We have a new attorney preference case

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…and dirt lawyers are not going to like it

The South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled recently in favor of Quicken Loans, Inc. in a foreclosure case where the defendants argued the lender was not entitled to foreclose because it had violated the attorney preference statute during the application process.* My friend and classmate, Special Referee James Martin Harvey, Jr., had granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Quicken appealed.

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Quicken telephonically takes information for loan applications from borrowers, according to the recited facts. Quicken’s system prompts Quicken’s banker to ask the borrower: “Will the borrower select legal counsel to represent them in this transaction.” If the borrower responds “no”, the attorney preference form is populated to read, “I/We will not use the services of legal counsel.”  No list of acceptable closing attorneys is provided to borrowers who answer “no” to this question, and the file is sent to Quicken’s affiliate company, Title Source, Inc., which acts as settlement agent in the transaction and subcontracts with attorneys to perform the settlement services.

If the borrower answers “yes”, Quicken’s system populates the attorney preference form to read, “Please contact lender with preference.” The system does not allow an attorney’s name to be entered at this stage of the application process.

The borrowers in this case declined legal representation during the initial telephonic application process.

The Court of Appeals indicated the form used by Quicken is identical to the form promulgated by the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (DOCA) except that Quicken’s form is prepopulated with responses. Like the DOCA form, Quicken’s form states, “I/We have been informed by the lender that I (we) have a right to select legal counsel to represent me (us) in all matters in this transaction relating to the closing of the loan.” Unlike the DOCA form, however, Part 1(a) of the Quicken form is prepopulated to read, “I/We will not use the services of legal counsel.”

Under Part 1(b) the Quicken form, like the DOCA form, initially states, “Having been informed of this right, and having no preference, I asked for assistance from the lender and was referred to a list of acceptable attorneys. From that list I select…” Unlike the DOCA form, which provides blank lines to fill in an attorney’s name and the borrower’s signature, the Quicken form is prepopulated with the response, “Not Applicable.”

Quicken produced the affidavit of closing attorney Carlton D. Robinson, who said it was his practice to explain the legal effect of the attorney preference to borrowers and that he would not have closed if the borrowers had expressed any dissatisfaction with having him act as closing attorney.

The Attorney Preference Statute (S.C. Code §37-10-102(a) provides that when the primary purpose of a loan secured by real estate is for personal, family or household purpose, the creditor must ascertain prior to closing the preference of the borrower as to the legal counsel employed to represent the borrower in the closing. The purpose of this statute is to protect consumers.

DOCA filed an Amicus Brief arguing that Quicken had violated the statute. The Court of Appeals held that Quicken complied with the statute because an agent of Quicken asked the borrowers if they would be using preferred legal counsel and only populated the form after the borrowers responded that they did not have counsel of preference. Quicken sent the form to the borrowers, who signed and returned it without asking further questions.

Will the Supreme Court agree with the Court of Appeals given the opportunity? My guess that the current Justices will agree. My guess would have been different before the retirement of Chief Justice Jean Toal. Will the legislature tighten the language of the statute? That is always a possibility, but we have heard nothing on that front to date. I hate to be the bearer of such bad news for South Carolina real estate practitioners.

*Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Wilson, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion No. 5613, January 9, 2019.

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Supreme Court calls Awendaw’s annexation efforts “nefarious conduct”

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Conduct results in standing for challengers

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The Town of Awandaw’s annexation of a ten-foot wide, 1.25 mile-long parcel of land within beautiful Francis Marion National Forest was challenged by two individuals and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League in a recent South Carolina Supreme Court case.*

The sole question before the Court was whether the challengers had standing to contest the annexation in a case where the “100 percent method” of annexation is used, meaning all property owners petition the municipality to have their property annexed.

The case involved three parcels of land serving as links in a chain necessary to satisfy the contiguity requirement of annexation. The first link is the ten-foot strip managed by the United States Forest Service. The second link is owned by the Mt. Nebo AME Church, and the third link is approximately 360 acres of unimproved real estate surrounded by the National Forest on three sides and owned by Defendant EBC, LLC.

In the fall of 2003, the Town sought to annex the ten-foot strip which required a petition signed by the Forest Service. Town representatives sent the Forest Service four letters seeking approval. Through verbal discussions, the Town learned the Forest Service was opposed to annexations because of their impact on the Service’s ability to conduct controlled fire burns. Additionally, the Forest Service indicated any petition would have to come from Washington, D.C., officials, a process that might take several years.

The Town annexed the property anyway in 2004, relying on a 1994 letter from a Forest Service representative, stating it had “no objection” to annexing several strips of property in the same vicinity. However, the Town had previously stated that it realized this letter was unclear.

In 2009, EBC, LLC requested that Awendaw annex its property, and the Town passed an ordinance annexing that property and simultaneously rezoning it as a “planned development” to permit residential and commercial development. In annexing the EBC property, the Town relied on the ten-foot National Forest strip as well as the church property. Without either component, there would be no contiguity and annexation would be impossible.

In November of 2009, the petitioners filed a complaint against the Town and EBC alleging, among other things, that the Town lacked authority to annex the ten-foot strip of National Forest property because the Forest Service never submitted an annexation petition. The Town and EBC moved for partial summary judgment contending the petitioners lacked standing and that the statute of limitations had run.

At trial, a surveyor testified that the 1994 Forest Service letter referred to a different strip of land. The Town’s administrator responded that the Town had used the 1994 letter at least seven times, and that he believed the letter incorporated the property in question. The petitioners testified they were concerned about potential harm caused by developing the property, including damage to unique species of animals. They testified that they were also concerned that the proposed development would threaten the Forest Service’s ability to conduct the controlled burns necessary to maintain the health of the forest.

The trial court found that the petitioners had standing and concluded that the annexations were void because the Town never received the required petition from the Forest Service. The Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioners lacked standing.

In analyzing the standing issue, the South Carolina Supreme Court discussed its prior cases that held “non-statutory parties” (meaning, non-property owners of the annexed properties) lacked standing to challenge a purportedly unauthorized annexation. Those cases, however, were premised on good faith attempts by annexing bodies, according to the Court.

The opinion at hand stated that the Court did not believe the General Assembly intended in establishing the statutory framework for annexation to preclude standing where there is a credible allegation that the annexing body engaged in “deceitful conduct”. The Court held that a party that can demonstrate the annexing body engaged in “nefarious conduct” has standing to challenge the annexation.

The Court also discussed the public importance exception to the standing rule. This exception states that standing may be found when an issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance. The Court stated that the petitioners had satisfied the “future guidance” prong of the public importance exception because the Town had used the 1994 letter numerous times and fully intended to use it again.

The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address the Towns’ remaining arguments.

*Vacary v. Town of Awendaw, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion No. 27855 (December 19, 2018).

Deadline approaching for new HOA recording requirement

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“Governing documents” should be recorded by January 10

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The South Carolina Homeowners Association Act, an amendment to Title 27 of the South Carolina Code which included new §27-30-130, was signed into law by Governor Henry McMaster and became effective on May 17.

The act states that in order to continue to be enforceable, a homeowners association’s governing documents must be recorded in the county where the property is located by January 10, 2019 for associations in place on the effective date of the legislation. For new associations or for amendments to governing documents, recording must take place by January 10 of the year following the adoption or amendment of the documents.

The requirement to record Master Deeds is, of course, not new to South Carolina practitioners. We have recorded Master Deeds and their required attachments since the creation of Horizontal Property Regimes became possible in South Carolina. The new requirement applies to rules, regulations and bylaws of associations, including amendments to rules, regulations and bylaws. Practitioners have not routinely recorded these documents. It is interesting that recording rules, regulations and bylaws will not be subject to the requirement of witnesses and acknowledgements of §30-5-30.

A memorandum from the Register of Deeds of Horry County states that these documents will be accepted electronically and across the counter. Documents recorded across the counter must contain an original wet signature plus the printed name and title of the signatory. Horry County will also require contact information (address, email address or telephone number) of the person recording the document, the Homeowners Association’s name and the physical address or legal description of the property. Horry County also highly recommends, but does not require, the book and page number of the recorded Master Deed. This additional information may be included in a cover sheet.

The law also creates a new duty to disclose whether real property being sold is part of a homeowners association and a duty to disclose the condition of floors, foundations, plumbing, electrical and other components of the property. Real estate practitioners may be called upon to assist with these newly-created disclosures.

Another requirement of the legislation includes a 48-hour notice for meetings that are intended to increase budgets by more than ten percent. A requirement for access to community documents by owners was also added. This requirement was previously in place for associations that are created as non-profit corporations. The new law makes it clear that all homeowners associations must provide similar access to documents for owners. The law also gives magistrate’s courts concurrent jurisdiction for monetary disputes of up to $7,500 involving homeowners association disputes.

SC Court reverses itself on “active energy” judgment issue

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South Carolina dirt lawyers seldom breathe a sigh of relief when our Supreme Court decides a real estate case. But the November 21 opinion in Gordon v. Lancaster* was greeted with a collective “thank goodness”!  We were living with a less-than-exact term for the viability of a judgment, and we didn’t like it.

The question in this case was whether a creditor may execute on a judgment more than ten years after enrollment when the ten-year statutory period for execution** expires during the course of litigation. The Court overturned its 2010 decision in Linda Mc Co. v. Shore***, which held that, despite the passage of more than ten years, the judgment continued to have “active energy” because the judgment creditor had filed for supplemental proceedings.

In the current case, a judgment was enrolled in 2002 against Rudolph Drews, the now-deceased uncle of the Petitioner Donald Lancaster, in connection with a civil action for violating securities laws in an investment scheme for a new business venture in Charleston. Frank Gordon, the creditor, filed a petition for supplemental proceedings in 2006. During the hearing, Gordon’s counsel became suspicious that Drews’ wife and Lancaster were attempting to shield Drews’ assets from creditors. The hearing was continued when Drews failed to produce tax and financial documents.

Drews died in 2007. Gordon sought to continue supplemental proceedings, but there were delays in the estate administration. In 2010, suspicions were confirmed about hiding assets when Lancaster was deposed. Soon after, one day before her scheduled deposition, Drews’ wife died. Gordon filed this action, asserting Lancaster assisted Drews is hiding assets in violation of the Statute of Elizabeth. In 2011, Drews’ estate confessed judgment in the approximate amount of $300,000, and his wife’s estate settled with Gordon for $60,000.

During a bench trial in 2013, Lancaster moved for a directed verdict based on Gordon’s prior concession that the suit was based on the earlier judgment, which was obviously older than ten years. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, relying on the holding in Linda Mc: If a party takes action to enforce a judgment within the ten-year statutory period of active energy, the resulting order will be effective even if issued after the ten-year period has expired.

The Court noted that Linda Mc represented a departure from its historic approach and created confusion in what was formerly a well-settled area of the law. (To that I would like to very politely reply “duh”.) The Court overruled itself and returned to the bright-line ten-year rule.

In a footnote, the Court stated that it is overruling Linda Mc prospectively. The same footnote referred to Justice Pleicones’ dissent in Linda Mc, which predicted confusion in a previously settled area of the law.

Justice Few concurred in the result but disagreed with overruling Linda Mc, which he said created a narrow exception to the bright-line ten-year rule for the issuance of an execution on a judgment. There was a discussion in the opinion and the concurring opinion about dictum vs. holding, but, thankfully, nothing concrete came out of that. Justice James concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Linda Mc should be overruled, but believing that Gordon should have received relief because of the prospective nature of the decision.

Pennsatucky AmenAs a title insurance lawyer and title examiner from way back, I am happy to see us return to a common sense, bright-line approach to the ten-year rule. Can I get an “Amen”?

* South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27847, November 21, 2018.

** South Carolina Code Section 15-39-30.

*** 390 S.C. 543, 703 S.E.2d 499 (2010).

Welcome to The Hotel California*

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You can resign; but you can never stop paying dues

 

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A recent South Carolina Supreme Court case deals with whether the governing documents of a Beaufort County development, Callawassie Island, unambiguously require equity members to continue paying expenses after resignation.** The trial court and Supreme Court found no ambiguities. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Justice Hearn disagreed.

In 1999, Ronnie and Jeanette Dennis purchased a home on Callawassie Island for $590,000 and joined a private club known as the Callawassie Island Club, paying $31,000 to become “equity members”. The governing documents in place at the time of the purchase provided that an equity member who resigns will be obligated to continue to pay dues and food and beverage minimums to the Club until the equity membership is reissued.

In 2010***, Mr. and Mrs. Dennis decided to resign their membership in the club but to retain ownership of their home. They sent a letter of resignation to the club and stopped making all payments. At that time, the required payments included $634 monthly as membership dues, $100 monthly in special assessments, and $1,000 yearly in food and beverage minimums.

The governing documents were amended many times over the years, and the dissent argued that the controlling documents at issue in the case could not even be identified by the Club. The Supreme Court held, however, that all versions of the documents contained the language requiring the continued payments.

Mr. and Mrs. Dennis argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Club’s interpretation violates §33-31-620 of the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act which provides that a member of a nonprofit corporation may resign at any time. The Supreme Court pointed to subsection (b) of that statute, however, which states that a resignation does not relieve the member from any obligations incurred prior to the resignation. The dissent said the majority’s interpretation effectively eliminates any meaningful right of resignation.

The dissent called the majority’s result “harsh” and stated that taking the majority’s view to its “logical end”, the monetary obligations to the club would extend beyond a member’s lifetime. The majority stated that they were not deciding whether the governing documents could support perpetual liability. The emphasis was provided by the Court.

The Supreme Court suggested that Mr. and Mrs. Dennis could have eliminated their obligations to the Club by selling their home. In footnote 7, the dissent countered that the majority “blithely” suggests selling the house, which may be easier said than done.

The footnote refers to a news article included in the record that reveals the Club’s membership scheme has significantly chilled potential buyers. **** According to this article, one member failed to sell her property for more than two years, despite listing it for $1. As of July of 2016, according to the article, eight lots were listed at less than $10,000 each. The footnote asserts that these facts bely the use by the majority of the description of Callawassie Island property as “exclusive.”

The circuit court had awarded the Club summary judgment, and the Supreme Court reinstated that order. What an interesting case! I hope some of my lawyer friends from Beaufort County will let me know whether the homes in this development are selling better in 2018.

 

*Not my joke.  See footnote 4 of the case:  “Although we disagree with the court of appeals’ legal reasoning here, we do applaud the reference to the Eagles’ hit Hotel California.”  Who said justices aren’t funny?

**The Callawassie Island Members Club, Inc. v. Dennis, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27835 (August 29, 2018).

***Keep in mind how dismal the economy continued to be in South Carolina in 2010.

****Kelly Meyerhofer, Callawassie Club ruling: Court sides with members, cited Eagles song, The Beaufort Gazette (August 5, 2016).

Can an alley be the basis of an appurtenant easement in SC?

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The Court of Appeals says it can

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Two valuable downtown Charleston residential lots were the subject of an easement case decided by the South Carolina Court of Appeals on September 19.* Much to the dismay of the owners of 45 Lagare Street, the Court held that an appurtenant easement exists in the form of an alley that runs along a boundary of 45 Lagare Street for the benefit of 47 Lagare Street.

Master-in-Equity Mikell Scarborough had granted summary judgment in favor of the owner of 47 Lagare Street, finding an easement appurtenant burdened 45 Lagare Street, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In 1911, the properties were considered a single lot known as 47 Lagare Street owned by W.G. Hinson. That year, Hinson divided the property, creating 45 Lagare Street, and conveying that lot to his niece. The 1911 deed established an easement for the benefit of the 47 Lagare Street, which Hinson retained. This language established the easement:

Also, the full and free use and enjoyment as an easement to run with the land of the right of ingress, egress, and regress, in, over, through, and upon the alley-way eight (8) feet wide as a drive way or carriage way, situation, lying, and being immediately to the south of (47 Lagare), and being the southern boundary of said (47 Legare).

Title to both lots passed to third parties, and in 1971, a new survey was drawn,** and the owners of both properties provided verbatim descriptions of the original easement and covenanted that the no buildings or obstructions would be erected on the easement area. The documents stated that the covenants would run with the land.

The most recent deed of the benefited property recited the existence of the easement, but the most recent deed of the burdened property did not. In 2004, the owner of the benefited property added a chain-link fence and masonry wall along the border with the burdened property.

During the trial, the Appellants argued that the easement had been abandoned and stated that the only time it was used was to allow for the Respondent’s landscapers to walk down the driveway to use the gate. Respondent testified that the easement area is also used by her family members, guests, tradesmen and other permittees to access the rear of 47 Legare for large-scale appliances, equipment, and machinery and to provide access to the only suitable area for off-street parking. She also claimed that she uses the easement to access the back of her property in a golf cart.

The first issue on appeal became whether a terminus existed on 47 Legare, a requirement for an appurtenant easement. Two Supreme Court cases were discussed, Whaley v. Stevens, 21 S.C.221 (1884), which held that the terminus requirement in South Carolina only requires the dominant estate to be contiguous or adjacent to the easement. A later case, Steele v. Williams, 204 S.C. 124 (1944) held that an alleyway was an easement in gross rather than an appurtenant easement because it lacked a terminus.

The Court of Appeals found Whaley controls although no South Carolina case has explicitly defined the terminus requirement. The Court held that the terminus issue is a fact-specific inquiry and that, intuitively, the dominant estate must have access to the purported easement.

In addition, the Court stated, an appurtenant easement might be found if the purported easement (1) at least touches the dominant estate and (2) in cases where the easement is an adjacent boundary between—or runs parallel—to the dominant and servient estates, such as the case at hand, the easement does not extend beyond the dominant estate’s boundary. (At most, the easement ends at the lot line of the dominant estate.) In Steele, the alley extended beyond the appellant’s property.

The intent of the parties was held to be determinative, and the Court held that the 1911 common owner, Hinson, clearly intended that the driveway would be an easement appurtenant.

The Court next discussed the appurtenant easement requirement of necessity. 47 Legare Street obviously has direct public access on Lagare Street, but the Court held that the easement was necessary to reach the rear of the property by large-scale equipment and tools and to provide for off-street parking.

We will wait to see whether our Supreme Court has the opportunity to weigh in on this issue.

 

* Williams v. Tamsberg, S.C. Court of Appeals Opinion No. 5596 (September 19, 2018)

** Plat of Number 47 Legare Street and Easement surveyed by Cummings & McCrady, Inc., dated February 1971, is attached.