SC Court reverses itself on “active energy” judgment issue

Standard

law-books-gavel1

South Carolina dirt lawyers seldom breathe a sigh of relief when our Supreme Court decides a real estate case. But the November 21 opinion in Gordon v. Lancaster* was greeted with a collective “thank goodness”!  We were living with a less-than-exact term for the viability of a judgment, and we didn’t like it.

The question in this case was whether a creditor may execute on a judgment more than ten years after enrollment when the ten-year statutory period for execution** expires during the course of litigation. The Court overturned its 2010 decision in Linda Mc Co. v. Shore***, which held that, despite the passage of more than ten years, the judgment continued to have “active energy” because the judgment creditor had filed for supplemental proceedings.

In the current case, a judgment was enrolled in 2002 against Rudolph Drews, the now-deceased uncle of the Petitioner Donald Lancaster, in connection with a civil action for violating securities laws in an investment scheme for a new business venture in Charleston. Frank Gordon, the creditor, filed a petition for supplemental proceedings in 2006. During the hearing, Gordon’s counsel became suspicious that Drews’ wife and Lancaster were attempting to shield Drews’ assets from creditors. The hearing was continued when Drews failed to produce tax and financial documents.

Drews died in 2007. Gordon sought to continue supplemental proceedings, but there were delays in the estate administration. In 2010, suspicions were confirmed about hiding assets when Lancaster was deposed. Soon after, one day before her scheduled deposition, Drews’ wife died. Gordon filed this action, asserting Lancaster assisted Drews is hiding assets in violation of the Statute of Elizabeth. In 2011, Drews’ estate confessed judgment in the approximate amount of $300,000, and his wife’s estate settled with Gordon for $60,000.

During a bench trial in 2013, Lancaster moved for a directed verdict based on Gordon’s prior concession that the suit was based on the earlier judgment, which was obviously older than ten years. The trial court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, relying on the holding in Linda Mc: If a party takes action to enforce a judgment within the ten-year statutory period of active energy, the resulting order will be effective even if issued after the ten-year period has expired.

The Court noted that Linda Mc represented a departure from its historic approach and created confusion in what was formerly a well-settled area of the law. (To that I would like to very politely reply “duh”.) The Court overruled itself and returned to the bright-line ten-year rule.

In a footnote, the Court stated that it is overruling Linda Mc prospectively. The same footnote referred to Justice Pleicones’ dissent in Linda Mc, which predicted confusion in a previously settled area of the law.

Justice Few concurred in the result but disagreed with overruling Linda Mc, which he said created a narrow exception to the bright-line ten-year rule for the issuance of an execution on a judgment. There was a discussion in the opinion and the concurring opinion about dictum vs. holding, but, thankfully, nothing concrete came out of that. Justice James concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that Linda Mc should be overruled, but believing that Gordon should have received relief because of the prospective nature of the decision.

Pennsatucky AmenAs a title insurance lawyer and title examiner from way back, I am happy to see us return to a common sense, bright-line approach to the ten-year rule. Can I get an “Amen”?

* South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27847, November 21, 2018.

** South Carolina Code Section 15-39-30.

*** 390 S.C. 543, 703 S.E.2d 499 (2010).

Statute of Elizabeth case provides important reminders

Standard

Conveyance to an LLC is set aside

A recent South Carolina Court of Appeals case* affirmed a Circuit Court order that set aside a conveyance under the Statute of Elizabeth. This is yet another tale of woe from the economic downturn.

scales - blue background

Kenneth Clifton was a successful real estate developer who commonly purchased investment property in his own name. When he developed property, he transferred his interest to a limited liability company (LLC). He organized more than forty LLCs during his career.

In 1993, Clifton and Linda Whiteman purchased approximately 370 acres in Laurens County in their individual names as tenants in common.

Clifton routinely borrowed money from lenders to finance his developments. At issue in this case were three loans from First Citizens Bank totaling around $4 million. These loans were renewed over the years as Clifton made progress payments.

When the real estate market slowed in 2008, Clifton sought additional extensions for two of the loans. First Citizens asked for a personal financial statement. Clifton’s financial statement claimed a net worth of $50 million with real estate comprising over $48 million. The subject 370 acres in Laurens was included. The statement stated Clifton owned a 50% unencumbered interest valued at approximately $1.5 million. Relying on this financial statement, First Citizens renewed the loans to mature in 2009.

Later in 2008, Clifton requested an extension on the third loan. Just prior to receiving the extension, Clifton and Whiteman transferred their interests in the property to Park at Durbin Creek, LLC (PDC). Clifton testified that he and Whiteman chose to transfer this property to PDC over Whiteman’s concern about personal liability because the property was being leased to third parties for recreational hunting purposes. All three loans were extended to mature in 2009.

Clifton failed to make payments, to provide a business plan or to secure additional collateral. First Citizens initiated foreclosure proceedings in February of 2009 and eventually secured a deficiency judgment of $745,000 against him.

During the foreclosure proceedings, Clifton and his daughters entered into an assignment agreement resulting in a transfer by Clifton in PDC to Streamline, an LLC that was nonexistent on the date of the transfer but whose members, upon creation, were Clifton’s daughters and ex-wife.

In 2010, First Citizens initiated supplemental proceedings, but by this time, Clifton had no remaining assets. First Citizens began this case under the Statute of Elizabeth (S.C. Code §27-23-10), alleging causes of action for fraudulent conveyance, civil conspiracy and partition.

court money 2The Circuit Court found sufficient “badges of fraud” to infer Clifton possessed fraudulent intent when he transferred his 50% interest in the property to PDC.

This is the first valuable reminder from this case:  The conveyance to Streamline was held void ab initio because Streamline did not exist at the time of the conveyance. (Dirt lawyers, make sure your entities are properly created before you assist your clients in making conveyances to them!)

A second valuable reminder involves requirements concerning transfers of interests in member-managed LLCs like PDC. When Clifton attempted to transfer his interest in PDC to a separate LLC, he failed to obtain Whiteman’s consent. Section 33-44-404 (c)(7) of the South Carolina code states that, in a member-managed LLC, the admission of a new member requires the consent of all members. The lack of consent in this case would have invalided the transfer to streamline even if the transfer to PDC had been held valid. (Dirt lawyers, make sure you follow statutory procedures when dealing with transfers of interests in entities.)

The case then sets out a simple South Carolina primer on the Statute of Elizabeth. The statute provides:

Every gift, grant, alienation, bargain, transfer and conveyance of lands…for any intent or purpose to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties, and forfeitures must be deemed and taken…to be clearly and utterly void.

Citing earlier cases, the Court of Appeals stated that this statute can be used to set aside conveyances whether or not consideration is paid.

Where there is valuable consideration, the following element must be established:

  1. The transfer was made with the actual intent to defraud creditors;
  2. The grantor was indebted at the time of the transfer;
  3. The grantor’s intent is imputable to the grantee.

Where there is no valuable consideration, no actual intent to hinder or delay creditors is required. Instead, the transfer will be set aside if:

  1. The grantor was indebted to the plaintiff at the time of the transfer;
  2. The conveyance was voluntary; and
  3. The grantor failed to retain sufficient property to pay the indebtedness to the plaintiff at the time when the plaintiff seeks to collect the debt.

In this case, the Circuit Court found and both parties agreed that valuable consideration was paid. For that reason, First Citizens was required to prove that Clifton transferred the property with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud First Citizens.

Citing earlier cases again, the Court of Appeals stated that when a party denies fraudulent intent, as Clifton did, the creditor must prove “badges of fraud”. One badge of fraud may not create a presumption of fraud, but several badges of fraud does create the presumption.

Nine badges of fraud have been identified by our courts:

  1. The insolvency or indebtedness of the transferor;
  2. Lack of consideration for the conveyance;
  3. Relationship between the transferor and the transferee;
  4. The pendency or threat of litigation;
  5. Secrecy or concealment;
  6. Departure from the usual method of business;
  7. The transfer of the debtor’s entire estate;
  8. The reservation of benefit to the transferor; and
  9. The retention by the debtor of possession of the property.

The Court held that six of the nine badges of fraud were present in this case, resulting in a presumption of fraud. The Court next considered whether Clifton successfully rebutted the presumption. The Court concluded that Clifton wanted to protect the property from creditors, despite offering the legitimate reason for the transfer, that Whiteman was concerned about personal liability on hunting property.

Finally, the Court held that the invalidity of the conveyance of Clifton’s undivided 50% interest in the property does not invalidate Whiteman’s conveyance despite the fact that only one deed was used.

* First Citizens Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Park at Durbin Creek, LLC, South Carolina Court of Appeals Case 5469 (February 15, 2017)