We have a new rule against perpetuities case!

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Dirt lawyers have been known to joke that after decades of successfully practicing real estate law, they have never encountered a true rule against perpetuities situation. Here is one such situation that arose in Columbia and made it to our Court of Appeals this year.

Spring Valley Interests, LLC v. The Best for Last, LLC* involved a perpetual option to purchase a 74.425% undivided co-tenancy interest in real estate located in Columbia.

In 2017, Spring Valley’s predecessor, White Interests Limited Partnership, entered into an agreement with Best through which White loaned Best $800,000. Best used the loan proceeds to purchase the property. As a part of the consideration for the loan, Best granted White the freely assignable perpetual option. The language of the option contains no termination date other than a statement that Best would exercise the option at its sole discretion by delivery of a written notice no later than thirty days before the intended closing.

White assigned the option to Spring Valley, and in 2019, Spring Valley sent Best a letter exercising the option. Best objected to the purchase of the undivided co-tenancy interest and, instead, insisted that Spring Valley exercise the option by becoming a member of Best. The parties negotiated and nearly came to an agreement except for Spring Valley’s insistence on certain attorneys’ fees.

Spring Valley filed a complaint seeking specific performance of the option. Best filed an answer asserting defenses including that the option was void because it violated the common law rule against perpetuities. Spring Valley asserted that our common law rule was preempted by our statutory rule against perpetuities (S.C. Code § 27-6-10, et seq.), which became effective in 2007.

The common law rule mandates that any interest not certain to vest within a life in being plus 21 years is void. The statutory construction provides for a ninety-year wait-and-see period that would likely save otherwise violative transfers. The statutory construction states that it supersedes the common law rule, but also states that it does not apply to nonvested property interests arising out of nondonative transfers.

Best eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted, stating that the statute does not apply to nondonative transfers and, therefore, cannot replace the common law; thus the common law is the appropriate legal standard to conclude that the option is unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Court of Appeals stated that most states that have adopted a form of the uniform rule seem to conclude that such adoption removes commercial transactions from the common law rule and the uniform rule. But South Carolina was the first state to adopt a form of the uniform act, and the Court said it cannot say with certainty that the abolishment of the common law rule was the legislature’s intent at the time.

Also, according to the Court, the complete abolition of the common law rule without some provision for limitations in commercial transactions risks putting two legal principles at odds—freedom to contract and restrictions on alienability.

Since the Court believed it could construe the statutory construction in a manner that preserved the common law, it affirmed the lower court’s ruling finding the option void under the common law.

I would not be surprised to see this case go to our Supreme Court.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6070 (July 10, 2024).

SC Legislature provides fix for MV Realty problem

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This blog has previously discussed MV Realty, as title examiners reported finding “Homeowner Benefit Agreements” or “Exclusive Listing Agreements” filed in the public records as mortgages or memoranda of agreement. The duration of the agreements purported to be forty years, and searches revealed hundreds of these unusual documents filed in South Carolina. The documents state they create liens against the real estate in question.

The company behind these documents is MV Realty PBC, LLC which appeared to be doing business in the Palmetto State as MV Realty of South Carolina, LLC. The company’s website indicated the company would pay a homeowner between $300 and $5,000 in connection with its Homeowner Benefit Program. In return for the payment, the homeowner agreed to use the company’s services as listing agent if the decision was made to sell the property during the term of the agreement. The agreements typically provided that the homeowner may elect to pay an early termination fee to avoid listing the property in question with MV Realty.

The company has been the target of litigation and legislation in many states, and, thankfully, Governor McMaster signed South Carolina Code §27-28-10, et seq., into law on May 20. This legislation effectively bans these long-term listing agreements.

The legislation defines a real estate service agreement as a “written contract between a service provider and the owner or potential buyer of residential real estate to provide services, current or future, in connection with the maintenance, purchase, or sale of residential real estate.” Under the new law, a real estate service agreement is “unfair” and void if it is intended to be effective for more than one year; 1) expressly or implicitly purports to run with the land and bind future owners of the property; 2) allows for the assignment of the services contract without notice or consent of the owner; or 3) creates a lien, encumbrance, or security interest on the property.

Under the legislation, any recorded unfair real estate services contract is no longer effective as a lien, encumbrance or security interest against property. The recording of this type of document no longer serves as constructive notice to any interested party in the real estate. And no additional filing is necessary to void the unfair agreements or to clear the public records.

Further, the property owner of the real estate may collect actual damages, costs and attorneys’ fees resulting from the filing of the contract. Such contracts are expressly stated to be in violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.

Contact your friendly title insurance company underwriter if you have questions about these documents, but these documents should no longer create title problems for South Carolina dirt lawyers. Some things do work out as they should!

Captain Sam’s Spit is in the news again

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This blog has discussed “Captain Sam’s Spit” in Kiawah Island three times before. Googling that picturesque name will reveal a treasure trove of news, opinion and case law involving the proposed development of a beautiful and extremely precarious tract of pristine beach property on South Carolina’s coast.

In the news, reported by WCSC- TV (Charleston), the town of Kiawah Island, the Kiawah Island Community Association, and the Kiawah Conservancy filed a breach of contract suit against KDP II, LLC, the owner of the spit. According to the reporting, the lawsuit alleges that a 2013 development agreement required KDP to deed a portion of the property to the Kiawah Island Community Association as community open space and to place all remaining undeveloped lands under a conservation easement to be held by the Conservancy.

The most recent blog discussed the 2021 Supreme Court case the latest case* in which the Court refers to the property as one of our state’s only three remaining pristine sandy beaches readily accessible to the general public. The other two beaches are Hunting Island State Park and Huntington Beach State Park. I enjoy the blessing of walking the pristine beach of Huntington Beach State Park on a regular basis, so despite having a career on the periphery of real estate development, I am in favor of maintaining these three state treasures.

The South Carolina Bar’s Real Estate Intensive seminars have included field trips to Captain Sam’s Spit, from a distance at least. Professor Josh Eagle of the University of South Carolina School of Law was an excellent tour guide, and how many opportunities do we, as dirt lawyers, have for field trips? The South Carolina Environmental Law Project, located in Pawleys Island, fights these cases. Amy Armstrong, an attorney with that entity, joined our group to explain the environmental and legal issues.

Here are greatly simplified facts. Captain Sam’s Spit encompasses approximately 170 acres of land above the mean high-water mark along the southwestern tip of Kiawah Island and is surrounded by water on three sides. The Spit is over a mile long and 1,600 feet at its widest point, but the focal point of the latest appeal is the land along the narrowest point (the “neck”), which is the isthmus of land connecting it to the remainder of Kiawah Island. The neck occurs at a deep bend in the Kiawah River where it changes direction before eventually emptying into the Atlantic Ocean via Captain Sam’s Inlet.

The neck has been migrating eastward because of the erosive forces of the Kiawah River. The “access corridor”—the buildable land between the critical area and the ocean-side setback line—has narrowed significantly in the past decade to less than thirty feet. Googling this issue will lead to active maps which show the change over time. The width of the neck is significant because the developer needs enough space to build a road. At the base of the neck is Beachwalker Park, operated by the Charleston County Parks and Recreation Commission. Our fieldtrips were conducted on that Park.

Twice before, the administrative law court (ALC), over the initial objection of DHEC, has granted permits for the construction of an extremely large erosion control device in the critical area. In both cases (citations omitted), the Supreme Court found the ALC erred. The 2021 case arose from the ALC’s third approval of another structure termed “gargantuan” by the Supreme Court—a 2,380-foot steel sheet pile wall designed to combat the erosive forces carving into the sandy river shoreline in order to allow the developer to construct the road to support the development of fifty houses. The Court again reversed and, in effect, shut down the proposed development, at least temporarily. The economic interests of an increased tax base and employment opportunities do not justify eliminating the public’s use of protected tidelands, according to the Court.

I wouldn’t be surprised to see future appellate court cases involving this property.

*South Carolina Coastal Conservative League v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28031 (June 2, 2021)

Court of Appeals affirms DeBordieu’s groin permit

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Photo from DeBordieu.com

South Carolina’s Court of Appeals affirmed the permit issued by DHEC to DeBordieu Colony Community Association for the construction of anti-erosion groins on DeBordieu Beach*.

In this appeal from the Administrative Law Court, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League contended that the ALC erred in finding the groins would be placed in a high erosion area, that the erosion threatened existing structures, and that the groins would not detrimentally impact the downdrift of sand to other beaches.

The Court defined a groin in footnote 2, referring to DHEC Regulations, as “a structure designed to stabilize a beach by trapping littoral drift. Groins are usually perpendicular to the short and extend from the shoreline into the water far enough to accomplish their purpose.”

The application for the permit was around 2,600 pages, and testimony was solicited by all sides from numerous experts. The Court acknowledged that while differing sides can reasonably debate methods to prevent erosion, our statutes allow the construction of new groins under specified conditions. The Court found that the ALC’s decision, based on probative, substantial, and reliable evidence in the record, is not clearly erroneous nor is it arbitrary or capricious.

An appeal to South Carolina’s Supreme Court is certainly expected in this case.

*South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion No. 6058 (May 1, 2024)

SC Supreme Court approves nonlawyer representation in eviction defense program

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The S.C. State Conference of the NAACP, the S.C. Advocate Program (“Housing Program”) and three prospective nonlawyer volunteers for the Housing Program petitioned our Supreme Court seeking authorization to allow nonlawyer volunteers to provide free, limited assistance to tenants facing eviction in magistrate courts.*

The petition sought a declaratory judgment in the Court’s original jurisdiction that their proposed activities will not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. Dirt lawyers will recognize the Court’s struggle with the UPL issue because it took 18 pages to reach an affirmative answer. More than three pages were devoted to the history of the UPL issue in South Carolina. Many of us can recite that history from memory.

The petitioners argued that the unmet legal needs of tenants facing eviction is an emergency situation justifying immediate action and that 99% of defendants in eviction cases are not represented by lawyers in the proceedings.

Tenants involved in the program will be advised that the volunteers are nonlawyers. The volunteers are required to limit the information they provide to tenants, and they may only:

  • Confirm that the tenant has a pending eviction;
  • Advise the tenant that they should request a hearing and, based on the text of the eviction notice and checking relevant court records, explain how and when to do so; and
  • Provide the tenant with narrow additional advice about the hearing by flagging common defenses, primarily pertaining to notice, that the tenant might be able to raise.

The volunteers will be instructed to avoid conflicts of interest, abide by confidentiality rules, and refrain from revealing any information about the tenant’s situation except to Housing Program staff. The volunteers must refer tenants to legal service providers when issues are beyond the scope of the program, such as when the tenant has a counterclaim, if the tenant does not have a written lease, if the tenant receives a housing voucher or lives in public housing, or when the tenant seeks information in excess of that permitted under the program.

The petition recited that lawyers have reviewed the program and will work closely with the volunteers, evaluating and assisting them.

The petitioners agreed to share data and information about the successes and failures of the program with the Court to allow the Court to weigh the efficacy of the program to determine whether sufficient safeguards are in place to protect the public.

The Court found that the program appears to provide for sufficient training, safeguards, and lawyer supervision so that the volunteers working within the strict limits set forth in the program’s training manual will not engage in the unauthorized practice of law.

The Court approved the program on a provisional, pilot basis for a term of three years, unless extended or terminated by the Court. Petitioners are required to submit annual reports including the date and metrics discussed in the order as well as a written summary of the activities of the program.

*Appellate Case No. 2023-0016089 (February 8, 2024)

Court of Appeals decides interesting conservation easement case

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The South Carolina Court of Appeals issued an opinion* on January 17 that interpreted a conservation easement as it affected two heirs of the original grantor.

In 2004, Benjamin Franklin Knott executed a will granting each of his daughters, Susan and Betsy, approximately one-half of a 371-acre parcel near Huger in Berkeley County. The property was subject to a conservation easement Mr. Knott had previously granted to Wetlands America Trust, Inc., a non-profit organization affiliated with Ducks Unlimited, Inc.

Conservation easements are creatures of statute in South Carolina and elsewhere. Such easements are defined as nonpossessory interests for the purposes of protecting natural, scenic, and open-space areas, ensuring the availability of property for agricultural, forest, recreation, educational or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining air or water quality, and preserving historical, architectural, archeological or cultural aspects of real property. The grantor of a conservation easement receives a tax benefit.

Mr. Knott died in 2009, and his daughters received deeds of distribution to their respective parcels. The only direct road frontage was Cainhoy Road, adjacent to Betsy’s parcel. There was originally indirect access to Susan’s parcel from Charity Church Road via an easement retained when Susan sold an adjacent parcel, but Susan terminated her easement in 2015.

Three years later, Susan asked Betsy if she could use Betsy’s parcel to access Susan’s parcel. According to Susan, Betsy rejected this request. Susan brought this declaratory judgment action arguing that she had an express access easement under the terms of the conservation easement. The Circuit Court granted a partial summary judgment to Susan. Betsy appealed.

The Circuit Court had concluded that under the terms of the conservation easement, Susan, as owner of approximately half of the property, had the right to use the roads crossing over Betsy’s property to access Susan’s property for all activities permitted under the conservation easement.

Among other rights reserved in the conservation easement was the right to maintain and replace existing roads and to construct new roads.

The Court of Appeals agreed with Betsy that the reservations in the conservation easement did not create rights for Susan to access her property via roads on Betsy’s property. The easement rights granted to the Ducks Unlimited entity did not translate to easement rights in favor of Susan as against Betsy. The Court reasoned that if Susan has the rights to use the roads on Betsy’s property, it logically follows that she must have all the other owner’s rights reserved for the grantor as to Betsy’s parcel.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Susan has no rights in Betsy’s property, and the conservation easement’s language does not convey any new rights to any person who is not the owner of the property over which the conversation easement lies.

The Court of Appeals reversed the partial summary judgment and remanded the case for further action by the Circuit Court.

*Floyd v. Dross, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6044 (January 17, 2024)

Western District of Missouri approves commission settlement

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This update furthers my effort to keep South Carolina dirt lawyers up to speed on the real estate agent commission cases that are proceeding through courts across the country. HousingWire is reporting that a judge in the Western District of Missouri has preliminarily approved a settlement with two corporate broker firms, RE/MAX and Anywhere Real Estate.

According to the article dated November 21, RE/MAX will pay $55 million, and Anywhere Real Estate will pay $83.5 million.

Settlement agreement provisions include no longer requiring agents to be members of the National Association of Realtors and that the brokerage firms will require or encourage agents to make it clear that commissions are negotiable. Agents will also have the flexibility to set or negotiate commissions as they see fit.

The parties are required to contact the court to schedule a final approval hearing before December 22.

Last week’s blog spoke to Housingwire’s November 10 article that Sauntell Burten has filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina alleging that the National Association of Realtors and Keller Williams colluded to artificially inflate agent commission rates.

The plaintiff is seeking class action status for all home sellers in South Carolina who have sold a home on the MLS with a Keller Williams agent since November of 2019. The 107-page complaint states that NAR’s “clear cooperation” policy leads to the commission problem because that policy requires agents to provide a blanket offer of compensation to the buyer’s agent to list a property on the MLS.

Real estate lawyers, let me know if you hear local updates on this situation.

SC joins states where real estate commissions are being litigated

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This blog recently discussed the Missouri class action by residential real estate sellers against the National Association of Realtors (NAR), a real estate agent trade association, and several real estate agent entities, which resulted in a judgment of $1.8 billion. The plaintiffs argued that commissions are rarely negotiable and that the seller is required to pay commissions for both sides of transactions

A South Carolina lawyer posted on a listserv I read on the subject that litigation like this wouldn’t happen in South Carolina because standard residential contracts leave a blank for the percentage of the buyer’s agent’s commission. This poster was, sadly, wrong.

Housingwire reported on November 10 that Shauntell Burton has filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina alleging that the NAR and Keller Williams colluded to artificially inflate agent commission rates. You can read the story here.

The plaintiff is seeking class action status for all home sellers in South Carolina who have sold a home on the MLS with a Keller Williams agent since November of 2019. The 107-page complaint states that NAR’s “clear cooperation” policy leads to the commission problem because that policy requires agents to provide a blanket offer of compensation to the buyer’s agent to list a property on the MLS.

Apparently, similar suits are being brought in multiple states.

Dirt lawyers, what do you think about this? Is Keller Williams the only broker involved in the practice, or will other brokers be named in the future? Is it your experience that commissions paid by sellers to buyers’ agents are negotiated, as the poster mentioned above suggested? I’d love to hear your thoughts and learn from your experience.

Unpublished Court of Appeals case is instructive in wire fraud arena

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I hate to report that any South Carolina law firm has fallen victim to fraud, but my friend and successor at Chicago Title, Jennifer Rubin, tells me that fraud is a daily challenge for closing attorneys in South Carolina. I am going to discuss this case delicately, because I believe this might happen to anyone who handles closings. I have sympathy for each closing law firm because they remain under constant pressure. But I also believe that everyone needs all the warnings we can collectively muster! This blog is yet another warning.

First, let me thank my friend, Bill Booth, Columbia attorney who keeps me posted on cases he follows. I appreciate being kept informed. This is an unpublished South Carolina Court of Appeals case* Bill brought to my attention. Bill said, “The fraudster was very clever in how he changed the seller’s email by a single letter.” Clever indeed! I stared at the real email address and the fraudulent email address for several minutes and failed to find the discrepancy. I handed the opinion to my husband and asked him to see if he could find it. He did, but it took him awhile.

Here are the two email addresses: mail4marvin@gmail.com vs. mail4rnarvin@gmail.com. Do you see it? The “m” in marvin was changed to “rn”. The Court of Appeals called this discrepancy “cunning”. I’ll say!

At trial, the seller was awarded a $10,306 verdict against the law firm, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. I assume the law firm will appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, and we may get further guidance.

Here are the facts. In 2016, Marvin Gipson contracted to sell his property to Clyde and Betty Williamson for $12,000. Gipson lived in Texas, and his local real estate agent recommended the closing firm, which represented both sides. Gipson testified that his only contact with the law firm was by mail, telephone, and email, mostly with an assistant.

Prior to closing, according to Gipson, the assistant told Gipson that she had received wiring instructions. Gipson testified he told her that he had never sent wiring instructions and expected to receive a check. He said he never received a phone call informing him that the closing had been completed and never received the check. He waited eleven days before contacting the law firm to report that he hadn’t received his seller’s proceeds.

Investigation revealed that the assistant had emailed the fraudulent address that the closing had taken place. By return email, she received fraudulent wiring instructions.

At trial, the law firm presented expert witness testimony to the effect that the law firm’s server was not hacked, and that the theft was facilitated by a “man in the middle attack”, wherein the thief was privy to information possibly obtained through a breach of Gipson’s or the real estate agent’s systems or by overhearing information. But the law firm was held liable at the trial level and by the Court of Appeals.

Lawyers, here is my advice. Please give your closing paralegals time. They need time to discover issues. They need time to investigate discrepancies. Please also give them training, not just once but weekly or even daily. They need to know about this case! No amount of training is too much. Talk to your title company. They have resources to assist! Use those resources! Stay up to date yourself! We spent three years in law school learning to spot issues. Apply those skills to your closing practices to spot those difficult issues.

Be very careful out there!

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion 2023-UP-324 (October 4, 2023)

This slander of title case tells a good story

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The preacher started his sermon on Sunday by saying: “I love a good story.”  I love a good story, too, and even though this one is about a South Carolina tax sale, not a twin’s stolen blessing from Genesis, it makes for a pretty good tale.

I’ve often said that our courts of appeal will overturn a tax sale on the flimsiest of technicalities. The technicalities in this case are not flimsy, and a claim of slander of title gives us a different slant on the typical tax sale case.

The opinion in Gleason v. Orangeburg County* starts, “This story began with a flawed tax sale, but there were several mistakes for years after.”  It’s not a John Grisham-worthy beginning, but it’s not bad for a South Carolina Court of Appeals case.

Bank of America began foreclosure proceedings in 1998 on property owned by Debra Foxworth. When the foreclosure was finalized, the bank sold the property to Wilton Gleaton. The opinion refers to Wilton Gleaton as “Wilton” because his wife will become a later player in the story. When Wilton bought the property, the 1998 taxes had not been paid.

In a classic tale of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing, Orangeburg County began proceedings in March of 1999 to collect the delinquent taxes. The County sent Foxworth notices for failing to pay taxes in March and May, shortly before the foreclosure sale to the bank, but long after the bank began foreclosure proceedings. The County sold the property at a delinquent tax sale to James Fields in February 2000.

The County sent three required “Dear Property Owner” letters to give notice of the redemption period. Two of the letters were addressed to Foxworth and the third was addressed to Wilton but mailed to Foxworth’s address.

In an interesting twist, Wilton’s wife, Sara, visited Orangeburg County in January 2001—before the redemption period expired—and went there precisely because she had not received a tax notice in the mail. She paid the 2000 property taxes. That tax bill listed a Charleston address at which neither Sara nor Wilton had ever lived. Sara gave the County her correct address and asked if any other taxes were owed. The County initially told her that no other taxes were due but later informed her the 1999 taxes had not been paid. She paid those taxes the next month, February 2001. In an “asleep at the wheel” move, the County employee did not inform her of the 2000 tax sale to Fields or of the right to redeem the property.

The redemption period expired in February 2001, not long after Sara paid the 2000 property taxes, but before she paid the 1999 taxes. In May 2001, The County issued a tax deed to Fields. The tax deed listed Foxworth as the defaulting taxpayer and “record owner against whom warrant was issued.” The tax deed made no reference to the Gleatons.

The Gleatons paid subsequent taxes as they came due.

In 2006, the County discovered Wilton—the record owner at the time of the 2000 tax sale—had not been noticed. In another interesting twist, the tax collector had Fields convey the property back to Foxworth via quitclaim deed in an effort to “reverse” the tax sale. The Gleatons were not notified about any of this.

In 2007, the Gleatons listed the property for sale. (Dirt lawyers, this is where the facts get “real” for us.) In October 2009, Donnie and Connie Hall contracted to buy the property for $33,000. It’s shocking, I know, but the Halls discovered a title problem! The County’s attorney offered to bring a declaratory judgment on the Hall’s behalf seeking rulings that the tax sale and quitclaim deed were void.

Wilton filed this suit against the County after the Halls backed out of the sale. In December 2014, the master issued an order finding the tax sale was flawed and invalid and the tax deed to Fields was improper. But the master left open the issues of liability and damages and ordered the Gleatons to attempt to sell the property within four months. Wilton died shortly after this order and Sara was substituted as a party. The property did not sell, and the master issued a final order in 2019. He found that the County’s actions were not malicious and “made no publication” that was intended to harm the Gleatons and made no statement that was knowingly false or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.

The master found that the only statement slandering Wilton’s title was the quitclaim deed from Fields to Foxworth, and that this deed was done for the purpose of returning the property to the defaulting taxpayer, not for the purpose of damaging Wilton’s title. The master also found that a proper title search would have revealed the 1998 taxes were due and owing at the time of the Gleatons’ purchase.

On appeal, Sara argued:

  1. The tax deed and subsequent deed to Foxworth disparaged the title.
  2. The County knew Wilton owned the property because the deed and mortgage were recorded before the tax deed.
  3. The master erred in failing to find malice because malice, in a slander of title action, includes publications made without legal justification.
  4. The Halls plainly refused to purchase the property because of the cloud on the title.

Citing an earlier case, the Cout of Appeals set out the elements of slander of title as:

  1. The publication
  2. with malice
  3. of a false statement
  4. that is derogatory to plaintiff’s title and
  5. causes special damages
  6. as a result of diminished value of the property in the eyes of third parties.

The Court held the master’s findings that the County’s actions did not result in any publication and did not contain any statement that was knowingly false or made in reckless disregard of the truth were not supported by the evidence. The Court also disagreed with the master’s finding that malice requires an intent to injure. The County’s numerous missteps were at least reckless, according to the Court, stating that the situation should have been resolved in a logical and reasonable manner when the mistakes were discovered.

The case was remanded for the master to consider each element in a slander of title action and the proper standard for malice.

Please note that more than 20 years have passed since this tale of woe began. The County should have discovered and fixed its mistakes when Sara visited in 2001 with the express purpose of paying taxes. And there is no excuse for the County’s continued failure to correct its errors in 2006 when the tax collector discovered Wilton’s ownership of the property.

*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 6003 (July 26, 2023)