Earlier this year, several news sources reported that South Carolina’s 2023 housing market could return to a “normal” sales level, leaving behind the frenzy we have seen in previous years. We were anticipating the market may return to our ordinary seasonal ebbs and flows. Law firms have always had to adapt to those fluctuations from a staffing and other cost standpoint.
Redfin is reporting some interesting South Carolina statistics. Redfin’s website indicates that in May, home prices were up 2.1% year-over-year. During the same period, the number of homes sold fell 11.5% and the number of homes for sale rose 2.5%. The median sales price was $375,200, and 6,893 homes sold during that period. The median number of days on the market was 55, up 16 days year-over-year.
We all know that South Carolina is a primary destination for consumers looking for milder winters and following jobs at BMW, Volvo and other companies. We have recently learned that Scout Motors is establishing a manufacturing plant in Blythewood to build all-electric trucks and SUVs. We have heard the company is investing $2 billion and has the potential to create 4,000 permanent jobs. The future in South Carolina definitely does not appear to be dismal in the long run.
National economists seem to be predicting that home prices will continue to rise in 2023. Sales may be down and mortgage rates may be up, but home prices still seem to be rising because there are so few homes for sale. Rising prices are good news for home sellers, but not for cash-strapped home buyers. Inflation, of course, is causing major concerns for these potential home buyers. The Federal Reserve may or may not continue to raise rates to control inflation.
I never miss a chance to ask a South Carolina real estate professional about business. I’d love to know what you are seeing in your office this year and how you are thinking about what 2024 might bring.
Real estate related issues should be kept to a minimum
My husband and I just returned from the 2023 annual meeting of the South Carolina United Methodist conference. We attended as lay members from our church, but my eyes and ears were open, as always, for real estate issues.
Dirt lawyers in South Carolina witnessed the real estate issues raised by the schism in the Episcopal Church several years ago. We made lists of church properties that could be sold or mortgaged without the involvement of any entity beyond the local congregation. We made lists of properties involved in a hierarchical church structure requiring agreements and signatures of persons in distant locations. We advised real estate practitioners to work in close connection with underwriting counsel of the title insurance companies to avoid title issues.
I have no inside information on this matter, but my guess is that the Methodists were able to learn from the Episcopalians and managed to avoid the extensive litigation involved in that earlier schism.
United Methodist churches exist under a hierarchical structure. Anyone who has handled a closing involving a United Methodist property has learned that the District Superintendent must be involved in closing documents. The church properties are, in effect, owned by the conference.
When issues began to arise about LGBT members and pastors and it became apparent that there would be a separation of congregations, South Carolina’s Bishop and the administrators surrounding him negotiated with the churches who desired to leave the conference. After months of talks, the parties agreed to a payout that would free the real estate of the local church from the involvement of the conference.
Churches who wanted to leave the conference were required to pay ten percent of the value of their real properties and other assets. They were also required to pay some funds related to pastor pensions and some funds related to “apportionments” (the money paid to the conference to support the work of the conference as opposed to the work of the local congregation.)
Prior to the meetings this week, we had heard that several churches decided to leave the conference. But we were surprised to learn that there are, in fact, 113 churches who made arrangements with the conference to separate from United Methodism. On the last day of the meetings, we were asked to vote to approve the separation. Thankfully, the meeting, although very sad, was handled in a respectful manner. We witnessed an amicable divorce.
If you are asked to handle any transaction involving a church that is or formerly was a United Methodist congregation, you should, of course, investigate the title issues as usual. You should involve the friendly underwriting counsel from your title insurance company. But, after these appropriate investigations, you should learn that there are no title issues arising from the involvement of the conference.
Never say never, though. I wouldn’t be shocked to learn that some of the 113 church congregations failed to tie up all the details of the separation. So be even more diligent than usual in examining the authority documents of the church. I assume that real estate practitioners will see numerous transactions as these churches, now separated from the administrative arm that supported them and having paid out substantial funds for the separation, will need real estate loans.
Dirt lawyers, do you remember studying the cases in first year property classes in law school that defined navigable waters? We discussed the ebb and flow of tides. We talked about whether the water is presently used or had been used in the past or may be susceptible for use in the future for transportation. I remember discussing whether logs could float and how big a boat must be to make the property qualify as navigable.
When I was in private practice in Columbia representing real estate developers, I ran into significant issues on a routine basis involving the federal government’s jurisdiction over wetlands. One developer was required to add an eight-acre lake to a residential subdivision because a minor portion of the property was soggy. We dealt with the Army Corps of Engineers on these issues, and getting approval for development was tedious at best. And I promise you that those soggy areas were not navigable by any size boat.
The reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA) was significantly constricted when the United States Supreme Court on May 25 issued a decision that narrowed the scope of wetlands and other water subject to the CWA’s protections. The case, Sackett v. EPA*, involved a residential lot in Priest Lake, Idaho.
Mike and Chantell Sackett bought the lot in 2004 for $23,000, intending to build a modest three-bedroom family home. They began building in 2007, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) demanded the construction be halted, claiming it violated the CWA because the property was a federally regulated “navigable water”.
That demand began a 16-year legal battle. The Sacketts sued the EPA, and the case has reached the Supreme Court twice. The first decision involved a procedural matter. The Court decided in 2012 that property owners are entitled to immediate judicial review of EPA compliance orders without waiting for agency to seek judicial enforcement to contest the assertion that properties contain “waters of the United States” subject to CWA jurisdiction.
The case then worked its way through the lower courts until the Supreme Court agreed in 2022 to consider the issue of whether the EPA can define “navigable waters” to include semi-soggy parcels of land.
In January 2023, while the Sackett case was pending, the EPA published a final rule adopting a new definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) to include traditional navigable waters, tributaries, adjacent wetlands and other waters that are not themselves navigable but are either relatively permanent or have a significant nexus to navigable waters. The Sackett case probably invalidates this rule.
The five-person majority held that WOTUS include only: (1) relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features described in ordinary parlance as streams, oceans, rivers and lakes; and (2) adjacent wetlands with continuous surface connection to such waters so that wetlands, as a practical matter indistinguishable from the bodies of water. To prove jurisdiction over a wetland, the EPA must now show that the adjacent body of water constitutes WOTUS (a relatively permanent body of water connected to interstate navigable waters) and that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine whether the water ends and the wetland begins.
As I type this, I sit outside on a screen porch listening to birds sing in the previously defined wetlands that adjoin two sides of our house. We bought the lot, in part, because of the beauty and peace provided by wetlands, including the birds, as opposed to human neighbors. I wonder whether our peace and quiet will change.
My family has a modest second home in North Litchfield Beach. It isn’t close to the ocean. My Fitbit clocks 700 steps to the beach, and most family members prefer to drive a golf cart for that reason. To call it a “raised beach house” is an understatement. Because of flood insurance concerns, the garage level of the house was required to be very tall when we built in 2011.
We can’t paint or power wash with the tallest ladders available to homeowners. If we had a big boat, we could park it in the garage. My point is that the living area of our house is so far above ground, that if it floods, it is likely that inland Pawleys Island and Georgetown County will also flood.
Thinking all the way back to Hurricane Hugo in 1989, my extended Georgetown County family members evacuated to Columbia to stay with us. Much to everyone’s surprise, our property in Columbia suffered more damage than their properties in Georgetown.
Earlier this year, we received a letter from our insurance agency indicating that it would attempt to obtain insurance for us for the upcoming insurance year, but we should be prepared for difficulty because of the frequency of hurricanes in our area. There is no reason our house should be difficult to insure other than its location on the beach side of Highway 17.
I share this information with South Carolina dirt lawyers, particularly those who practice in our coastal counties, for discussion purposes only. I’m not pushing a panic button by any means. But the headlines I read last week about State Farm’s decision to pull out of California as to new homeowners’ applications certainly caught my attention.
State Farm pointed to wildfire risks and construction cost inflation to justify its decision. Everyone is suffering from the latter, and, as to the former, the company didn’t attempt to limit the impact of its decision to those areas most affected by wildfires. Other stated concerns were climate change, reinsurance costs affecting the entire insurance industry, and global inflation. All of those concerns also affect all locations.
The company pulled out of the entire state as to new applications. And some news articles reported that State Farm is the largest insurer based on premium. The fact that the largest insurer pulled out of the third largest state seems impactful.
The announcement did state that existing customers will not be affected and that automobile insurance applications will continue to be accepted.
There doesn’t appear to be anything we should do at this point, other than to keep our eyes and ears open as to developments in the area of insurance for ourselves and our clients.
Braden’s Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach* involves two small, contiguous developed residential coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership, like the properties in question, to be merged into a single, larger property.
The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of the contiguous lots as vacation rental properties, but Braden’s Folly challenged the ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the Penn Central** test, which states that in regulatory takings cases, courts must examine the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, as well as the character of the government action.
Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden’s Folly. Folly Beach appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach.
The Court stressed that underlying its applicability of the Penn Central test was the distinct fragility of Folly Beach’s coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. The exemption empowered the City to act instead of the State in protecting the beach.
A portion of the northeast end of Folly beach has a double row of properties. The “A lots” are directly adjacent to the ocean-side of East Ashley Avenue, and the “B lots”—also known as “super-beachfront” lots—are closer to the ocean. There is no road between the A and B lots, so the B lots are accessible only through the A lots. Between beach renourishments, the B lots could be surrounded by the ocean on three sides. Braden’s Folly owns adjacent lots (Lot A and Lot B) on East Ashley Avenue. Both lots are very small.
Braden’s Folly contended that it had always intended to keep one of the lots and sell the other—whichever received the highest offer—to pay for the construction of a house on each lot. When the merger ordinance passed, the City sent a letter to Braden’s Folly requesting it stop marketing the lots separately. In response, Braden’s Folly filed the subject lawsuit.
The Supreme Court found that some facts weighed in favor of finding Braden’s Folly’s investment-backed expectation was reasonable and some facts weighed in favor of finding its expectation unreasonable. The PennCentral balancing test did not weigh in favor of either party, according to the Court.
Folly Beach and its witnesses set out the advantages to local beachfront property owners and the public at large of unwinding the super-beachfront development. The most important of the benefits to local property owners is the continued existence of federal funding for beach renourishment which in turn (1) protects A and B lots—particularly given that all the lots would be underwater if it were not for the continual renourishment; and (2) avoids property owners paying higher taxes if federal funding is extinguished.
The Court held that the merger ordinance was not a taking but responsible land use policy. Braden’s Folly retains, according to the Court, a near-full “bundle of sticks” incident to its ownership of the lots.
In Ani Creation, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, * the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that imposed a zoning overlay district intended to bolster the “family friendly” nature of Myrtle Beach’s historic downtown area. The ordinance targeted smoke shops and tobacco stores and the merchandizing of tobacco paraphernalia, products containing CBD, and sexually oriented material.
The opinion begins, “The City of Myrtle Beach (the city) is a town economically driven and funded by tourism.” The facts indicate that the city received frequent criticism from tourists and residents that the proliferation of smoke shops and tobacco stores repelled families from the area. The city passed a comprehensive plan that aimed at increasing tourism and concluded that all businesses needed to encourage and support a “family beach image”. The city passed an ordinance which created a zoning overlay district known as the Ocean Boulevard Entertainment Overlay District that encompassed the historic downtown area.
The prohibited uses in the district were declared immediately nonconforming when the ordinance was passed on August 14, 2018, but an amortization period was allowed which gave affected businesses until December 31, 2019, to cease the nonconforming portions of their businesses.
The zoning administrator issued citations to the nonconforming businesses. Nine of the 25 affected stories appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals which found (1) it did not have jurisdiction to declare the ordinance unconstitutional; (2) it could not grant a use variance because it would allow the continuation of a use not otherwise allowed in the district; and (3) the businesses were engaged in one or more of the prohibited uses. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s opinion, finding the appellants’ 25 grounds for challenging the ordinance meritless. The businesses appealed directly to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The appellants raised a “host” of constitutional and procedural challenges, all of which fell on deaf ears at the Supreme Court. The Court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s police powers. According to the Court, municipal governing bodies clothed with authority to determine residential and industrial districts are better qualified by their knowledge of the situation to act upon such matters than are the courts, and they will not be interfered with in the exercise of their police power to accomplish their desired end unless there is a pain violation of the constitutional rights of the citizens.
A comment on the Dirt Listserv said, “S. Carolina is OK with cancel culture after all.” A store selling sexually oriented materials was removed from Garners Ferry Road in Columbia (about three miles from my house) using similar legal arguments. I was delighted to see that store torn down before I had to explain it to my grandchildren! But I do understand the “cancel culture” argument. What do you think?
Dirt lawyers hear stories of dysfunctional homeowners’ associations routinely. I have one for you!
My husband and I built a second home at the beach in a relatively modest subdivision in 2011. Many of the houses are owner occupied, but many are on rental plans. My twenty-something daughter met a neighbor who asked her two questions, (1) “Is this your family’s first vacation home?” and (2) Your parents aren’t going to rent this house, are they?” It wasn’t a good start to our relationship.
We had several issues with ARB approvals during the building process, which were handled by our builder. At one point, he threw his hands in the air in frustration and said, “These people need to understand this isn’t DeBordieu.” In other words, the ARB seemed to believe the subdivision is much more affluent than it is.
When we attended our first (and only as it turns out) annual meeting of the owners, the president of the board promptly threw one of our neighbors out of the meeting for asking a question! It was during the first five minutes of the meeting. We were shocked and vowed to steer clear of those meetings.
During our first winter, we received a very nasty letter telling us we had a dead tree that must be removed immediately. We were in Columbia, didn’t know about the dead tree, and even when we investigated, we decided the tree didn’t look any worse than the other winter trees. But we quickly took it down! We heard another neighbor received a similar letter telling him his mailbox was dirty and needed to be cleaned immediately.
We decided that we were going to be good neighbors and properly maintain our house and yard, but we would enjoy the beach and the gatherings of our growing family (including the four grandchildren we’ve been blessed with since we built the house) without getting involved with the neighbors.
Believe it or not, this story has a happy ending. Apparently, all the problems were caused by one homeowner who managed to get herself elected to the board and the ARB. She roamed the streets looking for rules violations and wrote the letters herself. About the time we figured out the problem, she and her husband, thankfully, moved. The trouble among the neighbors immediately improved. Now, we have delightful neighborhood parties and enjoy getting to know our neighbors. And it seems everyone has a story about the bad neighbor. We stand around drinking beer and telling stories.
My guess is that our earlier bad HOA is like the one described in Buckholder v. Palisades Park Owners Ass’n, Inc.*, a Virginia case where the HOA imposed an assessment on all owners to fund the cost of inspecting each property for the purpose of finding violations of the HOA rules. Homeowners sued to have the assessment declared invalid.
Virginia has a statute that provides, “(e)xcept as expressly authorized by the Act, the declaration or as otherwise provided by law, no association shall…make an assessment or impose a charge against a lot owner unless the charge is a fee for services provided or related to use of the common area.”
The court invalided the assessment and remanded the case to the lower court.
I read about this interesting case on the DIRT listserv that I recommend routinely. You won’t be sorry if you sign up for the emails!
Professor Dale Whitman who moderates the listserv commented that this is the sort of thing that gives HOAs a bad name. He also commented, “While most states won’t have a statute exactly like Virginia’s, the lesson of the case remains applicable. If an HOA or condo board is going to impose an assessment to be used on anything other than the common areas (or reserves that will ultimately benefit the common areas), it needs to be certain that it has the legal power to do so, either by virtue of an applicable statute or its own declaration. This is particularly true if the assessment is almost certain to irritate and raise the hackles of some owners, as this one was.”
Several lawyers commented about the nature of folks who like to serve on HOA boards. Read the comments if you need a good laugh. The listserv is searchable.
I think I’ll share the case with my neighbors at the beach.
Pending legislation in South Carolina may affect your transactions
Remember the Chinese surveillance balloon the United States shot down off the coast of the Palmetto State in February? That incident and other rising tensions between our government and China over several issues (the war in Ukraine, recognition of Taiwan, to name only two) have resulted in politicians proposing to broaden state law bans on foreign ownership of real estate.
According to a New York Times article dated February 7, entitled “How U.S-China Tensions Could Affect Who Buys the House Next Door”, legislation in Texas was proposed after a Chinese billionaire with plans to create a wind farm bought more than 130,000 acres of land near a U.S. Air Force base.
Proposed legislation is also pending in Florida, California and now South Carolina to restrict ownership of real estate by “hostile nations” or “foreign adversaries.” Some have suggested that such bills may run afoul of due process and equal protection issues.
Chicago Title published an Underwriting Memorandum on April 5 entitled “Foreign Ownership of Property in South Carolina” to advise agents of the pending legislation in our state.
You may recall that we have an existing statute (S.C. Code §27-13-30) prohibiting any “alien” or corporation controlled by an “alien” from owning or controlling more than 500,000 acres of land in South Carolina. Recently, the South Carolina Senate passed Senate Bill 576 that amends the existing statute by expressly prohibiting any citizen of a foreign adversary or corporation controlled by a foreign adversary from acquiring any interest in South Carolina property. The proposed legislation will now be considered by the House.
The term “foreign adversary” is defined in the bill as “any foreign government or nongovernment person determined by the United States Secretary of Commerce to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States citizens.”
And there are other bills pending along the same lines.
Senate Bill 392 would amend our existing statute to reduce the amount of property allowed to be owned by an “alien” to 1,000 acres. House Bill 3566 would add a statute to reduce to 1,000 acres the amount of land that can be owned or controlled by China, the Chinese Communist Party, or an entity whose principal place of business is located within China. House Bill 3118 would prohibit any company owned or controlled by China or the Chinese Communist Party or that has a principal place of business in China from owning, leasing, possessing, or exercising any control over real estate located within 50 miles of a state or federal military base for the purpose of installing or erecting any type of telecommunications or broadcasting tower.
All dirt lawyers will know immediately that all versions of the proposed legislation will create uncertainty in our market. I have only two pieces of advice at this point. First, let’s all monitor the proposed legislation. And, second, let’s pay attention to guidance provided by our excellent title insurance underwriters.
Maybe, but real estate practitioners should be careful!
A recent discussion on South Carolina Bar’s real estate section listserv surrounded whether and how to close “double closings” vs. “assignments of contracts”. This is not a novel topic in our market. In the very hot market that preceded the crash beginning in 2007, one of the biggest traps for real estate attorneys was closing flip transactions. Title insurance lawyers fielded questions involving flips on an hourly basis!
Flips have never been illegal per se. Buying low and selling high or buying low and making substantial improvements before selling high are great ways to make substantial profits in real estate.
Back in the day, we suggested that in situations where there were two contracts, the ultimate buyer and lender had to know the property was closing twice and the first closing had to stand on its own as to funding. In other words, the money from the second closing could not be used to fund the first closing. (Think: informed consent confirmed in writing!)
Where assignments of contracts were used, we suggested that the closing statements clearly reflect the cost and payee of the assignment.
The term real estate investors are using these days to define buying low and selling high is “wholesaling”. A quick Google search reveals many sites defining and educating (for a price, of course) the process of wholesaling. This is a paraphrase of a telling quote I found from one site:
If you’re looking for a simple way to get started in real estate without a lot of money, real estate wholesaling could be a viable option. Real estate wholesaling involves finding discounted properties and putting the properties under contract for a third-party buyer. Before closing, the wholesaler sells their interest in the property to a real estate investor or cash buyer.
One of the smart lawyers on our listserv, Ladson H. Beach, Jr., suggested that there does not appear to be a consensus among practitioners about how to close these transactions. He suggested reviewing several ethics cases* that set out fact-specific scenarios that may result in ethical issues for closing attorneys.
In addition to the ethics issues, Mr. Beach suggested there may be a licensing issue where an assignor is not a licensed broker or agent. A newsletter from South Carolina Real Estate Commission dated May 2022 which you can read in its entirety here addresses this issue. The article, entitled “License Law Spotlight: Wholesaling and License Law” begins:
“The practice of individuals or companies entering into assignable contracts to purchase a home from an owner, then marketing the contract for the purchase of the home to the public has become a hot topic, nationwide in the real estate industry in recent years. This is usually referred to as ‘wholesaling’. The question is often, “is wholesaling legal?’ The answer depends upon the specific laws of the state in which the marketing is occurring. In South Carolina, the practice may require licensure and compliance with South Carolina’s real estate licensing law.”
The article suggests that the Real Estate Commission has interpreted that the advertising of real property belonging to another with the expectation of compensation falls under the statutory definition of “broker” in S.C. Code §40-57-30(3) and requires licensure. Further, the newsletter suggests S.C. Code §40-57-240(1) sets up an exception; licensing is not required if an unlicensed owner is selling that owner’s property. The Commission has interpreted, according to this article, that having an equitable interest is not equivalent to a legal interest for the purpose of licensing. In other words, a person having an equitable interest acquired by a contract is not the property’s owner and has no legal interest in the property for the purposes of this licensing exemption.
So real estate practitioners have several concerns about closing transactions of this type. Be very careful out there and consult your friendly title insurance underwriter and perhaps your friendly ethics lawyer if you have concerns as these situations arise in your practice.
*In re Barbare (2004), In re Fayssoux (2009), In re Brown (2004) and In re Newton (2007)
Real estate law never bores me, but our cases may seem particularly mundane considering the Murdaugh prosecution that has gripped our state for more than a month. You may want to put this blog aside until the jury returns its verdict. I’ve seen so many photos on social media of groups of lawyers watching the case together that I am confident real estate is not top of mind!
Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC* is a South Carolina Court of Appeals case which was originally issued June 1, 2022, then withdrawn, substituted and refiled February 15, 2023.
The Huskins signed a Purchase Agreement with Mungo in June 2015 for a home in Westcott Ridge subdivision in Irmo. The document consisted of three pages. The first page contained a statutory notice of arbitration, the second page included a paragraph entitled “LIMITED WARRANTY”, and the third page included a paragraph entitled “ARBITRATION AND CLAIMS.”
In 2017, the Huskins filed an action against Mungo alleging the Purchase Agreement violated South Carolina law by disclaiming implied warranties without providing for a price reduction or other benefit to the purchaser for relinquishing those rights. The causes of action included: (1) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and (4) declaratory relief regarding the validity of the waiver and release of warranty rights and the validity of Mungo’s purported transfer of all remaining warranty obligations to a third party.
Mungo filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Huskins’ responsive memorandum argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable. They asserted that the limitation of warranties provision should be considered as a part of the agreement to arbitrate. The Circuit Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration. In ruling the arbitration clause was not one-sided and unconscionable, the Circuit Court found that (1) the limited warranty provision must be read in isolation from the arbitration clause; and (2) terms in the arbitration clause pertaining to a 90-day time limit were not one-sided and oppressive because they did not waive any rights or remedies otherwise available by law.
The Court of Appeals initially held that the Circuit Court’s order was immediately appealable, stating that our state procedural rules, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act, govern appealability of arbitration orders. While arbitration orders are not typically immediately appealable under South Carolina law, this order had granted Mungo’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which is an appealable order.
The Court next held that the arbitration clause must be considered separately from the limited warranty provision, citing cases to the effect that arbitration provisions are separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded. A prior D.R. Horton South Carolina Supreme Court case** considered the arbitration and warranty provisions together, in part because the title of the paragraph, “Warranties and Dispute Resolution” signaled that the provisions should be read as a whole. Since the Mungo paragraphs were separated, the Court of Appeals said they should be read separately. In addition, the two provisions did not contain cross references.
The Court next addressed the Huskins’ argument that the limitation of claims provision restricted the statutory limitations period from three years to 90 days and was therefore not severable from the arbitration clause. The Court agreed that the provision that limited the statute of limitations is one-sided and oppressive, but held that the arbitration clause is enforceable because the unconscionable provision is severable.
After concluding that the Huskins lacked a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration clause, the Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause’s shortening of the statute of limitations violates South Carolina law and is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.
The Circuit Court’s order was affirmed as modified.
Now …. back to the Murdaugh trial!
*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5916 (June 1, 2022, Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled February 15, 2023.
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