, is to be transferred to the Town of Kiawah Island and will remain open to the public under the management of Charleston County.

The settlement is contingent upon the General Assembly approving the State’s $32 million contribution, which may occur before the end of the current legislative session. If lawmakers do not balk, Captain Sam’s Spit will be permanently conserved for the enjoyment of the public—and for the 18 endangered species that call the area home.

Data Centers Raise Legal Questions for Rural South Carolina

Standard

Across rural South Carolina, data center proposals are generating increasing controversy as residents challenge whether counties are complying with zoning statutes, comprehensive plans, and public‑notice requirements.

In Colleton County, Council amended its zoning ordinance to add data centers as a permitted use and to create a special exception within residential districts – changes that paved the way for a proposed $6 billion facility near the environmentally protected ACE Basin. In January, neighboring landowners, represented by the Southern Environmental Law Center, filed suit alleging that the county enacted these amendments without adequate notice or transparency, that the changes conflict with the county’s comprehensive plan, and that allowing an industrial special exception within a rural district is inconsistent with existing zoning classifications.

Similar disputes continue to surface statewide. In Marion County, Council recently approved a $2.4 billion data center project and a fee‑in‑lieu‑of‑tax agreement. The project appeared on the agenda only under the code name “Project Liberty” and was covered by a nondisclosure agreement, leaving the public without meaningful information until the final reading. Aiken and Berkeley Counties have faced comparable challenges.

Opponents of data centers emphasize their extraordinary electrical demand, which has already strained power grids across the country. Some estimates now place data‑center consumption at roughly seven percent of U.S. electricity use, with projections continuing to rise. In the Colleton debate, residents expressed concern that utilities lack sufficient capacity to serve the proposed facility and that ratepayers – particularly Santee Cooper customers – may ultimately bear the cost of necessary upgrades.

Water usage presents a parallel problem. Data centers generate substantial heat and rely heavily on water‑based cooling. The volume required can impose real stress on local water systems, particularly in rural areas. While newer closed‑loop cooling technologies reduce consumption, they require additional energy and higher capital investment.

Other community impacts have also drawn scrutiny. Backup diesel generators – which data centers depend on for uninterrupted service – emit gases and particulates that may pose health risks. Residents in rural counties also cite noise, light pollution, and the visual intrusion of large industrial campuses as threats to the historic and environmental character of their communities.

Yet despite these concerns, the economic incentives remain significant. Proponents of the Marion County project note that the facility could generate nearly $28 million annually for a county operating on a $25 million budget. Construction phases typically span several years, providing a substantial economic boost. And although data centers require relatively few employees once operational, they nevertheless contribute positively to local employment and tax revenue. Moreover, the facilities are essential to the growth of artificial intelligence and advanced computing – technologies many policymakers liken to a modern “space race.”

The General Assembly has taken notice. Several bills addressing data‑center siting, utility impacts, and environmental standards have been introduced this session. Developments in the Colleton County litigation, along with potential legislative action, will likely shape future permitting and zoning practices statewide.

For South Carolina lawyers, these projects are becoming increasingly complicated to navigate to completion. Title insurers are increasingly view data centers as high‑risk properties due to their scale, public visibility, and susceptibility to challenge. Attorneys may be asked to perform extended title examinations, provide more detailed zoning analyses, and secure specialized endorsements requiring careful underwriting. As counties pursue these high‑value developments and as communities continue to push back, lawyers will as always be on the front lines.

Georgia Real Estate Investor Fined for Violating OFAC Sanctions

Standard

Imagine that you have a real estate investor client who purchased a big house in a gated community at a foreclosure sale. The client then took out a mortgage on the house, paid to make significant repairs and renovations, and ultimately signed a contract to sell it on to a third party. Then, all of a sudden, the Federal government sends your client a cease and desist order, a subpoena, and eventually fines him $4,677,552.00 for violating OFAC (Office of Foreign Asset Control, an agency of U.S. Treasury) sanctions against a family member of a Russian oligarch. Does that sound fun to anybody? Unfortunately, that is more or less what happened to one real estate investor in Atlanta who unknowingly bought a house which was, in fact, owned by a person who was on the OFAC sanctions list.  

This particular person whose name appeared on OFAC’s sanctions list is now known as Karina Rotenberg. She is a family member of a Russian oligarch who was identified for US financial sanctions after Russia invaded Ukraine. For a time in the early 2000’s, she lived and worked and owned homes in Atlanta. At the time, her name was Karina Fox. Guess which last name her Atlanta home is owned under? That’s right – it’s Fox.

Well, it just so happened that, after it added her to the sanctions list, OFAC figured out that Ms. Fox/Rotenberg owned property in Atlanta. This means that her property could not be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise transferred, since doing so would be a violation of the sanctions. OFAC sent a notice to the Fulton County Clerk of Court specifically mentioning the property’s address, and listing several names by which Ms. Fox/Rotenberg was known (including both “Fox” and “Rotenberg”), and asked the Clerk to file the notice in the county records to let the public know that the OFAC sanctions existed. And the Clerk of Court did file that notice. Unfortunately, for reasons which are not clear, the Clerk appears to have only indexed the notice under the name Rotenberg. So, a title searcher who did not know that Karina Fox and Karina Rotenberg are the same person would not necessarily know that this home was owned by a person on the OFAC sanctions list.

Now, here comes our local real estate investor, by all accounts an entrepreneurial fellow who had immigrated from India and worked to further his education and succeed in this county. He operated his real estate deals through an LLC: King Holdings LLC. Most of his past deals had been smaller single-family homes that he had bought in distress, improved, and flipped for a profit. This home would be bigger than most of his past projects. But it was being sold at foreclosure and seemed like a bargain. King Holdings buys the home at foreclosure sale in January 2023.

Around April of 2023, OFAC learns about the foreclosure, and tracks our investor down. He says that an OFAC investigator called him on his cell phone and told him that he should not be doing anything with the home, due to the sanctions. In our investor’s version of the story, the caller seemed sketchy, and he says he wondered at the time if it was a scammer trying to scare him into giving up some personal information.  

Our investor goes ahead and mortgages the property to have funds to begin renovations. The law firm which closed the mortgage says it searched title to the home and did not find the OFAC notice (which, again was indexed in a different name, Rotenberg).

By December, 2023 our investor has learned that this home has significantly more repair/maintenance problems than he’d bargained for. He is beginning to think it was not such a great deal. He signs a contract with a third party to sell the home. After initially listing the property for $2.5M, he finally signs a contract to sell it for $1.4M.

In February 2024, OFAC issues a cease-and-desist order and administrative subpoena to our investor, restating the sanctions and requiring that he immediately stop doing anything with the home. The subpoena also demands information on all dealings involving the property since January 2023. It seems that our investor certified the accuracy of a response that disclosed the renovation work but did not say anything about the property’s listing and pending sale.

In March 2024, our investor closed the $1.4 million sale of the property to the third party buyer.

OFAC took the position that pretty much everything our investor did violated OFAC’s regulations/sanctions. (I also get the sense that they were pretty mad about him not disclosing the sale, and then going ahead with the sale to the third party, after OFAC had issued their cease-and-desist order.) So, as punishment, OFAC imposed the $4,677,552.00 fine on him personally.

It is really disappointing that the Clerk of Court did not index the OFAC notice under all the names that OFAC had listed. Another possible way this could have been avoided is if our investor had checked the OFAC sanctions list before proceeding. This is a great tool that all our CTIC agents should be using too – it could even help you save a client from ending up like our Atlanta investor!

Appeals Court Upholds Ruling Nullifying Transfer of Common Elements

Standard

The SC Court of Appeals released a new decision this week confirming that a Developer of a Horizontal Property Regime (HPR) may not remove common elements from the regime once the right to the common elements has vested in the individual unit owner. 

The facts are somewhat complicated, but I will try and simplify it as best as I can. The Developer of the fully constructed Mariner’s Cay Marina in Charleston committed the property to a HPR in 2006.  

The Marina consisted of individual boat slips, a fuel dock with a wastewater pumping station, and a two-story Ship Store. The 88 individual boat slips were converted to separate units or apartments with a designated ownership percentage of the common elements. The first and second floors of the Ship Store were designated Commercial Units 1-A and 1-B respectively. The fuel pump and the attendant wastewater pumping station were designated as Commercial Unit 2. The Master Deed stated that the Commercial Units were “common elements or limited common elements [of the Regime].”    

However, the Master Deed also provided that the Developer retained a right to “unilaterally amend the declaration for any purpose” for the earlier of 18 months or the point where it sold 90% of the unit, but not in such a way as to “adversely affect the title to any Unit unless the Owner shall consent in writing.”

In 2007, during its “unilateral” rights period, Developer amended the Master Deed by removing the language that designated the the Commercial Units as common elements or limited common elements.  At the time of the Amendment, at least 39 individual units (slips) had been sold. 

Shortly after recording the amendment to the Master Deed, Developer sold the Commercial Units to a third party, who in turn sold the property to another entity. This down the line entity borrowed money for construction at the Store, which it secured by a mortgage on the Commercial Units.  

It would not make for a good story unless the mortgage went into default. Lender filed a foreclosure action naming the HPR as a defendant by virtue of its liens for assessments. The Court indicates that the HPR participated in the proceedings without contesting the foreclosure or the right of the Developer to have transferred these units in the first place. In February 2015 the property was sold at public auction. It eventually was sold again to the two LLCs that are the defendants in the ensuing litigation.

It appears that between 2006 and 2015, the slip owners had enjoyed free use of the waste-water pumping station on the fuel docks and of the restrooms in the Ship Store. However, the new Commercial Unit owners changed quite a few things after taking possession of the units. The Commercial Unit owners took action to bar the slip owners from the use of the pumping stations, forced the dock master to vacate the Ship Store where his office had been located, and denied access to the restrooms.  

In response, several individual unit owners filed suit alleging that the Commercial Units were common elements of the HPR and that Developer did not have authority to change that status when it recorded the amendment to the Master Deed. In defense, the Commercial Unit owners argued that the Master Deed gave the Developer unilateral authority to amend the Master Deed and that the HPR waived the right (of all unit owners) to contest the Developer’s action when it acquiesced to the foreclosure proceedings. 

The Court of Appeal focused its holding on its prior ruling in  Vista Del Mar Condo. Ass’n v. Vista Del Mar Condos., LLC, 441 S.C. 223 (Ct App. 2023). In Vista Del Mar, a Developer originally committed a tract of land to a HPR pursuant to a multi-phase development plan. After construction of the initial phase, the Vista Developer changed its plan of development and determined that a portion of the undeveloped property committed to the HPR was no longer necessary to its intentions. The Master Deed had language giving the Vista Developer a unilateral authority to add or remove property from the regime on behalf of itself and as the agent for the individual unit owners.

Unit owners sued the Vista Developer arguing that common elements could not be conveyed. In issuing its opinion, the Court concluded that the Vista Developer had authority to convey the property because the unit owner’s rights in the particular property as common elements had not yet vested in the unimproved portion of the property, because the property was not scheduled to be a common element for recreation and the contemplated construction on the unimproved portion had not been commenced or completed. 

In the current opinion, the Court found that the rights of the slip owners in the common elements at Mariner’s Cay had fully vested. Once the vesting occurred, Developer’s authority to remove common elements ended regardless of the provisions of the Master Deed. The Court ruled that the Master was correct in finding the Commercial Unit owners “wrongfully held title.”

The Court was not impressed with the argument that the HPR’s participation had waived the rights of individual unit owners to contest the transfer of the common elements. The Court ruled that the individual units were not parties to the foreclosure action. Not being parties, they could not be estopped by any failure of the HPR to assert defenses in the foreclosure hearing.  Attorneys that litigate all kinds of cases against HPRs should take heed that the HPR Association does not necessarily have authority to bind individual unit owners.

While this new ruling is confirmation of prior standard concerning the vested rights of unit owners in common elements, practitioners may find that the devil is in the details concerning the point at which such rights vest. The Court was not exceptionally clear in laying out specific for determining whether a right to a common element vests, but it seems that it was important to the Court that the common elements were fully constructed, in active use by the slip owners. Perhaps too that fuel docks and pumping stations and restrooms have more obvious correlation to the expectation of slip owners in a Marina than unimproved property slated for future development might have had to unit owners in Vista Del Mar. Yet another distinction between the two case may have been what seems like much more explicit language in the Vista Del Mar Master Deed concerning the authority of the Developer in adding and subtracting property for use in future phases.