Real Estate Law

Should “love letters” in the real estate market be banned?

Standard

The Oregon legislature believes they should, but a Federal Court issued an injunction

Late last year, my son and daughter-in-law decided to buy a new house, mainly to move into the school district where their children attend school and to be closer to their children’s friends. My daughter-in-law is an elementary school teacher who had enrolled her children in the school where she teaches. She’s a great teacher, by the way, as evidenced by being named Richland One teacher of the year several years ago. I’m not just bragging about her, although I am very proud of her. Being a great teacher is part of the story.

They immediately sold their house in our very hot seller’s market and were looking at the daunting process of having to move twice. They got lucky when their real estate agent found the perfect house in the perfect neighborhood. The real estate agent advised them to make an offer at full price, which they did, but apparently several other real estate agents gave the same advice to their customers.

My son and daughter-in-law got lucky again when they learned that she had taught the seller’s children. She wrote a letter to the sellers to make that connection and to express how much they loved the house. They are happily living in that house today.

I learned just this week that the real estate industry has dubbed such attempts to influence sellers “love letters”. And an article published in the oregonlive.com on March 6 entitled “Federal judge blocks Oregon’s first-in-nation ban on homebuyer ‘love letters’” tells the tale of the Oregon legislature attempting to ban these letters. The news story points to a preliminary injunction* issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.

The opinion defined “love letters” as “notes, letters, and pictures that buyers may submit along with their offer to purchase in order to create an emotional connection between sellers and buyers – especially when significant competition exists on a given property.” A practicing real estate agent who is also an Oregon legislator introduced legislation to ban these letters because they “perpetuate systemic issues of bias in real estate transactions.”

The legislation, which passed in 2021, amended a statute that enumerates the duties and obligations owed by a seller’s agent and reads:

In order to help a seller avoid selecting a buyer based on the buyer’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, married status or familial status as prohibited by the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.), a seller’s agent shall reject any communication other than customary documents in a real estate transaction, including photographs, provided by a buyer.

The statute does not define “customary documents”, but Oregon’s Real Estate Commissioner offered guidance: “the Agency interprets (customary documents) to mean disclosure forms, sales agreements, counter offer(s), addenda, and reports. Love letters would not be considered customary documents.”

The plaintiff, a real estate agency, sought a preliminary injunction against Oregon’s real estate commissioner and attorney general against enforcing the statute. The Court said the purpose of the legislation is laudable, to stop discrimination in home ownership based on protected class status, but agreed to issue the preliminary injunction because the legislation “unquestionably” interferes with free speech.

The defendants presented evidence of the history and prevalence of housing discrimination in Oregon, and the Court agreed that considerable racial disparities persist in home ownership. The defendant’s expert opined that the vast majority of “love letters” disclosed the buyer’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, familial status, or disability. He said about half the letters used as evidence in the case included photographs that revealed some information about race, color, sex, and other characteristics. He opined that love letters enable intentional and unintentional discrimination in housing.

The evidence indicated love letters are powerful documents! The opinion cites a study conducted by the real estate company Redfin that found 40% of offers include love letters and that love letters increase the likelihood of having an offer accepted by 52%.  A real estate agent testified that love letters allow her clients to compete with higher offers, including those submitted by investors. The evidence also indicates that real estate agents play a significant role in drafting love letters, including providing templates to their clients.

The plaintiff suggested alternatives to the legislation: (1) greater enforcement of existing fair housing laws; (2) requirement that agents redact client love letters, (3) prohibition on the inclusion of photos; (4) fair housing disclosure requirement in real estate transactions; (5) increased fair housing training for real estate agents; (6) increase the stock of affordable housing; or (7) do nothing and allow individual real estate agents to advise their clients to not send love letters.

The Court indicated the last two alternatives do not merit serious consideration. The other alternatives, however, show that the defendants’ objectives could be achieved in a manner that places less of a burden on otherwise lawful speech.

I am confident we will see more “love letter” legislation and litigation in future.

*Total Real Estate Group, LLC v. Strode, 22 WL 633670, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38653 (D. Or., March 3, 2022)

Can mortgage lenders force arbitration on consumers?

Standard

Fourth Circuit says no in a published opinion

In Lyons v. PNC Bank*, a consumer, William Lyons, Jr., filed suit against his home equity line of credit lender alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). The lender, PNC Bank, had set-off funds from two of Mr. Lyons’ deposit accounts to pay the outstanding balance on his HELOC.

PNC moved to compel arbitration of the dispute based on an arbitration provision in the parties’ agreements relating to the deposit accounts. The case contains some discussion about jurisdiction, and one judges dissented on that basis. But the important holding in the case relates to pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer mortgages and related documents.

The Court found the relevant legislation to be 15 U.S.C. §1639c(e)(1) and §1639c(e)(3) from the Dodd-Frank Act, which had amended TILA. The first provision states:

“No residential mortgage loan and no extension of credit under and open end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer may include terms which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.”

The second provision states:

“No provision of any residential mortgage loan or any extension of credit under an open end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer, and no other agreement between the consumer and the creditor relating to the residential mortgage loan…shall be applied or interpreted so as to bar a consumer from bringing an action in an appropriate district court of the United States…”

The Court held that the plain language of the legislation is clear and unambiguous that a consumer cannot be prevented from bringing a TILA action in federal district court by a provision in any agreement related to a residential mortgage loan. The Court’s holding indicates its opinion that Congress clearly intended consumers to have the right to litigate mortgage disputes.

* United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Opinion No. 21-1058 (February 15, 2022)

Charleston ROD litigation reaches temporary resolution

Standard

This blog has previously discussed (here and here) the excellent lawsuit brought by The Finkel Law Firm against the Charleston County Register of Deeds seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the ROD (1) to immediately file all documents delivered to the ROD within one month of delivery; (2) to mark the documents as having been recorded on the date of delivery; and (3) to record all future documents in the order of the time delivery regardless of whether they were delivered in person or by the U.S. mail or parcel post.

The Court appointed Howard Yates, one of the most experienced real estate lawyers of the Charleston Bar, as Court Monitor. Mr. Yates issued a report dated January 31, 2022, the parties signed a Consent Order on February 10, and the Court issued a separate Order, also dated February 10. Please read all three documents here.

Mr. Yates has made numerous recommendations involving, among other matters, increasing office hours, increasing work hours for staff, and hiring employees from other ROD offices to reduce the backlog by working weekends.

The Court will maintain jurisdiction and will require frequent reports on progress. We can all applaud the efforts of The Finkel Law Firm and Howard Yates in bringing this matter to satisfactory conclusion, at least temporarily.

Court of Appeals answers novel JTROS question

Standard

In the first Advance Sheet of 2022, our Court of Appeals answered a novel question concerning the severance of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The case* involved the estate of a father who owned property in Garden City with his son, one of his five children. Father and son had purchased the property together, each owning a fifty percent interest.  

The facts are simple. The property owners entered into a contract to sell the property in November of 2013, prior to the father’s death on December 20, 2013. The transaction closed on December 27, just seven days after the father’s death. The son, who was also the personal representative, treated the sale as if he was the sole owner and claimed the proceeds of the sale individually. His siblings argued that the contract severed the joint tenancy, entitling the estate to half of the proceeds.

The Probate Court and Circuit Court agreed with the siblings, relying on South Carolina Federal Savings Bank v. San-A-Bel Corporation**, which held that a purchaser under a contract has an equitable lien on the property. The Probate Court reasoned that the sales contract entered into prior to the Decedent’s death encumbered the property, entitling the purchaser possession of the property upon payment of the purchase price and entitling the estate to one-half of the proceeds. The Circuit Court found that the Probate Court had correctly interpreted the law.

Dirt lawyers understand the San-A-Bel case sets up a trap for the unwary lawyer who fails to deal with the equitable lien that case established, but we have never understood that case to affect JTROS severance. The Court of Appeals agrees with us. Since neither San-A-Bel nor the JTROS statutes address the question at hand, the Court decided to look at rulings from other states to address the novel issue of whether a contract of sale severs a joint tenancy.

The Court cited cases from the states of Washington and Florida (citations omitted) and decided to follow the Florida court which held that severance does not automatically occur upon the execution of a contract executed by all joint tenants unless there is an indication in the contract or from the circumstances that the parties intended to sever and terminate the joint tenancy.

The Court found that the contract at issue was silent on the severance issue and no extraneous circumstances indicated severance was intended by the parties, so the joint tenancy was not severed by the contract, and the son was entitled to the sales proceeds.  

Dirt lawyers tend to hold our collective breath when our Courts address a novel real estate issue. But I believe that, this time, we can agree that they got it right. Let me know if you disagree with me!

*In the Matter of the Estate of Moore, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5887, January 5, 2022.

**307 S.C. 76, 413 S.E.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1992).

Happy New Year!

Standard

Watch out for those recurring dreams…

And don’t forget the mortgage subordinations!

As the last blog of the year, I thought I’d tell you the story of one of my recurring dreams, or more accurately, one of my recurring nightmares, for your entertainment.

Do you have recurring dreams? I grew up in Georgetown where everyone makes routine pilgrimages to Charleston for shopping, dining, and medical appointments. My first recurring nightmare as a child involved the fright of crossing that rickety, two-lane bridge between Mt. Pleasant and Charleston. Thank goodness that monstrosity was replaced by the beautiful suspension bridge we cross today!

Later came the dreams involving college at Carolina. I dreamed I couldn’t get into the mailbox in my dorm. I have no idea why I had that dream because nothing very important was ever there. I dreamed my meal card wouldn’t work but that was also a useless dream because missing those dorm meals would have been no great loss.

Then came law school. In those dreams, it was always time for the exam for a class I had forgotten I signed up for. A more accurate dream would have involved a class I knew I signed up for but failed to attend class because I didn’t understand a word the professor said (think international law). Thank goodness my boyfriend had a great “skinny” on that topic and I somehow made it through that class. And I later married that boy.

But my most vivid recurring dreams involve my professional life, and the stories are always based in fact. I’ll tell you the factual, not the fantasy version of this dream. And I’ll avoid the names for attorney-client and other confidentiality reasons. This is the biggest professional mistake I made or, more accurately, the biggest professional mistake I made that I know about. As dirt lawyers, we plant time bombs every day, right?

I represented real estate developers. They developed malls, shopping centers, residential subdivisions, residential condominiums, outlots for McDonalds and other fast-food restaurants and other properties. The story involves a very large tract that was developed into an upscale residential subdivision, a Walmart, a movie theater, a church, and a shopping center.

The development was complicated. It involved environmental issues that could have derailed the entire project. Multiple individuals formed various entities for buying, holding and selling the real estate. The underlying property was purchased from the Federal government, which created its own set of complications. The acquisition, for example, involved a bid process that was foreign to me at the time.

It all finally fell into place, and the residences and businesses are still in place in 2021.

The problem that I thought might derail my career came to light when one of the individual developers declared bankruptcy. When that happened, every legal step I had taken for that person in the prior three years was scrutinized. The main lawyer scrutinizing my work, along with a team of associates, was a law school classmate, and, thankfully, a very kind and smart lawyer. But I spent lots of time worrying that I had missed something important.

I can remember the phone call from my friend all these years later down to the clothes I was wearing and the coffee cup in my hand.

The commercial properties required easements because of the private roads the properties shared. They also had easements for maintenance, pedestrian access, shared utilities, etc. Here’s the pitfall. When properties with these legal connections are owned and mortgaged separately, the lenders almost always must subordinate their mortgages to the easements to ensure the easements remain in place in the event of foreclosure, or in this case, bankruptcy.

I knew that!

I routinely obtained mortgage subordinations at every step of the development, except for one commercial tract. To this day, I have no idea how I missed one set of subordinations. And I think I lost several years off my life between the phone call from my kind classmate until I was able to obtain the subordinations very much after the fact. I was very lucky because the lender I had to approach (hat in hand) was a local lender. I even knew the person I had to persuade to cure my problem. And the good Lord must have smiled on me that day because it all worked out. I kept my license and my clients.

So, as I wish you a very happy, healthy, and prosperous 2022, I remind you to avoid the mistake I made. Always obtain the necessary mortgage subordinations!

Lawyer publicly reprimanded for closing irregularity

Standard

Most South Carolina dirt lawyers were disappointed with the result of the 2017 Quicken Loan case which did not hold, as many had hoped, that a South Carolina licensed lawyer must be at the center of each residential real estate closing, overseeing each step, and ensuring that the consumer client’s interests are protected in each step. That case blessed a scenario where an out-of-state entity oversaw the closing process and divvied up the required lawyer functions among various functions.

A disciplinary case* from August of 2021 demonstrates just one way the scenario approved by Quicken can go awry.

The lawyer was hired by Superior Closing and Title Services, LLC to serve as closing attorney for a home purchase for an attorney’s fee of $200. That fee is our first clue about the type of closing that is the subject of this case.  The Court refers to the purchaser as “C.W.” The lender was 1st Choice Mortgage, and the loan was assigned to Wells Fargo.

Almost two years after the closing, Wells Fargo demanded 1st Choice repurchase the loan because of a discrepancy with the title. The Court states “it was discovered” that C.W. was a straw purchaser who never made a payment on the loan.  The lawyer argued, and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel did not dispute, that the lawyer was unaware of the straw purchase. The closing statement showed a payment by C.W. of $11,598.16. At the closing, a copy of a $12,000 cashier’s check made payable to Superior Closing was shown to the lawyer and to 1st Choice Mortgage as the source of the down payment.

The lawyer signed the normal certification at closing representing that the settlement statement was a true and accurate account of the transaction.

The $12,000 check was never negotiated, and 1st Choice never received the funds. 1st Choice paid over $39,000 to settle the claim with Wells Fargo.

1st Choice sued Superior Closing and the lawyer. The lawyer represented that Superior Closing prepared the closing statement and acknowledged that he failed to properly supervise the preparation of the settlement statement and the disbursement of funds. As a result of the lawsuit, a $39,739 judgment was filed against the lawyer and Superior Closing. The judgment has been satisfied.

We all know how challenging it is to supervise the disbursement of a residential closing where the funds do not flow through the closing attorney’s trust account. This disciplinary case demonstrates the danger of skipping that problematic but necessary step.

*In the Matter of Ebener, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion No. 28047 (August 11, 2021)

This tax sale case has an interesting twist

Standard

The alleged successful purchaser seeks to void the sale!

I’ve always believed our courts will happily void any tax sale on the flimsiest of technicalities, but apparently not when the purported tax sale buyer is the party seeking to get out of the purchase.

Alterna Tax Asset Group, LLC v. York County* is a Court of Appeals case from July dealing with a 2014 tax sale. Alterna claims it was the successful bidder at the sale and sought to void the sale and cancel its ownership relying on §12-61-20 of the South Carolina Code, which reads, in part:

“Any…person…(that) has purchased at or acquired through a tax sale and obtained title to any real or personal property, may bring an action in the court of common pleas of such county for the purpose of barring all other claims thereto.”

The complaint alleged that the title to the property was clouded because of York County’s failure to provide proper notice. The complaint set up four causes of action: (1) declaratory judgment; (2) injunctive relief, (3) quiet title, and (4) unjust enrichment.

The Master consulted the County’s records and took judicial notice that Alterna was neither the purchaser of the property at the tax sale, nor the owner currently listed on the deed. The Master ruled Alterna was not a real party in interest and lacked standing. The Master also ruled that the quoted code section does not create a valid cause of action to void a tax sale.

Alterna appealed claiming the Master erred in taking judicial notice of the public records. The Court of Appeals termed this use of judicial notice “problematic” but decided the appeal on what it called a more fundamental issue:  whether, as the alleged tax sale purchaser, Alterna may seek to rescind its successful purchase based on the facts in this case.

Since the purpose of the code section is to clear tax titles, the Court held that Alterna states to viable cause of action when it seeks to defeat rather than defend its title.

The Court accepted for the purposes of this appeal from a 12(b)(6) motion Alterna’s allegation that it purchased the property at the tax sale and concluded that no valid causes of action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief existed.

The Court then stated that the remaining questions whether a winning bidder at a tax sale may use the quiet title doctrine or claim of unjust enrichment to defeat rather affirm the bidder’s title, are novel questions in South Carolina. The Court held that the complaint does not allege a proper cause of action for quiet title because there is no existing adverse claim. Neither the County nor anyone else was challenging Alterna’s tax title, so the claim is “imaginary or speculative”.

The unjust enrichment cause of action, which claimed the county was enriched by picketing the tax sale proceeds yet delivering a clouded title, collides, according to the Court, with South Carolina Code §12-51-160, which establishes as a matter of law the presumption that a tax deed is prima facie evidence of good title.

The Court further noted that Alterna’s alleged cloud on the title, that York County’s notification was defective, was a matter of public record visible to Alterna before the sale.

Finally, the Court held that Alterna’s claim was not a justiciable controversy. Alterna claimed its title was hopelessly clouded and would someday be snatched away by someone with a superior claim. The court resisted the request to “tame paper tigers or pass upon issues not subject to a genuine, concrete dispute.”

This is a very interesting case! I’ll keep you posed of future developments.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5836, July 14, 2021

Court decides an interesting, but unpublished, case on the effect of a plat notation

Standard

Unpublished opinions don’t typically get my attention, but my friend, Bill Booth, sent this one* to me because he found it interesting, and I do, too. As a reminder, unpublished opinions have no precedential value, but they sometimes provide insight on how the Court might react in a similar situation, at least under the current makeup of the court.

The issue in this case was whether a notation on a subdivision plat that certain lots were “for agricultural use only” created a valid restriction of the use of the lots. Mikell Scarborough, Master-in-Equity for Charleston County, granted summary judgment, relying on extrinsic evidence to conclude that there was no intent to create a restriction despite the plain language on the face of the plat. That decision was affirmed.

The Court cited familiar cases holding that restrictive covenants are contractual in nature and must be strictly construed in favor of the free use of property. The Court also referred to cases holding that when a deed describes land as shown on a plat, the plat becomes a part of the deed. The interesting twist became whether the plat notation created an ambiguity that would allow the introduction of extrinsic evidence.

The Court found that the language in the plat was not ambiguous, but that the origin of the note created the ambiguity. The surveyor provided an affidavit to the effect that the Charleston County Planning Commission placed the agricultural use restriction on the plat “for the purpose of indicating that Charleston County would not, at that time, approve building permits for the lots because (the lots in question) did not meet current minimum standards for a modified conventional sub-service disposal system.”

When the plat was submitted for approval, the property owners included a letter explaining they were aware that the land possessed poor soil conditions for septic systems. The letter requested that the subdivision be approved with the stipulation that any lot that did not support a septic system would be restricted from becoming a building lot until public sewer service became available.

The case doesn’t make this point clear, but I am assuming the Appellant sued other lot owners who had built on their lots despite the plat notation. In other words, the Appellant wanted the restriction enforced as to other lots, not the lot the Appellant purchased. Interestingly, one house had been built before the Appellant purchased its lot.

A representative of the Appellant claimed he relied on the plat notation and that his title insurance company told him the lots were restricted. The Court found it significant, however, that the property owners who recorded the plat did not intend to restrict the property.

The Appellant argued that the deeds for all the lots specifically state that the property is subject to all restrictions, reservations, easements and other limitations that appear of record, including on the Plat. The Court held, citing 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions §151 (2015) that common “subject to” language does not create a restriction where none exists.

The Appellant also argued that an agricultural use exception in the title insurance policy was evidence that the restriction ran with the land, but the Court held that the title insurance company was merely noting the provision was on the plat so that it would not be liable if the Appellant could not build on its lot.  

The Court concluded that the record does not contain a scintilla of evidence to support the imposition of a building restriction on the Respondents’ lots.

Carpenter Braselton, LLC v. Roberts, South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-280.

SC Supreme Court deals with Rock Hill stormwater issue

Standard

Justice Few declares piping storm water under a house is “wrong”

I love a case where a separate opinion (usually a dissent) cuts to the chase and explains in a few words a multiple-page quagmire.  That’s what we have in Ray v. City of Rock Hill*, a case decided on August 4 by the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Lucille Ray sued the City of Rock Hill for inverse condemnation, claiming her property was taken as a result of stormwater flowing through pipes under City streets into a terra cotta pipe that runs behind her property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the City engaged in an affirmative, positive, aggressive act sufficient to support the inverse condemnation claim. The Supreme Court modified and affirmed that decision, remanding the case for a determination on that issue.

The facts are particularly interesting for dirt lawyers. Ray purchased her house on College Avenue in 1985. Before the house was built in the 1920s, someone—there is no record as to who—installed a 24-inch underground terra cotta pipe under the property. The property and the pipe are located at the topographical low point of a 29-acre watershed. Three stormwater pipes installed and owned by the City collect stormwater and transport it under various streets in the neighborhood. Stormwater runs through the pipe to a catch basin directly in front of Ray’s house. When the water reaches the catch basin, it is channeled under Ray’s house to the back of her property. The pipe has been channeling stormwater in this fashion for roughly 100 years although the record reflects no evidence of an easement.

You won’t be shocked that Ray’s property had a history of sinking and settling. In 1992, Ray saw her gardener fall waist-deep into a sinkhole. The house’s roof was subject to bending and movement. The steps on the front porch sank. In 2008, Ray contacted the City and was told about the pipe running under those steps. (This exchange supported the City’s claim that the statute of limitations had run on a damages claim.)

In 2012, Ray brought this action seeking inverse condemnation and trespass. Other relief was sought and the South Carolina Department of Transportation was added as a defendant, but those issues are not relevant to this appeal. Shortly after Ray brought the suit, the City began maintenance work on a sewer line beneath College avenue.

To get to the sewer line, the City had to dig up part of College Avenue in front of the property and to sever three stormwater pipes from the catch basin. The basis of the inverse condemnation claim is that the City’s reconnection of the pipes to the catch basin was an affirmative, positive, aggressive act. That issue was returned to the circuit court for determination.

Justice Few’s separate opinion (not categorized as a concurrence or a dissent) is cogent. He wrote to make two points. First, the City should not be piping stormwater under Ray’s house! It is wrong, he said, and he doesn’t care who built the pipe or whose fault it is that the house is sinking because of the water. “The City should do the right thing and fix the problem.”

Justice Few’s second point is that all wrongs are not subject to redress in our civil courts. To the extent Ray’s inverse condemnation theory is valid, he said, the taking occurred many years ago, either when the pipes were installed or when the deterioration of the pipes began to harm the property. He said it makes no difference that the pipes were reconnected in 2012. The effect of that act was to continue to run storm water under property Ray alleges had already been taken.

Justice Few concluded that there is simply no right of action available under an inverse condemnation theory and that the circuit court correctly dismissed that claim

I look forward to what happens next!

* South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28045, August 4, 2021

Do we face lurking condo repair problems like those in Surfside, Florida?

Standard

This is a difficult subject, and I’ve waited to address it for time to pass since the tragic June 24 collapse of the 136-unit Champlain Towers South condo project in Surfside, Florida.

South Carolina has many aging condominium projects, particularly along our coast. And we have an earthquake fault line to consider. Do our local homeowners’ association boards face expensive repair and reserve dangers similar to those in Florida?

Dale Whitman, the esteemed retired professor from the University of Missouri School of Law who moderates the national Dirt Real Estate Lawyers Listserv (Dirt@listserv.umkc.edu) has commented on Florida’s concerns in this regard. (If you’re not already following this listserv, I highly recommend it for all South Carolina dirt lawyers.)

Professor Whitman pointed to two informative and insightful news stories on the collapse, one from NBC News and the other from the Miami Herald.

The legal news following the collapse is that the Florida Bar has appointed a committee to review existing Florida legislation and to make recommendations for changes. Apparently, Florida law requiring reserve studies is weak and can be waived by a majority of the unit owners. To my knowledge, South Carolina has no such legislation.

It was estimated that nearly $17 million would have been needed to make the necessary repairs to the building that collapsed, but that available reserves amounted to only $770,000. Massive special assessments (more than $300,000 per unit) would have been needed. Collection was ongoing at the time of the collapse. But many unit owners simply did not have access to funds in that amount.

Professor Whitman wrote in the listserve on July 8:

“A much more robust program of reserves would have been needed to avoid this problem. But how much?  The need for a large expenditure to shore up the building’s structure is inherently unpredictable; it isn’t like a roof with a 20-year life, for example. But some sort of prediction is nonetheless necessary. Pick a number: say, a goal of achieving a reserve of 20% of the building’s original capital cost over the first 20 years of the building’s life, with continuing growth at the same rate thereafter. That would mean that the original assessments would be considerably higher than they would be with a more modest, conventional reserve program. It would add to the residents’ monthly cost and would make ‘affordable housing’ harder to achieve. But isn’t that better than a catastrophic collapse?”

He also speculated that periodic structural inspections by qualified engineers may be necessary. The building that collapsed apparently had such an inspection in 2018. That inspection revealed structural problems that could have been repaired for $9 million.

A couple of Florida Counties require aging high-rises to go through inspections after they reach 40 years of age. Failing the inspections can result in the loss of certificates of occupancy. But there is no similar state-wide requirement in Florida or South Carolina.

Much more stringent building inspection and condominium law requirements may be needed in South Carolina. I believe our HOA legislative scheme provides only the bare bones necessary to create and maintain a horizontal property regime. And I am not aware of any state-wide legislation that requires periodic inspections of high-rise buildings.

We should watch to see what Florida does and consider making similar changes. These issues are difficult to legislate and enforce but preventing comparable tragedies in South Carolina must be worth the effort.