Welcome to The Hotel California*

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You can resign; but you can never stop paying dues

 

hotel california

A recent South Carolina Supreme Court case deals with whether the governing documents of a Beaufort County development, Callawassie Island, unambiguously require equity members to continue paying expenses after resignation.** The trial court and Supreme Court found no ambiguities. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Justice Hearn disagreed.

In 1999, Ronnie and Jeanette Dennis purchased a home on Callawassie Island for $590,000 and joined a private club known as the Callawassie Island Club, paying $31,000 to become “equity members”. The governing documents in place at the time of the purchase provided that an equity member who resigns will be obligated to continue to pay dues and food and beverage minimums to the Club until the equity membership is reissued.

In 2010***, Mr. and Mrs. Dennis decided to resign their membership in the club but to retain ownership of their home. They sent a letter of resignation to the club and stopped making all payments. At that time, the required payments included $634 monthly as membership dues, $100 monthly in special assessments, and $1,000 yearly in food and beverage minimums.

The governing documents were amended many times over the years, and the dissent argued that the controlling documents at issue in the case could not even be identified by the Club. The Supreme Court held, however, that all versions of the documents contained the language requiring the continued payments.

Mr. and Mrs. Dennis argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Club’s interpretation violates §33-31-620 of the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act which provides that a member of a nonprofit corporation may resign at any time. The Supreme Court pointed to subsection (b) of that statute, however, which states that a resignation does not relieve the member from any obligations incurred prior to the resignation. The dissent said the majority’s interpretation effectively eliminates any meaningful right of resignation.

The dissent called the majority’s result “harsh” and stated that taking the majority’s view to its “logical end”, the monetary obligations to the club would extend beyond a member’s lifetime. The majority stated that they were not deciding whether the governing documents could support perpetual liability. The emphasis was provided by the Court.

The Supreme Court suggested that Mr. and Mrs. Dennis could have eliminated their obligations to the Club by selling their home. In footnote 7, the dissent countered that the majority “blithely” suggests selling the house, which may be easier said than done.

The footnote refers to a news article included in the record that reveals the Club’s membership scheme has significantly chilled potential buyers. **** According to this article, one member failed to sell her property for more than two years, despite listing it for $1. As of July of 2016, according to the article, eight lots were listed at less than $10,000 each. The footnote asserts that these facts bely the use by the majority of the description of Callawassie Island property as “exclusive.”

The circuit court had awarded the Club summary judgment, and the Supreme Court reinstated that order. What an interesting case! I hope some of my lawyer friends from Beaufort County will let me know whether the homes in this development are selling better in 2018.

 

*Not my joke.  See footnote 4 of the case:  “Although we disagree with the court of appeals’ legal reasoning here, we do applaud the reference to the Eagles’ hit Hotel California.”  Who said justices aren’t funny?

**The Callawassie Island Members Club, Inc. v. Dennis, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27835 (August 29, 2018).

***Keep in mind how dismal the economy continued to be in South Carolina in 2010.

****Kelly Meyerhofer, Callawassie Club ruling: Court sides with members, cited Eagles song, The Beaufort Gazette (August 5, 2016).

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Captain Sam’s Spit continues to be the subject of litigation

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I’ve blogged about “Captain Sam’s Spit” in Kiawah Island previously. Googling that name will reveal a treasure trove of news, opinion and case law involving the proposed development of a gorgeous but extremely precarious tract of pristine beach property on South Carolina’s coast.

The South Carolina Bar’s Real Estate Intensive seminar in July of 2016 and again in July of 2018 included field trips to view this property, from a distance at least. Professor Josh Eagle of the University School of Law is an excellent tour guide, and how many opportunities do we, as lawyers, have for field trips? South Carolina Dirt lawyers should calendar the July 2020 version of this workshop.

Real estate development is my bread and butter, but two visits to the area told me that property should not be developed. A fellow field tripper, however, pointed out that the south end of Pawleys Island, where my parents took me to the beach as a child and which has been developed for many years, is just as precarious.

Captain Sam's Spit

Aerial view of Captain Sam’s Spit from The Post & Courier

The South Carolina Environmental Law Project located in Pawleys Island fights these cases. Amy Anderson, an attorney with that entity, joined us and explained the environmental issues as well as the legal battle.

Six months ago, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a bulkhead and retaining wall could not be built to develop the property.  Just last month, however, Administrative Law Court Judge Ralph Anderson ruled that a road can be built to support the development because the economic benefits of building homes on Captain Sam’s Spit outweigh its natural preservation.

Here are greatly simplified facts in a very complicated South Carolina Supreme Court case: the developer and the community association entered into a development agreement in 1994. That agreement covered many issues, one of which was the proposed conveyance from the developer to the community association of a ten-mile strip of beachfront property, basically, the entire length of the island. A deed consummated that conveyance in 1995. All of the property conveyed was undevelopable because of the State’s jurisdictional lines.

I didn’t learn the following fact from the published case, but I learned it from one of the lawyers who was kind enough to speak with me. When the jurisdictional lines were redrawn by the State, the 4.62 acre tract became developable. The developer then took the position that the 1994 development agreement and the 1995 deed resulted from a mutual mistake, and that the parties never intended to include that tract.

The Master-in-Equity and Court of Appeals did not see it that way. Both found that the agreement and deed were unambiguous and that parole evidence of the intent of the parties was not allowable. The Supreme Court agreed.

In the recent Administrative Law Court case, Judge Anderson said the economic benefit of developing the property would include real property taxes of $5 million per year. This case is just the most recent in a decade of litigation.

Count on an appeal in this case and other litigation to follow. I’ll keep you posted!

Lawyer disciplined for involvement in investment scheme

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The SEC is not “another jurisdiction” for the purpose of reciprocal discipline

On June 27, the South Carolina Supreme Court suspended a lawyer for eighteen months based on Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charges*. While this case has nothing to do with dirt law, I bring it to the attention of South Carolina lawyers because they often find themselves in the position of forming and representing limited liability companies (LLCs).

SECThe South Carolina lawyer, John Kern, helped form and served as general counsel for Ventures Trust II LLC and Face-Off Acquisitions, LLC, two of the LLCs used in a fraudulent investment scheme perpetrated by Craig Berkman. Berkman fraudulently raised around $13.2 million from approximately 120 investors by selling memberships in the LLCs he controlled. Unfortunately for these investors, Berkman was subject to a $23 million judgment in Oregon, in connection with another fraudulent investment scheme, and was also facing bankruptcy in Florida. Berkman began to use some of the funds from his new ventures to pay his bankruptcy obligations in Florida, and the SEC got involved.

In 2014, Kern signed an offer of settlement and consented to an entry by the SEC of an order imposing sanctions against him. SEC findings included that (1) Kern willfully aided and abetted the fraudulent conduct of Berkman; (2) Kern was ordered to disgorge fees of around $235,000 and to pay a fine of $100,000; (3) Kern was barred from associating with brokers and investment advisors; and (4) Kern consented to being denied the privilege of practicing law before the SEC.

South Carolina’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) filed formal charges in 2016 and argued that the SEC is “another jurisdiction” under the Rule 29(e), which deals with conclusiveness of misconduct adjudications against lawyers in other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court found that the SEC is not a jurisdiction for the purposes of reciprocal discipline, but found that Kern was guilty of providing false information in statements to others.

Kern falsely assured Berkman’s bankruptcy attorney that none of the funds used to settle Berkman’s bankruptcy obligations were derived from Ventures II. Kern also issued a false memorandum to investors in Ventures II to the effect that their funds were secure and were not part of a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Berkman.

Kern’s primary defense in his South Carolina disciplinary proceedings was that he was totally unaware of Berkman’s malfeasance, and that as soon as he became aware, he resigned as general counsel for the LLCs and encouraged a principal in the companies to act as a whistleblower to the SEC. Kern argued that he had no dishonest or selfish motive, did not profit from his misconduct and showed remorse for the harm caused to investors. The Court said that it took these mitigating factors into consideration in imposing sanctions.

Professor John Freeman, who taught ethics to many of us, was qualified as an expert in the case and testified that when a lawyer acts as general counsel for a private securities company, he or she must exercise due diligence to ensure money is invested for the represented purposes.

Despite the fact that the SEC is not considered by the South Carolina Supreme Court to be a jurisdiction for the purposes of reciprocal jurisdiction against attorneys, this attorney was suspended for eighteen months because of his conduct that led to charges before the SEC.

The lesson to us is clear. Be careful in forming and representing LLCs and use proper due diligence in statements made to the investors in those entities. Lacking a dishonest motive is not enough to protect lawyers from discipline.

*In the Matter of Kern, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27820 (June 27, 2018)

SC Supreme Court holds email provides sufficient written notice

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….for at least one purpose

This blog is about dirt, but from time to time, dirt lawyers should review the rules our brother and sister litigators follow. Why? Sometimes those rules bleed over into our world, and sometimes, unfortunately, the transactions we handle are subject to litigation. And in this “ever changing world in which we live in”*, we should pay particular attention to changing rules involving technology. This is one of those changes.

The South Carolina Supreme Court held on February 28 that an email that provides written notice of entry of an order or judgment, if sent from the court, an attorney or record, or a party, triggers the time to serve a notice of appeal under Rule 203(b)(1) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR)*.  And the Court held that this is such a novel question of law that its holding applies only prospectively, and not to the case at hand.

Here’s the background. On December 15, 2014, the master-in-equity denied the foreclosure defendants’ petition for an order of appraisal. That same day, the master’s administrative assistant emailed a signed and stamped copy of the order and Form 4 to the bank and the defendants. Three days later, the defendants received a copy of both documents in the mail.

Believing the time to appeal began on the day they received the documents in the mail, the defendants served notice of appeal on January 15, 2015, which was thirty-one days after the email and twenty-eight days after they received the documents in the mail.

The Court of Appeals held that the email triggered the time to serve notice of appeal. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the petitioners did not dispute that the email constituted written notice of entry of the order or judgment. But they argued that the time to serve notice of an intent to appeal is only triggered when written notice is received by mail or hand delivery according to Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP). The Supreme Court held that the SCRCP do not apply to appellate procedure.

The Supreme Court examined Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR, which requires that a notice of appeal must be served within thirty days after receiving written notice of entry of the order or judgment and held that there is no requirement of service. All that is required, according to the Court, is that the parties receive notice. Further, there is nothing in the appellate court rules suggesting that the manner in which a party may receive notice is limited to the methods used to effectuate service.

Got it, dirt lawyers?  It’s technical, but this holding suggests that our Court is gradually accepting the technology we use every day as sufficient for notice purposes. One lesson for us is that we should be careful what we say in our emails as we handle our transactional practices! Another lesson for us is that we should all check our spam and junk email files to make sure we receive all communications that may create responsibility or liability for us.

*…with sincere apologies to Sir Paul McCartney.

**Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fallon Properties South Carolina, LLC, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27773, February 28, 2018.

The Quicken decision is out

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It’s not what dirt lawyers wanted or expected

The South Carolina Supreme Court never ceases to amaze when it decides real estate cases. Dirt lawyers seldom know what to expect. We read the precedents. We attend the hearings. We listen to the Justices’ questions. We believe we get a glimpse of what they may be thinking. But we miss the mark. Last week, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided the much anticipated Quicken case*, and if I had predicted the top five possible outcomes, I would not have come close to the actual decision.

I fully expected a 3-2 decision in either direction. But it is a 5-0 strongly written decision. It is a decision that was written to dispose of the controversy. It is a decision that was written to deny the possibility of reconsideration.

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This is an unauthorized practice of law case brought in the Court’s original jurisdiction. The case was assigned to Circuit Court Judge Diane Goodstein as Special Referee to take evidence and issue a report. Judge Goodstein held a two-week trial and issued a report finding, essentially, that no South Carolina licensed lawyer quarterbacked (my word) the mostly Internet-based residential refinance closings. In the facts recited in Judge Goodstein’s report, lawyers were peripherally involved in all of the steps required by State v. Buyers Service Co.** and its progeny, but no lawyer was actually involved in a way that the interest of the borrower was protected.

(Summarizing the prior decisions, the steps requiring lawyers are: (1) document preparation; (2) title search; (3) closing; (4) recording; and (5) disbursement.)

The Supreme Court somehow reviewed the same record and found that lawyers were involved and used their professional judgment in each step. The facts recited in the Court’s decision were not recognizable from the facts recited by Judge Goodstein’s report. The Court completely rejected the report and apparently decided that a finding of UPL under the circumstances would “mark an unwise and unnecessary intrusion into the marketplace”. “Simply put,” the Court stated, “we believe requiring more attorney involvement in cases such as this would belie the Court’s oft-stated assertion that UPL rules exist to protect the public, not lawyers.”

Most South Carolina dirt lawyers were hoping the Court would find a South Carolina licensed lawyer must be at the center of each closing, overseeing each step, and insuring that the consumer client’s interests were protected in each step. That is definitely not what we got.

There is, however, some good news in this decision. The Court made the clearest implication to date (without an explicit holding) that Buyers Service and its progeny may not apply in the commercial arena. The Court repeatedly stated that the context of this case is the residential refinance arena. I have discussed this case with several commercial lawyers to ascertain whether they are now comfortable to forego certifications that other South Carolina licensed lawyers are involved in the closing steps that are not under their control. They seem to feel slightly more comfortable, but not comfortable enough to let go of that step. Perhaps the passage of time will help.

Other good news is that, despite the facts recited by Judge Goodstein to the contrary, the Court clearly stated that lawyers were involved and used their professional judgment in each required step. The out-of-state entities who do business here should make sure their processes include this professional judgment in each step of the closing.

After reading this case a dozen times, I’ve decided that no law has changed. Nothing will change in our local processes. Nothing will likely change dramatically in the processes of the out-of-state entities who do business here. If I had not read Judge Goodstein’s report and if I had not attended the Supreme Court’s hearing, I would probably not be shocked with this result.

I would love hear what you think.

*Boone v. Quicken Loans, Inc., South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27727, July 19, 2017

** State v. Buyers Serv. Co., 292 S.C. 426, 357 S.E.2d 15 (1987)