Supreme Court

Supreme Court holds CFPB’s funding mechanism is constitutional

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s funding mechanism is constitutional, according to CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association, decided May 16.

Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 decision. Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch dissented.

A payday lender trade association sued the CFPB in 2017, seeking to overturn a rule prohibiting debits from bank accounts and arguing that the CFPB and all its actions since 2010 were unconstitutional because of its funding structure.

The agency is housed inside the Federal Reserve and draws up to $600 million from the Federal Reserve annually. Funding was set up in this manner to insulate the CFPB from industry influence. Normal funding would include the regular appropriations process. Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution (the Appropriations Clause) states that no money shall be withdrawn from the Treasury “but in the consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”

The association’s argument was that this deviation from the normal appropriations process gave the agency “perpetual” funding. The opinion held, “Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is simply a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes. The statute that provides the Bureau’s funding meets these requirements.”

In addition to the CFPB, the Customs Service, Postal Service and revenue officers are all funded through non-annual, standing appropriations.

The dissent stated, “Unfortunately, today’s decision turns the Appropriations Clause into a minor vestige. The Court upholds a novel statutory scheme under which the powerful Consumer financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) may bankroll its own agenda without any congressional control or oversight.

From a practical perspective, I can’t imagine how difficult it would have been to undo the many investigations, rulings, and fines during the CFPB’s tenure. This decision holds that the Bureau’s actions stand.

US Supreme Court redefines “waters of the United States”

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Dirt lawyers, do you remember studying the cases in first year property classes in law school that defined navigable waters? We discussed the ebb and flow of tides. We talked about whether the water is presently used or had been used in the past or may be susceptible for use in the future for transportation.  I remember discussing whether logs could float and how big a boat must be to make the property qualify as navigable.

When I was in private practice in Columbia representing real estate developers, I ran into significant issues on a routine basis involving the federal government’s jurisdiction over wetlands. One developer was required to add an eight-acre lake to a residential subdivision because a minor portion of the property was soggy. We dealt with the Army Corps of Engineers on these issues, and getting approval for development was tedious at best. And I promise you that those soggy areas were not navigable by any size boat.

The reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA) was significantly constricted when the United States Supreme Court on May 25 issued a decision that narrowed the scope of wetlands and other water subject to the CWA’s protections. The case, Sackett v. EPA*, involved a residential lot in Priest Lake, Idaho.

Mike and Chantell Sackett bought the lot in 2004 for $23,000, intending to build a modest three-bedroom family home. They began building in 2007, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) demanded the construction be halted, claiming it violated the CWA because the property was a federally regulated “navigable water”.

That demand began a 16-year legal battle. The Sacketts sued the EPA, and the case has reached the Supreme Court twice. The first decision involved a procedural matter. The Court decided in 2012 that property owners are entitled to immediate judicial review of EPA compliance orders without waiting for agency to seek judicial enforcement to contest the assertion that properties contain “waters of the United States” subject to CWA jurisdiction.

The case then worked its way through the lower courts until the Supreme Court agreed in 2022 to consider the issue of whether the EPA can define “navigable waters” to include semi-soggy parcels of land.

In January 2023, while the Sackett case was pending, the EPA published a final rule adopting a new definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) to include traditional navigable waters, tributaries, adjacent wetlands and other waters that are not themselves navigable but are either relatively permanent or have a significant nexus to navigable waters. The Sackett case probably invalidates this rule.

The five-person majority held that WOTUS include only: (1) relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features described in ordinary parlance as streams, oceans, rivers and lakes; and (2) adjacent wetlands with continuous surface connection to such waters so that wetlands, as a practical matter indistinguishable from the bodies of water. To prove jurisdiction over a wetland, the EPA must now show that the adjacent body of water constitutes WOTUS (a relatively permanent body of water connected to interstate navigable waters) and that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine whether the water ends and the wetland begins.

As I type this, I sit outside on a screen porch listening to birds sing in the previously defined wetlands that adjoin two sides of our house. We bought the lot, in part, because of the beauty and peace provided by wetlands, including the birds, as opposed to human neighbors. I wonder whether our peace and quiet will change.

*U.S. Supreme Court Opinion 21-454 (May 25, 2023)

U. S. Supreme Court rules CFPB structure is unconstitutional

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CFPB building

The Supreme Court issued an order on Monday, June 29 holding that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is unconstitutional. But the agency has not been abolished.

In a 5-4 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the agency run by a single director who can be fired by the President only for cause violates the separation of powers doctrine. The agency can be saved simply by striking the for-cause termination provision of the Dodd Frank Act.

There will be no immediate effect because the agency is currently being run by an acting director who has not been confirmed by the Senate. For this reason, the director can be fired by the President without case.

In the case, a California law firm alleged that an investigative demand issued by the CFPB is invalid on the grounds that the CFPB’s structure is unconstitutional.

South Carolina lawyers: We have a new UPL case

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This blog is about dirt, and the facts of the new unauthorized practice of law case do not involve real estate, but who among us doesn’t like to keep up with what our Supreme Court is thinking about UPL, the topic we believe can make us or break us at any moment?

The case, Westbrook v. The Murkin Group, LLC*, was decided March 18 and involved a Florida company that provides debt collection services in exchange for contingency fees. The Murkin Group advertises itself as having “in-house collection specialists”. Under the terms of its agreement with clients, once an account is turned over to Murkin, the client agrees to cease all communication with the debtor and to allow Murkin to be the sole point of contact. The agreement further authorizes Murkin to forward accounts to an attorney designated by Murkin when legal action is required.

In 2017, Wando River Grill became dissatisfied with its linen supplier, Cintas, and suspended its services. Cintas claimed the suspension constituted a breach of contract and invoked a liquidated damages provision in the contract, seeking more than $8,000 in damages. Cintas hired Murkin to collect the debt.  A South Carolina licensed attorney represented the restaurant in the dispute.

Murkin sent a demand letter, and the parties began to communicate about the dispute via email. Murkin claimed Cintas would waive its damages claim if the restaurant paid a “one-time processing fee for reinstatement”. Murkin prepared and sent the reinstatement agreement to the restaurant with signature lines for the restaurant and “The Murkin Group, on behalf of Cintas Corporation – Charleston, SC.”

The restaurant sent the proposed reinstatement agreement to the Petitioner, its lawyer, Edward Westbrook. Westbrook contacted Murkin and asked to discuss the matter directly with Murkin’s South Carolina counsel. The response was, “Whether or not this gets forwarded to local counsel is a decision which out office will make, with our client, when we feel it appropriate.”

(I can only imagine how that comment was received!)

The dispute continued, and Westbrook emailed Murkin asking for the South Carolina Bar numbers of several Murkin employees. Westbrook then filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to our Supreme Court’s request that individuals who become aware of UPL bring a declaratory judgment action in the Court’s original jurisdiction.

The Court referred the matter to a special referee who filed a report recommending that the Court find Murkin’s actions constituted UPL.

The Supreme Court held that Murkin engaged in UPL when it interpreted Cintas’ client agreement and gave legal opinions as to what damages were recoverable. It also engaged in UPL when it sought to negotiate the contract dispute and advised Cintas on settlement.

While Murkin characterized its actions as “debt collection”, the Court stated that the true nature of the underlying matter is a contract dispute. The Court enjoined Murkin from engaging in any further such conduct.

 

*South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27952 (March 18, 2020).