FinCEN warns that Russian bad actors seek to invest in U.S. commercial real estate

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Financial institutions have reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act, and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published an alert on January 25 warning financial institutions to be alert to potential investments in commercial real estate by sanctioned Russian elites, oligarchs, their family members, and the entities through which they act.  Commercial real estate lawyers should also be alert to these dangers.

You can read the Alert in its entirety here.

Use this link for a list of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.

Commercial real estate transactions are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by bad actors because of the complex financing methods and opaque ownership vehicles routinely employed. Because commercial properties are so high in value, buyers and sellers seek to use these methods and vehicles to limit their legal, tax and financial liability. In addition, foreign investors are common in commercial real estate.

The Alert points to the following types of transactions and vehicles that are so common that protection against invasion into them by bad actors would be difficult at best. The green, italicized words are mine:

  • The use of pooled investment vehicles, including offshore funds, to avoid due diligence and beneficial ownership protocols established by financial institutions. In other words, a bad actor may attempt to reduce its ownership percentage in a property to avoid normal due diligence for owners with higher percentages.
  • The use of shell companies and trusts to conceal ownership interests.
  • Involvement of third parties to invest in behalf of a criminal or corrupt actor.
  • Inconspicuous investments that provide stable returns. The properties may not be high end. They may be multi-family housing, retail, office, industrial or hotels in small and mid-size urban areas.

Thankfully, FinCEN’s Alert provides several red flags to assist in these difficult determinations.

  • The use of a private investment vehicle that is based offshore to purchase commercial real estate and that includes politically exposed persons or other foreign nationals (particularly family members or close associates of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies) as investors. I had to Google the term “politically exposed person”. It means a person who has been entrusted with a prominent public function. These individuals generally represent a higher risk for potential involvement in bribery and corruption by virtue of their positions and influence.
  • When asked questions about the ultimate beneficial owners or controllers of a legal entity or arrangement, customers decline to provide information. In my former life in which I represented developers, when I asked questions about the identity of the beneficial owners, I got answers. It is a red flag if you are unable to obtain those answers.
  • Multiple limited liability companies, corporations, partnerships, or trusts are involved in a transaction with ties to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies, and the entities have slight name variations.
  • The use of legal entities or arrangements, such as trusts, to purchase commercial real estate that involves friends, associates, family members, or others with close connection to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.
  • Ownership of commercial real estate through legal entities in multiple jurisdictions (often involving a trust based outside the United States) without a clear business purpose. Again, if you can’t get good answers to your questions, this is a red flag.
  • Transfers of assets from a politically exposed person or Russian elite to a family member, business associate, or associated trust in close temporal proximity to a legal event such as an arrest or an OFAC designation of that person. Remember that we check the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) list for individuals in our transactions using links provided by title companies. If you have questions about how to perform this function, call your friendly title insurance company underwriter. You can use this link.
  • Implementation of legal instruments that are intended to transfer an interest in commercial real estate from a politically exposed person or Russian elite to a family member, business associate or associated trust following a legal event such as an arrest or an OFAC designation of that person.
  • Private investment funds or other companies that submit revised ownership disclosures to financial institutions showing sanctioned individuals or politically exposed persons that previously owned more than 50 percent of a fund changing their ownership to less than 50 percent.
  • There is a limited discernable business value in the investment, or the investment is outside of the client’s normal business operations.

This is the fourth FinCEN alert on potential Russian illicit activity since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Federal government is serious about policing these activities. I recommend that you contact your favorite title insurance underwriter any time you determine that sanctioned persons or their proxies involved in your transactions. Be careful out there!

Feds extend timeframe of FinCEN order

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Will this obligation eventually extend to South Carolina?

Secretly purchasing expensive real estate continues to be a popular method for criminals to launder dirty money. Setting up shell entities allows these criminals to hide their identities. When the real estate is later sold, the money has been miraculously cleaned.

In early 2016, The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States Department of the Treasurer issued an order that required the four largest title insurance companies to identify the natural persons or “beneficial owners” behind the legal entities that purchase some expensive residential properties.

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At that time, the reach of the project extended to the Borough of Manhattan in New York City, and Dade County, Florida, where Miami is located. In those two locations, the designated title insurance companies were required to disclose to the government the names of buyers who paid cash for properties over $1 million in Miami and over $3 million in Manhattan. The natural persons behind the legal entities had to be reported for any ownership of at least 25 percent in an affected property.

By order effective August 28, 2016, all title insurance underwriters, in addition to their affiliates and agents, were required to be involved in the reporting process, and the footprint of the project was extended.

The targeted areas and their price thresholds as of August 28, 2016 were:

  • Borough of Manhattan, New York; $3 million;
  • Boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens and Bronx, New York; $1.5 million;
  • Borough of Staten Island, New York; $1.5 million;
  • Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties, Florida; $1 million;
  • Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara and San Diego Counties, California; $2 million; and
  • Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas; $500,000.

By order effective September 22, 2017, wire transfers were included, and the footprint of the project will include transactions over $3 million in the city and county of Honolulu, Hawaii.

The Geographic Targeting Orders were updated again beginning March 21, 2018, and extended to September 16, 2018

Although the initial project was termed temporary and exploratory, FinCEN has indicated that the project is helping law enforcement identify possible illicit activity and is also informing future regulatory approaches.

We have no way of knowing whether or when this program may be expanded to South Carolina, but it is entirely likely that expensive properties along our coast are being used in money laundering schemes. We will keep a close watch on this program for possible expansion!

Feds extend footprint of shell game again

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Will this obligation eventually extend to South Carolina?

shell game

Secretly purchasing expensive real estate continues to be a popular method for criminals to launder dirty money. Setting up shell entities allows these criminals to hide their identities. When the real estate is later sold, the money has been miraculously cleaned.

In early 2016, The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States Department of the Treasurer issued an order that required the four largest title insurance companies to identify the natural persons or “beneficial owners” behind the legal entities that purchase some expensive residential properties.

At that time, the reach of the project extended to the Borough of Manhattan in New York City, and Dade County, Florida, where Miami is located. In those two locations, the designated title insurance companies were required to disclose to the government the names of buyers who paid cash for properties over $1 million in Miami and over $3 million in Manhattan. The natural persons behind the legal entities had to be reported for any ownership of at least 25 percent in an affected property.

By order effective August 28, 2016, all title insurance underwriters, in addition to their affiliates and agents, were required to be involved in the reporting process, and the footprint of the project was extended.

The targeted areas and their price thresholds as of August 28, 2016 were:

  • Borough of Manhattan, New York; $3 million;
  • Boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens and Bronx, New York; $1.5 million;
  • Borough of Staten Island, New York; $1.5 million;
  • Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties, Florida; $1 million;
  • Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara and San Diego Counties, California; $2 million; and
  • Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas; $500,000.

By order effective September 22, 2017, wire transfers were included, and the footprint of the project will include transactions over $3 million in the city and county of Honolulu, Hawaii.

Although the initial project was termed temporary and exploratory, FinCEN has indicated that the project is helping law enforcement identify possible illicit activity and is also informing future regulatory approaches. The current order extends through March 20, 2018.

We have no way of knowing whether or when this program may be expanded to South Carolina, but it is entirely likely that expensive properties along our coast are being used in money laundering schemes. We will keep a close watch on this program for possible expansion

Feds Extend Footprint of Shell Game

Standard

Will this obligation eventually extend to South Carolina?

Secretly purchasing expensive real estate continues to be a popular method for criminals to launder dirty money. Setting up shell entities allows these criminals to hide their identities. When the real estate is later sold, the money has been miraculously cleaned.

Early this year, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States Department of the Treasurer issued an order that required the four largest title insurance companies to identify the natural persons or “beneficial owners” behind the legal entities that purchase some expensive residential properties.

shell game

At that time, the reach of the project extended to the Borough of Manhattan in New York City, and Dade County, Florida, where Miami is located. In those two locations, the designated title insurance companies were required to disclose to the government the names of buyers who paid cash for properties over $1 million in Miami and over $3 million in Manhattan. The natural persons behind the legal entities had to be reported for any ownership of at least 25 percent in an affected property.

Now, all title insurance underwriters, in addition to their affiliates and agents, will be involved, and the footprint of the project is being extended effective August 28.

The targeted areas and their price thresholds will be:

  • Borough of Manhattan, New York; $3 million;
  • Boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens and Bronx, New York; $1.5 million;
  • Borough of Staten Island, New York; $1.5 million;
  • Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm Beach Counties, Florida; $1 million;
  • Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara and San Diego Counties, California; $2 million; and
  • Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas; $500,000.

Although the initial project was termed temporary and exploratory, FinCEN has indicated that the project is helping law enforcement identify possible illicit activity and is also informing future regulatory approaches.

We have no way of knowing whether or when this program may be expanded to South Carolina, but it is entirely likely that expensive properties along our coast are being used in money laundering schemes. We will keep a close watch on this program for possible expansion!

Feds Play Shell Game in Manhattan And Miami

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Title companies obligated to ID true owners behind shell entities.

Will this obligation migrate closer to home?

money launderingSecretly purchasing expensive residential real estate is evidently a popular way for criminals to launder dirty money. Setting up shell entities allows these criminals to hide their identities. When the real estate is later sold, the money has been miraculously cleaned.

The Federal government is seeking to stop this practice.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the United States Department of the Treasury issued orders on January 13 that will require the four largest title insurance companies to identify the natural persons or “beneficial owners” behind the legal entities that purchase some expensive residential properties.

This is a temporary measure (effective March 1 to August 27) and is limited to at this point to the Borough of Manhattan in New York City, and Dade County, Florida, where Miami is located. In those two locations, the designated title insurance companies must disclose to the government the names of buyers who pay cash for properties over $1 million in Miami and over $3 million in Manhattan. FinCEN will require that the natural persons behind legal entities be reported if their ownership in the property is at least 25 percent.

FinCEN’s official mission is to safeguard the financial system of the United States from illicit use, to combat money laundering, and to promote national security through the collection, analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence.

FinancialCrimesEnforcementNetwork-Seal.svgThese orders are a continuation of FinCEN’s focus on anti-money laundering protections for the real estate sector. Previously, the focus was only on transactions involving lending. The new orders expand that focus to include the complex gap of cash purchases.

FinCEN’s Director, Jennifer Shasky Calvery, was quoted in the agency’s press release: “We are seeking to understand the risk that corrupt foreign officials, or transnational criminals, may be using premium U.S. real estate to secretly invest millions in dirty money.”

American Land Title Association officials met with FinCEN to confirm the details of the orders. Michelle Korsmo, Executive Direction of ALTA, indicated that ALTA is supportive of the effort but is concerned that the program must be implemented in order to determine whether it will work. She said it will be difficult for a title insurance company to figure out a transaction involving a major drug kingpin who buys a mansion through a string of shell corporations all over the world.

This phase of the new program is being called temporary and exploratory, meaning that it may or may not work, and if it does work, it may or may not be expanded to other locations. (Query:  why won’t a money launderer who seeks to purchase residential real estate during the initial phase of this program, simply change locations to Chicago, Houston, San Francisco or Los Angeles?)

We have no way of knowing whether or when this program might be expanded to South Carolina, but it is entirely likely that expensive properties along our coast are being used in similar money laundering schemes. Will South Carolina closing attorneys enjoy ferreting out this sort of information for the Government? We will keep a close watch on what occurs in New York and Florida during the first 180 days of this program.