Upscale Mt. Pleasant Condo Project Subject of Arbitration Clause Dispute

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Court of Appeals sides with roofing supplier

The South Carolina Court of Appeals handed down a decision on June 1 that will delight the drafters of corporate contracts who imbed arbitration clauses within their warranty provisions.  Whether the South Carolina Supreme Court will approve remains to be seen.

The dispute arises over the construction of One Belle Hall, an upscale condominium community in Mt. Pleasant. Tamko Building Products, Inc. was the supplier of the asphalt shingles for the community’s four buildings, and placed a mandatory binding arbitration clause within its warranty provision. The warranty purported to exclude all express and implied warranties and to disclaim liability for all incidental and consequential damages.

roof shingles

At some point after construction was completed, the owners’ association determined that the buildings were affected by moisture damage, water intrusion and termite damage, all resulting from various alleged construction defects. The developer contacted Tamko to report a warranty claim on the roof shingles, contending they were blistering and defective.  Tamko sent the developer a “warranty kit”, requiring the claimant to provide proof of purchase, samples of the allegedly defective shingles and photographs. The developer failed to respond.

Two years later, the owners’ association filed a proposed class action lawsuit on behalf of all owners, alleging defective construction against the community’s various developers and contractors. Tamko filed for a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.

Circuit Court Judge J. C. Nicholson, Jr. denied the motion and ruled that Tamko’s sale of shingles was based on a contract of adhesion and that the condominium owners lacked any meaningful choice in negotiating the warranty and arbitration terms. The trial court held the arbitration clause to be unconscionable and unenforceable because of the cumulative effect of several oppressive and one-sided terms in the warranty.

The Court of Appeals begged to differ. It held that the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration clause in the warranty was unconscionable. It stated that our supreme court has made it clear that adhesion contracts are not per se unconscionable. The underlying sale of Tamko’s shingles was stated to be a typical modern transaction for goods in which the buyer never has direct contact with the manufacturer to negotiate warranty terms.

The court found it significant that the packaging contained a notation: “Important: Read Carefully Before Opening” providing that if the purchaser is not satisfied with the terms of the warranty, then all unopened boxes should be returned. The court pointed to the standard warranty in the marketplace that gives buyers the choice of keeping the goods or rejecting them by returning them for a refund.

The appellate court also found it significant that the arbitration clause did facilitate an unbiased decision by a neutral decision maker and that the arbitration clause was separable from the warranty.

Consider the exact opposite approach of the CFPB’s recently-announced proposed rule that would ban financial companies from using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses to deny consumers the right to join class action lawsuits. That proposed rule can be read here and is the subject of a May 12 blog entitled “CFPB’s proposed rule would allow consumers to sue banks”.

It’s interesting to see such different approaches by two authorities on an issue affecting consumers in the housing arena. I wouldn’t be surprised to see more to come from either ruling.

* One Belle Hall Property Owners Association, Inc. vs. Trammell Crow Residential Company, S.C. Ct. App. Opinion 5407 (June 1,2016)

SC Supreme Court Warns Closing Attorneys

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Don’t be used as a “rubber stamp” or “rent” your name and status as an attorney!

businessman nametag for rentIn a disciplinary case filed on April 20,* the South Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded an attorney for failing to properly supervise the disbursement aspect of a residential refinance closing. In a three-two decision, the Court pointedly seized the opportunity to warn residential closing lawyers.

The disciplined attorney worked as an independent contractor for Carolina Attorney Network, a management service located in Lexington, that provides its services to, among other entities, Vantage Point Title, Inc.  Vantage Point Title was described as a non-lawyer owned title company based in Florida. The attorney testified that 99.9% of his business comes from Carolina Attorney Network and that he had no direct contact with Vantage Point Title.

The attorney had previously been suspended for thirty days by the Court for failing to properly maintain his trust account. He stated in oral arguments in the current case that the suspension caused him to lose his ability to perform closings in the normal manner because he lost his status as an agent for a title insurance company. As a result, he said he was forced to handle closings through the management service.

The attorney testified that he didn’t recall the closing at issue, but he described the process. He said he receives closing documents via e-mail and reviews the title opinions. He verifies that a South Carolina licensed attorney completed the title opinions. He also reviews the closing instructions and the closing statements. He does not review the title commitments nor verify the loan payoff amounts. He conducts the closings and returns the closing packages with authorizations to disburse. Vantage Point disburses the funds, records the documents and issues the title insurance policies. Vantage Point then sends the lawyer disbursement logs showing how closing funds are disbursed. The lawyer reviews the disbursement logs to ensure they have a zero balance. He or an employee of Carolina Attorney Network reviews the online records of the ROD to verify that the mortgages are properly recorded.

The loan at issue had been “net funded” and the disbursement log did not “zero out”. The log showed a credit of approximately $100,000, and a disbursement of approximately $800. The Court stated that the disbursement log was inaccurate, and that the lawyer did not even know at the time of closing that the loan had been net funded.

The HUD-1 Settlement Statement in the closing at issue showed Vantage Point received approximately $800 for “title services and lender’s title insurance”, but attorney’s fees were not reflected. In fact, Vantage Point paid Carolina Attorney Network $250, and Carolina Attorney Network paid the attorney $150.

Vantage Point maintains a national trust account for all fifty states, but at some point, it opened “for unknown reasons”, according to the Court, a SC IOLTA account. Two checks were written on the IOLTA account for the closing at issue. When those two checks were returned for insufficient funds, the investigation by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel was triggered. Ultimately, all checks cleared, and no one sustained harm.

Doe v. Richardson is the controlling case. In this 2006 seminal case, the S.C. Supreme Court held that disbursement of funds in a residential refinance is an integral step in the closing and constitutes the practice of law. Richardson further held that although the attorney must supervise disbursements in residential closings, the funds do not have to pass through the supervising attorney’s trust account.

The Court stated the current case presents a situation where the lawyer conducted his duty to supervise disbursement in name only. He “rented” his name and status as an attorney to attempt to satisfy the attorney supervision requirement. There is no question, according to the Court, that the lawyer’s cursory review of the disbursement log did not satisfy the duty to supervise disbursement. The Court stated in furtherance of its concern that attorneys are being used as “rubber stamps” to satisfy the attorney supervision requirement in low cost real estate closings, and it took the opportunity in this case to expand upon Richardson.

The Court clarified that an attorney’s duty to oversee the disbursement of loan proceeds in residential closings is nondelegable. To fulfil this duty, the attorney must ensure: (a) that he or she has control over the disbursement of loan proceeds; or (b) at a minimum, that he or she receives detailed verification that the disbursement was correct.

The Court stated that, in practice, an attorney may find that utilizing his or her trust account and personally disbursing funds provides the most effective means to fulfil this duty. The Court stood by the Richardson holding, however, that residential closing funds are not required to pass through the supervising attorney’s trust account. It held that the attorney’s verification of proper disbursement, via sufficient documentation or information received from the appropriate banking institution, in addition to the disbursement log, is acceptable to fulfil this duty.

In essence, according to the Court, the lawyer was used as a “rubber stamp” for a non-lawyer, out-of-state organization with no office in South Carolina, whose involvement was not disclosed to the clients. The Court stated that it has insisted on lawyer-directed real estate closings in order to protect the public. The lawyer’s method of handling his client’s business was stated to provide no real protection and was held to be a “gross abandonment” of his supervisory authority.

Former Chief Justice Toal wrote the opinion for the Court. Justices Kittredge and Moore concurred. Current Chief Justice Pleicones dissented in a separate opinion in which Justice Hearn concurred.

The dissent characterized the case as a situation that through an error by a title company, the ODC became aware of a single closing where the attorney failed to explain the nature of a “net funding” transaction to clients who suffered no harm. Nothing in this single instance justifies a public reprimand, according to the dissent, nor justifies a modification of Richardson, adopting a non-delegable duty to oversee loan disbursements through “detailed verification” or through the receipt of “sufficient documentation or information” in addition to the disbursement log.

The dissent said that the majority neither explains what this means nor how more oversight could have prevented the title company from issuing checks drawn on the wrong account. In a footnote, the dissent accused the majority of imposing a “new, vague requirement on residential real estate closings”.

The real question becomes….what in the world will the next case on this topic hold?

*In the Matter of Breckenridge, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion No. 27625, April 20, 2016.

SC Supreme Court Assesses “Sick” Pawleys Island Condo Project

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A 30+-year saga of leaky buildings continues to be litigated

watery apartmentFisher v. Shipyard Village Council of Co-Owners, Inc.,* involves a four-building condominium project in Pawleys Island that experienced leaks as early as 1983. The leaks began around the windows and sliding glass doors, which were defined as a part of each “unit” by the master deed, making the respective owners responsible for repairs rather than the owners’ association.

The bylaws require the Board to act if an owner fails to maintain a unit and that failure adversely affects other units or the common areas. Reducing the facts in this case to one sentence, the issue is whether the owners of units in all four buildings must be responsible for extensive repairs required in two of the buildings.

The cause of the water intrusion is still in question, but the evidence indicates the Board may have known about the leaks for years before it took action.

In 1999, the Board notified owners that they should waterproof balcony thresholds and window frames. In 2002, the Board hired a consultant who found safety issues with the windows and told the Board to pursue legal action. In 2003, the Board hired a construction company that concluded water was leaking through stucco, not windows.

In 2004, Ben and Katie Morrow, owners of a unit in Building B, replaced their windows but continued to experience water intrusion. They engaged an engineer who identified stucco cracks as the source of the problem and stated that Building B was “sick and about to become cancerous” because of the severe moisture intrusion.

And the saga continued.

In 2006, the Board received a $2.4 million proposal to replace windows in Buildings A and B and attempted to amend the Bylaws to designate the windows as common elements, which would have placed the responsibility on the Board. After two attempts to pass the amendment, the Board crafted a letter stating the amendment had passed. The letter did not address the voting procedure and, in fact, incorrectly said a special meeting had been held. The amendment did not address the sliding glass doors.

In 2007, the Board hired a consultant who identified an “open joint” directly under the doors’ thresholds which allowed water to leak to units below.  In 2008, the Board said Buildings A and B required repairs to the tune of $12 – 13 million. The Board hired yet another consultant who identified two primary problems in Buildings A and B: (1) failures in the structural concrete, including corrosion of the reinforcing steel; and (2) the building envelope was not “weather tight”. Another inspection revealed this startling list of defects in Buildings A and B:  roof, façade, edge beam, soffit, concrete, expansion joint, horizontal surface and HVAC anchorage failures, and poor to non-existent flashing in the windows and doors.

In 2008, the owners of units in Buildings C and D hired an attorney, who sent a letter to the Board asserting that a proposed special assessment was invalid because the amendment had not been property adopted, and the cost of repairs should be the responsibility of the owners in Buildings A and B. In 2009, a majority of the owners of units in Buildings C and D brought suit challenging the validity of the amendment. Later that year, the Board notified the owners that the windows and doors in Buildings A and B would be replaced through a special assessment of up to $88,398 per unit. The owners voted against the special assessment, and the Board incorporated the repair costs into the 2010 and 2011 operating budgets.

Later in 2009, the Petitioners (50 owners in Building C and D) filed a new suit, alleging negligence, gross negligence, negligent and gross negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the master deed and bylaws. This two suits were consolidated, and in May of 2012, the Petitioners moved for summary judgment on their negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.

The trial court granted summary judgment on the issues of duty and breach, finding the bylaws and master deed imposed affirmative duties on the Board to enforce, investigate and correct known violations, and to investigate evidence of the owners’ neglect of maintenance responsibilities. The trial court also found that the Board was precluded from asserting the business judgment rule because of its ultra vires conduct, as well as its lack of good faith and failure to use reasonable care in discharging its duties.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the existence of a duty to investigate but reversed on the business judgment rule and the issue of breach. The case was remanded for trial, but the Supreme Court granted Certiorari.

The Supreme Court stated that the business judgment rule applies only to intra vires acts. In other words, the rule protects a board that exercises its best judgment within the scope of its authority. The Court held that a corporation that acts within its authority, without corrupt motives and in good faith, is protected by the rule, and remanded the case for jury consideration of whether the Board violated its obligations.

warren buffet quote

As to the issue of summary judgment on breach of duty, the Court found that the record contains at least a scintilla of evidence that the Board did not breach its duty to investigate. The Court stated that the record contains some evidence to support a conclusion that the water leaks occurred because of water intrusion through the common elements.  Thus, the trial court should not have decided the question of whether the Board breached its duty to investigate as a matter of law.

The parties are now free to litigate for years to come!

* S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27603, January 27, 2016

County May Owe Duty to Lot Owners in Failed Subdivision

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Infrastructure regulations were not followed

scales - blue backgroundOn January 6, the S.C. Court of Appeals reversed the Georgetown County Circuit Court’s directed verdict and remanded a case involving failed West Stewart Subdivision.* The developer, Harmony Holdings, LLC, went belly up in 2007, leaving the lot owners without roads and utilities after the County failed to follow its own regulations that provided a safety net for such catastrophes.

The plaintiff owned two lots in the subdivision, and filed a negligence action, arguing that Georgetown County had a “tort-like” duty to lot owners under the plain language of its development regulations. The County denied that it owed a duty to lot owners.

The County attorney explained the administrative issues at trial. He testified that in South Carolina, a developer is generally not allowed to sell lots that do not have infrastructure (roads, water and sewer). County regulations, however, allow the County to accept cash, bonds, financial guarantees or letters of credit to ensure money is available to complete infrastructure in case a developer fails.

Under the regulations in question, the County had discretion to accept a letter of credit equal to 125% of the cost estimate to complete the infrastructure. In this case, the developer posted a letter of credit on May 23, 2006 in the amount of $1,301,705 based on a cost estimate of $1,040,000.

Also under the regulations, the County had the power to approve reductions in the letter of credit upon receipt of an engineer’s certification that a certain amount of the work had been completed and sufficient funds were available for the remaining work. Other technical procedures were also required. The County allowed for a reduction in the letter of credit on July 20, 2006, October 9, 2006 and November 8, 2006, reducing the letter of credit to $553,370. In December of 2006, the County was advised that the estimated cost to complete the infrastructure was $1,153,205, which was higher than the original estimate. Despite this information, the letter of credit was reduced again on March 9, 2007 to $156,704.

The letter of credit expired in May of 2007, and the developer gave the county a check for $140,000. In August of 2007, the developer informed the County that it no longer had the financial means to complete the construction. Then the developer declared bankruptcy.

Repko described his lot as “woods” accessible by a path but inaccessible by a road. He testified that he believes his property is valued at “zero”. He said he pays property taxes on his lot, but the County will not allow him to build because of the absence of basic utilities.

The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the County on the grounds that the regulations do not create a private duty to lot owners. (Other issues were argued that will not be discussed here.) The Court of Appeals agreed with the lot owner that the County owed a special duty to him with respect to the County’s management of the financial guaranty that allowed the developer to sell lots.

inigo montoya memeThe County had relied on a 1993 Hilton Head case.** In that case, the preamble to the development ordinances stated, “The town council finds that the health, safety and welfare of the public is in actual danger….if development is allowed to continue without limitation.” When the development failed, a lot owner sued the Town, claiming it had negligently administered its ordinances. The Supreme Court held that the ordinances did not create a special duty to lot owners because their essential purpose, according to the preamble, was to protect the public from overdevelopment.

The Court of Appeals in the current case held that, unlike the Hilton Head ordinances, the Georgetown County regulations contained no express language declaring their purpose, but reviewing them as a whole, the purpose is to protect lot owners in the event the developer does not complete infrastructure.

I expect we have not seen the end of this case!

* Repko v. County of Georgetown, Opinion 5374, January 6, 2016.

** Brady Development Co. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 312 S.C. 73, 439 S.E.2d 266 (1993).

A Short Time Ago in a Revenue Office Not Far Away …

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Check them out in DOR Information Letter #15-20

The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) issued a Revenue Ruling and an Information Letter in 2015 addressing deed recording fees and the affidavits that must accompany deeds.

Revenue Ruling #15-3, issued earlier this year, contains a comprehensive treatment of the subject, and Information Letter #15-20, issued on December 11, creates new affidavit forms, the Affidavit for Taxable or Exempt Transfers and the Affidavit for Exempt Transfers. Former affidavits, created in 1996, and using the term “arm’s length transaction” were decertified.

darth vader

“Luke … I am your lawyer.”

Deed recording fees of $1.35 (state) and $.55 (county) per $500 or any fractional part of $500 of the value of the real estate are imposed by §12-24-10 of the South Carolina Code for the “privilege” of recording a deed. This has not changed. Also unchanged is the list of 15 exemptions, and the statement that deeds of distribution and deeds transferring property from a trust to a trust distributee upon the settlor’s death are not subject to the fees.

One statutory change from 2015 was addressed in the Information Letter. Code §2-59-140 was amended in June to provide in subjection (E) that deductions from “value” include “any lien or encumbrance on realty in the possession of a forfeited land commission which may subsequently be waived or reduced after the transfer under a signed contract or agreement between the lienholder and the buyer existing before the transfer.” This change was added to Item 5 of the Affidavit for Taxable and Exempt Transfers.

Real estate practitioners can find the Revenue Ruling and the Information Letter at www.dor.sc.gov. Be sure to use the new forms!

SC Court of Appeals Upholds Developer’s Plan for Tailgate Condo Project

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The SPUR avoids kiddie condo status.

In a case decided in the midst of a wretched Carolina football season, the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a restriction against rentals to students in a condominium project that was clearly built to accommodate terrific tailgate parties.

williams brice condoLalla v. The SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Association, Inc.* involved a three bedroom condominium in the shadow of Williams Brice stadium purchased in 2007 for $470,000. Mr. and Mrs. Lalla purchased the condo intending to enjoy football games and to allow their daughter and two roommates to live there during college.  However, the great market decline beginning in 2008 spoiled their plans.

The Master Deed contained a prohibition against renting to any student enrolled in a two or four year college. But owners could allow their children or grandchildren to reside in or rent a unit along with rent-paying roommates.

When the market declined, the value of the condominium substantially decreased in value, and the Lallas unsuccessfully attempted to sell it. At the time of the appellate court hearing in 2014, the condo had been on the market for four years.

During the summer of 2010, the Lallas notified the owners’ association of their decision to rent to college students and began to do so. In June of 2010, the board of the association met and considered a comment card from a unit owner complaining that the association was allowing the project to turn into a dormitory.  Following this meeting, the board sent out a notice to each owner indicating the restrictions would be enforced and giving owners until May of 2011 to terminate any violating leases.

When the rules were not followed by Mr. and Mrs. Lalla, the association filed a declaratory judgment action seeking interpretation and enforcement of the master deed. The Lallas answered and counterclaimed, seeking a ruling that the restrictions were null and void because of changed circumstances. The association prevailed in the circuit court, and the Lallas appealed, asserting that the restrictions discriminated against a specific class of individuals (college students) and are unreasonable because the violation caused no damage to other property owners.

football tailgateThe discrimination argument failed because ”college students have not faced a long history of discrimination, are not an insular minority, and have not been classified according to an immutable trait acquired at birth.” In other words “college students” is not an inherently suspect class. The purpose of the restriction, to insure the comfort and safety of the residents and to protect the investment of the property owners by minimizing the risk of creating a dormitory-like atmosphere, was held to be rational.

The Court of Appeals also held that the economic change in circumstances failed to support the termination of the restriction because the declining market had no effect on the association’s need to minimize the risk that the project might develop a dormitory-like atmosphere.

South Carolina dirt lawyers like to see restrictive covenants enforced as written, so this case matches our world view.  And the Carolina fans among us dream of an outstanding replacement for Steve Spurrier so those terrific tailgate parties can resume!

Same Sex Marriage Law May Require Tweaks in Title Search Practices

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Males as well as females may change their names.

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On January 1, this blog discussed a South Carolina Department of Revenue Ruling (14-9) that impacts some areas of the real estate practitioner’s world. This Revenue Ruling was issued following the United State Supreme Court 2014 decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, which made same-sex marriage legal in all fifty states.

The most significant changes to our practices from the Revenue Ruling include:

  1. A same-sex legally married couple may be able to qualify their home for the 4% assessment ratio.
  2. If each member of a same-sex legally married couple owns a residence, only one of those residences may qualify for the 4% assessment ratio since as a married couple they may have only one legal residence.
  3. Transfers of property between spouses of a same-sex couple may now be exempted from the assessable transfer of interest rules.
  4. Transfers of real property from one same-sex spouse to the other will now be exempted from the deed recording fee.

Now that dirt lawyers have had a chance to think about how same-sex marriage may otherwise impact our practices, some of us have come to the conclusion that title examiners should now take into consideration name changes for men as well as women. This change in practice may affect every title examination for individuals holding title since 2014.

hello my name isWe have always cautioned that a woman who holds title with two surnames, should be searched under both names. For example, Hillary Rodham Clinton should be searched as Hillary Rodham and Hillary Clinton.

Now consider the name Neil Patrick Harris. Not knowing whether Patrick is a middle name bestowed by parents at birth or a former surname, consider whether he should be checked by both Neil Patrick and Neil Harris.

Undoubtedly, this extra step will lead to many “false positives” with judgments, tax liens and other public record items. As always, the hits that are uncovered should be addressed by paying them at closing or eliminating them with the use of identifying information such as full names, addresses social security numbers, etc. And, when in doubt, get your title insurance underwriter to take the appropriate leap of faith with you.

Remember that buyers should be checked for judgments and tax liens because those matters will attach immediately when property is purchased. And also remember that purchase money mortgages will take priority over tax liens and judgments against buyers.

Unfortunately, it appears that searching titles isn’t getting any easier over time, despite the use of new and improved technology.  It’s public knowledge and common sense that Caitlyn Jenner should be searched as Bruce Jenner. But I have no advice about similar name changes in title examinations. It’s a brave new abstracting world!

Dirt Lawyers Will Like This Mortgage Satisfaction Case

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S.C. Supreme Court holds equity lines are subject to the timely satisfaction statute.

In an opinion written by Justice Beatty, our Supreme Court held on August 5 that open-ended mortgages are satisfied in the same manner as conventional mortgages and under the same statutory requirement for timely satisfaction by lenders.

Regions Bank v. Strawn involved a mortgage foreclosure against Robert and Nancy Borchers. The Borchers counterclaimed seeking to recover from Regions Bank under §§29-3-310 and 29-3-320 of the South Carolina Code based on the bank’s failure to satisfy the mortgage within the three-month time period required.

mortgage jengaThe home had been purchased from Cammie Strawn, who had taken title from her then-husband, Richard Strawn. Mr. Strawn had previously obtained the home equity line of credit. At the time of the Borchers’ closing, the balance of the mortgage was $32,240.42. Immediately after the closing, the Borchers’ attorney, James Belk, had an employee deliver a payoff check and a mortgage satisfaction transmittal letter to Regions Bank. The check had the words “Payoff of first mortgage” typed on it.

Instead of satisfying the mortgage, the bank applied the check to the balance, bringing it to zero, and provided Richard Strawn with new checks even though he had not owned the home for more than two years. Mr. Strawn spent more than $72,000 on the equity line.

When Regions Bank attempted to collect on Mr. Strawn’s debt by foreclosing on the Borchers’ home, the Borchers answered, counterclaimed and moved for summary judgment. The bank argued that a revolving line of credit should be handled differently than conventional mortgages, and this particular mortgage could not be satisfied without instructions from Mr. Strawn.

The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Borchers. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Regions Bank made two basic arguments: (1) open ended mortgages are an exception to the statutory satisfaction requirement because only the original borrower is authorized to request a satisfaction; and (2) the Borchers could not assert a violation of the mortgage satisfaction statutes because their attorney had the authority to satisfy the mortgage pursuant to the attorney satisfaction statute (§29-3-330).

The Court affirmed and held that the first argument failed because the mortgage itself contemplated that the property may be sold and specifically stated that it would be binding on the mortgagor’s successors and assigns. Also, the court stated that anyone with an interest in mortgaged property is allowed to request a satisfaction upon payment, and there is no exception for equity lines of credit.

Sale of a house. Object over whiteAs to the argument that the Borchers’ attorney could have satisfied the mortgage, the Court stated simply that this argument is without merit because the statutory framework does not exempt a mortgage holder of an equity line from the penalty provisions for failing to satisfy a mortgage within the required time frame.

This is a good opinion for South Carolina closing lawyers!

Malpractice Case Questions Delegation of Responsibility for Title Work

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SC Supreme Court decides client’s informed consent is required.

The South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that a closing attorney cannot delegate the ultimate responsibility for delivering clear title to a purchaser without the purchaser’s informed consent. Johnson v. Alexander is an attorney malpractice case decided on July 29. This case involved Amber Johnson’s 2006 closing of a home in North Charleston.  Ms. Johnson alleged that her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house had been sold at a tax sale in 2005.

shutterstock_113463292The title examination had been performed by another attorney, Charles Feeley at the request of Ms. Johnson’s previous attorney, Mario Inglese.  Mr. Alexander purchased the title work from Mr. Inglese and relied on the title examination, which concluded that no back taxes were owed on the property. Ms. Johnson stopped making mortgage payments when she learned she didn’t have title to the property, and the property went to foreclosure.

At trial, Ms. Johnson moved for partial summary judgment as to Mr. Alexander’s liability. At the summary judgment hearing, an affidavit of the Delinquent Tax Collector for Charleston County was proffered to prove the availability of the delinquent tax records during the time when the title would have been examined.  Mr. Feeley’s affidavit indicated he could  not remember the specific title work, but that he always searched titles the same way, and he always checked delinquent taxes for a ten-year period. His notes showed that he found no outstanding taxes. Further, Mr. Feeley attested that the tax sale would not have appeared in the chain of title because the tax sale deed was actually recorded after the closing.

As a side note to abstractors: recent tax sales often do not appear in chains of title because the deeds are not yet recorded. Title examiners should check for payment of taxes for a ten-year period to uncover ad valorem tax delinquencies.

The trial court granted Ms. Johnson’s motion on Mr. Alexander’s liability.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding the lower court incorrectly focused its inquiry on whether an attorney conducting a title examination should have discovered delinquent taxes from 2003 and 2004 and the tax sale from 2005. Instead, the appellate court held the proper question was whether Mr. Alexander acted reasonably in relying on the title work and reversed and remanded the case for trial.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination of damages. Ms. Johnson argued that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the correct inquiry is whether an attorney reasonably relied on another attorney’s work where that work is outsourced. She contended that an attorney should be liable for negligence arising from tasks he delegates unless he has expressly limited the scope of the representation. The Supreme Court agreed.

The Supreme Court said the Court of Appeals erroneously equated delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The opinion, written by Justice Hearn, stated that while Feeley’s negligence was the issue, that does not displace Alexander’s ultimate liability.

The opinion states, “while an attorney may delegate certain tasks to other attorneys or staff, it does not follow that the attorney’s professional decision to do so can change his liability to his client absent that client’s clear, counseled consent.”

The Court cited Rule 1.8(h) of the Rules of Professional Responsibility which indicates a lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement.

Notice that the Court makes no distinction between delegating a task to staff and delegating it to another attorney. Mr. Alexander had argued that because Ms. Johnson knew he did not personally examine the title, its accuracy was not within the scope of his representation to her. The Court clearly held that the scope of representation can only be limited through the clear, counseled consent of the client.

Many residential closings are handled in South Carolina by attorneys who have nothing to do with the title examination. This case clearly states that those attorneys should limit the scope of their representation and obtain their clients’ clear, counseled consent. Otherwise, the title work is the ultimate responsibility of the closing attorney regardless of who performs it.

shutterstock_233295964And on a related topic, it is my opinion that any title examination that covers less than a full-search period or is based on a prior title insurance policy should be used only after consultation with the client and obtaining the client’s informed consent.  Many residential and commercial closing attorneys rely heavily on prior title policies for back title, and they may want to tweak their practices after they read this opinion.

Closing attorneys’ files should be papered with those informed consents confirmed in writing!

FHA Settlement Certification Will Require Tweaking After October 3

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FHA answers a FAQ; it doesn’t officially change the certification

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) released a new settlement certification this summer in anticipation of the implementation of the TRID rules on October 3. The new certification is intended to replace FHA’s current addendum to the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and will be used for the new Closing Disclosures once the TRID rules become effective.

The new certification reads:

“To the best of my knowledge, the Closing Disclosure which I have prepared is a true and accurate account of the funds which were (i) received, or (ii) paid outside closing, and the funds received have been or will be disbursed by the undersigned as part of the settlement of this transaction. I further certify that I have obtained the above certifications which were executed by the borrower(s) and seller(s) as indicated.”

Please note that the new certification contains the language “which I have prepared”.  As we have all heard by now, many of the large lenders have indicated that settlement agents will not prepare the Closing Disclosures to be delivered to borrowers. Because of the perceived liability, several of the larger lenders have announced that they will prepare the deliver borrowers’ Closing Disclosures.

frustrated man paperworkSettlement agents (closing attorneys in South Carolina) will prepare and deliver sellers’ Closing Disclosures in all cases and will prepare the borrowers’ forms for the smaller lenders who are not taking the responsibility internally.

American Land Title Association reached out to FHA, the Mortgage Bankers Association and individual lenders to inform them that the new certification would be inaccurate in the cases where the lender prepares the Closing Disclosure.  FHA did not revise its certification, but, in connection with issuing an additional 120 new FAQs to its Single-Family Handbook Frequently Asked Questions, it answered the following question this month:

FAQ 347:

Q: “The Model Settlement Certification requires the Settlement Agent certifying that he or she has prepared the Closing Disclosure but the CFPB’s requirements for issuing the new TRID Closing Disclosure will make this unlikely to be the case. Should the Settlement Agent sign the form anyway?”

A: “FHA does not wish for anyone to make a false certification. Because this is a model component, FHA will accept the tailoring of this phrase to the actual circumstances. This if the Settlement Agent does not prepare the closing disclosure, he or she should remove or strike through the statement ‘which I have prepared’ before executing the Settlement Certification.

FHA is only providing this guidance through the FAQ. It is neither revising the certification nor clarifying the instructions on the certification itself.  As a result, closing attorneys will be required to educate their staff members about the necessity to revise the certification for FHA closings after the new rules take effect.