Real Estate Law

No horsing around with HOA disputes

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Real estate practitioners will not be surprised to hear that neighbors in a well-to-do development with a significant set of covenants and shared easements will sometimes disagree (and even litigate) about how those easements ought to apply to their properties. Our Court of Appeals recently had occasion to hear an appeal related to covenants and easements in an equestrian subdivision in Aiken County, in the case of Richard Viviano v. Fulton Jeffers and Braeloch I Association, Inc., Appellate Case No. 2024-000147, Ct. App., Opinion No. 6120, Filed August 20, 2025.

The underlying dispute in the case concerned an established equestrian community near Aiken named Braeloch. Braeloch has extensive pedestrian and riding trails, and when the subdivision was originally planned, one trail extended all the way around the outer boundaries of the subdivision. The recorded covenants included easements encumbering all the lots around the subdivision’s exterior boundary to account for this trail. The trail easement was also shown on the recorded subdivision plat. Later (in 2002) an additional lot was added (Lot 51) and eventually became the center of a dispute involving Lot 51’s owner, the homeowners association, and the owners of two adjacent existing lots. The neighboring lot owners and Lot 51’s owner disagreed about how the riding trail should be adjusted or relocated in light of Lot 51’s addition. Mr. Viviano was one of those neighboring lot owners. The Court of Appeals opinion implies that personalities clashed, and that the neighboring lot owners questioned the motivation and personal friendships of the HOA officers in making decisions about Lot 51 and the trail. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree at this point, and litigation was filed.      

The main issue presented to the Court of Appeals here, which may be less interesting to real estate practitioners, concerned whether a settlement agreement that the parties signed at the conclusion of mediation would be enforceable. (Spoiler alert: The Court of Appeals said, Yes, it is enforceable.) At the trial court level, the parties had mediated the case and reached a written agreement. The agreement was broad and addressed all the issues in dispute between the parties: relocation of the riding path easement, who would pay to make improvements to the path, compensation to the impacted lot owners, that the parties would sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement, etc. It required formal approval by the full HOA of a few items that the HOA representatives agreed to in mediation; the HOA formally voted and approved those after the fact.

As a worthwhile aside, the mediator (retired Judge Thomas Cooper, Jr.) made a lovely allusion to Aristotle (or the movie “Legally Blonde,” depending on your point of view) when he noted in his mediation report that the attorneys and parties had wisely “recogni[zed] . . . that emotion has to give way to reason to resolve difficult disputes.” We can all benefit from remembering that “law is reason, free from passion.”  

Later, several months after mediation, Mr. Viviano seemed to have regretted the agreement and changed his mind. A couple of the details that he asked the court to consider in support of his motion might be of more interest to dirt lawyers.

Viviano’s argument was basically that the 2002 petition to amend the covenants and easements to add Lot 51 was not valid because it did not have the support of the required number of lot owners. Viviano also argued that there was a “smoking gun” email from the owners’ association acknowledging that they did not have enough signatures on the petition to add Lot 51, and he claimed that this email had been deliberately concealed from him. (He argued that he would not have signed the settlement if he had known about it.) The Court of Appeals found this argument meritless. Without getting into the details of whether or not the Lot 51 admission had been completed correctly, the court pointed out that the Lot 51 admission documents were filed in the Aiken County public records, and therefore available to anyone to review. Viviano’s own complaint in the underlying suit had made an allegation of fact that Lot 51 had been admitted with two thirds vote of the HOA members. The court also noted that Viviano had access to the HOA email acknowledging insufficient signatures on the petition, as it had been produced in discovery more than 2 years prior to mediation, so it was not “concealed” from him. The Court of Appeals also cited established caselaw reinforcing the principle that, once the parties have reached a written settlement agreement, the courts are not inclined to entertain arguments by one party who regrets having agreed to the settlement.   

For those real estate practitioners who represent HOAs, this case might be a good opportunity to remind your association clients about the importance of having counsel assist in the process of amending CCRs. Having an attorney guide an association through the complicated formalities of submitting petitions, calling meetings, sending notices, and being sure to obtain the required number of signatures/votes to amend could avoid costly litigation in the long run! For practitioners who review title and handle real estate closings (and prepare title commitments and policies!), this is also a good reminder to be on the lookout for recorded amendments to covenants, and to carefully review those to determine how they affect the title.          

FNF challenges FinCEN Rule and ALTA concurs

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In our previous blog entry, Jennifer Stone did a great job of summarizing FinCEN’s new Anti-Money Laundering Rule that is scheduled to go into effect as of December 1, 2025. In short, the Rule will generally require South Carolina real estate attorneys to make reports to FinCEN concerning every residential (1-4 Family property) transaction where 1) the grantee is an entity or trust and 2) there is no financing provided by a lender that is subject to federal anti-money laundering reporting obligations. 

The closing attorney will be on the hook (under threat of civil and criminal liability) to collect extensive information from the parties to the transaction, including the names and addresses of every person or entity who has a beneficial interest in or control over the grantee entity. Generally speaking, the collection of information is well outside the scope of the usual real estate closing and places the burden on attorneys and title companies to collect information from third parties who may not be willing to share that information.

However, there is still the possibility that the Rule will not go into effect as scheduled in December. This past May, Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (“FNF”), the parent corporation of Chicago Title, filed suit in federal court challenging the Rule and thereby taking the lead role in speaking up on behalf of attorneys and title agents in advocating for more measured, less burdensome requirements and reporting.

In the lawsuit, FNF has requested an injunction suspending FinCEN’s enforcement of the Rule. A hearing is currently scheduled to be heard on September 30, 2025.

FNF also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which the American Land Title Association (ALTA) recently expressed its support by filing an amicus brief. ALTA, of course, is the most prominent trade association of title insurance companies and title agents in the United States.

While FinCEN asserts that the cost to the title industry (including closing attorneys) of meeting the reporting requirements could reach as high as $600 million annually, ALTA’s brief argues that FinCEN has significantly underestimated the training and collection time necessary to comply and that the true cost to the industry will be significantly higher. ALTA argues that the this significant burden cannot possibly be outweighed by the corresponding benefit to law enforcement. ALTA points out that FinCEN drastically reduced the scope of the reporting of Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) under the Corporate Transparency Act (which we wrote about here) in part because the new administration believed that reporting on American formed entities was of limited value to law enforcement.

ALTA further argues that the reporting burden under the Rule will disproportionately fall on small businesses that are “ill equipped” to absorb the additional costs and regulatory burden of reporting in an industry with already thin margins. I think many South Carolina residential real attorneys with already thinly stretched teams would agree wholeheartedly with ALTA in that statement. 

Certainly, there are quite a few miles to go with this lawsuit before a final verdict is rendered concerning the new Rule. We will continue to keep an eye on the progress of this case, but for now South Carolina attorneys must continue to develop procedures for complying with this Rule when it goes lives on December 1. 

SC Supreme Court clarifies realtor liability under Disclosure Act

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Call me a little strange, but I am always interested to read about real estate contract disputes. An odd fact of my career is that my trial history is bookended by Magistrate Court-level trials involving real estate contract disputes. The first was a seriously thrilling fight (to a baby lawyer) over $1500 in earnest money on a flat fee that certainly did not reflect the legal hours expended. My final was in defense of a client’s failure to disclose “mold” around a leaky water heater. For the record, I am undefeated in Magistrate’s Court, despite it being the only Court a judge has ever demanded I produce my bar card. I was wearing a suit and had a briefcase and everything!   

The Supreme Court recently issued an opinion that may be interesting to real estate attorneys and litigators concerning the liability of real estate agents. The Court’s opinion in Isaacs v Onions held that there is no right of private action against a seller’s real estate agent under the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act for the seller’s failure to disclose a property defect. The Court also made a finding that the buyer could not have reasonably relied upon general statements made by the seller’s agent concerning the findings of a prior CL-100. 

The facts of the case were as follows: The Onionses (“Sellers”) listed their home in Litchfield Plantation with the Selling Agent (“Agent”), and filled out a Residential Property Condition Disclosure denying any “present wood problems caused by termites, insects, wood destroying organisms, dry rot[,] or fungus.” The property was listed and promptly came under contract. During the course of the due diligence, the first contract buyers obtained an inspection report revealing the absence of a vapor barrier in the crawl space in some areas and noted damp soil conditions. That report recommended further inspection.

In response to the buyers’ inspection, the Oniones retained a pest control company to inspect the crawlspace.  The company issued a report finding elevated moisture readings, wood destroying fungi, and some moisture damage. They recommended installation of vapor barrier, a dehumidifier, and coverage of the outside vents, and treatment for mold, for an estimate of $4,595.00. Instead, the Sellers retained a handyman to address the vapor barrier, replace insulation, remove debris, and install a crawl space fan for $706.00. The first buyers had separately commissioned a CL-100 which showed lesser moisture readings, no active wood destroying fungi, but recommended a fan.

The first contract ultimately fell through, the property was re-listed, and the Isaacs became interest in the property ultimately entering into a contract to purchase it. Early in the transaction, Agent provided copies of the Property Condition Disclosure Form, the prior inspection reports, disclosed the scope of repairs.  Agent sent an email to the Isaacs sharing that the first buyers “CL-100 was done yesterday and from what I understood it was good, but I can obtain the report if/when necessary as the sellers paid for it.”  

The Isaacs declined to request a copy of the prior CL-100 as they intended to commission their own CL-100. The Isaac’s CL-100 revealed significantly diminished moisture levels and no evidence of any issues.  The Isaacs proceeded to closing.

Two days after closing, the crawl space flooded after heavy rains.  A week later inspection reports revealed standing water, very high moisture readings, and active fungi. The Isaacs filed suit against the Sellers, Agent, and their CL-100 inspector. They specifically alleged fraud and misrepresentation against Agent, as well as violations with regard to misinformation on the Property Condition Disclosure Form.

The Court found that while the South Carolina Residential Property Condition Disclosure Act creates a private right of action against the sellers for violations, it does not create a private right of action against real estate agents. The Court pointed out that there would be other causes of action available to the buyer in that situation.

The Court also noted that the Isaacs had been provided reports that provided ample evidence of a possible issue in the crawl space and that the real estate agent’s statement that she had heard that the CL-100 was “good” could not have been something that the Isaacs reasonably relied upon in their decision to purchase the home. In fact, the Isaacs testified that they did not request the prior CL-100 because they intended to obtain their own. 

The Court’s ruling seems to resolve (for now) that real estate agents are not subject to suit under the Act and that vaguely encouraging comments from selling agents are not to be relied upon by buyers, particularly when there is evidence of potential issues with the property. Perhaps the Isaacs faired better against the Sellers in this action on better facts.

It’s the little things

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Most real estate practitioners can relate to the experience of getting that call or email from a real estate agent, saying that a nice little deal is coming our way. The buyer and seller have already signed a contract and set a closing date. There may be some “little issues” that will need to be worked out before closing, but that should not be a problem. Right?

Often, a lawyer has been involved in preparing the contract or advising the parties before that call comes in. As often as not, those “little issues” turn out to be significant, and some can even derail a closing and pit the seller and purchaser against each other. The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in the case of Anderson v. Pearson, Appellate Case 2023-001897 (Ct. App., 2025) discussing a case where there were, in fact, some big issues. We are left to wonder how different the outcome might have been if an attorney had been consulted in drafting the contract and advising the parties as to its terms.

The basic facts of the case are that Pearson (together with some family members) owned acreage in Spartanburg County, on Lake Cooley. This consisted of one parcel which Anderson agreed to buy (and which the parties chose to refer to as the “twenty-acre parcel”), as well as another nine-acre parcel next to it. Anderson (who owned property adjacent to Pearson’s) and Pearson, communicating through a broker, negotiated and agreed to some basic contract terms including a purchase price and closing date. Other details, such as whether the property was to be defined in a new survey, and whose responsibility it would be to get a survey, were not included in the contract. The contract was, however, clear on the inclusion of a “time is of the essence”, merger, and non-reliance clauses. The contract included the (not very helpful) comment that “[b]rokers recommend Buyer have Property surveyed . .  .”

After depositing her earnest money, the record indicates that Anderson continued to communicate with Pearson via the broker, and that Pearson indicated multiple times that he was obtaining a survey of the 20 acres in order to address the placement of an access route that would be needed to get to and from the nine-acre parcel which he was not selling. Communications went back and forth for some time, with Pearson never providing a copy of the survey, and Anderson continuing to ask for updates. Pearson applied for mortgage financing through AgSouth, but the record indicates that she had not provided all the items (such as a title commitment or a survey) that AgSouth would require to make the loan.  Eventually, the contract closing date came and went. The broker told Anderson that Pearson was not returning her calls or texts. Eventually, several weeks later, Pearson told the broker “We are building on the property ourself. We no longer want to sell.”  Turns out the Pearsons had actually gotten a survey but chose not to share it with Anderson. And the Pearsons had determined that they could sell the property to a developer for more than twice what Anderson had agreed to pay.

Some months later, Anderson filed suit for specific performance. At summary judgment, the Master in Equity conducted a trial and entered a judgment granting Anderson’s request for specific performance. Anderson offered evidence at trial concerning communications about the survey, which were not reflected in the written contract. A significant ruling by the Master in reaching her decision was that Pearson should be equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds to exclude Anderson’s evidence of those communications. Pearson appealed, raising several issues on appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Master’s order, focusing on the Master’s application of the Statute of Frauds and equitable estoppel. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found that Anderson’s reliance on Pearson’s communications was not reasonable. The Court of Appeals believed that Anderson should have realized that Pearson was delaying, and gotten her own survey. Additionally, the Court of Appeals expressed its view that Anderson did not change her position in reliance on Pearson’s communications about the survey, and since detrimental reliance is an element of equitable estoppel, the Court of Appeals held the Master erred in finding that equitable estoppel should apply to Pearson in his assertion of the Statute of Frauds.

As additional grounds, the Court of Appeals opined that since the contract did not require Pearson to provide a survey, the merger and non-reliance clauses weighed in Pearson’s favor on that point. The Court of Appeals proposed that the Master should have applied the parol evidence rule to Anderson’s offer of communications outside the contract itself. Further, the “time of the essence” clause, in the Court of Appeals’ view, meant that since the contract had expired by its own terms, and Anderson had not demonstrated that she had been able to timely perform her obligations under the contract (i.e. she did not show that she had the cash ready to pay the purchase price) specific performance was not available as a remedy. 

This case may be a good example to mention to real estate agents and brokers (as well as clients) to demonstrate the value of a clearly drafted contract and of legal advice from a seasoned real estate attorney as to contract terms.

Corporate Transparency Act Whack-a-Mole

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I have written many words about the Beneficial Ownership Information (BOI) reporting requirement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) over the last couple of years and much of my writing has been rendered obsolete by events. So, it came as no surprise on March 21, 2025, when the world changed again, but even I wouldn’t have thought they’d have done the CTA like they done.    

If you want to get to the meat of the latest development, you can skip ahead to the end of this lengthy entry, but for those of you that need a refresher or those that just want to watch me work through my feelings a bit, the next few paragraphs are for you. 

Readers of this blog probably know by now that Congress passed the CTA some years ago for the stated purpose of assisting law enforcement agencies in preventing bad guys (foreign and domestic) from laundering money and hiding assets in the United States using shell companies. In its wisdom, Congress decreed that almost any entity registered with a Secretary of State’s office must file a report detailing the significant stakeholders in the entity and where they might be found.

Under the Biden Administration, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, came up with a framework of rules, processes, and penalties covering the duty of entities to report BOI. New companies would have 30 days to report the required BOI information to FinCEN; all existing entities would have to make their report by January 1, 2025. 

However, the whole thing did not go off as smoothly as planned for FinCEN.  Across the country (but most especially in Texas) plaintiffs filed lawsuits challenging the reporting requirement as unconstitutional or at least very inconvenient and burdensome. Before FinCEN could even think about imposing its first fine, a Texas federal court entered an injunction enjoining FinCEN from enforcing the BOI reporting requirement while the parties litigated the constitutionality of the Rule.  Game Off!  

The Government appealed this ruling to the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which initially removed the injunction. Game On! 

But, just a few days later, the same Court of Appeals, reinstated the injunction.  Game Off!  

The Government (by this time the Trump Administration) remained dogged in its defense of the reporting requirements and appealed the matter to our highest court. There, the United States Supreme Court ultimately sided with the Government and rescinded the injunction in the first Texas case. Game On!  However, by this time a second Texas federal district court had entered its own nationwide injunction against enforcement of the Act. Game Off!  

More time passed, additional words were written, and additional hearings were held, but eventually this other Texas federal district court decided that despite the impassioned argument of the Plaintiffs it did not have authority to ignore the persuasive authority of the Supreme Court’s previous ruling in a nearly identical case. Subsequently, the Texas court (I would like to imagine) somewhat sulkily rescinded its injunction. Game On! Likely a joyous party continued into the wee hours in the FinCEN offices the day it announced that BOI reporting was back, and that the deadline for reporting would for certain be March 21, 2025.  

However, this is the year 2025, and this the Corporate Transparency Act we are talking about, so it was not so simple for the good folks at FinCEN. On February 21, 2025, FinCEN issued a press release indicating that despite the Government’s vigorous effort to defend the Rule all the way the Supreme Court, that it did not plan to enforce the Rule. The press release indicated that FinCEN planned to issue an Interim Rule before the March deadline, but the FinCEN website still promised fines and penalties for anyone failing to comply. Game Off?

On March 21st, FinCEN issued an Interim Rule that dramatically changed the scope and application of the Rule. First, the Interim Rule specifically exempts United States entities from BOI reporting requirements.  Second, the Interim Rule provides that foreign entities registered to do business in the United States need not report any information about its beneficial owners that are United States individuals. Third, the reporting deadline for foreign entities to file BOI reports was extended to 30 days from the effective date of the Interim Rule.

The Interim Rule certainly reduces the theoretical usefulness of BOI reporting to law enforcement as FinCEN’s database will now only contain information about foreign entities that register in the United States and their foreign beneficial owners. Criminals inclined to set up shell companies to hide their illicit assets probably would be well advised to use entities formed in the United States if that isn’t what they were doing before. Perhaps, the Interim Rule is arguably not what Congress intended, but there is a lot of that going around.

Practically, the reduction in the scope of the Rule will diminish the relevance of the CTA to real estate lawyers. Those attorneys that represent foreign entities doing business in the United States will need to be prepared to advise clients of the reporting requirements that go along with registering their foreign entity in the U.S., but those attorneys representing entities formed in the United States can likely breathe a long sigh of relief.  At least for the moment.

For your holiday reading pleasure … here’s another drafting nightmare case, dirt lawyers

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South Carolina’s Supreme Court has invalidated an arbitration agreement in a residential home purchase contract because of a sentence found to run afoul of public policy*. The homebuyers are free to pursue their lawsuit against the home builder.

Amanda and Jay Huskins bought a house from Mungo Homes. The arbitration section in the purchase contract included this sentence:

“Each and every demand for arbitration shall be made within ninety (90) days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has arisen, except that any claim, dispute or matter in question not asserted within said time periods shall be deem waived and forever barred.”

The Court held that it is undisputed that this clause shortened the statute of limitations for any claim to the ninety-day period. Mungo conceded that this provision ran afoul of South Carolina Code §15-3-140 (2005), which forbids and renders void contract clauses attempting to shorten the legal statute of limitations.

The Huskins brought this lawsuit against Mungo, raising various claims related to the sale. Mungo asked the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint and compel arbitration. The Huskins countered that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable and the lower court granted the motion to compel arbitration. The Court of Appeals held the clause was unconscionable and unenforceable but ruled the clause could be severed from the rest of the arbitration agreement and affirmed the order compelling arbitration.

The Supreme Court stated that the better view is that the clause is unenforceable because it is void and illegal as a matter of public policy. The Court further noted that the contract contained no severability provision and that Mungo’s “manipulative skirting of South Carolina public policy goes to the core of the arbitration agreement and weighs heavily against severance.”

The Court mused that it has been steadfast in protecting home buyers from unscrupulous and overreaching terms, and stated that applying severance here would erode laudable public policy. The Court, therefore, declined to sever the unconscionable provision for public policy reasons. The entire arbitration provision was held to be unenforceable. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further action.

Drafting contracts for corporate clients can be tricky, dirt lawyers. Read this case and similar cases carefully!

*Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28245 (December 11, 2024).

Following injunction, FinCEN announces compliance with CTA is voluntary

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On December 3, the United District Court for the Eastern Division of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that prohibits the federal government from enforcing The Corporate Transparency Act.

In response, the United States Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced on December 9 that while the injunction is in place, compliance with the CTA is only voluntary.

The Corporate Transparency Act, which went into effect January 1, 2024, requires many companies to report beneficial ownership information to FinCEN. Beneficial ownership information is defined as identifying information about the individuals who directly or indirectly own or control a company. The deadline for entities created before January 1, 2024 was January 1, 2025

Lawyers have been scrambling to grasp the intricacies of the new law and to assist their corporate clients, including homeowners’ associations, in compliance.

Six plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in May challenging the constitutionality of the law. The decision is based on the Commerce Clause, and the statute is based on national security and aimed at enforcing laws against money laundering.

This case will surely go to the Supreme Court, and we will have to wait to see how that Court reacts. It is possible that the rationale for the legislation holds for some but not all entities. Homeowners’ associations seem to be likely candidates to dodge this particular bullet.

In the meantime, your clients are not required to comply with the new law.

Court grants nationwide injunction against enforcement of CTA

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The Corporate Transparency Act, which went into effect January 1, 2024, requires many companies to report beneficial ownership information to the United States Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Beneficial ownership information is defined as identifying information about the individuals who directly or indirectly own or control a company. The deadline for entities created before January 1, 2024 is January 1, 2025.

Lawyers have been scrambling to grasp the intricacies of the new law and to assist their corporate clients, including homeowners’ associations, in compliance.

But we have a huge development.

On December 3, the United District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction that prohibits the federal government from enforcing the new law.

Six plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in May challenging the constitutionality of the law. The decision is based on the Commerce Clause, and the statute is based on national security and aimed at enforcing laws against money laundering. This case will surely go to the Supreme Court, and we will have to wait to see how that Court reacts. It is possible that the rationale for the legislation holds for some but not all entities. Homeowners’ associations seem to be likely candidates to dodge this particular bullet.

Department of Justice takes last-minute action against NAR Settlement

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On November 24, just 48 hours before the National Association of Realtors’ settlement agreement headed to final approval, the Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in the lawsuit.

The filing indicated that the DOJ did not participate in the underlying litigation, but it challenged the settlement’s provision that requires buyers and buyers’ agents to enter into a written agreement before touring a home. This provision raises concerns under antitrust laws that could be addressed in multiple ways, according to the DOJ’s statement.

The DOJ suggested rectifying the issue by eliminating the buyer broker agreement requirement or to disclaim that the settlement creates any immunity or defense under the antitrust laws. Otherwise, the court could clarify that the settlement approval affords no immunity or defense for the buyer-agreement provision. The DOJ believes the settlement could limit the ways buyer brokers compete for clients.

The final hearing is scheduled for November 26 in Missouri. The NAR said in a statement that it will advocate for a final settlement that day. The statement suggested that the settlement is not what the NAR wants, but that it is preferable to continued litigation and the uncertainty of a jury verdict.

We’ll see lots of news on this topic this week and next week!

In the meantime, Happy Thanksgiving wishes for you and your family!

Court of Appeals holds right of first refusal unenforceable

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Heads up, dirt lawyers, this is another case dealing with drafting issues. Please read it carefully and apply its concepts the next time you are asked to draft a right of first refusal.

Crescent Homes SC, LLC v. CJN, LLC* involved a contract for CJN to develop 32 lots in a subdivision for sale to Crescent Homes. Crescent Homes would build single-family homes on these lots for sale to homebuyers. The contract referenced a “Future Phase on adjacent property owned by CJN and contained the following paragraph:

“Right of First Refusal: At the Initial Closing, (CJN) will grant to (Crescent) a right of first refusal with respect to the lots cross-hatched and shown on Exhibit ‘A-2’ as “Future Phase” and any additional lots that may from time to time be annexed or otherwise included in the Subdivision. A memorandum of such right of first refusal in a form reasonabl(y) acceptable to the Parties will be recorded in the public records of Greenville County at the Initial Closing.”

CJN did not start development of the future phase because of cost concerns. Crescent brought a lawsuit for breach of contract asserting CJN delayed the initial closing by, most significantly, failing to maintain the lots free from trash and debris. Crescent sought specific performance and other remedies.

CJN entered into a contract with Douglas Clark making termination of the right of first refusal in the Crescent contract a contingency. When CJN provided a copy of the Clark offer to Crescent, Crescent responded by offering $700,000 to purchase the property and by filing a lis pendens. Crescent notified CJN that even though the right of first refusal was binding, Crescent was not required to exercise or waive it at that time because the initial closing had not yet occurred.

Crescent asserted that the right of first refusal had not been delivered and was not capable of being validly exercised at that time. Clark withdrew his offer for reasons unrelated to this controversy.

The initial closing took place and the parties began the process of developing the lots in the first phase of the subdivision.

CJN filed a lawsuit against Crescent seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging abuse of legal process. The suit alleged that that the right of first refusal was invalid and Crescent had filed four lis pendens for the ulterior purpose of preventing the sale of the future phase property to third parties. CJN also answered Crescent’s complaint asserting counterclaims of breach of contract and quantum meruit/unjust enrichment and seeking remedies of specific performance and monetary damages.

CJN filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging the right of first refusal was void because it constituted a restraint on the alienation of the property.  The Master denied the motion, finding factual disputes and novel issues required further inquiry.

CJN continued to market the property and obtained at least one additional offer. Crescent filed a motion to consolidate the cases. CJN amended its complaint, adding causes of action for tortious interference with a contractual relationship and unfair and deceptive trade practices.

The Master bifurcated the proceeding and tried CJN’s cause of action for a declaration that the right of first refusal was unenforceable. Crescent moved to dismiss, arguing no justiciable controversy as the matter was not ripe because the previous offers had been withdrawn.

The Master denied that motion and found the right of first refusal to be unenforceable because it was an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of an interest in land, stating “based on the language used in (the paragraph), the court is unable to interpret and/or give meaning to the parties’ agreement without substantially and significantly creating terms and conditions that the parties themselves could have and should have included.”  This appeal followed.

The Court of Appeals held that the matter was justiciable once a bona fide offer had been made. Neither party provided cases regarding ripeness in which offers were made and subsequently withdrawn.

As to the enforceability of the right of first refusal, the Court stated that such a right does restrain an owner’s power of alienation, but the question becomes whether the right unreasonably restrains alienation.

The Court cited a prior case holding that a right of first refusal was unenforceable because it failed to identify the property it encumbered, failed to contain price provisions and failed to contain procedures governing the exercise of the right. The Court found those factors present in this case and affirmed the Master’s finding of unenforceability.

Dirt lawyers, a rule against perpetuities issues was also raised against the right of first refusal, but the Court held it did not have to reach that issue. That is drafting challenge that we will save for another day. The bottom line in this case is that drafting real estate documents requires a great deal of skill and continuing legal research. Be careful out there!

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6093 (November 20, 2024)