South Carolina law

SC Supreme Court Decides Family Equitable Mortgage Case

Standard

…and dirt lawyers are gratified to see the deeds called deeds!tug o war

On Oct. 28, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided a family dispute surrounding a transaction between a deceased brother and his sister and held that two deeds to the sister were, in fact, deeds, and did not constitute an equitable mortgage*.

While Justice Kittredge’s dissent suggested the Court established a “categorical rule” that only evidence created contemporaneously with a conveyance can be considered in support of an equitable mortgage, the majority, in a footnote, disagreed with Justice Kittredge’s interpretation and signified subsequent events and writings may assist in determining the intent of the parties at the time of the conveyance.

After two appeals, the facts remain murky.

Kenneth Walker owned and lived on a 200-acre farm in Colleton County. In 1996, he conveyed 26.52 acres to his sister, Catherine Brooks. The stated consideration was $13,250, although Brooks testified she paid nothing. In 2002, Walker conveyed an additional 15.16 acres to Brooks for the stated consideration of $5.00.

According to Brooks, her brother conveyed the property to her because she supported him emotionally and financially. She testified that she paid his debts, paid his electric and telephone bills, bought his groceries, gave him cash for living expenses, helped him receive social security benefits and served as trustee for those benefits.

In 2004, at Walker’s request, Brooks wrote a note stating that Walker intended proceeds from sand removal and soil and waste water discharge onto the property would be paid to Brooks until she received $60,000. Walker and Brooks also generated a ledger that began with an entry of $60,000 and ended with an entry of $27,400.

It is clear that Brooks did not exercise control over the property.

deed - definitionBefore Walker died, his attorney sent a letter to Brooks referring to this note and ledger, and requesting her to tender a deed in exchange for $2,893.87. This amount was inexplicable, according to the Court.  After Walker’s death, his son and personal representative offered to pay Brooks $27,400 in exchange for a deed. Brooks refused, and this dispute arose.

The special referee held that the note and ledger showed that Walker was indebted to Brooks at the time of his death, and the conveyance was intended as security for the debt. He found the existence of an equitable mortgage, and held that the estate was entitled to the property upon payment of $27,400. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court, referring to a C.J.S. article and a prior case, indicated that the existence of an equitable mortgage must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, and that the intent of the parties must be evaluated at the time of the conveyance.  The court referred to the personal representative’s “self-serving testimony” and the fact that Brooks did not exercise control over the property as the only evidence that the parties intended to establish an equitable mortgage at the time the property was conveyed. The existence of the note and ledger were discounted as not being contemporaneous with the deeds.

Justice Kittredge would have reinstated the trial court’s finding of an equitable mortgage, denouncing the Court’s “categorical rule” in the face of these “equitable, fact intensive inquiries.” He found the existence of the note and ledger persuasive that the parties intended that the conveyance was, in legal effect, a mortgage.

Like dirt lawyers everywhere, I like certainty when it comes to deeds and find the Supreme Court’s holding comforting.

 

 

*Walker v. Brooks, Appellate Case No. 2013-001377

Dirt Lawyers Will Like This Mortgage Satisfaction Case

Standard

S.C. Supreme Court holds equity lines are subject to the timely satisfaction statute.

In an opinion written by Justice Beatty, our Supreme Court held on August 5 that open-ended mortgages are satisfied in the same manner as conventional mortgages and under the same statutory requirement for timely satisfaction by lenders.

Regions Bank v. Strawn involved a mortgage foreclosure against Robert and Nancy Borchers. The Borchers counterclaimed seeking to recover from Regions Bank under §§29-3-310 and 29-3-320 of the South Carolina Code based on the bank’s failure to satisfy the mortgage within the three-month time period required.

mortgage jengaThe home had been purchased from Cammie Strawn, who had taken title from her then-husband, Richard Strawn. Mr. Strawn had previously obtained the home equity line of credit. At the time of the Borchers’ closing, the balance of the mortgage was $32,240.42. Immediately after the closing, the Borchers’ attorney, James Belk, had an employee deliver a payoff check and a mortgage satisfaction transmittal letter to Regions Bank. The check had the words “Payoff of first mortgage” typed on it.

Instead of satisfying the mortgage, the bank applied the check to the balance, bringing it to zero, and provided Richard Strawn with new checks even though he had not owned the home for more than two years. Mr. Strawn spent more than $72,000 on the equity line.

When Regions Bank attempted to collect on Mr. Strawn’s debt by foreclosing on the Borchers’ home, the Borchers answered, counterclaimed and moved for summary judgment. The bank argued that a revolving line of credit should be handled differently than conventional mortgages, and this particular mortgage could not be satisfied without instructions from Mr. Strawn.

The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Borchers. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Regions Bank made two basic arguments: (1) open ended mortgages are an exception to the statutory satisfaction requirement because only the original borrower is authorized to request a satisfaction; and (2) the Borchers could not assert a violation of the mortgage satisfaction statutes because their attorney had the authority to satisfy the mortgage pursuant to the attorney satisfaction statute (§29-3-330).

The Court affirmed and held that the first argument failed because the mortgage itself contemplated that the property may be sold and specifically stated that it would be binding on the mortgagor’s successors and assigns. Also, the court stated that anyone with an interest in mortgaged property is allowed to request a satisfaction upon payment, and there is no exception for equity lines of credit.

Sale of a house. Object over whiteAs to the argument that the Borchers’ attorney could have satisfied the mortgage, the Court stated simply that this argument is without merit because the statutory framework does not exempt a mortgage holder of an equity line from the penalty provisions for failing to satisfy a mortgage within the required time frame.

This is a good opinion for South Carolina closing lawyers!

Malpractice Case Questions Delegation of Responsibility for Title Work

Standard

SC Supreme Court decides client’s informed consent is required.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that a closing attorney cannot delegate the ultimate responsibility for delivering clear title to a purchaser without the purchaser’s informed consent. Johnson v. Alexander is an attorney malpractice case decided on July 29. This case involved Amber Johnson’s 2006 closing of a home in North Charleston.  Ms. Johnson alleged that her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house had been sold at a tax sale in 2005.

shutterstock_113463292The title examination had been performed by another attorney, Charles Feeley at the request of Ms. Johnson’s previous attorney, Mario Inglese.  Mr. Alexander purchased the title work from Mr. Inglese and relied on the title examination, which concluded that no back taxes were owed on the property. Ms. Johnson stopped making mortgage payments when she learned she didn’t have title to the property, and the property went to foreclosure.

At trial, Ms. Johnson moved for partial summary judgment as to Mr. Alexander’s liability. At the summary judgment hearing, an affidavit of the Delinquent Tax Collector for Charleston County was proffered to prove the availability of the delinquent tax records during the time when the title would have been examined.  Mr. Feeley’s affidavit indicated he could  not remember the specific title work, but that he always searched titles the same way, and he always checked delinquent taxes for a ten-year period. His notes showed that he found no outstanding taxes. Further, Mr. Feeley attested that the tax sale would not have appeared in the chain of title because the tax sale deed was actually recorded after the closing.

As a side note to abstractors: recent tax sales often do not appear in chains of title because the deeds are not yet recorded. Title examiners should check for payment of taxes for a ten-year period to uncover ad valorem tax delinquencies.

The trial court granted Ms. Johnson’s motion on Mr. Alexander’s liability.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the lower court incorrectly focused its inquiry on whether an attorney conducting a title examination should have discovered delinquent taxes from 2003 and 2004 and the tax sale from 2005. Instead, the appellate court held the proper question was whether Mr. Alexander acted reasonably in relying on the title work and reversed and remanded the case for trial.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination of damages. Ms. Johnson argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the correct inquiry is whether an attorney reasonably relied on another attorney’s work where that work is outsourced. She contended that an attorney should be liable for negligence arising from tasks he delegates unless he has expressly limited the scope of the representation. The Supreme Court agreed.

The Supreme Court said the Court of Appeals erroneously equated delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The opinion, written by Justice Hearn, stated that while Feeley’s negligence was the issue, that does not displace Alexander’s ultimate liability.

The opinion states, “while an attorney may delegate certain tasks to other attorneys or staff, it does not follow that the attorney’s professional decision to do so can change his liability to his client absent that client’s clear, counseled consent.”

The Court cited Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Responsibility which indicates a lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.

Notice that the Court makes no distinction between delegating a task to staff and delegating it to another attorney. Mr. Alexander had argued that because Ms. Johnson knew he did not personally examine the title, its accuracy was not within the scope of his representation to her. The Court clearly held that the scope of representation can only be limited through the clear, counseled consent of the client.

Many residential closings are handled in South Carolina by attorneys who have nothing to do with the title examination. This case clearly states that those attorneys should limit the scope of their representation and obtain their clients’ clear, counseled consent. Otherwise, the title work is the ultimate responsibility of the closing attorney regardless of who performs it.

shutterstock_233295964And on a related topic, it is my opinion that any title examination that covers less than a full-search period or is based on a prior title insurance policy should be used only after consultation with the client and obtaining the client’s informed consent.  Many residential and commercial closing attorneys rely heavily on prior title policies for back title, and they may want to tweak their practices after they read this opinion.

Closing attorneys’ files should be papered with those informed consents confirmed in writing!

Waters Of The United States Redefined

Standard

South Carolina is among the states suing the Feds

The Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers published a Final Clean Water Act Rule defining “waters of the United States” on June 29. The effective date of the rule, which greatly expands the scope of jurisdictional waters, is August 28. The full text of the rule can be read here.

shutterstock_180127517The Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction relates to “navigable waters” which was previously defined simply as “waters of the United States or the territorial seas”.  This vague definition led to numerous lawsuits and much regulatory interpretation, but confusion persisted. For this reason, the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers decided to resolve the uncertainty by promulgating a new definition by federal rule. Supporters say the true motivation for the rule is to protect the safety of drinking water and stream health.

The new rule will affect several industries, two of which are of particular importance to real estate practitioners:  construction and housing. The rule will undoubtedly lead to considerable additional costly federal permitting and is likely to slow development.

The rule deems all tributaries to traditional navigable waters with beds, banks and ordinary high water marks, as jurisdictional, regardless of size. The definition of “wetlands” has been expanded to include “neighboring” wetlands which incorporates all waters within the floodplain or within specified distances from the ordinary high water mark of traditional navigable waters, their tributaries and impoundments.

Of local significance, the rule extends protections to “Carolina Bays”, on a case-by-case basis, depending on the significance of their nexus to navigable waters. Carolina bays are defined as ponded depressional wetlands that occur along the Atlantic coastal plains.

shutterstock_147620981Two lawsuits were filed by 22 states on the day after the rule was published. South Carolina is a plaintiff in Georgia v. McCarthy, which claims the rule infringes on state sovereignty by eliminating the states’ primary authority to regulate and protect water under state standards. The lawsuit also alleges that the rule imposes significant new federal burdens on the states, homeowners, business owners and farmers by forcing them to obtain costly federal permits to continue to conduct activities on their property that have no significant impact on navigable, interstate waters.

The second lawsuit, North Dakota v. McCarthy, alleges that the rule harms states in their capacity as owners and regulators of waters and lands within their respective jurisdictions.

It is likely that other challenges to the new rule will follow.  In addition to the challenges by the states, the housing, construction, farming and oil industries are opposed to the implementation of this far reaching rule.

Hilton Head Timeshare Project Entangled In Consumer Litigation

Standard

Lawsuits involve tales of fraudulent sales tactics

Hilton Head’s Island Packet newspaper continues to report on approximately sixty state and federal lawsuits pitting disgruntled consumer purchaser plaintiffs against The Coral Sands Resort timeshare project on Pope Avenue in Hilton Head. The cases have been weaving their way through the court systems for three years.

shutterstock_47620291The lawsuits involve tales of fraudulent tactics by timeshare salesmen, such as promises of extra weeks in related projects that never materialize, promises of waived maintenance fees that never materialize, a pattern of baiting-and-switching units, promises that the developer will purchase timeshare units owned by the consumers in other projects as a sort of trade in, and sales of weeks that are available only every other year or every third year as if they were available every year. In short, the purchasers claim they were misled by sales pitches, and the documents they received did not reflect what had been told.

Most recently, Dan Burley reported on July 1 that two out-of-state couples received full refunds through arbitration. These two decisions are the first rulings in the various cases.

According to the July 1 article, separate arbitrators voided the couples’ contracts and ordered refunds because the contracts were determined to have violated aspects of the South Carolina Timeshare Act.

But the relief the consumers had requested went far beyond the refund of several thousand dollars. One of the cases was arbitrated by Hilton Head lawyer Curtis Coltrane. His twelve-page Award was attached to the news report and discussed allegations of common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy and Unfair Trade Practices, among others. All of those claims were dismissed for lack of evidence.  The arbitrator stated that the plaintiffs were intelligent individuals who should have been able to ascertain the contents of the documents by reading them.shutterstock_55553422

The second suit was arbitrated by Florence lawyer Richard L. Hinson with a similar result. As in the first case, all claims were dismissed except for the causes of action for Violation of the South Carolina Timeshare Act, in Mr. Hinson’s two-page award.

Representatives of the project are quoted as saying that thousands of customers are pleased with their Coral Resorts experience, and that owners who suffer from buyers’ remorse can ask for a refund within five days of signing the contract.

Mr. Burley’s previous articles in The Island Packet provide additional detail. I recommend the previous …and future articles on this litigation for interesting reading!

Donut Fridays

Standard

Ethics Opinion gives them a thumbs up!


donutsSavvy residential dirt lawyers continue to explore innovative marketing methods. A recent Ethics Advisory Opinion (15-02) issued by the Ethics Advisory Committee of the South Carolina Bar blessed the following scenario, with a few caveats:

“Law Firm would like to pursue a practice referred to as “Donut Friday,” where an employee of Law Firm visits the Firm’s existing vendors (e.g., banks, real estate agencies, etc.) and delivers a box of donuts to these vendors. Included with the box of donuts are a dozen koozies bearing the name of Law Firm, as well as a fee sheet, a pamphlet containing information about Law Firm and its staff, and a coupon for $50.00 off Law Firm’s fee for a consultation or real estate closing. None of the marketing materials is addressed or directed to any one person, nor does the material request that existing vendors refer business to Law Firm, although the intent is to receive referrals.”

The Committee stated as a preliminary matter that the mere delivery of gifts or other marketing materials to a business generally without delivery to specific individuals does not constitute solicitation. For that reason, Rule 7.3 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility does not apply. Enclosing law firm materials in a donut box does constitute lawyer advertising, making the remainder of the advertising and communication rules (7.1, 7.2, 7.4 and 7.5) apply.

Because the donut box recipients are existing law firm vendors who refer closing business to the firm, the specific rule at play, according to the Committee, is Rule 7.2(c), which prohibits giving “anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services.”  The Committee specified that as long as the weekly donut boxes are delivered regardless of whether the lender or real estate agency had referred clients to the law firm that week, and regardless of how many, then the requisite quid pro quo for a Rule 7.2 (c) violation does not exist. The rule would be violated, however, if the delivery of donuts was contingent on the referral of business.

keep_calm_and_eat_a_donut

The Committee said that only the donuts, koozies and coupons (not the fee sheets or pamphlets) would be considered things “of value” under Rule 7.2 because the rule contemplates value to the recipient and not cost to the sender. Finally, the Committee stated that although the Rules of Professional Conduct are “rules of reason”, the prohibition on giving “anything” of value contains no explicit de minimis exception.

Kudos to the law firm that devised this marketing ploy and received the blessing of the Ethics Advisory Committee!

SC Supreme Court Expands Attorney Liability

Standard

Erika Fabian, the niece of a wealthy South Carolina doctor brought suit against her uncle’s estate planning attorneys for professional negligence and breach of contract in Fabian v. Lindsay, 410 S.C. 475, 765 S.E.2d 132, an October 2014 case decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The case had been dismissed in the circuit court for failure to state a cause of action on the grounds that there was no attorney-client relationship and no privity.

The facts were viewed in the light most favorable to willand testamentMs. Fabian. She alleged that her uncle, Denis Fabian, had signed a trust agreement drafted by his attorneys when he was around 80 years old, leaving his wife, who was about 20 years younger, a life interest. Remainder beneficiaries included his wife’s two daughters from a prior marriage, Dr. Fabian’s one living brother, Eli Fabian, who was in his 70’s and not in good health, and two nieces, Miriam Fabian, Eli’s daughter, and Erika Fabian, the daughter of a predeceased brother.

Erika had been told by her uncle and his wife that when his wife passed away, one half of the estate would be distributed to Mrs. Fabian’s daughters, and the other half would be distributed to Dr. Fabian’s nieces.

Dr. Fabian died in early 2000, and his brother died a few weeks later. The trust was valued at approximately $13 million.

After Dr. Fabian’s death, his estate planners mailed a letter and two pages of the trust agreement to Ms. Fabian informing her that she would not be receiving anything from the estate. Instead, her cousin Miriam would inherit as Eli’s only heir. Erika alleged that a drafting error resulted in an unexpected windfall to her cousin.

gavel cashThe Court took a huge leap, joined the vast majority of states, and recognized causes of action, both in tort and contract, by a third-party beneficiary of an existing will or estate planning document against a lawyer whose drafting error defeats or diminishes the client’s intent. Recovery under either cause of action was limited to individuals named in the estate planning document or otherwise identified in the instrument by their status.

Interestingly, the Court stated that its decision did not place an undue burden on estate planning attorneys because it merely puts them in the same position as most other attorneys by making them responsible for their professional negligence.

Ms. Fabian had argued that an estate planning lawyer’s negligence impacts three potential classes of plaintiffs: (1) the client, who is deceased; (2) the client’s estate, which lacks a cause of action or damages or both; and (3) the intended beneficiaries, the only possible plaintiffs who might suffer harm. If no cause of action is available for the beneficiaries, the negligent drafting lawyer is effectively immune from liability.

Also interesting was the Court’s application of the new rule to cases on appeal as of the date of the opinion. In a separate opinion, Justice Pleicones stated that the new rule should only apply prospectively because this case creates new liability where formerly none existed.

While not technically a dirt case, real estate practitioners should take note of the court’s inclination to favor third-party beneficiaries and reflect whether the Justices’ thought process could affect our world.

Collaboration is King!

Standard

ALTA’s CFPB webinar emphasizes that the exchange of data will be the biggest challenge to the closing process after August 1, 2015.

American Land Title Association’s value to closing attorneys grows each day as August 1, 2015 approaches. Closing forms will change dramatically later this year, and ALTA is valiantly attempting to keep those of us who plan to remain in this game ahead of the learning curve.

pawns king crown - small featheredSouth Carolina has strong representation in ALTA! Cynthia Blair, a real estate attorney in Columbia, sits on ALTA’s board and participated in this webinar. Each time Cynthia said, “In my state” we knew we were about to receive information specific to us. This local support at this critical time is invaluable, and I strongly encourage South Carolina closing attorneys to join ALTA.

Yesterday, ALTA hosted an excellent webinar entitled “5 Key Areas to Prime Your Operation for the New Closing Process”. The webinar was attended by more than 1,100 of us! The strong message was “Collaboration is King”.

Closing attorneys and lenders will work more closely together than ever to manage and share information. Some lenders have indicated they will deliver the Closing Disclosure to the borrower, but others will require the closing attorney to deliver it. The seller’s form will be prepared by the closing attorney, and a copy of it must be provided to the lender.

The underlying information for the closing documents will be located in two systems: (1) the lenders’ loan origination systems (LOS) will contain the loan-centric information; and (2) the closing attorney’s systems (sometimes referred to as the “title platform”) will contain the property-centric information. Large lenders are likely to utilize entirely electronic systems that will avoid rekeying of information to reduce the possibility of errors. The two systems will talk to each other via platforms that are now being developed.

Attorney Fakes Title Insurance Documents and Gets Disbarred

Standard

Think you’ve heard it all? Listen to this!

The South Carolina Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer last month for fraudulently producing title insurance commitments and policies.*

By way of background, the vast majority of real disciplinary actionestate lawyers in South Carolina are also licensed as title insurance company agents.  In other parts of the country, lenders receive title insurance documents directly from title companies’ direct operations.  In South Carolina, title companies run agency operations, supporting their networks of agents, almost all of whom are South Carolina licensed attorneys.

Lenders require closing protection letters for closings involving agents.  Stated simply, these letters inform lenders that the insurer may be responsible in the event a closing is handled improperly by the closing attorney.

Title insurance company agents also produce title insurance policies and commitments, following the guidelines of their insurance underwriters, and using software programs designed to support the production of these documents.

Some closing attorneys are not agents but instead act as approved attorneys for title insurance companies. Approved attorneys can obtain closing protection letters from their title companies, but they are not able to issue their own title insurance documents. Instead, they certify title to a title insurance company or to a title company’s agent.

If an attorney cannot provide lenders with closing protection letters, that attorney generally cannot close mortgage loans in South Carolina.

 red card - suitIn 2007, Mr. Davis was canceled as an agent by his title insurance company.**  After that cancelation, he was able to legitimately obtain title insurance commitments and policies through an agent. In 2011, however, Mr. Davis was canceled as an approved attorney.  He didn’t let that fact stop him though. He began to fraudulently produce title insurance documents, making it appear that the title insurance company was issuing closing protection letters, commitments and policies for his closings.  He also collected funds designated as title insurance premiums, but he never paid those premiums to the title insurance company.  He continued to handle closings using fraudulent title insurance documents until his actions were discovered and he was suspended from the practice of law by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 2013. In 2015, Mr. Davis was disbarred.

I suppose I should close by saying don’t do this!  Please!

* In the Matter of Davis, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27480 (January 21, 2015)

** In the interest of full disclosure, I work for that company.

SCDOR Issues Revenue Rulings On Same-Sex Marriage Tax Issues

Standard

rainbow stateOn December 31, 2014, the South Carolina Department of Revenue issued two Revenue Rulings (14-8 and 14-9) addressing same-sex marriage tax issues. These Revenue Rulings were necessary because South Carolina’s ban on same sex marriage was held unconstitutional in November of 2014.

Revenue Ruling 14-8 states that same-sex couples who are legally married in any state must file their South Carolina income tax returns, beginning with tax year 2014, using a married filing status, either “married filing jointly” or “married filing separately”.  Same-sex couples legally married before 2014 may amend their South Carolina income tax returns for any taxable year within the statutory time limitations to a married filing status, but they are not required to take this action.

Revenue Ruling 14-9 has more impact for real estate practitioners. It states that same-sex couples who are legally married under any state law will now be treated as married and as “spouses” for all South Carolina tax purposes.

Revenue Ruling 14-9 provided examples:

Ad valorem property taxes:

  • A same-sex legally married couple may be able to qualify their home for the 4% assessment ratio.
  • If each member of a same-sex legally married couple owns a residence, only one of those residences may qualify for the 4% assessment ratio since as a married couple they may have only one legal residence.
  • Same-sex legally married couples may now qualify for the homestead exemption.
  • A person in a same-sex marriage now qualifies as a “spouse” for purposes of exemptions for the homes of certain disabled veterans, law enforcement officers and firefighters.
  • A person in a same-sex marriage now qualifies as a “spouse” for the purposes of exemptions for the home of a paraplegic or hemiplegic person.
  • Transfers of real property between spouses of a same-sex couple may now be exempted from the assessable transfer of interest rules.

Deed recording fee

  • Transfers of real property from one same-sex spouse to the other will now be exempted from the deed recording fee.
  • Transfers of real estate to a former same-sex spouse pursuant to the terms of a divorce decree or settlement will now be exempted from the deed recording fee.
  • Deeds from a family partnership (one in which all partners are members of the same family) to one of the partners are exempt from the deed recording fee as long as no consideration is paid for the transfer other than a reduction in the grantee’s interest in the partnership. Since the definition of “family” in this exemption includes a “spouse”, the exemption now applies to family partnerships that include same-sex spouses.

Refunds

The recognition in South Carolina of same-sex marriages may allow a same-sex couple, or a same-sex spouse or surviving spouse, to be eligible for a refund of previously paid property taxes or deed recording fees if the same-sex couple was considered legally married under any state law for the period for which the refund is requested and the refund request is made within the applicable statutory time limitation.