South Carolina law

South Carolina has another builder arbitration case

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Real estate law never bores me, but our cases may seem particularly mundane considering the Murdaugh prosecution that has gripped our state for more than a month. You may want to put this blog aside until the jury returns its verdict. I’ve seen so many photos on social media of groups of lawyers watching the case together that I am confident real estate is not top of mind!

Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC* is a South Carolina Court of Appeals case which was originally issued June 1, 2022, then withdrawn, substituted and refiled February 15, 2023.

The Huskins signed a Purchase Agreement with Mungo in June 2015 for a home in Westcott Ridge subdivision in Irmo. The document consisted of three pages. The first page contained a statutory notice of arbitration, the second page included a paragraph entitled “LIMITED WARRANTY”, and the third page included a paragraph entitled “ARBITRATION AND CLAIMS.”

In 2017, the Huskins filed an action against Mungo alleging the Purchase Agreement violated South Carolina law by disclaiming implied warranties without providing for a price reduction or other benefit to the purchaser for relinquishing those rights. The causes of action included: (1) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and (4) declaratory relief regarding the validity of the waiver and release of warranty rights and the validity of Mungo’s purported transfer of all remaining warranty obligations to a third party.

Mungo filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Huskins’ responsive memorandum argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable. They asserted that the limitation of warranties provision should be considered as a part of the agreement to arbitrate. The Circuit Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration. In ruling the arbitration clause was not one-sided and unconscionable, the Circuit Court found that (1) the limited warranty provision must be read in isolation from the arbitration clause; and (2) terms in the arbitration clause pertaining to a 90-day time limit were not one-sided and oppressive because they did not waive any rights or remedies otherwise available by law.

The Court of Appeals initially held that the Circuit Court’s order was immediately appealable, stating that our state procedural rules, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act, govern appealability of arbitration orders. While arbitration orders are not typically immediately appealable under South Carolina law, this order had granted Mungo’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which is an appealable order.

The Court next held that the arbitration clause must be considered separately from the limited warranty provision, citing cases to the effect that arbitration provisions are separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded. A prior D.R. Horton South Carolina Supreme Court case** considered the arbitration and warranty provisions together, in part because the title of the paragraph, “Warranties and Dispute Resolution” signaled that the provisions should be read as a whole. Since the Mungo paragraphs were separated, the Court of Appeals said they should be read separately. In addition, the two provisions did not contain cross references.

The Court next addressed the Huskins’ argument that the limitation of claims provision restricted the statutory limitations period from three years to 90 days and was therefore not severable from the arbitration clause. The Court agreed that the provision that limited the statute of limitations is one-sided and oppressive, but held that the arbitration clause is enforceable because the unconscionable provision is severable.

After concluding that the Huskins lacked a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration clause, the Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause’s shortening of the statute of limitations violates South Carolina law and is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.

The Circuit Court’s order was affirmed as modified.

Now …. back to the Murdaugh trial!

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5916 (June 1, 2022, Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled February 15, 2023.

**Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. 42, 790 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

Facts of HOA-Developer dispute called “not for the weary”

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On February 8, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an opinion* in a real estate case involving the I’On development in Charleston County. Justice Hearn’s opening sentence is revealing: “This case involves promises made and broken to homeowners by a developer and its affiliated entities.” The first sentence describing the facts is equally telling: “The facts of this case are complicated, and, (in the words of a prior Supreme Court opinion, citation omitted) are “not for the weary.”

I’On is described as a high-density residential development that comprises public squares, restaurants, shops, and homes designed to imitate historic urban housing, including a replica of downtown Charleston’s Rainbow Row. The opinion recites that after the Court rejected a referendum effort to restrict multi-use zoning, construction of I’On Phase II began around 2000.

In 2010 two individual homeowners sued the developer entities and individuals for various causes of action related to the nonconveyance of certain real property and community amenities within the neighborhood. A mistrial was ordered to realign the homeowner’s association as a plaintiff. A subsequent trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the HOA in the amount of $1.75 million for breach of fiduciary duty and in favor of an individual owner in the amount of $20,000 for negligent misrepresentation.

The history of the development includes a 1998 Property Report filed with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to comply with the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The report contained a paragraph in all caps promising that “recreational facilities” would be conveyed to the HOA upon completion of construction. But the report warned that certain recreational facilities may be owned and operated by persons other than the HOA.

The Court recited that shortly after the Report was issues, the developers began a pattern of conduct altering their initial promise to convey ownership of the disputed properties to the HOA. Later, an easement agreement was executed and signed by the same person in three different roles, as manager of the I’On Club, as president of the HOA, and as general manager of the I’On Company. A property owner expressed the concern that this agreement was “sort of shaking hands with yourself.”

The Court of Appeals waffled, first upholding the lower’s court’s verdicts, then, on rehearing, practically nullifying the verdicts.

I am not going to get down into the weeds on the complex facts, but I do want to make a couple of points for your information.

First, the statute of limitations issues were thorny, and the Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court’s submission of these issues to the jury and stated that the facts supported the jury’s determination of the question of when the statute of limitations began to run.

Second, please pay attention to footnote 7. It states that the developer conceded on appeal that one individual owner’s contract to purchase his lot was a sealed instrument and thus has a twenty-year statute of limitations under S.C. Code §15-3-520. Please pay particular attention to whether your clients signed “sealed instruments” because liability under those instruments may be much longer than anticipated.

Otherwise, the Court was adamant that the verdicts were appropriate because of the “plethora of evidence presented of the Developers’ bad faith, broken promises, and self-dealing.”

Represent your developer clients well, dirt lawyers, to avoid losing cases like this one.  Read this case carefully and share it with your developer clients as an excellent lesson of what not to do!

*Walbeck v. The I’On Company, LLC, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28134 (February 8, 2023)

MV Realty sued by Florida Attorney General

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This blog has previously discussed MV Realty PBC, LLC. South Carolina title examiners report they are discovering “Homeowner Benefit Agreements” or “Exclusive Listing Agreements” filed in the public records as mortgages or memoranda of agreement. The duration of the agreements purport to be forty years, and quick search revealed hundreds of these unusual documents filed in several South Carolina counties. The documents indicate that they create liens against the real estate in question.

The company behind these documents is MV Realty PBC, LLC which appears to be doing business in the Palmetto State as MV Realty of South Carolina, LLC. The company’s website indicates the company will pay a homeowner between $300 and $5,000 in connection with its Homeowner Benefit Program. In return for the payment, the homeowner agrees to use the company’s services as listing agent if the decision is made to sell the property during the term of the agreement. The agreements typically provide that the homeowner may elect to pay an early termination fee to avoid listing the property in question with MV Realty.

In response to numerous underwriting questions on the topic, Chicago Title sent an underwriting memorandum to its agents entitled “Exclusive Listing Agreements”. Chicago Title’s position on the topic was set out in its memorandum as follows: “Pending further guidance, Chicago Title requires that you treat recordings of this kind like any other lien or mortgage. You should obtain a release or satisfaction of the recording as part of the closing or take an exception to the recorded document in your commitments and final policies.”

Googling MV Realty results in a great deal of information. Real estate lawyers should familiarize themselves with this company and its program to advise clients who may question whether the program makes sense from a financial and legal perspective.

In December, Florida’s Attorney General sued the company calling the venture a “deceptive scheme”. The lawsuit seeks an injunction, preventing enforcement of the contracts with consumers, preventing future deceptive and unfair trade practices, and returning funds to consumers.

News sources report that the company is active in 23 states, including South Carolina, and that Attorneys General in several other states are investigating the activities of this company. News sources also report numerous lawsuits against consumers seeking to enforce these contracts. U.S. Senator Sharrod Brown (D-Ohio) has indicated the company could face scrutiny from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development.

Dirt lawyers, pay attention to this situation. We will certainly see updates.

Second real estate case of the year rejects replacement mortgage doctrine

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SC Supreme Court discards arguments of ALTA and PLTA

Real estate cases can be absent from our Advance Sheets for months, but we have seen two cases already in 2023. In ArrowPoint Federal Credit Union v. Bailey* our Supreme Court was asked to adopt a novel replacement mortgage doctrine, but the Court deflected the question, deferring to the legislature, even though American Land Title Association and Palmetto Land Title Association filed amicus briefs in favor of the doctrine.

This is a real estate mortgage priority dispute between two institutional lenders concerning a residential property in Winnsboro.  Jimmy and Laura Bailey mortgaged their residence at 247 Morninglow Drive to Quicken Loans in the amount of $256,500. The mortgage was recorded on October 20, 2009. One week later, the Baileys closed an equity line of credit with ArrowPoint Federal Credit Union in the amount of $99,500. The second mortgage was recorded on November 4. ArrowPoint had record notice of the Quicken mortgage. On November 23, the Baileys refinanced the Quicken mortgage with Quicken, this time in the amount of $296,000.

In connection with the refinance, the Baileys executed an interesting document entitled “Title Company Client Acknowledgment”, which stated the only outstanding lien on the property was the prior Quicken mortgage. This statement was false. The Court stated that there was no clear explanation as to whether Quicken had the title searched at this point.

The Baileys used $257,459 from the refinance to pay off the first mortgage. On December 15, Quicken released the first mortgage and recorded the refinance mortgage. Quicken assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank, the petitioner in this case.

(If these facts make you break out into a cold sweat, then you were around doing real estate closings at the break-neck speed we suffered during this time frame.)

The Baileys defaulted on the line of credit, and ArrowPoint filed this action seeking a declaration that its line of credit had priority over the Quicken refinance mortgage. Both lenders moved for summary judgment. U.S. Bank claimed it had priority under the replacement mortgage doctrine. The special referee and Court of Appeals agreed with ArrowPoint, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Both appeals courts concluded that adopting the replacement mortgage doctrine is a question for the General Assembly.

Dirt lawyers are intimately familiar with South Carolina’s race-notice statute (S.C. Code §30-7-10) which prioritizes liens based on notice and the recording date.

The Supreme Court recited that it had recognized the equitable subordination doctrine as an exception to the race-notice statute. The Court noted the right of subrogation is essentially a creation of the court of equity, which allows a person who is secondarily liable for a debt, upon paying the debt, to assume by law the place of the creditor whose debt is paid.  Decades later, the Court declined to recognize the doctrine for a lender that refinanced its own mortgage but failed to discover an intervening mortgage. The Court said in the case at hand that it had previously warned lenders of their duty to search titles!**

The Court noted that the replacement mortgage doctrine is another exception to the race-notice statute, and many jurisdictions either recognize the doctrine or follow its logic. Cases from other jurisdictions were cited, and the Restatement (Third) of Property was quoted. According to the Restatement, the replacement mortgage doctrine provides:

  • If a senior mortgage is released of record and, as a part of the same transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage retains the same priority as its predecessor, except
  • To the extent that any change in the terms of the mortgage or the obligation it secures is materially prejudicial to the holder of a junior interest in the real estate, or
  • To the extent that one who is protected by the recording act acquires an interest in the real estate at a time that the senior mortgage is not of record.

The Court said that it was required to respect the authority of the legislature on public policy matters and declined to sit as a “superlegislature” to second-guess the General Assembly’s decisions. The Court differentiated the equitable subrogation doctrine from the replacement mortgage doctrine by saying that the “race” begins with the original mortgage in the equitable subrogation situation, and the intervening lender suffers no loss. Under the replacement mortgage doctrine, on the other hand, the original first mortgage is satisfied of record and replaced with a new mortgage that is recorded after the intervening mortgage.

The Court also criticized the replacement mortgage doctrine because it dilutes the importance of title examinations. Lenders who seek to refinance their own mortgages, as Quicken did in this case, can easily search the title to discover the intervening lien. The last words of the case state, “Finally, we emphasize parties must conduct diligent title searches to protect their interests under the race-notice statute.”

I, for one, will not argue with that final statement. It now appears that if ALTA and PLTA want a replacement mortgage doctrine in South Carolina, they need to approach the legislature.

*South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28129, January 11, 2023.

**All the citations are omitted but are set out in detail in the subject case.  

Happy New Year dirt lawyers

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2023’s first real estate case is both humorous and sexy!

If real estate lawyers weren’t easily amused, our profession might live up to the common misconception that it’s boring. But the first South Carolina real estate case of 2023 is both funny and sexy. I’ll explain the funny part shortly. Sadly, the only thing sexy about this case* is that the property is occupied by two strip clubs. But let’s agree to be entertained where we can.

This is a specific performance case involving property in Charleston County. Clarke owned a strip club located at 2015 Pittsburgh Avenue in Charleston. The defendant’s predecessor in title owned a strip club across the street at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue. The Supreme Court called the property at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue the subject property, so we will, too. The subject property includes buildings and a parking lot.

In 1999, Clarke entered into a lease which permitted him to share the parking spaces on the subject property with the property owner. The lease contained the following language: “Right of First Refusal: Lessor grants the Lessee the right of first refusal should it wish to sell.”

Before we discuss what the Supreme Court had to say about this language, let me throw in my two cents. Don’t use the terms “lessor” and “lessee” when you draft leases. Use the terms everyone can understand, “landlord” and “tenant”. And please pay attention to prepositions. In this language, which party is “it”?  A drafter of real estate documents cannot be too precise!

Back to the case. I often read cases by starting with the dissent or concurrence. With complicated cases, the minority opinion often explains the holding quickly. This case isn’t complicated, but Justice Few really cut to the chase in his concurrence. And this is the funny part. Justice Few quips, “This instrument says nothing, does nothing, restrains nothing.” (Remember I admit to being easily amused.)

Justice James’ majority opinion goes into more detail.

When Clarke learned that his landlord had conveyed to subject property to Fine Housing for $150,000, he initiated this action for specific performance. Interestingly, the closing attorney failed to raise the lease and the right of first refusal with the purchaser, but Fine Housing admitted it had record notice of both.

The trial court ruled the right of first refusal is enforceable as to the entire property and ordered Fine Housing to convey title to Clarke upon his payment of $350,000. There is no explanation for this figure. Appraisals must have been involved. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the right of first refusal is an unreasonable restraint on alienation and is therefore unenforceable.

The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that whether a right of first refusal is enforceable turns on whether the right unreasonably restrains alienation. The Court agreed with The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §3.4 and held that the factors to be considered include: (1) the legitimacy of the purpose of the right; (2) the price at which the right may be exercised; and (3) the procedures for exercising the right. The Court further held that these factors are not exclusive, and in this case, agreed to address another point raised by Fine Housing—the lack of clarity as to what real property the right encumbers.

Clarke argued that the lease provides the right applies to all the property, the price should be determined by the seller, and South Carolina law requires that the right should be exercised within a reasonable time.

Fine Housing argued that the lease merely identifies the location of the leased parking spaces, and the remaining language does not provide the clarity needed to identify the property intended to be encumbered by the right. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the uncertainty as to what property is encumbered supports the conclusion that the right is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.

The Court also agreed with Fine Housing that the failure of the right to determine a price and the procedures for its exercise also created an unreasonable restraint on alienation.

The bottom line is that the Court held the language to be so imprecise as to be unenforceable. While real estate lawyers are always interested in obtaining the best deal for clients, the second most important aim of drafting real estate documents should be clarity.

Always keep in mind how Justice Few dismissed the language that says nothing, does nothing and restrains nothing! You never want language you draft to be dismissed so easily!

*Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc., South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28126 (January 4, 2023)

All the Rules of Professional Conduct are not intuitive

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…but this one is: be honest!

Some of the rules we learned in our professional responsibility classes in law school were problematic because they didn’t seem intuitive. I found the advertising rules to be particularly prickly. The rules surrounding financial recordkeeping require extreme attention to detail in accounting, and we went to law school because we aren’t strong in math, right? Even the rules surrounding competency require careful study for each practice area.

But Rule 407’s requirement of honesty is identical to the directive our parents imposed and, for that reason, absolutely intuitive. As lawyers, we must be honest in our professional relationships.

One lawyer learned this lesson the hard way according to a November 23 attorney disciplinary opinion from the South Carolina Supreme Court. *

This lawyer worked as a law clerk for a firm after graduation and became an associate attorney when he was admitted to practice in November 2017. He was paid on an hourly basis. The firm used computer software to track working hours in real time, and throughout 2018, the lawyer used software to clock in and out during times when he was not in the office or otherwise working to inflate his hours and increase his pay.

Fortunately, the lawyer did not bill clients directly, so no client overpaid because of his misconduct. At tax time, though, the lawyer’s supervising attorney discovered the discrepancy and confronted the associate. The total overpayment was just short of $18,000. After confronting the lawyer, the firm allowed the associate to self-report. His report included a signed restitution agreement in which he agreed to repay the law firm in full. 

The lawyer also filed an affidavit in mitigation, in which he expressed remorse and explained that his preoccupation with financial security arose from his disadvantaged upbringing. He said he was desperate to prove his personal worthiness and to achieve financial security. Those goals eclipsed his better judgment. He also stated he has worked with counselors to understand why he committed this misconduct.

He entered into an agreement for a six-month suspension, which the Court accepted. He was also required to complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School and to pay the costs incurred by the ODC in investigating and prosecuting the matter.

Stay honest out there, lawyers, and take the time to mentor young lawyers with regard to their ethical responsibilities.

*In the Matter of Jacob, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion No. 28122 (November 23, 2022).

Housing Authority must exercise discretion in eviction

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Real estate cases can be sad, and this is one of those. City of Charleston Housing Authority v. Brown* Involved the eviction of a mother from a public housing apartment because her son committed a crime.

The facts, according to the Court, are not in dispute. Katrina Brown renewed her lease with CHA in 2015. Brown’s minor son and daughter were listed as residents and members of her household. Early in 2016, Brown’s son, who was 17 at the time, was arrested a mile away from his home carrying a gun. Two weeks later, CHA sent an official 30-day notice of eviction to Brown. The notice informed Brown that her eviction was based on the lease’s prohibition against violent criminal behavior.

At the magistrate’s hearing, a Charleston detective testified that Brown’s son confessed to an attempted armed robbery that occurred two days before his arrest and approximately one mile from the housing complex. Brown testified that her son was being held in jail, and if he was able to make bond, he would live with his grandmother.

The magistrate found that evictions based on criminal activity provisions of housing lease agreements must be determined on a case-by-case basis and denied the application for eviction based on the testimony as well as factors from federal law.  On appeal, the circuit court remanded the case for factual findings and analysis regarding whether Brown’s eviction was warranted under 42 U.S.C. §1437(1)(6), the federal statute governing public housing leases, which is colloquially known as the “One-Strike Rule.”

The “One-Strike Rule” requires federally-funded public housing authorities and private landlords renting their properties to tenants receiving federal housing assistance to include a provision in all leases stating that drug-related criminal activity, as well as criminal activity that threatens other tenants or nearby residents, are grounds for eviction, regardless of the tenant’s personal knowledge of the criminal activity. The strict-liability, no-fault rule was premised on the idea that public housing tenants are entitled to homes that are “decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.

In May of 2017, the magistrate issued an order evicting Brown, finding her son’s actions created good cause for eviction. At an appeal hearing before the circuit court, Brown argued that non-drug related criminal activity can only be grounds for eviction if the activity constitutes a present threat to the residents of the public housing facility and occurred in the immediate vicinity of the facility. She also argued that CHA was required to demonstrate that they used discretion in evaluating the circumstances and alternatives to eviction of an innocent tenant before evicting the entire household. She asserted that CHA made no showing that it exercised discretion.

The circuit court affirmed Brown’s eviction. The Court of Appeals found that Brown’s son’s actions created good cause for the eviction. The Court cited a 2007 Massachusetts case that set out the policy reason for the “One-Strike Rule”: Tenants of public housing developments represent some of the most needy and vulnerable segments of our population, including low-income families, children, the elderly, and the handicapped. It should not be their fate, to the extent manifestly possible, to live in fear of their neighbors.

The Court further held that the threat need not be “ongoing” to justify eviction. Then the Court turned to an interesting aspect of federal law, holding the “One-Strike Rule” does not automatically require eviction. Rather, the housing authority must demonstrate that it exercises discretion in the decision to evict. The record must reflect that the housing authority knew it could refrain from invoking the “One-Strike Rule” under the circumstances.

The case was remanded to the magistrate for a hearing to determine whether CHA exercised discretion in deciding to pursue the eviction of Brown’s entire household for the criminal actions of her son.

I’m sure you understand what I mean about this case being sad. It is sad for the mother to be evicted for the actions of her son, and it is sad for the other residents of the facility to be subjected to such criminal activity. This is a difficult situation, and I’m encouraged to know that discretion must be exercised.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion No. 5941 (August 24, 2022)

Failure to search title leads to disastrous result

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Fourth Circuit unpublished opinion weighs in on SC tax sale issue

South Carolina appellate courts will overturn tax sales on the flimsiest of technicalities. In a recent unpublished opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a tax sale was not overturned, but the result was almost the same for the tax sale purchaser who failed to search the title.

Remember that an unpublished opinion has no precedential value, but this case is particularly interesting to South Carolina dirt lawyers who understand the necessity of searching titles. Thanks to my friend and real estate litigator extraordinaire Jim Koutrakos who sent this case to me.

Guardian Tax SC, LLC v. Day* involved a Charleston County tax sale. Ralph and Virginia Day bought property in Charleston in 1991. In 2006, the Days mortgaged the property to Bank of New York Mellon. Between 2005 and 2007, the Days failed to pay their federal income taxes, and beginning in 2010, they failed to pay -county taxes.

In 2016, the Day’s title was subject to three interests: (1) the county tax lien; (2) the mortgage; and (3) the federal tax lien. By operation of law (S.C. Code §12-49-10), the county tax lien took priority. The mortgage had a higher priority than the federal tax lien because it was recorded first. Charleston County sold the property to Guardian through a tax sale that year.

The County did not notify the bank or the United States of the tax sale, but it did publish notice in a local newspaper. Guardian’s purchase of the property satisfied the County lien and generated approximately $1.6 million in excess proceeds. The Days owed approximately $3.5 million to the bank and their federal tax liabilities totaled approximately $2.9 million.

After the tax sale, the County searched the title and notified the Days and the bank of their one-year statutory redemption period. The County did not notify the United States nor inform Guardian of the notices it sent to the Days and the bank. Neither the Days nor the bank redeemed the property. At some point after the expiration of the period of redemption, Guardian searched the title and discovered for the first time the interests of the bank and the United States. Guardian filed a quiet title action which was removed to federal court by the United States.

Guardian, the bank, and the United States filed competing motions for summary judgment. Guardian and the bank argued over the excess proceeds, and Guardian argued that the federal tax lien was extinguished by the tax sale or, alternatively, the United States should be awarded a 120 day right of redemption.

The district court agreed with the bank that it was entitled to the proceeds and agreed with the United States that its lien was valid and that a right of redemption was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tax sale was nonjudicial and that the United States’ lien survived the tax sale because it did not receive the required notice. Further, because of the lack of notice, the redemption period never began to run.

Both courts rejected Guardian’s argument that the federal lien should be extinguished because of South Carolina equitable principles because federal law governs the enforcement of federal tax liens. The Court of Appeals quoted the District Court’s jab that there is “nothing inequitable about the outcome” because Guardian could have avoided the result by engaging in due diligence prior to the tax sale by searching the title, a “minimal burden.”

*United States District Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished Opinion No. 21-1411 (August 23, 2022)

SC Supreme Court issues one more opinion on the Episcopal church controversy

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….despite the fact that the same Court declared “this case is over” in April

This is the fifth blog about the controversy surrounding the Episcopal Church and its properties in South Carolina. The subject of this post is the case the South Carolina Supreme Court decided on August 17* which follows an opinion in April** that declared definitively “this case is over”. It seems the Court found a reason to disagree with itself. And, once again, the Court declares that there will be no remand and that the case is over.

Church schisms are difficult in many ways, and the real estate issues are particularly thorny. This dispute began in 2010 when the Lower Diocese of South Carolina, after doctrinal disputes, dissociated from the National Episcopal Church. The parties have been involved in extensive litigation in state and federal courts for the years that have followed the dissociation. As dirt lawyers, we don’t have to figure out the doctrinal issues, but we do have to be concerned with the real estate issues.

As I said in April, my best advice to practicing real estate lawyers is to call your friendly and intelligent title insurance underwriter if you are asked to close any transaction involving Episcopal church property. In fact, call your underwriter when you deal with any church real estate transaction. They will stay current on the real estate issues involving churches.

The current controversy involves whether the parishes adopted the national church’s “Dennis Cannon”. This church law provides that all real and personal property owned by a parish is held in trust for the national church. The actions taken by each church with respect to the Dennis Cannon have been examined ad nauseum by our Court.

In April, the Court ruled that 14 of the 29 churches would be returned to the national body. The opinion re-filed in August ruled that six more churches are allowed to keep their properties. After this decision, 21 parishes will remain with the local entity and eight will be returned to the national entity.

Without belaboring the analysis, the following parishes will maintain their properties according to the April opinion. The statuses of these congregations do not change with the August opinion:

  • Trinity Episcopal Church, Pinopolis
  • The Protestant Episcopal Church of the Parish of Saint Philip, Charleston
  • The Protestant Episcopal Church of the Parish of Saint Michael, Charleston
  • Church of the Cross, inc. and Church of the Cross Declaration of Trust, Bluffton
  • The Church of the Epiphany, Eautawville
  • The Vestry and Church Warden of the Episcopal Church of the Parish of St. Helena, Beaufort
  • Christ St. Paul’s Episcopal Church, Conway
  • The Church of the Resurrection, Surfside
  • The Church of St. Luke and St. Paul, Radcliffeboro
  • The Vestry and Church Wardens of St. Paul’s Church, Summerville
  • Trinity Episcopal Church, Edisto Island
  • St.Paul’s Episcopal Church of Bennettsville, Inc.
  • All Saints Protestant Episcopal Church, Inc. Florence
  • The Church of Our Savior of the Diocese of South Carolina, John’s Island
  • The Church of the Redeemer, Orangeburg

The following churches were ordered returned to the National Church by the April opinion but allowed to maintain their properties by the August opinion:

  • The Church of the Good Shepherd, Charleston
  • St. Bartholomew’s Episcopal Church, Hartsville
  • The Vestry and Church Wardens of the Episcopal Church of the Parish of St. John, John’s Island
  • St. David’s Church, Cheraw
  • The Vestry and Church Wardens of the Parish of St. Matthew, St. Matthews, Fort Motte
  • Holy Trinity Episcopal Church, Charleston
  • Vestry and Church Wardens of the Episcopal Church of the Parish of Christ Church, Mount Pleasant
  • St. James Church, James Island

The properties of the following parishes are held in trust for the National Church, according to both opinions.

  • The Church of the Holy Comforter, Sumter
  • The Vestry and Church Wardens of St. Jude’s Church of Walterboro
  • Saint Luke’s Church, Hilton Head
  • The Vestries and Church Wardens of the Parish of St. Andrew (Old St. Andrew’s, Charleston)
  • The Church of the holy Cross, Spartanburg
  • Trinity Church of Myrtle Beach

We may see more church schism opinions in South Carolina and elsewhere. Stay in touch with your friendly title insurance company underwriter!

*The Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina v. The Episcopal Church, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion No. 28095 (Re-filed August 17, 2022)

**The Episcopal church in the Diocese of South Carolina v. The Episcopal Church, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion NO. 28095 (April 20, 2022).

Easements don’t typically lead to criminal contempt charges

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These horrible commercial neighbors have fought (and litigated) for years!

Our Advance Sheet from August 10 contained two Court of Appeals easement cases involving adjoining commercial properties in Murrells Inlet. Last week’s blog discussed the first of the two cases, which involved an award of attorneys’ fees*. This week, we’ll take up the second case. A footnote in the first case indicates the parties were heading to trial again immediately after oral arguments. These neighbors are obviously not getting along!

The litigation involves a restaurant property owned by Gulfstream Café, Inc. and an adjoining property containing a marina, a store and a parking lot owned by Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC. Palmetto’s predecessor in title granted four non-exclusive easements in 1986 and 1990 to Gulfstream. The easements allowed for ingress and egress and vehicular parking. It was anticipated that the marina property would use the parking primarily in the daytime and the restaurant property would use the parking primarily in the evening.

The easements included general warranties, the same language that appears in our normal general warranty deeds: “(A) does hereby bind itself and its successors and assigns, to warrant and forever defend, all and singular, the said easement unto (B), its successors and assigns, against itself and its successors and assigns, and all others whomsoever lawfully claiming, or to claim the same or any part thereof.” This language is consistent with South Carolina Code §27-7-10.

This case actually involves a criminal contempt finding in the Circuit Court for parking a golf cart in front of the easement holder’s delivery gate! The golf cart was parked there on multiple occasions in a normal parking spot. But Gulfstream couldn’t orchestrate efficient deliveries while the golf cart blocked its delivery gate. The parties are obviously horrible neighbors.

The second case reveals an interesting fact. The property owner of the burdened property intended to demolish its building and rebuild a larger building on stilts and extending over the parking lot. The owner of the easement was having none of that!

In 2017, the Circuit Court found criminal contempt and ordered a fine of $3,000 or thirty days in jail. In 2018, the parties proceeded to trial, and a jury awarded Gulfstream $1,000 for interference with the easement. The Circuit Court entered a permanent injunction: “(Appellants) are enjoined from preventing (Gulfstream) from enjoying the right(s) granted to it in the recorded nonexclusive joint easement. (Appellants) are restrained and may not expand the outside boundaries of any new building beyond those previously used. The (c)ourt is specifically not talking about height, only the outside boundaries.”

The parties fought on, seeking to clarify the easement, and seeking another criminal contempt finding. The Court amended the injunction for clarification. The Appellants moved again to clarify the injunction and argued that an injunction should not have been granted because the jury awarded monetary relief. Other arguments related to the building’s construction and that the injunction enlarged the easement. The Circuit Court denied the motions and issued a finding that the Appellants “engaged in criminal contempt of court by deliberate and intentional acts by placement of a golf cart which interfered with the proper use of the non-exclusive easement in this matter and was in direct violation of the (c)ourt’s previous order.” Appellants were fined $5,000.

Skipping a little of the very long procedural history, let’s move on to the appeal. To make a very long story shorter, the Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellants in criminal contempt. You should read these two entertaining cases. Real estate lawyers don’t often have the pleasure of being entertained by published opinions!

*The Gulfstream Café, Inc. v. Palmetto Industrial Development, LLC, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5935 (August 20, 2022).

** The Gulfstream Café, Inc., vs Lawhon, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5936 (August 20, 2022).