Charleston County

Captain Sam’s Spit is in the news again

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This blog has discussed “Captain Sam’s Spit” in Kiawah Island three times before. Googling that picturesque name will reveal a treasure trove of news, opinion and case law involving the proposed development of a beautiful and extremely precarious tract of pristine beach property on South Carolina’s coast.

In the news, reported by WCSC- TV (Charleston), the town of Kiawah Island, the Kiawah Island Community Association, and the Kiawah Conservancy filed a breach of contract suit against KDP II, LLC, the owner of the spit. According to the reporting, the lawsuit alleges that a 2013 development agreement required KDP to deed a portion of the property to the Kiawah Island Community Association as community open space and to place all remaining undeveloped lands under a conservation easement to be held by the Conservancy.

The most recent blog discussed the 2021 Supreme Court case the latest case* in which the Court refers to the property as one of our state’s only three remaining pristine sandy beaches readily accessible to the general public. The other two beaches are Hunting Island State Park and Huntington Beach State Park. I enjoy the blessing of walking the pristine beach of Huntington Beach State Park on a regular basis, so despite having a career on the periphery of real estate development, I am in favor of maintaining these three state treasures.

The South Carolina Bar’s Real Estate Intensive seminars have included field trips to Captain Sam’s Spit, from a distance at least. Professor Josh Eagle of the University of South Carolina School of Law was an excellent tour guide, and how many opportunities do we, as dirt lawyers, have for field trips? The South Carolina Environmental Law Project, located in Pawleys Island, fights these cases. Amy Armstrong, an attorney with that entity, joined our group to explain the environmental and legal issues.

Here are greatly simplified facts. Captain Sam’s Spit encompasses approximately 170 acres of land above the mean high-water mark along the southwestern tip of Kiawah Island and is surrounded by water on three sides. The Spit is over a mile long and 1,600 feet at its widest point, but the focal point of the latest appeal is the land along the narrowest point (the “neck”), which is the isthmus of land connecting it to the remainder of Kiawah Island. The neck occurs at a deep bend in the Kiawah River where it changes direction before eventually emptying into the Atlantic Ocean via Captain Sam’s Inlet.

The neck has been migrating eastward because of the erosive forces of the Kiawah River. The “access corridor”—the buildable land between the critical area and the ocean-side setback line—has narrowed significantly in the past decade to less than thirty feet. Googling this issue will lead to active maps which show the change over time. The width of the neck is significant because the developer needs enough space to build a road. At the base of the neck is Beachwalker Park, operated by the Charleston County Parks and Recreation Commission. Our fieldtrips were conducted on that Park.

Twice before, the administrative law court (ALC), over the initial objection of DHEC, has granted permits for the construction of an extremely large erosion control device in the critical area. In both cases (citations omitted), the Supreme Court found the ALC erred. The 2021 case arose from the ALC’s third approval of another structure termed “gargantuan” by the Supreme Court—a 2,380-foot steel sheet pile wall designed to combat the erosive forces carving into the sandy river shoreline in order to allow the developer to construct the road to support the development of fifty houses. The Court again reversed and, in effect, shut down the proposed development, at least temporarily. The economic interests of an increased tax base and employment opportunities do not justify eliminating the public’s use of protected tidelands, according to the Court.

I wouldn’t be surprised to see future appellate court cases involving this property.

*South Carolina Coastal Conservative League v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28031 (June 2, 2021)

Happy New Year dirt lawyers

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2023’s first real estate case is both humorous and sexy!

If real estate lawyers weren’t easily amused, our profession might live up to the common misconception that it’s boring. But the first South Carolina real estate case of 2023 is both funny and sexy. I’ll explain the funny part shortly. Sadly, the only thing sexy about this case* is that the property is occupied by two strip clubs. But let’s agree to be entertained where we can.

This is a specific performance case involving property in Charleston County. Clarke owned a strip club located at 2015 Pittsburgh Avenue in Charleston. The defendant’s predecessor in title owned a strip club across the street at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue. The Supreme Court called the property at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue the subject property, so we will, too. The subject property includes buildings and a parking lot.

In 1999, Clarke entered into a lease which permitted him to share the parking spaces on the subject property with the property owner. The lease contained the following language: “Right of First Refusal: Lessor grants the Lessee the right of first refusal should it wish to sell.”

Before we discuss what the Supreme Court had to say about this language, let me throw in my two cents. Don’t use the terms “lessor” and “lessee” when you draft leases. Use the terms everyone can understand, “landlord” and “tenant”. And please pay attention to prepositions. In this language, which party is “it”?  A drafter of real estate documents cannot be too precise!

Back to the case. I often read cases by starting with the dissent or concurrence. With complicated cases, the minority opinion often explains the holding quickly. This case isn’t complicated, but Justice Few really cut to the chase in his concurrence. And this is the funny part. Justice Few quips, “This instrument says nothing, does nothing, restrains nothing.” (Remember I admit to being easily amused.)

Justice James’ majority opinion goes into more detail.

When Clarke learned that his landlord had conveyed to subject property to Fine Housing for $150,000, he initiated this action for specific performance. Interestingly, the closing attorney failed to raise the lease and the right of first refusal with the purchaser, but Fine Housing admitted it had record notice of both.

The trial court ruled the right of first refusal is enforceable as to the entire property and ordered Fine Housing to convey title to Clarke upon his payment of $350,000. There is no explanation for this figure. Appraisals must have been involved. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the right of first refusal is an unreasonable restraint on alienation and is therefore unenforceable.

The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that whether a right of first refusal is enforceable turns on whether the right unreasonably restrains alienation. The Court agreed with The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §3.4 and held that the factors to be considered include: (1) the legitimacy of the purpose of the right; (2) the price at which the right may be exercised; and (3) the procedures for exercising the right. The Court further held that these factors are not exclusive, and in this case, agreed to address another point raised by Fine Housing—the lack of clarity as to what real property the right encumbers.

Clarke argued that the lease provides the right applies to all the property, the price should be determined by the seller, and South Carolina law requires that the right should be exercised within a reasonable time.

Fine Housing argued that the lease merely identifies the location of the leased parking spaces, and the remaining language does not provide the clarity needed to identify the property intended to be encumbered by the right. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the uncertainty as to what property is encumbered supports the conclusion that the right is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.

The Court also agreed with Fine Housing that the failure of the right to determine a price and the procedures for its exercise also created an unreasonable restraint on alienation.

The bottom line is that the Court held the language to be so imprecise as to be unenforceable. While real estate lawyers are always interested in obtaining the best deal for clients, the second most important aim of drafting real estate documents should be clarity.

Always keep in mind how Justice Few dismissed the language that says nothing, does nothing and restrains nothing! You never want language you draft to be dismissed so easily!

*Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc., South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28126 (January 4, 2023)

Failure to search title leads to disastrous result

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Fourth Circuit unpublished opinion weighs in on SC tax sale issue

South Carolina appellate courts will overturn tax sales on the flimsiest of technicalities. In a recent unpublished opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a tax sale was not overturned, but the result was almost the same for the tax sale purchaser who failed to search the title.

Remember that an unpublished opinion has no precedential value, but this case is particularly interesting to South Carolina dirt lawyers who understand the necessity of searching titles. Thanks to my friend and real estate litigator extraordinaire Jim Koutrakos who sent this case to me.

Guardian Tax SC, LLC v. Day* involved a Charleston County tax sale. Ralph and Virginia Day bought property in Charleston in 1991. In 2006, the Days mortgaged the property to Bank of New York Mellon. Between 2005 and 2007, the Days failed to pay their federal income taxes, and beginning in 2010, they failed to pay -county taxes.

In 2016, the Day’s title was subject to three interests: (1) the county tax lien; (2) the mortgage; and (3) the federal tax lien. By operation of law (S.C. Code §12-49-10), the county tax lien took priority. The mortgage had a higher priority than the federal tax lien because it was recorded first. Charleston County sold the property to Guardian through a tax sale that year.

The County did not notify the bank or the United States of the tax sale, but it did publish notice in a local newspaper. Guardian’s purchase of the property satisfied the County lien and generated approximately $1.6 million in excess proceeds. The Days owed approximately $3.5 million to the bank and their federal tax liabilities totaled approximately $2.9 million.

After the tax sale, the County searched the title and notified the Days and the bank of their one-year statutory redemption period. The County did not notify the United States nor inform Guardian of the notices it sent to the Days and the bank. Neither the Days nor the bank redeemed the property. At some point after the expiration of the period of redemption, Guardian searched the title and discovered for the first time the interests of the bank and the United States. Guardian filed a quiet title action which was removed to federal court by the United States.

Guardian, the bank, and the United States filed competing motions for summary judgment. Guardian and the bank argued over the excess proceeds, and Guardian argued that the federal tax lien was extinguished by the tax sale or, alternatively, the United States should be awarded a 120 day right of redemption.

The district court agreed with the bank that it was entitled to the proceeds and agreed with the United States that its lien was valid and that a right of redemption was not appropriate. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tax sale was nonjudicial and that the United States’ lien survived the tax sale because it did not receive the required notice. Further, because of the lack of notice, the redemption period never began to run.

Both courts rejected Guardian’s argument that the federal lien should be extinguished because of South Carolina equitable principles because federal law governs the enforcement of federal tax liens. The Court of Appeals quoted the District Court’s jab that there is “nothing inequitable about the outcome” because Guardian could have avoided the result by engaging in due diligence prior to the tax sale by searching the title, a “minimal burden.”

*United States District Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Unpublished Opinion No. 21-1411 (August 23, 2022)

Here’s a great idea!

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The official who records our deeds should not be selected via popularity contest!

I’m all about the democratic process. But when it comes to the Register of Deeds, I believe that person should be appointed locally based on a very specific skill set. Popularity and politics should have nothing to do with choosing the appropriate person to handle the very meticulous administrative process that deals with recording public documents.

Apparently, the Executive Committee of the Charleston County Bar Association wants to take action to make sure the ROD for Charleston County is qualified. Take a look at this letter that body wrote to County Council on January 19.

If you follow this blog, you know that the Finkel Firm has brought suit against the Charleston County ROD asking for a writ of mandamus based on the horrific lag involved with recording documents in that county. This letter provides additional evidence that something is terribly wrong in the Charleston County ROD office, and action needs to be taken sooner rather than later.

As this letter points out, South Carolina is a race notice state. If our deeds, mortgages and other documents are not recorded in a timely manner and in the proper order, then the proper priorities among parties is thrown to the wind. The rights of parties relating to real property are based on when the documents establishing those rights are properly recorded.

The letter lists eighteen counties where the RODs are currently appointed. The letter also states that no constitutional provision or statutory edict requires an election in this case.

What do you think? Should the Register of Deeds be appointed by County Council?

Court decides an interesting, but unpublished, case on the effect of a plat notation

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Unpublished opinions don’t typically get my attention, but my friend, Bill Booth, sent this one* to me because he found it interesting, and I do, too. As a reminder, unpublished opinions have no precedential value, but they sometimes provide insight on how the Court might react in a similar situation, at least under the current makeup of the court.

The issue in this case was whether a notation on a subdivision plat that certain lots were “for agricultural use only” created a valid restriction of the use of the lots. Mikell Scarborough, Master-in-Equity for Charleston County, granted summary judgment, relying on extrinsic evidence to conclude that there was no intent to create a restriction despite the plain language on the face of the plat. That decision was affirmed.

The Court cited familiar cases holding that restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and must be strictly construed in favor of the free use of property. The Court also referred to cases holding that when a deed describes land as shown on a plat, the plat becomes a part of the deed. The interesting twist became whether the plat notation created an ambiguity that would allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence.

The Court found that the language in the plat was not ambiguous, but that the origin of the note created the ambiguity. The surveyor provided an affidavit to the effect that the Charleston County Planning Commission placed the agricultural use restriction on the plat “for the purpose of indicating that Charleston County would not, at that time, approve building permits for the lots because (the lots in question) did not meet current minimum standards for a modified conventional sub-service disposal system.”

When the plat was submitted for approval, the property owners included a letter explaining they were aware that the land possessed poor soil conditions for septic systems. The letter requested that the subdivision be approved with the stipulation that any lot that did not support a septic system would be restricted from becoming a building lot until public sewer service became available.

The case doesn’t make this point clear, but I am assuming the Appellant sued other lot owners who had built on their lots despite the plat notation. In other words, the Appellant wanted the restriction enforced as to other lots, not the lot the Appellant purchased. Interestingly, one house had been built before the Appellant purchased its lot.

A representative of the Appellant claimed he relied on the plat notation and that his title insurance company told him the lots were restricted. The Court found it significant, however, that the property owners who recorded the plat did not intend to restrict the property.

The Appellant argued that the deeds for all the lots specifically state that the property is subject to all restrictions, reservations, easements and other limitations that appear of record, including on the Plat. The Court held, citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions §151 (2015) that common “subject to” language does not create a restriction where none exists.

The Appellant also argued that an agricultural use exception in the title insurance policy was evidence that the restriction ran with the land, but the Court held that the title insurance company was merely noting the provision was on the plat so that it would not be liable if the Appellant could not build on its lot.  

The Court concluded that the record does not contain a scintilla of evidence to support the imposition of a building restriction on the Respondents’ lots.

Carpenter Braselton, LLC v. Roberts, South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-280.