OFAC

Georgia Real Estate Investor Fined for Violating OFAC Sanctions

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Imagine that you have a real estate investor client who purchased a big house in a gated community at a foreclosure sale. The client then took out a mortgage on the house, paid to make significant repairs and renovations, and ultimately signed a contract to sell it on to a third party. Then, all of a sudden, the Federal government sends your client a cease and desist order, a subpoena, and eventually fines him $4,677,552.00 for violating OFAC (Office of Foreign Asset Control, an agency of U.S. Treasury) sanctions against a family member of a Russian oligarch. Does that sound fun to anybody? Unfortunately, that is more or less what happened to one real estate investor in Atlanta who unknowingly bought a house which was, in fact, owned by a person who was on the OFAC sanctions list.  

This particular person whose name appeared on OFAC’s sanctions list is now known as Karina Rotenberg. She is a family member of a Russian oligarch who was identified for US financial sanctions after Russia invaded Ukraine. For a time in the early 2000’s, she lived and worked and owned homes in Atlanta. At the time, her name was Karina Fox. Guess which last name her Atlanta home is owned under? That’s right – it’s Fox.

Well, it just so happened that, after it added her to the sanctions list, OFAC figured out that Ms. Fox/Rotenberg owned property in Atlanta. This means that her property could not be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise transferred, since doing so would be a violation of the sanctions. OFAC sent a notice to the Fulton County Clerk of Court specifically mentioning the property’s address, and listing several names by which Ms. Fox/Rotenberg was known (including both “Fox” and “Rotenberg”), and asked the Clerk to file the notice in the county records to let the public know that the OFAC sanctions existed. And the Clerk of Court did file that notice. Unfortunately, for reasons which are not clear, the Clerk appears to have only indexed the notice under the name Rotenberg. So, a title searcher who did not know that Karina Fox and Karina Rotenberg are the same person would not necessarily know that this home was owned by a person on the OFAC sanctions list.

Now, here comes our local real estate investor, by all accounts an entrepreneurial fellow who had immigrated from India and worked to further his education and succeed in this county. He operated his real estate deals through an LLC: King Holdings LLC. Most of his past deals had been smaller single-family homes that he had bought in distress, improved, and flipped for a profit. This home would be bigger than most of his past projects. But it was being sold at foreclosure and seemed like a bargain. King Holdings buys the home at foreclosure sale in January 2023.

Around April of 2023, OFAC learns about the foreclosure, and tracks our investor down. He says that an OFAC investigator called him on his cell phone and told him that he should not be doing anything with the home, due to the sanctions. In our investor’s version of the story, the caller seemed sketchy, and he says he wondered at the time if it was a scammer trying to scare him into giving up some personal information.  

Our investor goes ahead and mortgages the property to have funds to begin renovations. The law firm which closed the mortgage says it searched title to the home and did not find the OFAC notice (which, again was indexed in a different name, Rotenberg).

By December, 2023 our investor has learned that this home has significantly more repair/maintenance problems than he’d bargained for. He is beginning to think it was not such a great deal. He signs a contract with a third party to sell the home. After initially listing the property for $2.5M, he finally signs a contract to sell it for $1.4M.

In February 2024, OFAC issues a cease-and-desist order and administrative subpoena to our investor, restating the sanctions and requiring that he immediately stop doing anything with the home. The subpoena also demands information on all dealings involving the property since January 2023. It seems that our investor certified the accuracy of a response that disclosed the renovation work but did not say anything about the property’s listing and pending sale.

In March 2024, our investor closed the $1.4 million sale of the property to the third party buyer.

OFAC took the position that pretty much everything our investor did violated OFAC’s regulations/sanctions. (I also get the sense that they were pretty mad about him not disclosing the sale, and then going ahead with the sale to the third party, after OFAC had issued their cease-and-desist order.) So, as punishment, OFAC imposed the $4,677,552.00 fine on him personally.

It is really disappointing that the Clerk of Court did not index the OFAC notice under all the names that OFAC had listed. Another possible way this could have been avoided is if our investor had checked the OFAC sanctions list before proceeding. This is a great tool that all our CTIC agents should be using too – it could even help you save a client from ending up like our Atlanta investor!

FinCEN warns that Russian bad actors seek to invest in U.S. commercial real estate

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Financial institutions have reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act, and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published an alert on January 25 warning financial institutions to be alert to potential investments in commercial real estate by sanctioned Russian elites, oligarchs, their family members, and the entities through which they act.  Commercial real estate lawyers should also be alert to these dangers.

You can read the Alert in its entirety here.

Use this link for a list of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.

Commercial real estate transactions are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by bad actors because of the complex financing methods and opaque ownership vehicles routinely employed. Because commercial properties are so high in value, buyers and sellers seek to use these methods and vehicles to limit their legal, tax and financial liability. In addition, foreign investors are common in commercial real estate.

The Alert points to the following types of transactions and vehicles that are so common that protection against invasion into them by bad actors would be difficult at best. The green, italicized words are mine:

  • The use of pooled investment vehicles, including offshore funds, to avoid due diligence and beneficial ownership protocols established by financial institutions. In other words, a bad actor may attempt to reduce its ownership percentage in a property to avoid normal due diligence for owners with higher percentages.
  • The use of shell companies and trusts to conceal ownership interests.
  • Involvement of third parties to invest in behalf of a criminal or corrupt actor.
  • Inconspicuous investments that provide stable returns. The properties may not be high end. They may be multi-family housing, retail, office, industrial or hotels in small and mid-size urban areas.

Thankfully, FinCEN’s Alert provides several red flags to assist in these difficult determinations.

  • The use of a private investment vehicle that is based offshore to purchase commercial real estate and that includes politically exposed persons or other foreign nationals (particularly family members or close associates of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies) as investors. I had to Google the term “politically exposed person”. It means a person who has been entrusted with a prominent public function. These individuals generally represent a higher risk for potential involvement in bribery and corruption by virtue of their positions and influence.
  • When asked questions about the ultimate beneficial owners or controllers of a legal entity or arrangement, customers decline to provide information. In my former life in which I represented developers, when I asked questions about the identity of the beneficial owners, I got answers. It is a red flag if you are unable to obtain those answers.
  • Multiple limited liability companies, corporations, partnerships, or trusts are involved in a transaction with ties to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies, and the entities have slight name variations.
  • The use of legal entities or arrangements, such as trusts, to purchase commercial real estate that involves friends, associates, family members, or others with close connection to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.
  • Ownership of commercial real estate through legal entities in multiple jurisdictions (often involving a trust based outside the United States) without a clear business purpose. Again, if you can’t get good answers to your questions, this is a red flag.
  • Transfers of assets from a politically exposed person or Russian elite to a family member, business associate, or associated trust in close temporal proximity to a legal event such as an arrest or an OFAC designation of that person. Remember that we check the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) list for individuals in our transactions using links provided by title companies. If you have questions about how to perform this function, call your friendly title insurance company underwriter. You can use this link.
  • Implementation of legal instruments that are intended to transfer an interest in commercial real estate from a politically exposed person or Russian elite to a family member, business associate or associated trust following a legal event such as an arrest or an OFAC designation of that person.
  • Private investment funds or other companies that submit revised ownership disclosures to financial institutions showing sanctioned individuals or politically exposed persons that previously owned more than 50 percent of a fund changing their ownership to less than 50 percent.
  • There is a limited discernable business value in the investment, or the investment is outside of the client’s normal business operations.

This is the fourth FinCEN alert on potential Russian illicit activity since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Federal government is serious about policing these activities. I recommend that you contact your favorite title insurance underwriter any time you determine that sanctioned persons or their proxies involved in your transactions. Be careful out there!