Real Estate Law

Owner of Folly Beach lots loses takings case in SC Supreme Court

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Braden’s Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach* involves two small, contiguous developed residential coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership, like the properties in question, to be merged into a single, larger property.

The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of the contiguous lots as vacation rental properties, but Braden’s Folly challenged the ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the Penn Central** test, which states that in regulatory takings cases, courts must examine the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, as well as the character of the government action.

Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden’s Folly. Folly Beach appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach.

The Court stressed that underlying its applicability of the Penn Central test was the distinct fragility of Folly Beach’s coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. The exemption empowered the City to act instead of the State in protecting the beach.

A portion of the northeast end of Folly beach has a double row of properties. The “A lots” are directly adjacent to the ocean-side of East Ashley Avenue, and the “B lots”—also known as “super-beachfront” lots—are closer to the ocean. There is no road between the A and B lots, so the B lots are accessible only through the A lots. Between beach renourishments, the B lots could be surrounded by the ocean on three sides. Braden’s Folly owns adjacent lots (Lot A and Lot B) on East Ashley Avenue. Both lots are very small.

Braden’s Folly contended that it had always intended to keep one of the lots and sell the other—whichever received the highest offer—to pay for the construction of a house on each lot. When the merger ordinance passed, the City sent a letter to Braden’s Folly requesting it stop marketing the lots separately. In response, Braden’s Folly filed the subject lawsuit.

The Supreme Court found that some facts weighed in favor of finding Braden’s Folly’s investment-backed expectation was reasonable and some facts weighed in favor of finding its expectation unreasonable. The Penn Central balancing test did not weigh in favor of either party, according to the Court.

Folly Beach and its witnesses set out the advantages to local beachfront property owners and the public at large of unwinding the super-beachfront development. The most important of the benefits to local property owners is the continued existence of federal funding for beach renourishment which in turn (1) protects A and B lots—particularly given that all the lots would be underwater if it were not for the continual renourishment; and (2) avoids property owners paying higher taxes if federal funding is extinguished.

The Court held that the merger ordinance was not a taking but responsible land use policy. Braden’s Folly retains, according to the Court, a near-full “bundle of sticks” incident to its ownership of the lots.

*South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28148 (April 5, 2023)

**Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978)

Virginia court holds HOA assessment invalid

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Dirt lawyers hear stories of dysfunctional homeowners’ associations routinely. I have one for you!

My husband and I built a second home at the beach in a relatively modest subdivision in 2011. Many of the houses are owner occupied, but many are on rental plans. My twenty-something daughter met a neighbor who asked her two questions, (1) “Is this your family’s first vacation home?” and (2) Your parents aren’t going to rent this house, are they?” It wasn’t a good start to our relationship.

We had several issues with ARB approvals during the building process, which were handled by our builder. At one point, he threw his hands in the air in frustration and said, “These people need to understand this isn’t DeBordieu.” In other words, the ARB seemed to believe the subdivision is much more affluent than it is.

When we attended our first (and only as it turns out) annual meeting of the owners, the president of the board promptly threw one of our neighbors out of the meeting for asking a question!  It was during the first five minutes of the meeting. We were shocked and vowed to steer clear of those meetings.

During our first winter, we received a very nasty letter telling us we had a dead tree that must be removed immediately. We were in Columbia, didn’t know about the dead tree, and even when we investigated, we decided the tree didn’t look any worse than the other winter trees. But we quickly took it down! We heard another neighbor received a similar letter telling him his mailbox was dirty and needed to be cleaned immediately.

We decided that we were going to be good neighbors and properly maintain our house and yard, but we would enjoy the beach and the gatherings of our growing family (including the four grandchildren we’ve been blessed with since we built the house) without getting involved with the neighbors.

Believe it or not, this story has a happy ending. Apparently, all the problems were caused by one homeowner who managed to get herself elected to the board and the ARB. She roamed the streets looking for rules violations and wrote the letters herself.  About the time we figured out the problem, she and her husband, thankfully, moved. The trouble among the neighbors immediately improved. Now, we have delightful neighborhood parties and enjoy getting to know our neighbors. And it seems everyone has a story about the bad neighbor. We stand around drinking beer and telling stories.

My guess is that our earlier bad HOA is like the one described in Buckholder v. Palisades Park Owners Ass’n, Inc.*, a Virginia case where the HOA imposed an assessment on all owners to fund the cost of inspecting each property for the purpose of finding violations of the HOA rules. Homeowners sued to have the assessment declared invalid.

Virginia has a statute that provides, “(e)xcept as expressly authorized by the Act, the declaration or as otherwise provided by law, no association shall…make an assessment or impose a charge against a lot owner unless the charge is a fee for services provided or related to use of the common area.”

The court invalided the assessment and remanded the case to the lower court.

I read about this interesting case on the DIRT listserv that I recommend routinely. You won’t be sorry if you sign up for the emails!

Professor Dale Whitman who moderates the listserv commented that this is the sort of thing that gives HOAs a bad name. He also commented, “While most states won’t have a statute exactly like Virginia’s, the lesson of the case remains applicable. If an HOA or condo board is going to impose an assessment to be used on anything other than the common areas (or reserves that will ultimately benefit the common areas), it needs to be certain that it has the legal power to do so, either by virtue of an applicable statute or its own declaration. This is particularly true if the assessment is almost certain to irritate and raise the hackles of some owners, as this one was.”

Several lawyers commented about the nature of folks who like to serve on HOA boards. Read the comments if you need a good laugh. The listserv is searchable.

I think I’ll share the case with my neighbors at the beach.

*76 Va. App. 577, 882 S.E.2d 906 (2023)

Foreign ownership of real estate has become a political issue

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Pending legislation in South Carolina may affect your transactions

Remember the Chinese surveillance balloon the United States shot down off the coast of the Palmetto State in February? That incident and other rising tensions between our government and China over several issues (the war in Ukraine, recognition of Taiwan, to name only two) have resulted in politicians proposing to broaden state law bans on foreign ownership of real estate.

According to a New York Times article dated February 7, entitled “How U.S-China Tensions Could Affect Who Buys the House Next Door”, legislation in Texas was proposed after a Chinese billionaire with plans to create a wind farm bought more than 130,000 acres of land near a U.S. Air Force base.

Proposed legislation is also pending in Florida, California and now South Carolina to restrict ownership of real estate by “hostile nations” or “foreign adversaries.” Some have suggested that such bills may run afoul of due process and equal protection issues.

Chicago Title published an Underwriting Memorandum on April 5 entitled “Foreign Ownership of Property in South Carolina” to advise agents of the pending legislation in our state.

You may recall that we have an existing statute (S.C. Code §27-13-30) prohibiting any “alien” or corporation controlled by an “alien” from owning or controlling more than 500,000 acres of land in South Carolina. Recently, the South Carolina Senate passed Senate Bill 576 that amends the existing statute by expressly prohibiting any citizen of a foreign adversary or corporation controlled by a foreign adversary from acquiring any interest in South Carolina property.  The proposed legislation will now be considered by the House.

The term “foreign adversary” is defined in the bill as “any foreign government or nongovernment person determined by the United States Secretary of Commerce to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States citizens.”

And there are other bills pending along the same lines.

Senate Bill 392 would amend our existing statute to reduce the amount of property allowed to be owned by an “alien” to 1,000 acres. House Bill 3566 would add a statute to reduce to 1,000 acres the amount of land that can be owned or controlled by China, the Chinese Communist Party, or an entity whose principal place of business is located within China.  House Bill 3118 would prohibit any company owned or controlled by China or the Chinese Communist Party or that has a principal place of business in China from owning, leasing, possessing, or exercising any control over real estate located within 50 miles of a state or federal military base for the purpose of installing or erecting any type of telecommunications or broadcasting tower.

All dirt lawyers will know immediately that all versions of the proposed legislation will create uncertainty in our market. I have only two pieces of advice at this point. First, let’s all monitor the proposed legislation. And, second, let’s pay attention to guidance provided by our excellent title insurance underwriters.

Who said real estate law is boring?

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Take a look at this “Deed of Child”

My friend and self-professed “fellow title nerd”, Lacey Higginbotham, who practices in Myrtle Beach, sent to me a “Deed of Child” she found in the Horry County records. The document is dated May 10, 1930, recorded June 3. 1930, and purports to convey a child from a father to another family .

Because the document is difficult to read, I’ll squint for you and set it out here for your reading pleasure:

I can imagine Professor Spitz presenting this document to us as an exam in our first- year property law class. He might ask for us to spot all the issues concerning the enforceability of this document. Thanks, Lacey, for this diversion!

How do mail away closings work in light of In re Lester*?

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A reader posed this question to me

A recent blog about a South Carolina Supreme Court amendment to a comment following our UPL rule contained the following paragraph:

“Remember that our Supreme Court adamantly told us in In re Lester* that a lawyer must be physically present for a closing. Prior to Lester, a closing attorney might be on vacation and available by telephone to answer closing questions. Lester called a halt to that practice.”

A reader responded, “Claire, can you clarify the effects of In Re Lester on ‘mail away’ closings?” This is such a great question, and I responded that I would answer with a new blog. This is that blog!

In the South Carolina Bar’s publication, Handbook for South Carolina Dirt Lawyers, I included the following discussion of mail-away closings.

“Attorneys in resort areas have done “mail away” closings routinely for years. Titles are examined, closing packages are prepared and mailed to a remote location for signatures. Recent South Carolina Supreme Court disciplinary cases requiring attorneys to be present at closings have caused some attorneys to question whether mail away closings can be done ethically by South Carolina attorneys.

The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue specifically, so no one knows the answer to this question. However, in a seminar in 2005, a lawyer from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel was asked whether an attorney can ethically handle a closing by mail.

He responded that it was his opinion that the attorney should:

           •     Schedule a closing date, time and place;

           •     Advise the clients that they should attend the closing;

           •     Advise the clients that the attorney will be able to provide better representation if the clients attend the closing; and

           •     Require the clients to sign a document indicating they received the foregoing advice but chose not to attend the closing.

Another speaker at the seminar suggested that he would only handle mail away closings if the clients agreed to meet with a lawyer in the clients’ location to execute the documents.

On September 16, 2005, we received a more formal opinion in the form of Ethics Advisory Opinion 05-16. This opinion states that an attorney may ethically conduct a real estate closing by mail as long as it is done in a way that:  (1) ensures that the attorney is providing competent representation to the client; (2) all aspects of the closing remain under the supervision of an attorney;  and (3) the attorney complies with the duty to communicate with the client, so as to maintain the attorney-client relationship and be in a position to explain and answer any questions about the documents sent to the client for signature. To meet this test, according to the opinion, clients must have reasonable means to be in contact with the attorney, by telephone, facsimile, or electronic transmission.

The Opinion states that there is no legal requirement that a client attend the closing, but it must be the client’s decision not to attend the closing. The Opinion acknowledges today’s climate by this statement: “Given today’s technological advances in communications and funds transfer, to require a client living in one part of the country to attend a closing against the client’s own wishes is both unnecessary and punitive.” The Opinion makes the point that the duties of the attorney do not change when the closing is accomplished by mail in this statement: “The prudent attorney will conduct closings by mail in such a fashion that the client is fully informed and properly advised, that the client has a reasonable means to consult with the attorney, and that all personnel assisting the attorney are properly supervised.”

South Carolina closing attorneys are relieved to have this authority and appreciative of the efforts of the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee.”

Of course, technology has drastically changed since these words were written, but the legal issues have not. A dirt lawyer can certainly handle mail away closings ethically. But dirt lawyers must still practice law in connection with those closings.

Please feel free to make comments and ask questions about these blogs!

*353 S.C. 246, 578 S.E. 2d 7 (2003).

Does real estate “wholesaling” work in our market?

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Maybe, but real estate practitioners should be careful!

A recent discussion on South Carolina Bar’s real estate section listserv surrounded whether and how to close “double closings” vs. “assignments of contracts”.  This is not a novel topic in our market. In the very hot market that preceded the crash beginning in 2007, one of the biggest traps for real estate attorneys was closing flip transactions. Title insurance lawyers fielded questions involving flips on an hourly basis!

Flips have never been illegal per se. Buying low and selling high or buying low and making substantial improvements before selling high are great ways to make substantial profits in real estate.  

Back in the day, we suggested that in situations where there were two contracts, the ultimate buyer and lender had to know the property was closing twice and the first closing had to stand on its own as to funding. In other words, the money from the second closing could not be used to fund the first closing. (Think: informed consent confirmed in writing!)

Where assignments of contracts were used, we suggested that the closing statements clearly reflect the cost and payee of the assignment.

The term real estate investors are using these days to define buying low and selling high is “wholesaling”.  A quick Google search reveals many sites defining and educating (for a price, of course) the process of wholesaling. This is a paraphrase of a telling quote I found from one site:

If you’re looking for a simple way to get started in real estate without a lot of money, real estate wholesaling could be a viable option. Real estate wholesaling involves finding discounted properties and putting the properties under contract for a third-party buyer. Before closing, the wholesaler sells their interest in the property to a real estate investor or cash buyer.

One of the smart lawyers on our listserv, Ladson H. Beach, Jr., suggested that there does not appear to be a consensus among practitioners about how to close these transactions. He suggested reviewing several ethics cases* that set out fact-specific scenarios that may result in ethical issues for closing attorneys.

In addition to the ethics issues, Mr. Beach suggested there may be a licensing issue where an assignor is not a licensed broker or agent. A newsletter from South Carolina Real Estate Commission dated May 2022 which you can read in its entirety here addresses this issue. The article, entitled “License Law Spotlight: Wholesaling and License Law” begins:

“The practice of individuals or companies entering into assignable contracts to purchase a home from an owner, then marketing the contract for the purchase of the home to the public has become a hot topic, nationwide in the real estate industry in recent years. This is usually referred to as ‘wholesaling’. The question is often, “is wholesaling legal?’ The answer depends upon the specific laws of the state in which the marketing is occurring. In South Carolina, the practice may require licensure and compliance with South Carolina’s real estate licensing law.”

The article suggests that the Real Estate Commission has interpreted that the advertising of real property belonging to another with the expectation of compensation falls under the statutory definition of “broker” in S.C. Code §40-57-30(3) and requires licensure. Further, the newsletter suggests S.C. Code §40-57-240(1) sets up an exception; licensing is not required if an unlicensed owner is selling that owner’s property. The Commission has interpreted, according to this article, that having an equitable interest is not equivalent to a legal interest for the purpose of licensing. In other words, a person having an equitable interest acquired by a contract is not the property’s owner and has no legal interest in the property for the purposes of this licensing exemption.

So real estate practitioners have several concerns about closing transactions of this type. Be very careful out there and consult your friendly title insurance underwriter and perhaps your friendly ethics lawyer if you have concerns as these situations arise in your practice.

*In re Barbare (2004), In re Fayssoux (2009), In re Brown (2004) and In re Newton (2007)

South Carolina has another builder arbitration case

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Real estate law never bores me, but our cases may seem particularly mundane considering the Murdaugh prosecution that has gripped our state for more than a month. You may want to put this blog aside until the jury returns its verdict. I’ve seen so many photos on social media of groups of lawyers watching the case together that I am confident real estate is not top of mind!

Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC* is a South Carolina Court of Appeals case which was originally issued June 1, 2022, then withdrawn, substituted and refiled February 15, 2023.

The Huskins signed a Purchase Agreement with Mungo in June 2015 for a home in Westcott Ridge subdivision in Irmo. The document consisted of three pages. The first page contained a statutory notice of arbitration, the second page included a paragraph entitled “LIMITED WARRANTY”, and the third page included a paragraph entitled “ARBITRATION AND CLAIMS.”

In 2017, the Huskins filed an action against Mungo alleging the Purchase Agreement violated South Carolina law by disclaiming implied warranties without providing for a price reduction or other benefit to the purchaser for relinquishing those rights. The causes of action included: (1) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and (4) declaratory relief regarding the validity of the waiver and release of warranty rights and the validity of Mungo’s purported transfer of all remaining warranty obligations to a third party.

Mungo filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Huskins’ responsive memorandum argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable. They asserted that the limitation of warranties provision should be considered as a part of the agreement to arbitrate. The Circuit Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration. In ruling the arbitration clause was not one-sided and unconscionable, the Circuit Court found that (1) the limited warranty provision must be read in isolation from the arbitration clause; and (2) terms in the arbitration clause pertaining to a 90-day time limit were not one-sided and oppressive because they did not waive any rights or remedies otherwise available by law.

The Court of Appeals initially held that the Circuit Court’s order was immediately appealable, stating that our state procedural rules, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act, govern appealability of arbitration orders. While arbitration orders are not typically immediately appealable under South Carolina law, this order had granted Mungo’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which is an appealable order.

The Court next held that the arbitration clause must be considered separately from the limited warranty provision, citing cases to the effect that arbitration provisions are separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded. A prior D.R. Horton South Carolina Supreme Court case** considered the arbitration and warranty provisions together, in part because the title of the paragraph, “Warranties and Dispute Resolution” signaled that the provisions should be read as a whole. Since the Mungo paragraphs were separated, the Court of Appeals said they should be read separately. In addition, the two provisions did not contain cross references.

The Court next addressed the Huskins’ argument that the limitation of claims provision restricted the statutory limitations period from three years to 90 days and was therefore not severable from the arbitration clause. The Court agreed that the provision that limited the statute of limitations is one-sided and oppressive, but held that the arbitration clause is enforceable because the unconscionable provision is severable.

After concluding that the Huskins lacked a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration clause, the Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause’s shortening of the statute of limitations violates South Carolina law and is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.

The Circuit Court’s order was affirmed as modified.

Now …. back to the Murdaugh trial!

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5916 (June 1, 2022, Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled February 15, 2023.

**Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 417 S.C. 42, 790 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

Facts of HOA-Developer dispute called “not for the weary”

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On February 8, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an opinion* in a real estate case involving the I’On development in Charleston County. Justice Hearn’s opening sentence is revealing: “This case involves promises made and broken to homeowners by a developer and its affiliated entities.” The first sentence describing the facts is equally telling: “The facts of this case are complicated, and, (in the words of a prior Supreme Court opinion, citation omitted) are “not for the weary.”

I’On is described as a high-density residential development that comprises public squares, restaurants, shops, and homes designed to imitate historic urban housing, including a replica of downtown Charleston’s Rainbow Row. The opinion recites that after the Court rejected a referendum effort to restrict multi-use zoning, construction of I’On Phase II began around 2000.

In 2010 two individual homeowners sued the developer entities and individuals for various causes of action related to the nonconveyance of certain real property and community amenities within the neighborhood. A mistrial was ordered to realign the homeowner’s association as a plaintiff. A subsequent trial resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the HOA in the amount of $1.75 million for breach of fiduciary duty and in favor of an individual owner in the amount of $20,000 for negligent misrepresentation.

The history of the development includes a 1998 Property Report filed with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to comply with the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The report contained a paragraph in all caps promising that “recreational facilities” would be conveyed to the HOA upon completion of construction. But the report warned that certain recreational facilities may be owned and operated by persons other than the HOA.

The Court recited that shortly after the Report was issues, the developers began a pattern of conduct altering their initial promise to convey ownership of the disputed properties to the HOA. Later, an easement agreement was executed and signed by the same person in three different roles, as manager of the I’On Club, as president of the HOA, and as general manager of the I’On Company. A property owner expressed the concern that this agreement was “sort of shaking hands with yourself.”

The Court of Appeals waffled, first upholding the lower’s court’s verdicts, then, on rehearing, practically nullifying the verdicts.

I am not going to get down into the weeds on the complex facts, but I do want to make a couple of points for your information.

First, the statute of limitations issues were thorny, and the Supreme Court upheld the Circuit Court’s submission of these issues to the jury and stated that the facts supported the jury’s determination of the question of when the statute of limitations began to run.

Second, please pay attention to footnote 7. It states that the developer conceded on appeal that one individual owner’s contract to purchase his lot was a sealed instrument and thus has a twenty-year statute of limitations under S.C. Code §15-3-520. Please pay particular attention to whether your clients signed “sealed instruments” because liability under those instruments may be much longer than anticipated.

Otherwise, the Court was adamant that the verdicts were appropriate because of the “plethora of evidence presented of the Developers’ bad faith, broken promises, and self-dealing.”

Represent your developer clients well, dirt lawyers, to avoid losing cases like this one.  Read this case carefully and share it with your developer clients as an excellent lesson of what not to do!

*Walbeck v. The I’On Company, LLC, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28134 (February 8, 2023)

MV Realty sued by Florida Attorney General

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This blog has previously discussed MV Realty PBC, LLC. South Carolina title examiners report they are discovering “Homeowner Benefit Agreements” or “Exclusive Listing Agreements” filed in the public records as mortgages or memoranda of agreement. The duration of the agreements purport to be forty years, and quick search revealed hundreds of these unusual documents filed in several South Carolina counties. The documents indicate that they create liens against the real estate in question.

The company behind these documents is MV Realty PBC, LLC which appears to be doing business in the Palmetto State as MV Realty of South Carolina, LLC. The company’s website indicates the company will pay a homeowner between $300 and $5,000 in connection with its Homeowner Benefit Program. In return for the payment, the homeowner agrees to use the company’s services as listing agent if the decision is made to sell the property during the term of the agreement. The agreements typically provide that the homeowner may elect to pay an early termination fee to avoid listing the property in question with MV Realty.

In response to numerous underwriting questions on the topic, Chicago Title sent an underwriting memorandum to its agents entitled “Exclusive Listing Agreements”. Chicago Title’s position on the topic was set out in its memorandum as follows: “Pending further guidance, Chicago Title requires that you treat recordings of this kind like any other lien or mortgage. You should obtain a release or satisfaction of the recording as part of the closing or take an exception to the recorded document in your commitments and final policies.”

Googling MV Realty results in a great deal of information. Real estate lawyers should familiarize themselves with this company and its program to advise clients who may question whether the program makes sense from a financial and legal perspective.

In December, Florida’s Attorney General sued the company calling the venture a “deceptive scheme”. The lawsuit seeks an injunction, preventing enforcement of the contracts with consumers, preventing future deceptive and unfair trade practices, and returning funds to consumers.

News sources report that the company is active in 23 states, including South Carolina, and that Attorneys General in several other states are investigating the activities of this company. News sources also report numerous lawsuits against consumers seeking to enforce these contracts. U.S. Senator Sharrod Brown (D-Ohio) has indicated the company could face scrutiny from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development.

Dirt lawyers, pay attention to this situation. We will certainly see updates.

Second real estate case of the year rejects replacement mortgage doctrine

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SC Supreme Court discards arguments of ALTA and PLTA

Real estate cases can be absent from our Advance Sheets for months, but we have seen two cases already in 2023. In ArrowPoint Federal Credit Union v. Bailey* our Supreme Court was asked to adopt a novel replacement mortgage doctrine, but the Court deflected the question, deferring to the legislature, even though American Land Title Association and Palmetto Land Title Association filed amicus briefs in favor of the doctrine.

This is a real estate mortgage priority dispute between two institutional lenders concerning a residential property in Winnsboro.  Jimmy and Laura Bailey mortgaged their residence at 247 Morninglow Drive to Quicken Loans in the amount of $256,500. The mortgage was recorded on October 20, 2009. One week later, the Baileys closed an equity line of credit with ArrowPoint Federal Credit Union in the amount of $99,500. The second mortgage was recorded on November 4. ArrowPoint had record notice of the Quicken mortgage. On November 23, the Baileys refinanced the Quicken mortgage with Quicken, this time in the amount of $296,000.

In connection with the refinance, the Baileys executed an interesting document entitled “Title Company Client Acknowledgment”, which stated the only outstanding lien on the property was the prior Quicken mortgage. This statement was false. The Court stated that there was no clear explanation as to whether Quicken had the title searched at this point.

The Baileys used $257,459 from the refinance to pay off the first mortgage. On December 15, Quicken released the first mortgage and recorded the refinance mortgage. Quicken assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank, the petitioner in this case.

(If these facts make you break out into a cold sweat, then you were around doing real estate closings at the break-neck speed we suffered during this time frame.)

The Baileys defaulted on the line of credit, and ArrowPoint filed this action seeking a declaration that its line of credit had priority over the Quicken refinance mortgage. Both lenders moved for summary judgment. U.S. Bank claimed it had priority under the replacement mortgage doctrine. The special referee and Court of Appeals agreed with ArrowPoint, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Both appeals courts concluded that adopting the replacement mortgage doctrine is a question for the General Assembly.

Dirt lawyers are intimately familiar with South Carolina’s race-notice statute (S.C. Code §30-7-10) which prioritizes liens based on notice and the recording date.

The Supreme Court recited that it had recognized the equitable subordination doctrine as an exception to the race-notice statute. The Court noted the right of subrogation is essentially a creation of the court of equity, which allows a person who is secondarily liable for a debt, upon paying the debt, to assume by law the place of the creditor whose debt is paid.  Decades later, the Court declined to recognize the doctrine for a lender that refinanced its own mortgage but failed to discover an intervening mortgage. The Court said in the case at hand that it had previously warned lenders of their duty to search titles!**

The Court noted that the replacement mortgage doctrine is another exception to the race-notice statute, and many jurisdictions either recognize the doctrine or follow its logic. Cases from other jurisdictions were cited, and the Restatement (Third) of Property was quoted. According to the Restatement, the replacement mortgage doctrine provides:

  • If a senior mortgage is released of record and, as a part of the same transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage retains the same priority as its predecessor, except
  • To the extent that any change in the terms of the mortgage or the obligation it secures is materially prejudicial to the holder of a junior interest in the real estate, or
  • To the extent that one who is protected by the recording act acquires an interest in the real estate at a time that the senior mortgage is not of record.

The Court said that it was required to respect the authority of the legislature on public policy matters and declined to sit as a “superlegislature” to second-guess the General Assembly’s decisions. The Court differentiated the equitable subrogation doctrine from the replacement mortgage doctrine by saying that the “race” begins with the original mortgage in the equitable subrogation situation, and the intervening lender suffers no loss. Under the replacement mortgage doctrine, on the other hand, the original first mortgage is satisfied of record and replaced with a new mortgage that is recorded after the intervening mortgage.

The Court also criticized the replacement mortgage doctrine because it dilutes the importance of title examinations. Lenders who seek to refinance their own mortgages, as Quicken did in this case, can easily search the title to discover the intervening lien. The last words of the case state, “Finally, we emphasize parties must conduct diligent title searches to protect their interests under the race-notice statute.”

I, for one, will not argue with that final statement. It now appears that if ALTA and PLTA want a replacement mortgage doctrine in South Carolina, they need to approach the legislature.

*South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28129, January 11, 2023.

**All the citations are omitted but are set out in detail in the subject case.