Lawyer Stuff

Corporate Transparency Act Whack-a-Mole

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I have written many words about the Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) reporting requirement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) over the last couple of years and much of my writing has been rendered obsolete by events. So, it came as no surprise on March 21, 2025, when the world changed again, but even I wouldn’t have thought they’d have done the CTA like they done.    

If you want to get to the meat of the latest development, you can skip ahead to the end of this lengthy entry, but for those of you that need a refresher or those that just want to watch me work through my feelings a bit, the next few paragraphs are for you. 

Readers of this blog probably know by now that Congress passed the CTA some years ago for the stated purpose of assisting law enforcement agencies in preventing bad guys (foreign and domestic) from laundering money and hiding assets in the United States using shell companies. In its wisdom, Congress decreed that almost any entity registered with a Secretary of State’s office must file a report detailing the significant stakeholders in the entity and where they might be found.

Under the Biden Administration, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, came up with a framework of rules, processes, and penalties covering the duty of entities to report BOI. New companies would have 30 days to report the required BOI information to FinCEN; all existing entities would have to make their report by January 1, 2025. 

However, the whole thing did not go off as smoothly as planned for FinCEN.  Across the country (but most especially in Texas) plaintiffs filed lawsuits challenging the reporting requirement as unconstitutional or at least very inconvenient and burdensome. Before FinCEN could even think about imposing its first fine, a Texas federal court entered an injunction enjoining FinCEN from enforcing the BOI reporting requirement while the parties litigated the constitutionality of the Rule.  Game Off!  

The Government appealed this ruling to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which initially removed the injunction. Game On! 

But, just a few days later, the same Court of Appeals, reinstated the injunction.  Game Off!  

The Government (by this time the Trump Administration) remained dogged in its defense of the reporting requirements and appealed the matter to our highest court. There, the United States Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Government and rescinded the injunction in the first Texas case. Game On!  However, by this time a second Texas federal district court had entered its own nationwide injunction against enforcement of the Act. Game Off!  

More time passed, additional words were written, and additional hearings were held, but eventually this other Texas federal district court decided that despite the impassioned argument of the Plaintiffs it did not have authority to ignore the persuasive authority of the Supreme Court’s previous ruling in a nearly identical case. Subsequently, the Texas court (I would like to imagine) somewhat sulkily rescinded its injunction. Game On! Likely a joyous party continued into the wee hours in the FinCEN offices the day it announced that BOI reporting was back, and that the deadline for reporting would for certain be March 21, 2025.  

However, this is the year 2025, and this the Corporate Transparency Act we are talking about, so it was not so simple for the good folks at FinCEN. On February 21, 2025, FinCEN issued a press release indicating that despite the Government’s vigorous effort to defend the Rule all the way the Supreme Court, that it did not plan to enforce the Rule. The press release indicated that FinCEN planned to issue an Interim Rule before the March deadline, but the FinCEN website still promised fines and penalties for anyone failing to comply. Game Off?

On March 21st, FinCEN issued an Interim Rule that dramatically changed the scope and application of the Rule. First, the Interim Rule specifically exempts United States entities from BOI reporting requirements.  Second, the Interim Rule provides that foreign entities registered to do business in the United States need not report any information about its beneficial owners that are United States individuals. Third, the reporting deadline for foreign entities to file BOI reports was extended to 30 days from the effective date of the Interim Rule.

The Interim Rule certainly reduces the theoretical usefulness of BOI reporting to law enforcement as FinCEN’s database will now only contain information about foreign entities that register in the United States and their foreign beneficial owners. Criminals inclined to set up shell companies to hide their illicit assets probably would be well advised to use entities formed in the United States if that isn’t what they were doing before. Perhaps, the Interim Rule is arguably not what Congress intended, but there is a lot of that going around.

Practically, the reduction in the scope of the Rule will diminish the relevance of the CTA to real estate lawyers. Those attorneys that represent foreign entities doing business in the United States will need to be prepared to advise clients of the reporting requirements that go along with registering their foreign entity in the U.S., but those attorneys representing entities formed in the United States can likely breathe a long sigh of relief.  At least for the moment.

For your holiday reading pleasure … here’s another drafting nightmare case, dirt lawyers

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South Carolina’s Supreme Court has invalidated an arbitration agreement in a residential home purchase contract because of a sentence found to run afoul of public policy*. The homebuyers are free to pursue their lawsuit against the home builder.

Amanda and Jay Huskins bought a house from Mungo Homes. The arbitration section in the purchase contract included this sentence:

“Each and every demand for arbitration shall be made within ninety (90) days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen, except that any claim, dispute or matter in question not asserted within said time periods shall be deem waived and forever barred.”

The Court held that it is undisputed that this clause shortened the statute of limitations for any claim to the ninety-day period. Mungo conceded that this provision ran afoul of South Carolina Code §15-3-140 (2005), which forbids and renders void contract clauses attempting to shorten the legal statute of limitations.

The Huskins brought this lawsuit against Mungo, raising various claims related to the sale. Mungo asked the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. The Huskins countered that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable and the lower court granted the motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals held the clause was unconscionable and unenforceable but ruled the clause could be severed from the rest of the arbitration agreement and affirmed the order compelling arbitration.

The Supreme Court stated that the better view is that the clause is unenforceable because it is void and illegal as a matter of public policy. The Court further noted that the contract contained no severability provision and that Mungo’s “manipulative skirting of South Carolina public policy goes to the core of the arbitration agreement and weighs heavily against severance.”

The Court mused that it has been steadfast in protecting home buyers from unscrupulous and overreaching terms, and stated that applying severance here would erode laudable public policy. The Court, therefore, declined to sever the unconscionable provision for public policy reasons. The entire arbitration provision was held to be unenforceable. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further action.

Drafting contracts for corporate clients can be tricky, dirt lawyers. Read this case and similar cases carefully!

*Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28245 (December 11, 2024).

Charleston County finally agrees to implement an e-filing system

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For many years, Charleston County’s Register of Deeds Office has refused to join the growing list of South Carolina counties that offer electronic filing for land records. Dirt lawyers have scratched their heads wondering when this large county will implement a system that has proved in other counties to be efficient and economically advantageous.

Finally, Charleston ROD has announced that it has entered into a contract with a vendor to implement an electronic filing system. Initial projections are that the new system will be in place in late 2025.

Charleston has also announced that it will provide property owners the opportunity to sign up for fraud prevention services that will notify owner of any filings that may affect their properties. Similar services have been offered by national companies at a price. Other counties in South Carolina have offered similar services free of charge.

Register of Deeds Karen Hollings said in a press release that the electronic filing system will make the Register of Deeds office better organized and more efficient for the people of Charleston County.

Merry Christmas to all!

Following injunction, FinCEN announces compliance with CTA is voluntary

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On December 3, the United District Court for the Eastern Division of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that prohibits the federal government from enforcing The Corporate Transparency Act.

In response, the United States Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced on December 9 that while the injunction is in place, compliance with the CTA is only voluntary.

The Corporate Transparency Act, which went into effect January 1, 2024, requires many companies to report beneficial ownership information to FinCEN. Beneficial ownership information is defined as identifying information about the individuals who directly or indirectly own or control a company. The deadline for entities created before January 1, 2024 was January 1, 2025

Lawyers have been scrambling to grasp the intricacies of the new law and to assist their corporate clients, including homeowners’ associations, in compliance.

Six plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in May challenging the constitutionality of the law. The decision is based on the Commerce Clause, and the statute is based on national security and aimed at enforcing laws against money laundering.

This case will surely go to the Supreme Court, and we will have to wait to see how that Court reacts. It is possible that the rationale for the legislation holds for some but not all entities. Homeowners’ associations seem to be likely candidates to dodge this particular bullet.

In the meantime, your clients are not required to comply with the new law.

Court grants nationwide injunction against enforcement of CTA

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The Corporate Transparency Act, which went into effect January 1, 2024, requires many companies to report beneficial ownership information to the United States Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Beneficial ownership information is defined as identifying information about the individuals who directly or indirectly own or control a company. The deadline for entities created before January 1, 2024 is January 1, 2025.

Lawyers have been scrambling to grasp the intricacies of the new law and to assist their corporate clients, including homeowners’ associations, in compliance.

But we have a huge development.

On December 3, the United District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that prohibits the federal government from enforcing the new law.

Six plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in May challenging the constitutionality of the law. The decision is based on the Commerce Clause, and the statute is based on national security and aimed at enforcing laws against money laundering. This case will surely go to the Supreme Court, and we will have to wait to see how that Court reacts. It is possible that the rationale for the legislation holds for some but not all entities. Homeowners’ associations seem to be likely candidates to dodge this particular bullet.

Department of Justice takes last-minute action against NAR Settlement

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On November 24, just 48 hours before the National Association of Realtors’ settlement agreement headed to final approval, the Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in the lawsuit.

The filing indicated that the DOJ did not participate in the underlying litigation, but it challenged the settlement’s provision that requires buyers and buyers’ agents to enter into a written agreement before touring a home. This provision raises concerns under antitrust laws that could be addressed in multiple ways, according to the DOJ’s statement.

The DOJ suggested rectifying the issue by eliminating the buyer broker agreement requirement or to disclaim that the settlement creates any immunity or defense under the antitrust laws. Otherwise, the court could clarify that the settlement approval affords no immunity or defense for the buyer-agreement provision. The DOJ believes the settlement could limit the ways buyer brokers compete for clients.

The final hearing is scheduled for November 26 in Missouri. The NAR said in a statement that it will advocate for a final settlement that day. The statement suggested that the settlement is not what the NAR wants, but that it is preferable to continued litigation and the uncertainty of a jury verdict.

We’ll see lots of news on this topic this week and next week!

In the meantime, Happy Thanksgiving wishes for you and your family!

Court of Appeals holds right of first refusal unenforceable

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Heads up, dirt lawyers, this is another case dealing with drafting issues. Please read it carefully and apply its concepts the next time you are asked to draft a right of first refusal.

Crescent Homes SC, LLC v. CJN, LLC* involved a contract for CJN to develop 32 lots in a subdivision for sale to Crescent Homes. Crescent Homes would build single-family homes on these lots for sale to homebuyers. The contract referenced a “Future Phase on adjacent property owned by CJN and contained the following paragraph:

“Right of First Refusal: At the Initial Closing, (CJN) will grant to (Crescent) a right of first refusal with respect to the lots cross-hatched and shown on Exhibit ‘A-2’ as “Future Phase” and any additional lots that may from time to time be annexed or otherwise included in the Subdivision. A memorandum of such right of first refusal in a form reasonabl(y) acceptable to the Parties will be recorded in the public records of Greenville County at the Initial Closing.”

CJN did not start development of the future phase because of cost concerns. Crescent brought a lawsuit for breach of contract asserting CJN delayed the initial closing by, most significantly, failing to maintain the lots free from trash and debris. Crescent sought specific performance and other remedies.

CJN entered into a contract with Douglas Clark making termination of the right of first refusal in the Crescent contract a contingency. When CJN provided a copy of the Clark offer to Crescent, Crescent responded by offering $700,000 to purchase the property and by filing a lis pendens. Crescent notified CJN that even though the right of first refusal was binding, Crescent was not required to exercise or waive it at that time because the initial closing had not yet occurred.

Crescent asserted that the right of first refusal had not been delivered and was not capable of being validly exercised at that time. Clark withdrew his offer for reasons unrelated to this controversy.

The initial closing took place and the parties began the process of developing the lots in the first phase of the subdivision.

CJN filed a lawsuit against Crescent seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging abuse of legal process. The suit alleged that that the right of first refusal was invalid and Crescent had filed four lis pendens for the ulterior purpose of preventing the sale of the future phase property to third parties. CJN also answered Crescent’s complaint asserting counterclaims of breach of contract and quantum meruit/unjust enrichment and seeking remedies of specific performance and monetary damages.

CJN filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging the right of first refusal was void because it constituted a restraint on the alienation of the property.  The Master denied the motion, finding factual disputes and novel issues required further inquiry.

CJN continued to market the property and obtained at least one additional offer. Crescent filed a motion to consolidate the cases. CJN amended its complaint, adding causes of action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship and unfair and deceptive trade practices.

The Master bifurcated the proceeding and tried CJN’s cause of action for a declaration that the right of first refusal was unenforceable. Crescent moved to dismiss, arguing no justiciable controversy as the matter was not ripe because the previous offers had been withdrawn.

The Master denied that motion and found the right of first refusal to be unenforceable because it was an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of an interest in land, stating “based on the language used in (the paragraph), the court is unable to interpret and/or give meaning to the parties’ agreement without substantially and significantly creating terms and conditions that the parties themselves could have and should have included.”  This appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals held that the matter was justiciable once a bona fide offer had been made. Neither party provided cases regarding ripeness in which offers were made and subsequently withdrawn.

As to the enforceability of the right of first refusal, the Court stated that such a right does restrain an owner’s power of alienation, but the question becomes whether the right unreasonably restrains alienation.

The Court cited a prior case holding that a right of first refusal was unenforceable because it failed to identify the property it encumbered, failed to contain price provisions and failed to contain procedures governing the exercise of the right. The Court found those factors present in this case and affirmed the Master’s finding of unenforceability.

Dirt lawyers, a rule against perpetuities issues was also raised against the right of first refusal, but the Court held it did not have to reach that issue. That is drafting challenge that we will save for another day. The bottom line in this case is that drafting real estate documents requires a great deal of skill and continuing legal research. Be careful out there!

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6093 (November 20, 2024)

We have a new real-estate related arbitration case

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Court of Appeals holds arbitration clause unconscionable

Photo from PalmettoBluff.com

315 Corley CW LLC v. Palmetto Bluff Development* involves an appeal from Beaufort County arising from the sale of real estate in the Palmetto Bluff Development to homeowners who ultimately became plaintiffs in this case.

Palmetto Bluff is a planned residential community. Purchasers, by accepting deeds, automatically become members in the Palmetto Bluff Club. Club membership is further memorialized by a Club Membership Agreement. The governing terms of the Club are set out in the Club Membership Plan. The Club is a for-profit entity which retains the power, according to the parties, to unilaterally change its fees and policies with no input from Club members.

In 2017, a clause was added to the Membership Agreement stating that disputes surrounding the Membership Agreement will be resolved by mandatory arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), applying the substantive law of South Carolina.

In 2020, several homeowners complained that the Club was planning to make changes that they understood would limit the ability of their short-term tenants to use the Club’s facilities. After failed mediation attempts, this lawsuit was brought in 2022. The plaintiff homeowners then demanded arbitration.

Later in 2022, the homeowners asked the circuit court to stay arbitration and sought summary judgment on the alleged invalidity of the arbitration clause. The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The lower court held that the arbitration clause was invalid because the agreement was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeals agreed that the agreement was unconscionable because the homeowners lacked a meaningful choice in entering the agreement and because the agreement can be unilaterally modified. 

The Court cited cases to the effect that whether one party lacks a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration agreement typically speaks to the fundamental fairness in the bargaining process. Courts consider the relative disparity in the parties’ bargaining power, the parties’ relative sophistication, whether the parties were represented by independent counsel, and whether the plaintiff is a substantial business concern. Contracts of adhesion, according to these cases, are standard form contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with terms that are not negotiable. However, contracts of adhesion are not per se unconscionable. Instead, adhesion contracts are not unconscionable in and of themselves so long as the terms are even-handed.

The Court of Appeals held that the contract at issue is unconscionable because there is no conceivable potential for bargaining power on the part of those whom the provisions purport to bind. There was an absence of meaningful choice. The Court also held that the agreement was oppressive and one-sided because it limited the award of treble damages, regardless of whether they are construed as compensatory or punitive.

I recommend that South Carolina dirt lawyers read this case in detail and apply its guidelines in drafting documents for developer and builder clients.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6074 (Filed July 24, 2024, Refiled November 13, 2024)

SC Supreme Court disbars real estate lawyer for “robbing Peter to pay Paul”

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…and using title insurance as his tool

In the Matter of Bush* resulted in a disbarment of a dirt lawyer who used a common “robbing Peter to pay Paul” scheme to steal from clients. The case involved three disciplinary complaints.

The first complaint revolved around the failure to wire $334,000 to a lender to pay off a mortgage in a real estate closing. The lawyer eventually admitted he used the money to replace funds he misappropriated from another closing.

The second complaint arose when the lawyer issued a closing protection letter and a title insurance commitment despite the fact that his title insurance company had suspended him as an agent and his title insurance agency license had expired. The lawyer received funds for this closing but, again, failed to satisfy the prior mortgage. The lawyer eventually admitted he used the funds to pay off the underlying mortgage for the closing described in the first complaint.

After the lawyer was placed in interim suspension by the Supreme Court, he responded to a third client whose mortgage had not been satisfied that, “I am going to plow back in to this and let me talk with some colleagues about a way to get a better resolution quickly.”  The lawyer did not tell the third client that he had failed to satisfy her mortgage. Instead, he provided false information to the client regarding the status of the debt. The lawyer finally admitted that he had stolen the funds.

It’s amazing that a few bad apples continue to employ these deceptive techniques that eventually come to light. It is impossible to hide this type of scheme forever because the economy always ebbs and flows. Even a small economic downturn can result in the failure of the next closing to materialize. Without the funds from the next closing, the mortgage from the prior closing is never paid, and the house of cards falls quickly. In this case, the lawyer’s former title insurance company received a claim from one of the lenders who was not paid. A title insurance complaint will also cause the house of cards to fall quickly.

Lawyers, please read this case carefully as a model of what not to do! Be careful out there!

*South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28241 (November 6, 2024).

Judge approves real estate commissions settlement

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Late in 2023, this blog discussed multiple class action lawsuits across the United States attempting to hold brokerage companies responsible for conspiring to keep residential real estate commissions artificially high. We have a development.

A Federal judge in Missouri said on October 31 that he will approve a $110 million settlement with nine brokerage companies. In May, a similar $208 million settlement was approved. And two more orders are expected in November, when the same judge weighs a pair of settlements against the National Association of Realtors and HomeService of America.

This blog also discussed last November that a similar class action was brought in South Carolina. Dirt lawyers, I would love to know what you are seeing in your markets. Are commissions now being negotiated to avoid the potential liability? I’d love to hear what’s going on out there.