Vance Brabham

SC Supreme Court Decides Gulfstream Case

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Commercial real estate lawyers know that disputes over parking lot use are common. The long-running legal battle between the owners of Gulfstream Café and Marlin Quay Marina, recently addressed by the Supreme Court, nearly escalated into a literal parking lot showdown given its contentious history.

In 2022, this blog discussed the continuing legal saga in two installments that some of you may wish to check out. A fight over attorney’s fees! Criminal contempt for the malicious parking of a golf cart! The drama!        

To catch readers up to speed: In 1982, Georgetown County approved the Marlin Quay Planned Development, which contained two distinct businesses: the Gulfstream Café and its 17 parking spots; and the Marlin Quay Marina, which consisted of 60 boat slips, a marina store, a restaurant, and 62 parking spaces. 

The businesses operated in seeming harmony for many years. In 1986, the Marina owner even granted Gulfstream a right of ingress/egress over and the non-exclusive use of Marina’s parking lot and parking spaces, which seemed very neighborly indeed.  This easement implied in part: “[i]t is anticipated by the parties that while they will each have joint and non-exclusive use of the area covered by this easement that the Grantor will primarily utilize the premises during the daytime and [Gulfstream] will primarily use these premises in the evening.”

Things went downhill in 2016 when the Marina was sold to a new owner with a different vision for its property. The new owner wished to demolish the existing buildings at the Marina and build a new restaurant and store in its place. Making matters worse for Gulfstream, the new owner also intended on operating the new restaurant in the evenings, created direct competition for customers and for parking spaces at night.

The County Council approved Marina’s request to modify the Planned Development according to this initial set of plans over the objection of Gulfstream. However, the Marina withdrew its petition after it became known that the Marina’s architect, a Georgetown County Council member, failed to recuse himself from the deliberations and vote[1]. 

After the County approved the re-submitted plans, Gulfstream filed suit against the Marina alleging that the proposed expansion of the restaurant violated the terms of its existing easement.  After a full trial, the Circuit Court ruled that the Marina must revise its plan so that it did not exceed the footprint of the existing building with respect to the parking lot if it chose to move forward.

The Marina revised its plans to comply with the Court’s order. It chose to build a bigger vertical space with a larger outside seating area waterside. Gulfstream again objected and maintained that the increased square footage would make the difficult parking situation worse. The County eventually approved the revised plans over Gulfstream’s objection finding that the new construction would be in better condition, bring the Marina into compliance with current building codes, and be a net benefit to tourism and the community over the existing structure. 

Not backing down, Gulfstream then filed suit against the County alleging that it had violated its own parking requirements under the zoning ordinance by approving the new plans. Gulfstream asserted that the County’s approval violated its right to substantive and procedural due process and amounted to a taking of its rights under the easement, all of which substantially diminished the value of its property.   

The case ultimately reached the South Carolina Supreme Court, which found in favor of the County.  The Court agreed that Gulfstream’s easement created a property right, but found that Gulfstream did not have an exclusive right to the use of the Marina’s parking spaces in the evening.  Further, Gulfstream had exactly as many parking spaces available to its customers after the approval of the new plans as it did before. The Court was unconvinced by Gulfstream’s arguments that the approval of the additional square footage of seating had overburdened its easement rights and determined that the County had not deprived Gulfstream of any property interest.

The Court found that the General Assembly had given Counties the option to approve “planned developments” so that they could be flexible in adopting innovative planning solutions for benefit of their local communities.[2] The County complied with all hearing requirements for approving the amendment to the planned development and Gulfstream had a full opportunity to present its opposition to the plan.   Therefore, the County had not violated any substantive or procedural due process right. 

The Court also ruled against Gulfstream on its claim that the County had engaged in a “taking”.  The County had not engaged in a “per se” taking because Gulfstream had not been deprived of all economically or productive use of its easement. Gulfstream still retained the same non-exclusive right it had always enjoyed concerning the  parking spaces in the Court’s view.

Further, the County had not engaged in a regulatory taking under the Penn Central test.[3] The County approved the plans in its estimate of the best interest of the community. The County had not appropriated the parking to its own use. County approval of the plans did not prevent Gulfstream from continuing to do business as before. The Court further rejected Gulfstream’s offered expert testimony that valued the property based on the assumption that Gulfstream did not have any use of the easement parking[4]. Finally, the Court reasoned that because Gulfstream did not have an exclusive right in the use of the parking spaces that the County’s ruling could not have upset any investment backed expectation in the use of the parking spots at night.   

Finally, the Court majority declined to hold that the councilman’s participation in the initial approval of the plans invalidated the subsequent approvals that took place after he recused himself. The majority found the subsequent approvals of the completely revised project by the Council, acting this time with the councilman’s recusal, were sufficient to overcome any impropriety in the first vote. 

The two dissenting Justices, though concurring in ultimate result, were much more skeptical of the councilman’s conduct and made it plain that the Justices believed County made unique concessions in its review of the Marina project.[5] The Court questioned whether the Council had properly re-examined the basis for approving the concessions after the recusal.   

In any event, the legal duel between the restaurants seems to be over for now. The next time you are in Garden City, you may just want to take a fact-finding mission to sample the cuisine. Just be sure to arrive early as you know that the parking may be an issue.

[1] The Court’s opinion tells us that Gulfstream separately filed an ethics complaint that resulted in an official sanction and fine being levied against the council member.

[2] See S.C. Code 6-29-740. 

[3] Penn Central Transport Corp. v City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1974).  Some attorneys may vaguely recall from the boring semester of Constitutional Law that under the Penn Central test, a court, in considering whether a state action amounts to a regulatory taking,  must consider 1) the character of the state’s action; 2) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; and 3) the extent the regulation interferes with an investment backed expectation. Partial credit to you though if the name seemed familiar! 

[4] The entire Court seemed to find the expert’s testimony as lacking in credibility. The Court characterizes his testimony as indicating that the new Marina restaurant had rendered the Gulfstream property as almost entirely without value.  The expert seems to have bitten off more than he could chew there. 

[5] The dissent seemed especially concerned that the councilman had asked for $72,000 from the Marina as additional compensation for his role in shepherding the matter through County Council.

Graceland Fraudster Does the Jailhouse Rock

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Riley Keough, inset, with Graceland

Lisa Findley, a woman from the Ozarks with a known history of petty crime, was sentenced to 57 months in federal prison last month after pleading guilty to mail fraud. The charge stemmed from a bizarre scheme in which she attempted to secure a $3 million payoff using a fake loan backed by a fraudulent mortgage on Graceland, the former home of Elvis Presley.

Using at least four different alter egos, Findley attempted to convince lawyers for the estate of the late Lisa Marie Pressley1 and of her daughter, actress Riley Keough2, that a non-existent company called Naussany Investments & Private Lending, LLC, had loaned Lisa Marie $3,800,000 secured by the iconic home.

Findley supported the scheme by forging the signatures of Lisa Marie and a real Florida notary on fake loan documents. She even went so far as to threaten foreclosure. While attorneys for the Presley estate grew suspicious minds, Findley escalated her efforts by filing a creditor’s claim against the estate in California and separately recording a fraudulent Note and Deed of Trust in Tennessee land records. Despite making little progress, she pressed the matter by publishing a Notice of Foreclosure Sale in the Memphis Commercial Appeal.

While the Pressley attorneys rushed to obtain an injunction to keep the Jungle Room in the family’s domain, reporters and law enforcement began to close in on what proved to be an easy web to unweave. Perhaps feeling caught in a trap, Findlay’s alter egos abruptly disclaimed any connection to the loan and directed attention to a third alter ego.  After some token resistance, this alter ego confessed in an email written in Spanish – don’t ask me why – to that he was really a Nigerian scam artist and that the authorities should seek him in that fine African nation. 

This final effort to by Findlay was … not successful. Despite asking the judge to don’t be cruel, she will now spend a blue Christmas in a federal penitentiary for the next several winters.

In all seriousness, this scheme highlights both the growing prevalence of “imposter” frauds and the lengths and doggedness which fraudsters will pursue them. While this imposter chose very poorly in her attempted fraud target, the methods used should be a warning to all real estate professionals of what kind of methods they might run across in a scam. You could see how a less ambitious scheme could have been a little more credible and come closer to success.  

[1] Daughter of the King of Rock and Roll, and wife to the King of Pop, Michael Jackson! Plus, her mom was on Dallas! Pure royalty. 

[2] Keough was great in the Amazon mini-series ‘Daisy Jones and the Six.’  Definitely worth the watch if you have not seen it.

[3] Foreclosures can proceed non-judicially in Tennessee, which means creditors may in many circumstances sell property without court oversight.  

FNF challenges FinCEN Rule and ALTA concurs

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In our previous blog entry, Jennifer Stone did a great job of summarizing FinCEN’s new Anti-Money Laundering Rule that is scheduled to go into effect as of December 1, 2025. In short, the Rule will generally require South Carolina real estate attorneys to make reports to FinCEN concerning every residential (1-4 Family property) transaction where 1) the grantee is an entity or trust and 2) there is no financing provided by a lender that is subject to federal anti-money laundering reporting obligations. 

The closing attorney will be on the hook (under threat of civil and criminal liability) to collect extensive information from the parties to the transaction, including the names and addresses of every person or entity who has a beneficial interest in or control over the grantee entity. Generally speaking, the collection of information is well outside the scope of the usual real estate closing and places the burden on attorneys and title companies to collect information from third parties who may not be willing to share that information.

However, there is still the possibility that the Rule will not go into effect as scheduled in December. This past May, Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (“FNF”), the parent corporation of Chicago Title, filed suit in federal court challenging the Rule and thereby taking the lead role in speaking up on behalf of attorneys and title agents in advocating for more measured, less burdensome requirements and reporting.

In the lawsuit, FNF has requested an injunction suspending FinCEN’s enforcement of the Rule. A hearing is currently scheduled to be heard on September 30, 2025.

FNF also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which the American Land Title Association (ALTA) recently expressed its support by filing an amicus brief. ALTA, of course, is the most prominent trade association of title insurance companies and title agents in the United States.

While FinCEN asserts that the cost to the title industry (including closing attorneys) of meeting the reporting requirements could reach as high as $600 million annually, ALTA’s brief argues that FinCEN has significantly underestimated the training and collection time necessary to comply and that the true cost to the industry will be significantly higher. ALTA argues that the this significant burden cannot possibly be outweighed by the corresponding benefit to law enforcement. ALTA points out that FinCEN drastically reduced the scope of the reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) under the Corporate Transparency Act (which we wrote about here) in part because the new administration believed that reporting on American formed entities was of limited value to law enforcement.

ALTA further argues that the reporting burden under the Rule will disproportionately fall on small businesses that are “ill equipped” to absorb the additional costs and regulatory burden of reporting in an industry with already thin margins. I think many South Carolina residential real attorneys with already thinly stretched teams would agree wholeheartedly with ALTA in that statement. 

Certainly, there are quite a few miles to go with this lawsuit before a final verdict is rendered concerning the new Rule. We will continue to keep an eye on the progress of this case, but for now South Carolina attorneys must continue to develop procedures for complying with this Rule when it goes lives on December 1. 

Corporate Transparency Act Whack-a-Mole

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I have written many words about the Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) reporting requirement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) over the last couple of years and much of my writing has been rendered obsolete by events. So, it came as no surprise on March 21, 2025, when the world changed again, but even I wouldn’t have thought they’d have done the CTA like they done.    

If you want to get to the meat of the latest development, you can skip ahead to the end of this lengthy entry, but for those of you that need a refresher or those that just want to watch me work through my feelings a bit, the next few paragraphs are for you. 

Readers of this blog probably know by now that Congress passed the CTA some years ago for the stated purpose of assisting law enforcement agencies in preventing bad guys (foreign and domestic) from laundering money and hiding assets in the United States using shell companies. In its wisdom, Congress decreed that almost any entity registered with a Secretary of State’s office must file a report detailing the significant stakeholders in the entity and where they might be found.

Under the Biden Administration, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, came up with a framework of rules, processes, and penalties covering the duty of entities to report BOI. New companies would have 30 days to report the required BOI information to FinCEN; all existing entities would have to make their report by January 1, 2025. 

However, the whole thing did not go off as smoothly as planned for FinCEN.  Across the country (but most especially in Texas) plaintiffs filed lawsuits challenging the reporting requirement as unconstitutional or at least very inconvenient and burdensome. Before FinCEN could even think about imposing its first fine, a Texas federal court entered an injunction enjoining FinCEN from enforcing the BOI reporting requirement while the parties litigated the constitutionality of the Rule.  Game Off!  

The Government appealed this ruling to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which initially removed the injunction. Game On! 

But, just a few days later, the same Court of Appeals, reinstated the injunction.  Game Off!  

The Government (by this time the Trump Administration) remained dogged in its defense of the reporting requirements and appealed the matter to our highest court. There, the United States Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Government and rescinded the injunction in the first Texas case. Game On!  However, by this time a second Texas federal district court had entered its own nationwide injunction against enforcement of the Act. Game Off!  

More time passed, additional words were written, and additional hearings were held, but eventually this other Texas federal district court decided that despite the impassioned argument of the Plaintiffs it did not have authority to ignore the persuasive authority of the Supreme Court’s previous ruling in a nearly identical case. Subsequently, the Texas court (I would like to imagine) somewhat sulkily rescinded its injunction. Game On! Likely a joyous party continued into the wee hours in the FinCEN offices the day it announced that BOI reporting was back, and that the deadline for reporting would for certain be March 21, 2025.  

However, this is the year 2025, and this the Corporate Transparency Act we are talking about, so it was not so simple for the good folks at FinCEN. On February 21, 2025, FinCEN issued a press release indicating that despite the Government’s vigorous effort to defend the Rule all the way the Supreme Court, that it did not plan to enforce the Rule. The press release indicated that FinCEN planned to issue an Interim Rule before the March deadline, but the FinCEN website still promised fines and penalties for anyone failing to comply. Game Off?

On March 21st, FinCEN issued an Interim Rule that dramatically changed the scope and application of the Rule. First, the Interim Rule specifically exempts United States entities from BOI reporting requirements.  Second, the Interim Rule provides that foreign entities registered to do business in the United States need not report any information about its beneficial owners that are United States individuals. Third, the reporting deadline for foreign entities to file BOI reports was extended to 30 days from the effective date of the Interim Rule.

The Interim Rule certainly reduces the theoretical usefulness of BOI reporting to law enforcement as FinCEN’s database will now only contain information about foreign entities that register in the United States and their foreign beneficial owners. Criminals inclined to set up shell companies to hide their illicit assets probably would be well advised to use entities formed in the United States if that isn’t what they were doing before. Perhaps, the Interim Rule is arguably not what Congress intended, but there is a lot of that going around.

Practically, the reduction in the scope of the Rule will diminish the relevance of the CTA to real estate lawyers. Those attorneys that represent foreign entities doing business in the United States will need to be prepared to advise clients of the reporting requirements that go along with registering their foreign entity in the U.S., but those attorneys representing entities formed in the United States can likely breathe a long sigh of relief.  At least for the moment.