Last week, this blog discussed a real estate dispute between a developer and a 93-year-old great-great-grandmother in Hilton Head who said her husband’s family has owned the property since the Civil War. This week, we turn to a similar story in St. Helena Island.
NPR reported on August 3 that residents of St. Helena Island have banded together to protect the culture of the Gullah Geechee people from a golf course development. You can read NPR’s story here.
The story reports that St. Helena Island has a decade’s old zoning ordinance that bans golf courses, resorts and gated communities, which the Gullah Geechee people say threaten their existence. Direct descendants of slaves have farmed and fished St. Helena Island for nearly 200 years, using their own language, culture and traditions.
NPR reports that developer Elvio Tropeano purchased 500 acres and wants to build a golf course despite the zoning ordinance. He contends the golf course would benefit the community by allowing public access and attracting visitors who would become educated about the Gullah Geechee people and spend funds that would support their culture. If he is unable to build the golf course, he threatens to build more than 160 luxury homes. According to the NPR story, some locals believe the subdivision would be worse than the golf course. They prefer to have the land sustained the way it is, unspoiled and resilient.
These stories are certainly not the first South Carolina tales we have heard about disputes between locals and developers and pressures on “heirs property” and other undeveloped, pristine real estate. The pressures seem to be building!
On July 12, South Carolina’s Court of Appeals issued an opinion* in favor of multiple property owners in a railroad abandonment case.
The properties at issue abutted a 24-mile railroad line extending from McCormick County to Abbeville County. In 1878, the State chartered the Savannah Valley Railroad Company (SVR) to construct the railroad. Prior title holders granted SVR easements to allow the construction and operation of the railroad. The documents stated the easements would be void in the event the railroad was not erected and established. Each successive title holders’ deed was subject to the easements. SVR conveyed its interest to Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company.
In the late 1970’s Seaboard decided to close the track and seek permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to abandon the line. The ICC granted the request in 1970. The company wrote a letter to the ICC dated February 25, 1980, indicating the track was abandoned as of February 15, 1980.
Calhoun Falls and Savannah Valley Trails (SVT) were the ultimate owners of the railroad’s interests. When SVT began to construct a walking trail on the former line, property owners adjoining the line in McCormick County filed suit in 2016 seeking a declaratory judgment that the properties reverted to them when the track was abandoned. Abbeville County property owners filed a similar suit in 2018.
The trial court issued two orders finding (1) the railroad abandoned the line; (2) when the railroad abandoned the line, the easements were terminated, and the property rights reverted to the adjoining title holders; and (3) the doctrine of laches did not bar the property owners’ claims.
SVT argued on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the abandonment failed to follow the details of the ICC order. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that SVT had the burden of proving the railroad’s abandonment was incomplete and failed to meet that burden.
SVT also argued on appeal that laches barred the property owners’ claims. The Court of Appeals noted that SVT failed to plead laches as an affirmative defense, and that the trial court could have declined to address the issue. But, ultimately, the appeals court agreed with the lower court that SVT failed to present evidence that would equip the trial court to make a finding of prejudice to support the laches claim.
Finally, SVT argued that the trial court erred in finding the railroad had abandoned the line. The Court of Appeals noted that the railroad ceased operations, sought permission for abandonment from the ICC, removed the tracks, and transferred its property interests. Further, nothing in the record showed that the railroad failed to comply with the requirements of the ICC. Citing prior cases, the Court stated that to rule otherwise would gut the longstanding rule that an easement is extinguished when the railroad abandons the right of way for railroad purposes.
As a dirt lawyer, I like this opinion! If you run into railroad abandonment issues in your chains of title, consult your friendly, intelligent title company underwriters.
*Myers v. Town of Calhoun Falls, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5998 (July 12, 2023)
In May, this blog discussed Ani Creation, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach,* a case where the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that imposed a zoning overlay district intended to bolster the “family friendly” nature of Myrtle Beach’s historic downtown area. The ordinance targeted smoke shops and tobacco stores and the merchandizing of tobacco paraphernalia, products containing CBD, and sexually oriented material.
The opinion begins, “The City of Myrtle Beach (the city) is a town economically driven and funded by tourism.” The facts indicate that the city received frequent criticism from tourists and residents that the proliferation of smoke shops and tobacco stores repelled families from the area. The city passed a comprehensive plan that aimed at increasing tourism and concluded that all businesses needed to encourage and support a “family beach image”. The city passed an ordinance which created a zoning overlay district known as the Ocean Boulevard Entertainment Overlay District that encompassed the historic downtown area.
The prohibited uses in the district were declared immediately nonconforming when the ordinance was passed on August 14, 2018, but an amortization period was allowed which gave affected businesses until December 31, 2019, to cease the nonconforming portions of their businesses.
The zoning administrator issued citations to the nonconforming businesses. Nine of the 25 affected stories appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals which found (1) it did not have jurisdiction to declare the ordinance unconstitutional; (2) it could not grant a use variance because it would allow the continuation of a use not otherwise allowed in the district; and (3) the businesses were engaged in one or more of the prohibited uses. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s opinion, finding the appellants’ 25 grounds for challenging the ordinance meritless. The businesses appealed directly to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The appellants raised a “host” of constitutional and procedural challenges, all of which fell on deaf ears at the Supreme Court. The Court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s police powers. According to the Court, municipal governing bodies clothed with authority to determine residential and industrial districts are better qualified by their knowledge of the situation to act upon such matters than are the courts, and they will not be interfered with in the exercise of their police power to accomplish their desired end unless there is a pain violation of the constitutional rights of the citizens.
The Appellants petitioned for a rehearing and in an opinion re-filed on June 28, the court again affirmed the Court of Appeals.
A comment on the Dirt Listserv said, “S. Carolina is OK with cancel culture after all.” A store selling sexually oriented materials was removed from Garners Ferry Road in Columbia (about three miles from my house) using similar legal arguments. I was delighted to see that store torn down before I had to explain it to my grandchildren! But I do understand the “cancel culture” argument. What do you think?
Court of Appeals reverses Circuit Court on this issue
In Rivers v. Smith*, South Carolina’s Court of Appeals reversed Orangeburg County’s Circuit Court order affirming a magistrate’s order of eviction.
Rufus Rivers and Merle Rivers have lived on property once owned by Jessie Mae Smith since 2009, although there was no record of a written lease. In 2013, Jessie Mae Smith signed a power of attorney in favor of her son, James Smith. In 2014, James Smith conveyed his mother’s property to himself by quitclaim deed using the power of attorney.
(The opinion contains no discussion of whether the conveyance of the property by the attorney in fact to himself was a valid transfer, but that would have been my first question.)
Jessie Mae Smith died in 2016. In 2018, James Smith sent the Rivers a letter demanding they vacate the property within 30 days. The Rivers refused. They asked James to cease and desist his efforts to displace them. They argued that James had an invalid power of attorney and alleged he had breached fiduciary duties. Competing lawsuits followed.
The Rivers’ lawsuit in the Circuit Court challenged James’ ownership of the property and alleged constructive fraud, unjust enrichment and other causes of action. The Rivers amended their complaint, alleging that James used an invalid power of attorney and that Jessie Mae Smith had orally given or promised the property to the Rivers.
James filed the subject case in the magistrate court, seeking eviction. The Rivers made various arguments to the magistrate opposing the eviction, including alleging that Jessie Mae Smith had promised the property to them. The Rivers also alerted the magistrate of their claims against James Smith in the circuit court.
James Smith’s main argument to the magistrate centered around the statute of limitations because the alleged gift would have occurred more than three years before the lawsuits were brought. The magistrate ruled that James Smith was the lawful owner of the property and ordered eviction.
On a motion by the Rivers to reconsider, the magistrate found that the case did not involve a question of title and that she had jurisdiction to hear the case. The circuit court affirmed, and this appeal followed.
The issue on appeal was whether South Carolina Code §22-3-20(2), which bars a magistrate from hearing a case when title to the property is in question, prohibited the magistrate from hearing this case.
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Smith has defenses to Rivers’ claims, and that those defenses may be valid ones, but held that the magistrate’s jurisdiction ended as soon as it became clear that there was a challenge to title. The opinion further stated that the case may end in a second and successful eviction, but they refused to say that outcome is certain.
I will be curious to learn what the future holds in the litigation between these parties. I hope the property is worth the litigation, and I note with interest that the Rivers represented themselves pro se in the subject case.
*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5992 (June 21, 2023)
Real estate related issues should be kept to a minimum
My husband and I just returned from the 2023 annual meeting of the South Carolina United Methodist conference. We attended as lay members from our church, but my eyes and ears were open, as always, for real estate issues.
Dirt lawyers in South Carolina witnessed the real estate issues raised by the schism in the Episcopal Church several years ago. We made lists of church properties that could be sold or mortgaged without the involvement of any entity beyond the local congregation. We made lists of properties involved in a hierarchical church structure requiring agreements and signatures of persons in distant locations. We advised real estate practitioners to work in close connection with underwriting counsel of the title insurance companies to avoid title issues.
I have no inside information on this matter, but my guess is that the Methodists were able to learn from the Episcopalians and managed to avoid the extensive litigation involved in that earlier schism.
United Methodist churches exist under a hierarchical structure. Anyone who has handled a closing involving a United Methodist property has learned that the District Superintendent must be involved in closing documents. The church properties are, in effect, owned by the conference.
When issues began to arise about LGBT members and pastors and it became apparent that there would be a separation of congregations, South Carolina’s Bishop and the administrators surrounding him negotiated with the churches who desired to leave the conference. After months of talks, the parties agreed to a payout that would free the real estate of the local church from the involvement of the conference.
Churches who wanted to leave the conference were required to pay ten percent of the value of their real properties and other assets. They were also required to pay some funds related to pastor pensions and some funds related to “apportionments” (the money paid to the conference to support the work of the conference as opposed to the work of the local congregation.)
Prior to the meetings this week, we had heard that several churches decided to leave the conference. But we were surprised to learn that there are, in fact, 113 churches who made arrangements with the conference to separate from United Methodism. On the last day of the meetings, we were asked to vote to approve the separation. Thankfully, the meeting, although very sad, was handled in a respectful manner. We witnessed an amicable divorce.
If you are asked to handle any transaction involving a church that is or formerly was a United Methodist congregation, you should, of course, investigate the title issues as usual. You should involve the friendly underwriting counsel from your title insurance company. But, after these appropriate investigations, you should learn that there are no title issues arising from the involvement of the conference.
Never say never, though. I wouldn’t be shocked to learn that some of the 113 church congregations failed to tie up all the details of the separation. So be even more diligent than usual in examining the authority documents of the church. I assume that real estate practitioners will see numerous transactions as these churches, now separated from the administrative arm that supported them and having paid out substantial funds for the separation, will need real estate loans.
Dirt lawyers, do you remember studying the cases in first year property classes in law school that defined navigable waters? We discussed the ebb and flow of tides. We talked about whether the water is presently used or had been used in the past or may be susceptible for use in the future for transportation. I remember discussing whether logs could float and how big a boat must be to make the property qualify as navigable.
When I was in private practice in Columbia representing real estate developers, I ran into significant issues on a routine basis involving the federal government’s jurisdiction over wetlands. One developer was required to add an eight-acre lake to a residential subdivision because a minor portion of the property was soggy. We dealt with the Army Corps of Engineers on these issues, and getting approval for development was tedious at best. And I promise you that those soggy areas were not navigable by any size boat.
The reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA) was significantly constricted when the United States Supreme Court on May 25 issued a decision that narrowed the scope of wetlands and other water subject to the CWA’s protections. The case, Sackett v. EPA*, involved a residential lot in Priest Lake, Idaho.
Mike and Chantell Sackett bought the lot in 2004 for $23,000, intending to build a modest three-bedroom family home. They began building in 2007, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) demanded the construction be halted, claiming it violated the CWA because the property was a federally regulated “navigable water”.
That demand began a 16-year legal battle. The Sacketts sued the EPA, and the case has reached the Supreme Court twice. The first decision involved a procedural matter. The Court decided in 2012 that property owners are entitled to immediate judicial review of EPA compliance orders without waiting for agency to seek judicial enforcement to contest the assertion that properties contain “waters of the United States” subject to CWA jurisdiction.
The case then worked its way through the lower courts until the Supreme Court agreed in 2022 to consider the issue of whether the EPA can define “navigable waters” to include semi-soggy parcels of land.
In January 2023, while the Sackett case was pending, the EPA published a final rule adopting a new definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) to include traditional navigable waters, tributaries, adjacent wetlands and other waters that are not themselves navigable but are either relatively permanent or have a significant nexus to navigable waters. The Sackett case probably invalidates this rule.
The five-person majority held that WOTUS include only: (1) relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographic features described in ordinary parlance as streams, oceans, rivers and lakes; and (2) adjacent wetlands with continuous surface connection to such waters so that wetlands, as a practical matter indistinguishable from the bodies of water. To prove jurisdiction over a wetland, the EPA must now show that the adjacent body of water constitutes WOTUS (a relatively permanent body of water connected to interstate navigable waters) and that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine whether the water ends and the wetland begins.
As I type this, I sit outside on a screen porch listening to birds sing in the previously defined wetlands that adjoin two sides of our house. We bought the lot, in part, because of the beauty and peace provided by wetlands, including the birds, as opposed to human neighbors. I wonder whether our peace and quiet will change.
Braden’s Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach* involves two small, contiguous developed residential coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership, like the properties in question, to be merged into a single, larger property.
The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of the contiguous lots as vacation rental properties, but Braden’s Folly challenged the ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the Penn Central** test, which states that in regulatory takings cases, courts must examine the economic impact of the regulation on the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, as well as the character of the government action.
Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden’s Folly. Folly Beach appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach.
The Court stressed that underlying its applicability of the Penn Central test was the distinct fragility of Folly Beach’s coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. The exemption empowered the City to act instead of the State in protecting the beach.
A portion of the northeast end of Folly beach has a double row of properties. The “A lots” are directly adjacent to the ocean-side of East Ashley Avenue, and the “B lots”—also known as “super-beachfront” lots—are closer to the ocean. There is no road between the A and B lots, so the B lots are accessible only through the A lots. Between beach renourishments, the B lots could be surrounded by the ocean on three sides. Braden’s Folly owns adjacent lots (Lot A and Lot B) on East Ashley Avenue. Both lots are very small.
Braden’s Folly contended that it had always intended to keep one of the lots and sell the other—whichever received the highest offer—to pay for the construction of a house on each lot. When the merger ordinance passed, the City sent a letter to Braden’s Folly requesting it stop marketing the lots separately. In response, Braden’s Folly filed the subject lawsuit.
The Supreme Court found that some facts weighed in favor of finding Braden’s Folly’s investment-backed expectation was reasonable and some facts weighed in favor of finding its expectation unreasonable. The PennCentral balancing test did not weigh in favor of either party, according to the Court.
Folly Beach and its witnesses set out the advantages to local beachfront property owners and the public at large of unwinding the super-beachfront development. The most important of the benefits to local property owners is the continued existence of federal funding for beach renourishment which in turn (1) protects A and B lots—particularly given that all the lots would be underwater if it were not for the continual renourishment; and (2) avoids property owners paying higher taxes if federal funding is extinguished.
The Court held that the merger ordinance was not a taking but responsible land use policy. Braden’s Folly retains, according to the Court, a near-full “bundle of sticks” incident to its ownership of the lots.
Dirt lawyers hear stories of dysfunctional homeowners’ associations routinely. I have one for you!
My husband and I built a second home at the beach in a relatively modest subdivision in 2011. Many of the houses are owner occupied, but many are on rental plans. My twenty-something daughter met a neighbor who asked her two questions, (1) “Is this your family’s first vacation home?” and (2) Your parents aren’t going to rent this house, are they?” It wasn’t a good start to our relationship.
We had several issues with ARB approvals during the building process, which were handled by our builder. At one point, he threw his hands in the air in frustration and said, “These people need to understand this isn’t DeBordieu.” In other words, the ARB seemed to believe the subdivision is much more affluent than it is.
When we attended our first (and only as it turns out) annual meeting of the owners, the president of the board promptly threw one of our neighbors out of the meeting for asking a question! It was during the first five minutes of the meeting. We were shocked and vowed to steer clear of those meetings.
During our first winter, we received a very nasty letter telling us we had a dead tree that must be removed immediately. We were in Columbia, didn’t know about the dead tree, and even when we investigated, we decided the tree didn’t look any worse than the other winter trees. But we quickly took it down! We heard another neighbor received a similar letter telling him his mailbox was dirty and needed to be cleaned immediately.
We decided that we were going to be good neighbors and properly maintain our house and yard, but we would enjoy the beach and the gatherings of our growing family (including the four grandchildren we’ve been blessed with since we built the house) without getting involved with the neighbors.
Believe it or not, this story has a happy ending. Apparently, all the problems were caused by one homeowner who managed to get herself elected to the board and the ARB. She roamed the streets looking for rules violations and wrote the letters herself. About the time we figured out the problem, she and her husband, thankfully, moved. The trouble among the neighbors immediately improved. Now, we have delightful neighborhood parties and enjoy getting to know our neighbors. And it seems everyone has a story about the bad neighbor. We stand around drinking beer and telling stories.
My guess is that our earlier bad HOA is like the one described in Buckholder v. Palisades Park Owners Ass’n, Inc.*, a Virginia case where the HOA imposed an assessment on all owners to fund the cost of inspecting each property for the purpose of finding violations of the HOA rules. Homeowners sued to have the assessment declared invalid.
Virginia has a statute that provides, “(e)xcept as expressly authorized by the Act, the declaration or as otherwise provided by law, no association shall…make an assessment or impose a charge against a lot owner unless the charge is a fee for services provided or related to use of the common area.”
The court invalided the assessment and remanded the case to the lower court.
I read about this interesting case on the DIRT listserv that I recommend routinely. You won’t be sorry if you sign up for the emails!
Professor Dale Whitman who moderates the listserv commented that this is the sort of thing that gives HOAs a bad name. He also commented, “While most states won’t have a statute exactly like Virginia’s, the lesson of the case remains applicable. If an HOA or condo board is going to impose an assessment to be used on anything other than the common areas (or reserves that will ultimately benefit the common areas), it needs to be certain that it has the legal power to do so, either by virtue of an applicable statute or its own declaration. This is particularly true if the assessment is almost certain to irritate and raise the hackles of some owners, as this one was.”
Several lawyers commented about the nature of folks who like to serve on HOA boards. Read the comments if you need a good laugh. The listserv is searchable.
I think I’ll share the case with my neighbors at the beach.
Pending legislation in South Carolina may affect your transactions
Remember the Chinese surveillance balloon the United States shot down off the coast of the Palmetto State in February? That incident and other rising tensions between our government and China over several issues (the war in Ukraine, recognition of Taiwan, to name only two) have resulted in politicians proposing to broaden state law bans on foreign ownership of real estate.
According to a New York Times article dated February 7, entitled “How U.S-China Tensions Could Affect Who Buys the House Next Door”, legislation in Texas was proposed after a Chinese billionaire with plans to create a wind farm bought more than 130,000 acres of land near a U.S. Air Force base.
Proposed legislation is also pending in Florida, California and now South Carolina to restrict ownership of real estate by “hostile nations” or “foreign adversaries.” Some have suggested that such bills may run afoul of due process and equal protection issues.
Chicago Title published an Underwriting Memorandum on April 5 entitled “Foreign Ownership of Property in South Carolina” to advise agents of the pending legislation in our state.
You may recall that we have an existing statute (S.C. Code §27-13-30) prohibiting any “alien” or corporation controlled by an “alien” from owning or controlling more than 500,000 acres of land in South Carolina. Recently, the South Carolina Senate passed Senate Bill 576 that amends the existing statute by expressly prohibiting any citizen of a foreign adversary or corporation controlled by a foreign adversary from acquiring any interest in South Carolina property. The proposed legislation will now be considered by the House.
The term “foreign adversary” is defined in the bill as “any foreign government or nongovernment person determined by the United States Secretary of Commerce to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States citizens.”
And there are other bills pending along the same lines.
Senate Bill 392 would amend our existing statute to reduce the amount of property allowed to be owned by an “alien” to 1,000 acres. House Bill 3566 would add a statute to reduce to 1,000 acres the amount of land that can be owned or controlled by China, the Chinese Communist Party, or an entity whose principal place of business is located within China. House Bill 3118 would prohibit any company owned or controlled by China or the Chinese Communist Party or that has a principal place of business in China from owning, leasing, possessing, or exercising any control over real estate located within 50 miles of a state or federal military base for the purpose of installing or erecting any type of telecommunications or broadcasting tower.
All dirt lawyers will know immediately that all versions of the proposed legislation will create uncertainty in our market. I have only two pieces of advice at this point. First, let’s all monitor the proposed legislation. And, second, let’s pay attention to guidance provided by our excellent title insurance underwriters.
My friend and self-professed “fellow title nerd”, Lacey Higginbotham, who practices in Myrtle Beach, sent to me a “Deed of Child” she found in the Horry County records. The document is dated May 10, 1930, recorded June 3. 1930, and purports to convey a child from a father to another family .
Because the document is difficult to read, I’ll squint for you and set it out here for your reading pleasure:
I can imagine Professor Spitz presenting this document to us as an exam in our first- year property law class. He might ask for us to spot all the issues concerning the enforceability of this document. Thanks, Lacey, for this diversion!
Let's Talk Dirt 