The official who records our deeds should not be selected via popularity contest!
I’m all about the democratic process. But when it comes to the Register of Deeds, I believe that person should be appointed locally based on a very specific skill set. Popularity and politics should have nothing to do with choosing the appropriate person to handle the very meticulous administrative process that deals with recording public documents.
Apparently, the Executive Committee of the Charleston County Bar Association wants to take action to make sure the ROD for Charleston County is qualified. Take a look at this letter that body wrote to County Council on January 19.
If you follow this blog, you know that the Finkel Firm has brought suit against the Charleston County ROD asking for a writ of mandamus based on the horrific lag involved with recording documents in that county. This letter provides additional evidence that something is terribly wrong in the Charleston County ROD office, and action needs to be taken sooner rather than later.
As this letter points out, South Carolina is a race notice state. If our deeds, mortgages and other documents are not recorded in a timely manner and in the proper order, then the proper priorities among parties is thrown to the wind. The rights of parties relating to real property are based on when the documents establishing those rights are properly recorded.
The letter lists eighteen counties where the RODs are currently appointed. The letter also states that no constitutional provision or statutory edict requires an election in this case.
What do you think? Should the Register of Deeds be appointed by County Council?
In the first Advance Sheet of 2022, our Court of Appeals answered a novel question concerning the severance of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The case* involved the estate of a father who owned property in Garden City with his son, one of his five children. Father and son had purchased the property together, each owning a fifty percent interest.
The facts are simple. The property owners entered into a contract to sell the property in November of 2013, prior to the father’s death on December 20, 2013. The transaction closed on December 27, just seven days after the father’s death. The son, who was also the personal representative, treated the sale as if he was the sole owner and claimed the proceeds of the sale individually. His siblings argued that the contract severed the joint tenancy, entitling the estate to half of the proceeds.
The Probate Court and Circuit Court agreed with the siblings, relying on South Carolina Federal Savings Bank v. San-A-Bel Corporation**, which held that a purchaser under a contract has an equitable lien on the property. The Probate Court reasoned that the sales contract entered into prior to the Decedent’s death encumbered the property, entitling the purchaser possession of the property upon payment of the purchase price and entitling the estate to one-half of the proceeds. The Circuit Court found that the Probate Court had correctly interpreted the law.
Dirt lawyers understand the San-A-Bel case sets up a trap for the unwary lawyer who fails to deal with the equitable lien that case established, but we have never understood that case to affect JTROS severance. The Court of Appeals agrees with us. Since neither San-A-Bel nor the JTROS statutes address the question at hand, the Court decided to look at rulings from other states to address the novel issue of whether a contract of sale severs a joint tenancy.
The Court cited cases from the states of Washington and Florida (citations omitted) and decided to follow the Florida court which held that severance does not automatically occur upon the execution of a contract executed by all joint tenants unless there is an indication in the contract or from the circumstances that the parties intended to sever and terminate the joint tenancy.
The Court found that the contract at issue was silent on the severance issue and no extraneous circumstances indicated severance was intended by the parties, so the joint tenancy was not severed by the contract, and the son was entitled to the sales proceeds.
Dirt lawyers tend to hold our collective breath when our Courts address a novel real estate issue. But I believe that, this time, we can agree that they got it right. Let me know if you disagree with me!
*In the Matter of the Estate of Moore, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5887, January 5, 2022.
This blog has previously informed South Carolina real estate practitioners about the Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed by the Finkel Law Firm against the Charleston County Register of Deeds because of the significant backlog in recording.
Attached here is a copy of the memorandum from the firm requesting affidavits from law firms, title abstractors, realtors, title companies and agencies, and other organizations associated with the real estate industry setting forth how they have impacted with these delays.
Please read this memorandum and help this law firm if you, your office, and your clients have been impacted.
Should limitations be imposed on the use of mascots?
One South Carolina law firm claims to have been unfairly targeted
Left Shark Law?
Several news sources (The Post and Courier, The State, AP News) have recently published stories involving a South Carolina law firm with a mascot problem.
According to the news reports, South Carolina attorney John Hawkins said he has been unfairly targeted by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel because of his law firm’s mascot, a hawk. You have probably seen the television ads showing the hawk and actors flapping their arms like hawks to promote the firm’s personal injury practice.
Hawkins has purportedly sued the ODC in Federal Court complaining that the ODC has reached a settlement with another legal entity that uses a tiger as a mascot for a national network of motorcycle accident attorneys styled “Law Tigers.”
Mr. Hawkins has complained in court filings that his mascot is a three-pound bird that eats mice, squirrels, and other small animals, while Law Tiger’s mascot is a 400-plus pound animal that mauls, attacks and eats people. Which mascot, he questions, unfairly represents the ability to “obtain results” in the personal injury arena?
The news reports indicate that two rival law firms and a former employee all filed complaints with the ODC about the hawk mascot in 2017. This year, the ODC filed formal disciplinary charges.
Hawkins’ lawsuit purportedly makes constitutional arguments against the ODC’s enforcement action. I’m not a litigator, but it seems to me that the place to make this argument is in the disciplinary action itself. It never occurred to me that the ODC could be sued in Federal Court.
What do you think, dirt lawyers? Will that suit be dismissed? Can advertising using mascots unfairly tout a law firm’s strength and ability? Are potential clients confused or unduly influenced by the use of mascots? It will be interesting to see how this story plays out.
Real estate practitioners don’t often get excited about litigation, but this lawsuit should bring cheers from dirt lawyers in every part of the Palmetto State! The Finkel Law Firm, LLC, as plaintiff, filed suit on November 24 against Michael Miller, individually and in his official capacity as the Charleston County Register of Deeds. You can read the complaint in its entirety here.
The complaint points to Miller’s chronic and willful failure to timely record real estate documents within one month of delivery. The allegations state that Miller has allowed substantial delays since late 2019, and that these delays have increased significantly in 2021, sometimes amounting to as long as four months.
Further, the complaint states the Charleston ROD routinely files documents that are hand delivered immediately while allowing hundreds or even thousands of documents delivered to his office by mail or parcel delivery to be stored for later filing.
We all know that South Carolina is a race notice state. Delay in filing real estate documents will, of course, create liability for parties and their lawyers. The complaint makes this point clearly.
The law firm alleges that these failures have substantially interfered with its ability to meet its professional obligations to protect the interests of its clients and has exposed the firm to potential liability for correcting title problems resulting from the ROD’s dereliction of duty.
The complaint seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the ROD:
To immediately file all real estate documents that have been delivered and have not been filed within one month of delivery;
To mark the recorded real estate documents as being recorded on the same date that they were delivered; and
To record all real estate documents in the order of the times at which they were brought to the ROD, regardless of whether they are personally delivered or are delivered by U.S. mail or parcel post.
The complaint asks the court to maintain jurisdiction for a reasonable time to monitor the continued operations of the ROD.
Every real estate practitioner in South Carolina should thank their friends at the Finkel Firm for taking this action. And every ROD in the State should take notice!
Court of Appeals holds the City is not responsible
On November 10, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment order in favor of the City of Columbia concerning the alleged destruction of an archeological and historical bridge abutment during a sewer rehabilitation project*.
The Brinkmans, Colemans, Fosters and Collins (property owners) own real estate on Castle Road on the banks of the Broad River in Richland County. The City of Columbia owns and operates sewer lines that run beneath portions of the property and has a permanent, 15-foot easement across the property for the purpose of maintaining the sewer lines. In 2014, the City began a sewer rehabilitation project which required access to the sewer lines.
According to the property owners, two bridge abutments stood on their property located outside the easement. The owners claim these abutments, which were made of carved rock, were built in the 1700s and were the “oldest existing structures in the Midlands.”
One of the owners testified that he shouted to the City’s contractors and said there was a valued monument on the property. Unfortunately, while the City and the contractors were clearing the land, they destroyed the stones that allegedly comprised the bridge abutments. The City acquiesced to the owner’s request that all work cease, and the property owners brought the subject lawsuit alleging various causes of action, including the destruction of archaeological resources in violation of §16-11-780 of the South Carolina Code.
This statute states that it is unlawful for a person to willfully, knowingly, or maliciously enter upon the lands of another and disturb or excavate a prehistoric or historic site for the purpose of discovering, uncovering, moving, removing or attempting to remove an archaeological resource.
The property owner’s expert testified that he believed the structures were historic abutments from the 1700s or early 1800s and likely to be the “Compty bridge abutment.” He explained that additional excavation and review of other properties across the river would have been the appropriate “next step”.
The property owners submitted an application in 2008 to the National Register of Historic Places, but the Department responded that a great deal more research and archeological investigation was needed before a determination of eligibility could be made.
The record contains a screenshot from the website “ArchSite. The property owner’s expert testified that ArchSite is a multi-agency website that allows access to the archaeological resources database. He explained that when ArchSite receives information about historic sites, it verifies the information and posts it to the website. The image in the record shows a rendering of part of the Broad River and Castle Road, and it includes the notation “Historic Areas: Broad River Ferry and Bridge Site.”
The trial court found no governing preservation or conservation authority had recognized the structures as either archaeological resources or historical structures. In granting the City’s motion for summary judgment, the court found that the City was not liable under the statute.
The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that no evidence exists that the City cleared the land “for the purpose of” discovering, uncovering, moving, removing or attempting to remove an archaeological resource. Clearly, the City was attempting to clear the easement area to access the sewer lines. In addition, the owners provided no evidence that the City had any knowledge of the historic nature of the site.
The owner who shouted at the contractors could not testify that the contractors heard him and did not know whether this incident took place before or after the destruction of the stones. In addition, the Court held that the owners failed to show the City was obligated to consult ArchSite. The Court also questioned whether the entry on ArchSite contained sufficient information to conclude the property is historic because the entry indicates the site is “not eligible or requires evaluation.”
Finally, the Court held that regardless of whether any preservation or conservation authorities designed the structures as archaeological resources, the property owners failed to demonstrate the City had either actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of such resources.
*Brinkman v. Weston & Sampson Engineers, Inc., South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion No. 5870, November 10, 2021
Lawyers: please take care of your mental and physical health!
This blog previously discussed three disciplinary cases from our July 7 Advance Sheet. Collectively, the facts from these three cases were downright depressing to lawyers who attempt to behave.
The first case* resulted in a disbarment of a lawyer who borrowed almost $100,000 from his trust account to make payroll and to cover other law firm operating expenses. The money was repaid within ten months!
The attorney attempted to correct this sorry state of affairs by reconciling his trust account, hiring a licensed CPA for all accounting and bookkeeping functions of his firm, giving the trust accounting responsibilities to another lawyer in the firm and completing Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School, Trust Account School, and Advertising School. He was disbarred anyway. We have heard the moral of this story many, many times. The Supreme Court will not allow a lawyer to dip into the trust account, not even for a few months.
On November 10, however, this case was withdrawn, substituted and refiled. ** In the second opinion, the lawyer’s disbarment was withdrawn, and he was, instead, suspended for three years.
Following the July 7 opinion, the lawyer filed a petition for rehearing urging the Court to reconsider the sanction in light of mitigating evidence he provided to the ODC. The lawyer had submitted an affidavit in mitigation which revealed that, at the time of the misconduct, the lawyer was suffering from undiagnosed mental and physical health conditions.
Specifically, he was diagnosed with persistent depressive disorder, Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), a motor tic disorder, an unspecified neurocognitive disorder secondary to a B12 deficiency, pernicious anemia, and hypothyroidism. One doctor’s report indicated it is likely that the lawyer’s neurocognitive impairment contributed to poor judgment and decision making. The lawyer now takes multiple medications, is undergoing clinical treatment, and testified that he is committed to continuing treatment for the rest of his life.
In a footnote, the Court pointed out that the ODC admits that it “inexplicably” failed to include the lawyer’s affidavit in mitigation with the other materials supplied to the Commission and the Court.
At the rehearing, the lawyer testified, credibly, according to the Court, that he is remorseful and regrets he did not recognize and treat his symptoms sooner, rather than withdrawing and isolating himself from the support of family, friends, and colleagues. He also testified that it was unfortunate that it took a catastrophe for him to get the help he needed. He said he believes he can make positive contributions to the legal profession if he is allowed to practice again.
The Court said that the mitigating circumstances do not, in any way, excuse the lawyer’s misconduct. But the Court was impressed that the lawyer adequately demonstrated his undiagnosed mental and physical conditions contributed to his conduct, and therefore considered these circumstances in imposing a sanction.
Lawyers, this case should be a lesson to all of us to take good care of our physical and mental health!
*In the Matter of Hopkins, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28042 (July 7, 2021).
**In the Matter of Hopkins, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28042 (November 10, 2021)
Court of Appeals holds lender’s foreclosure action is not a compulsory counterclaim
South Carolina’s Court of Appeals ruled on a noteworthy foreclosure case* in August.
The facts are interesting. In 1998, the borrowers signed a fixed-rate note in the amount of $60,400 at a 9.99% interest rate secured by a mortgage on property in Gaston. The note contained a balloon provision requiring payment in full on July 1, 2013.
On June 27, 2013, days before the note matured, the borrowers brought an action against the lender alleging a violation of South Carolina Code §37-10-102, the Attorney Preference Statute. The complaint alleged that no attorney supervised the closing, that the loan was unconscionable, and that the borrowers were entitled to damages, attorney’s fees and penalties as provided in the Consumer Protection Code. In addition, the complaint asserted a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. All the allegations were premised on the same alleged violation of the Attorney Preference Statute.
The borrowers immediately defaulted on the note, and the lender filed an answer asserting no counterclaims. At trial, the jury found for the lender. About a year later, the borrowers sent a letter by certified mail to the lender requesting that it satisfy the mortgage. The letter included a $40 check to pay the recording fee for the mortgage satisfaction. The lender refused to satisfy the mortgage and returned the check.
The lender brought the present action for foreclosure in October of 2016. The borrowers asserted defenses of res judicata, laches, unclean hands, waiver, and setoff, but admitted no payments had been made on the loan after July 1, 2013. The borrowers then sought a declaratory judgment that the lender held no mortgage on the property, or, alternatively, that the mortgage was unenforceable. They alleged that the lender was liable for failing to satisfy the mortgage and for noncompliance with the Attorney Preference Statute. The lender denied the allegations and argued that the claims under the Attorney Preference Statute were time-barred.
Both parties sought partial summary judgments before the master-in-equity. The master granter the borrower’s motion and denied the lender’s motion. He ruled that the mortgage was satisfied and instructed the lender to file a satisfaction.
On appeal, the lender argued the master erred by finding its foreclosure action was a compulsory counterclaim in the 2013 action. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the two claims arose out of separate transactions. The Attorney Preference claim arose from the closing, while the foreclosure arose from the borrower’s default, according to the Court. The Court reversed the master’s award of partial summary judgment to the borrower and remanded the case for further proceedings. Because of its decision on this issue, the Court determined that it did not need to address the remaining issues.
*Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Estate of Houck, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5844, August 11, 2021.
Although politics are important to me, I see absolutely zero benefit in discussing politics on social media or in this blog. For that reason, I raise this topic with some apprehension and definitely without taking a political position. I raise it for educational purposes only.
I invite you to put this term in your favorite search engine: “terminating single-family zoning”. You will find articles that range in tone and opinion from, “The conservative case for ending single-family zoning” to “Dems are set to abolish the suburbs”. The arguments are all over the place!
My purpose in raising this topic is simply to ensure South Carolina real estate practitioners have it on their respective radars. Like most extreme changes, this one is likely to be very slow to make it to The Palmetto State, but it’s important for us to be prepared to address if and when it arrives at our borders.
One interesting perspective comes from Journal of the American Planning Association (Volume 86, 2020 – Issue 1) which argues that the privilege of single-family homes “exacerbates inequality and undermines efficiency” by making it harder for people to access high-opportunity places and contributing to shortages of housing in expensive regions. In many cities, the paper argues, single-family zoning prevents housing development where development would be most beneficial and instead pushes expansion into denser, lower income neighborhoods, onto polluted commercial corridors, and into the undeveloped land outside city boundaries. The authors have no illusion that making this change will be simple or that every city can handle the controversy the same way.
Arguments against eliminating single-family zoning include the idea that most Americans prefer detached single-family houses, that it creates more aesthetically pleasing neighborhoods, that it protects against excessive density, and that eliminating it will be impossible. Many arguments are made against constructing a housing tower next to existing detached homes. But counter arguments are made that removing single-family zoning might reduce rather than increase the prevalence of high-rise development because tall buildings are a response to scarcity of development-friendly parcels.
The conservate argument against single-family zoning is apparently that there is no greater distortion of the free market than local zoning codes, and that there are few bureaucracies doing more harm to property rights and freedom than local zoning officers.
See what I mean when I said the arguments are all over the place?
That being said, jurisdictions in California, Washington State, Oregon, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Maryland are apparently considering loosening zoning restrictions. In one of his first actions after surviving an election seeking to oust him from office, California Governor Gavin Newsom essentially abolished single-family zoning throughout California and signaled his approval of legislation seeking to increase California’s housing production.
I doubt we will deal with this issue any time soon, but proactively becoming familiar with the arguments on all sides will only improve our ability to discuss the issues when the time comes.
The first Ethics Advisory Opinion of the year is noteworthy for South Carolina real estate practitioners.
Here is a brief summary of the facts: In a residential refinance, the lender’s loan estimate package provided the name of a specific South Carolina licensed attorney that the bank “identified” as one who could close the loan. The package expressly said the borrower could “shop for (the borrower’s) own providers” for legal and other services.
The borrower informed the bank that a different lawyer had been selected, but the bank’s second set of loan estimate documents again identified a different lawyer and again said the borrower could chose its own provider.
When the borrower asked why another lawyer’s name was identified, the bank responded that the borrower’s chosen lawyer could sign with a third-party company that the bank had contracted with to produce loan forms for an annual fee of $249 to be included on the list.
The borrower’s lawyer did not enroll in the program but did close the loan.
The question to the Ethics Advisory Committee was whether a lawyer may participate in a service provider network for an annual fee of $249 to be listed as an “identified” service provider without violating S.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 7.2(c)?
Rule 7.2 (c) generally provides that a lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services. One exception to the rule is that a lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by the Rule.
The Committee pointed to Comment 7 which states that a communication contains a recommendation if it endorses or vouches for a lawyer’s credentials, abilities, competence, character, or other professional qualities. The bank’s form in this case only provides contact information for participating lawyers and indicates the lawyers on the list have been identified. And the borrower is told in each instance that he or she can choose a different lawyer.
The Committee said these limited statements hardly match up the verbs and nouns used to describe a “recommendation” in the comment because the language in the forms says nothing substantive about the credentials, abilities, competence, character, or professional quality of the listed lawyers.
The Opinion further stated that participation in the network appears to be open to any real estate attorney and that the fee appears to be reasonable considering the enrollment, onboarding, and maintenance charges for including attorneys in the network.
The short answer to the question was “yes”, a lawyer may pay the fee and participate in the network of legal service providers and be “identified” as a possible service provider.
It is interesting that the facts included this statement: “The package and disclosures are assumed to be compliant with federal and state requirements for loan applications and attorney-preference notices.” The Committee answered the very specific question put to it and clearly has no authority to address federal law.
