SC Supreme Court Assesses “Sick” Pawleys Island Condo Project

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A 30+-year saga of leaky buildings continues to be litigated

watery apartmentFisher v. Shipyard Village Council of Co-Owners, Inc.,* involves a four-building condominium project in Pawleys Island that experienced leaks as early as 1983. The leaks began around the windows and sliding glass doors, which were defined as a part of each “unit” by the master deed, making the respective owners responsible for repairs rather than the owners’ association.

The bylaws require the Board to act if an owner fails to maintain a unit and that failure adversely affects other units or the common areas. Reducing the facts in this case to one sentence, the issue is whether the owners of units in all four buildings must be responsible for extensive repairs required in two of the buildings.

The cause of the water intrusion is still in question, but the evidence indicates the Board may have known about the leaks for years before it took action.

In 1999, the Board notified owners that they should waterproof balcony thresholds and window frames. In 2002, the Board hired a consultant who found safety issues with the windows and told the Board to pursue legal action. In 2003, the Board hired a construction company that concluded water was leaking through stucco, not windows.

In 2004, Ben and Katie Morrow, owners of a unit in Building B, replaced their windows but continued to experience water intrusion. They engaged an engineer who identified stucco cracks as the source of the problem and stated that Building B was “sick and about to become cancerous” because of the severe moisture intrusion.

And the saga continued.

In 2006, the Board received a $2.4 million proposal to replace windows in Buildings A and B and attempted to amend the Bylaws to designate the windows as common elements, which would have placed the responsibility on the Board. After two attempts to pass the amendment, the Board crafted a letter stating the amendment had passed. The letter did not address the voting procedure and, in fact, incorrectly said a special meeting had been held. The amendment did not address the sliding glass doors.

In 2007, the Board hired a consultant who identified an “open joint” directly under the doors’ thresholds which allowed water to leak to units below.  In 2008, the Board said Buildings A and B required repairs to the tune of $12 – 13 million. The Board hired yet another consultant who identified two primary problems in Buildings A and B: (1) failures in the structural concrete, including corrosion of the reinforcing steel; and (2) the building envelope was not “weather tight”. Another inspection revealed this startling list of defects in Buildings A and B:  roof, façade, edge beam, soffit, concrete, expansion joint, horizontal surface and HVAC anchorage failures, and poor to non-existent flashing in the windows and doors.

In 2008, the owners of units in Buildings C and D hired an attorney, who sent a letter to the Board asserting that a proposed special assessment was invalid because the amendment had not been property adopted, and the cost of repairs should be the responsibility of the owners in Buildings A and B. In 2009, a majority of the owners of units in Buildings C and D brought suit challenging the validity of the amendment. Later that year, the Board notified the owners that the windows and doors in Buildings A and B would be replaced through a special assessment of up to $88,398 per unit. The owners voted against the special assessment, and the Board incorporated the repair costs into the 2010 and 2011 operating budgets.

Later in 2009, the Petitioners (50 owners in Building C and D) filed a new suit, alleging negligence, gross negligence, negligent and gross negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the master deed and bylaws. This two suits were consolidated, and in May of 2012, the Petitioners moved for summary judgment on their negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.

The trial court granted summary judgment on the issues of duty and breach, finding the bylaws and master deed imposed affirmative duties on the Board to enforce, investigate and correct known violations, and to investigate evidence of the owners’ neglect of maintenance responsibilities. The trial court also found that the Board was precluded from asserting the business judgment rule because of its ultra vires conduct, as well as its lack of good faith and failure to use reasonable care in discharging its duties.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the existence of a duty to investigate but reversed on the business judgment rule and the issue of breach. The case was remanded for trial, but the Supreme Court granted Certiorari.

The Supreme Court stated that the business judgment rule applies only to intra vires acts. In other words, the rule protects a board that exercises its best judgment within the scope of its authority. The Court held that a corporation that acts within its authority, without corrupt motives and in good faith, is protected by the rule, and remanded the case for jury consideration of whether the Board violated its obligations.

warren buffet quote

As to the issue of summary judgment on breach of duty, the Court found that the record contains at least a scintilla of evidence that the Board did not breach its duty to investigate. The Court stated that the record contains some evidence to support a conclusion that the water leaks occurred because of water intrusion through the common elements.  Thus, the trial court should not have decided the question of whether the Board breached its duty to investigate as a matter of law.

The parties are now free to litigate for years to come!

* S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27603, January 27, 2016

County May Owe Duty to Lot Owners in Failed Subdivision

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Infrastructure regulations were not followed

scales - blue backgroundOn January 6, the S.C. Court of Appeals reversed the Georgetown County Circuit Court’s directed verdict and remanded a case involving failed West Stewart Subdivision.* The developer, Harmony Holdings, LLC, went belly up in 2007, leaving the lot owners without roads and utilities after the County failed to follow its own regulations that provided a safety net for such catastrophes.

The plaintiff owned two lots in the subdivision, and filed a negligence action, arguing that Georgetown County had a “tort-like” duty to lot owners under the plain language of its development regulations. The County denied that it owed a duty to lot owners.

The County attorney explained the administrative issues at trial. He testified that in South Carolina, a developer is generally not allowed to sell lots that do not have infrastructure (roads, water and sewer). County regulations, however, allow the County to accept cash, bonds, financial guarantees or letters of credit to ensure money is available to complete infrastructure in case a developer fails.

Under the regulations in question, the County had discretion to accept a letter of credit equal to 125% of the cost estimate to complete the infrastructure. In this case, the developer posted a letter of credit on May 23, 2006 in the amount of $1,301,705 based on a cost estimate of $1,040,000.

Also under the regulations, the County had the power to approve reductions in the letter of credit upon receipt of an engineer’s certification that a certain amount of the work had been completed and sufficient funds were available for the remaining work. Other technical procedures were also required. The County allowed for a reduction in the letter of credit on July 20, 2006, October 9, 2006 and November 8, 2006, reducing the letter of credit to $553,370. In December of 2006, the County was advised that the estimated cost to complete the infrastructure was $1,153,205, which was higher than the original estimate. Despite this information, the letter of credit was reduced again on March 9, 2007 to $156,704.

The letter of credit expired in May of 2007, and the developer gave the county a check for $140,000. In August of 2007, the developer informed the County that it no longer had the financial means to complete the construction. Then the developer declared bankruptcy.

Repko described his lot as “woods” accessible by a path but inaccessible by a road. He testified that he believes his property is valued at “zero”. He said he pays property taxes on his lot, but the County will not allow him to build because of the absence of basic utilities.

The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the County on the grounds that the regulations do not create a private duty to lot owners. (Other issues were argued that will not be discussed here.) The Court of Appeals agreed with the lot owner that the County owed a special duty to him with respect to the County’s management of the financial guaranty that allowed the developer to sell lots.

inigo montoya memeThe County had relied on a 1993 Hilton Head case.** In that case, the preamble to the development ordinances stated, “The town council finds that the health, safety and welfare of the public is in actual danger….if development is allowed to continue without limitation.” When the development failed, a lot owner sued the Town, claiming it had negligently administered its ordinances. The Supreme Court held that the ordinances did not create a special duty to lot owners because their essential purpose, according to the preamble, was to protect the public from overdevelopment.

The Court of Appeals in the current case held that, unlike the Hilton Head ordinances, the Georgetown County regulations contained no express language declaring their purpose, but reviewing them as a whole, the purpose is to protect lot owners in the event the developer does not complete infrastructure.

I expect we have not seen the end of this case!

* Repko v. County of Georgetown, Opinion 5374, January 6, 2016.

** Brady Development Co. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 312 S.C. 73, 439 S.E.2d 266 (1993).

Creative Use of Google AdWords Gets SC Lawyer in Hot Water

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Supreme Court is not amused by timeshare attorney’s advertising technique


yellow card - suitThe South Carolina Supreme Court handed down a public reprimand last year against a Hilton Head lawyer for his resourceful use of Google AdWords.*

According to the Court, Google AdWords is an Internet marketing technique in which the advertiser places bids for “keywords”. When a Google search includes the advertiser’s keywords, the search results list may or may not include the advertiser’s ad. The advertiser pays Google for clicks on the ad from the search results.

The lawyer and his partner (the “law firm”) handled timeshare litigation and had filed numerous lawsuits against a particular timeshare company. The law firm bid on key words including the timeshare company’s name and the names of three lawyers who represented that company. The law firm’s ad appeared in some Internet search results when those names were used. The ad read:

“Timeshare Attorney in SC – Ripped off? Lied to? Scammed” Hilton Head Island, SC Free Consult”

Sometimes the law firm’s ad appeared as the first result and other times, it appeared later in the list. The law firm paid for its advertisement each time an Internet searcher clicked on the firm’s ad.

The Court held that the attorney violated the Lawyer’s Civility Oath by using the names of opposing parties and their counsel in this manner. By taking the oath, a lawyer pledges to opposing parties and their counsel fairness, integrity, and civility in all written communications and to employ only such means consistent with trust, honor and principles of professionalism.

Marketing is now virtually a necessity for successful lawyers. Attorneys are exploring many avenues in their marketing efforts, including numerous Internet marketing techniques. But, beware, this one is not a good idea!

 

*In the Matter of Naert, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion No. 27574, September 30, 2015.

A Short Time Ago in a Revenue Office Not Far Away …

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Check them out in DOR Information Letter #15-20

The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) issued a Revenue Ruling and an Information Letter in 2015 addressing deed recording fees and the affidavits that must accompany deeds.

Revenue Ruling #15-3, issued earlier this year, contains a comprehensive treatment of the subject, and Information Letter #15-20, issued on December 11, creates new affidavit forms, the Affidavit for Taxable or Exempt Transfers and the Affidavit for Exempt Transfers. Former affidavits, created in 1996, and using the term “arm’s length transaction” were decertified.

darth vader

“Luke … I am your lawyer.”

Deed recording fees of $1.35 (state) and $.55 (county) per $500 or any fractional part of $500 of the value of the real estate are imposed by §12-24-10 of the South Carolina Code for the “privilege” of recording a deed. This has not changed. Also unchanged is the list of 15 exemptions, and the statement that deeds of distribution and deeds transferring property from a trust to a trust distributee upon the settlor’s death are not subject to the fees.

One statutory change from 2015 was addressed in the Information Letter. Code §2-59-140 was amended in June to provide in subjection (E) that deductions from “value” include “any lien or encumbrance on realty in the possession of a forfeited land commission which may subsequently be waived or reduced after the transfer under a signed contract or agreement between the lienholder and the buyer existing before the transfer.” This change was added to Item 5 of the Affidavit for Taxable and Exempt Transfers.

Real estate practitioners can find the Revenue Ruling and the Information Letter at www.dor.sc.gov. Be sure to use the new forms!

Paralegal Certification Program Established in SC

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The new program should not disrupt current employment of paralegals.

The South Carolina Supreme Court, acting on the request of the Chief Justice Toal’s Commission on the Profession, adopted a voluntary program for paralegal certification on November 12.

The stated purpose of the program is to assist in the delivery of legal services to the public by identifying individuals who are qualified by education, training and experience and who have demonstrated knowledge, skill and proficiency to perform substantive legal work under the supervision of licensed attorneys.

certified - stampThe program is voluntary in that the Court’s directive makes it clear that no person will be required to be certified as a paralegal to be employed by a lawyer as a paralegal. Thankfully, this program should not disrupt any South Carolina lawyer’s current employment of paralegals.  Dirt lawyers are already in a transition period because of the new CFPB rules. Adding a mandatory paralegal certification may have pushed some of us over the proverbial edge!

At the time of an application to be a “South Carolina Certified Paralegal”, the individual must be designated as a Certified Legal Assistant (CLA)/Certified Paralegal (CP) or PACE-Registered Paralegal (RP).  The designation is valid for a one-year period. To qualify for renewal, an applicant must obtain twelve hours of approved continuing paralegal education (CPE), at least one hour of which shall be devoted to the areas of professional responsibility or professionalism.  Any CLE program approved for lawyers in South Carolina will be acceptable for CPE, but other programs may be approved as well.

The Court’s order establishes a Board of Paralegal Certification which will, among its other duties, prepare and publish applications and other forms to facilitate this program. Regulations for the program may be established by the Court or the board.

SC Court of Appeals Upholds Developer’s Plan for Tailgate Condo Project

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The SPUR avoids kiddie condo status.

In a case decided in the midst of a wretched Carolina football season, the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a restriction against rentals to students in a condominium project that was clearly built to accommodate terrific tailgate parties.

williams brice condoLalla v. The SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Association, Inc.* involved a three bedroom condominium in the shadow of Williams Brice stadium purchased in 2007 for $470,000. Mr. and Mrs. Lalla purchased the condo intending to enjoy football games and to allow their daughter and two roommates to live there during college.  However, the great market decline beginning in 2008 spoiled their plans.

The Master Deed contained a prohibition against renting to any student enrolled in a two or four year college. But owners could allow their children or grandchildren to reside in or rent a unit along with rent-paying roommates.

When the market declined, the value of the condominium substantially decreased in value, and the Lallas unsuccessfully attempted to sell it. At the time of the appellate court hearing in 2014, the condo had been on the market for four years.

During the summer of 2010, the Lallas notified the owners’ association of their decision to rent to college students and began to do so. In June of 2010, the board of the association met and considered a comment card from a unit owner complaining that the association was allowing the project to turn into a dormitory.  Following this meeting, the board sent out a notice to each owner indicating the restrictions would be enforced and giving owners until May of 2011 to terminate any violating leases.

When the rules were not followed by Mr. and Mrs. Lalla, the association filed a declaratory judgment action seeking interpretation and enforcement of the master deed. The Lallas answered and counterclaimed, seeking a ruling that the restrictions were null and void because of changed circumstances. The association prevailed in the circuit court, and the Lallas appealed, asserting that the restrictions discriminated against a specific class of individuals (college students) and are unreasonable because the violation caused no damage to other property owners.

football tailgateThe discrimination argument failed because ”college students have not faced a long history of discrimination, are not an insular minority, and have not been classified according to an immutable trait acquired at birth.” In other words “college students” is not an inherently suspect class. The purpose of the restriction, to insure the comfort and safety of the residents and to protect the investment of the property owners by minimizing the risk of creating a dormitory-like atmosphere, was held to be rational.

The Court of Appeals also held that the economic change in circumstances failed to support the termination of the restriction because the declining market had no effect on the association’s need to minimize the risk that the project might develop a dormitory-like atmosphere.

South Carolina dirt lawyers like to see restrictive covenants enforced as written, so this case matches our world view.  And the Carolina fans among us dream of an outstanding replacement for Steve Spurrier so those terrific tailgate parties can resume!

The Strange Appearance of Title Insurance Rates on the New Closing Disclosure

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calculator paperIs this what the CFPB intended?

South Carolina closing attorneys are in the throes of their first closings under the new CFPB rules. Title insurance company offices are fielding all kinds of unusual questions as everyone works through their first few sets of documents. And our collective eyes are having difficulty adjusting to the appearance of title insurance rates on the new Closing Disclosure.

Under the filed rates of the title companies in South Carolina, we have a simultaneous issue rate of $100 for a second policy in a transaction. Typically, the owner’s liability amount and premium are higher, so the simultaneous issue rate of $100 is the charge for the loan policy.

The South Carolina Department of Insurance (SCDOI) requires us to disclose the true cost of an owner’s policy over the cost of the loan policy. We have been accustomed to referring to this charge as the “difference plus $100” because we take the difference in the full cost of both policies and add the $100 simultaneous issue fee to arrive at the number the SCDOI requires.

Let’s look at an example:

In a purchase transaction, the sales price is $455,000, and the loan amount is $409,500.  The full premium for the ALTA Homeowner’s policy is $1,290.60, and the full premium for the loan policy is $981.00. In the past, the title and software companies’ rate calculators would have shown:

ALTA Homeowner’s policy rate: $1,290.60 (full premium)
Loan Policy (standard rate): 100.00 (simultaneous issue fee)
$1390.60 (total)

For the SCDOI required disclosure, we would have shown:

ALTA Homeowner’s policy rate: $409.60 (difference plus $100)
Loan Policy (standard rate): 981.00 (full premium amount)
$1390.60 (total)

The total of the two calculations was always consistent.

Now, the CFPB requires that the total cost of the loan policy be disclosed and any simultaneous issue discounts must be shown against the owner’s policy. That’s ok with our South Carolina eyes because we can use our “difference plus $100” calculation to reach the same result.

The problem occurs where there is a reissue credit. While the CFPB never specifically addressed how to handle a reissue credit, the agency was clear that the loan policy premium had to be reflected in full. So most of the title and software companies have decided to take the reissue credit from the owner’s policy premium as well.

In our example, let’s assume that there was a prior ALTA Homeowner’s policy in the amount of $315,000. The reissue credit would be $468.90 (half the full premium for $315,000), so the new total cost would be $921.70 ($1,390.60 – $468.20), and this is where the problem becomes more challenging:

ALTA Homeowner’s policy rate: $ -59.30 ($409.60 minus the credit of $468.90)
Loan Policy (standard rate): 981.00 (simultaneous issue fee)
$921.70 (total)

The total is the same (and correct in our collective view), but notice the negative number as the cost of the owner’s policy.

We have decided in our office to think about it this way. The Closing Disclosure is not a replacement for the HUD-1, and it is not a closing statement. It is simply what it is entitled, a closing disclosure that the CFPB requires for the consumer borrower.

We are going to have to prepare other documents (closing statements, disbursement analyses) that will allow us to properly disburse and to completely disclose each disbursement as required by the SCDOI, not to mention the South Carolina Supreme Court! And our eyes are just going to have to adjust to those negative numbers!

Thanks to Cris Garrick, the IT guru in our office who figured this out and convinced me it’s correct!

SC Supreme Court Crafts New Foreclosure Law

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foreclosureFailure to file bond does not render appeal moot

In a case decided on November 4*, the Supreme Court of South Carolina interpreted S.C. Code §18-9-170** in a way that may come as a surprise to dirt lawyers.

The case arose from the foreclosure of an HOA lien. The absentee owner defaulted in the foreclosure and did not appeal. Instead, he moved to vacate the resulting sale. When his motion to vacate was denied, the master issued a deed to the successful bidder, and the defaulting owner appealed without filing an appeal bond.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the property owner failed to comply with the statute that would have stayed the sale, and, therefore the master-in-equity’s deed rendered the appeal moot.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the merits.

Real estate practitioners have likely read §18-9-170 to mean that failure to file a bond in this situation renders the appeal moot. This case indicates that the failure to file a bond may not be an issue. If no bond is filed, the master may issue the deed to the successful bidder, but the appeal can proceed. By implication, if the appeal is successful, then the purchaser’s deed may be set aside. The Court specifically stated that the master’s deed does not moot the appeal, and the appellate court may reach the merits.

For title examiners and the lawyers who rely on title examinations, this case means that whether or not an appeal bond has been filed, we must pay attention to a case on appeal.

* Wachesaw Plantation East Community Services Association, Inc., v. Alexander, Appellate Case No. 2012-21340, Opinion 27585

** S.C. Code §18-9-170 reads in relevant portion: “If the judgment appealed from directs the sale or delivery of possession of real property, the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed unless a written undertaking be executed….”

SC Supreme Court Decides Family Equitable Mortgage Case

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…and dirt lawyers are gratified to see the deeds called deeds!tug o war

On Oct. 28, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided a family dispute surrounding a transaction between a deceased brother and his sister and held that two deeds to the sister were, in fact, deeds, and did not constitute an equitable mortgage*.

While Justice Kittredge’s dissent suggested the Court established a “categorical rule” that only evidence created contemporaneously with a conveyance can be considered in support of an equitable mortgage, the majority, in a footnote, disagreed with Justice Kittredge’s interpretation and signified subsequent events and writings may assist in determining the intent of the parties at the time of the conveyance.

After two appeals, the facts remain murky.

Kenneth Walker owned and lived on a 200-acre farm in Colleton County. In 1996, he conveyed 26.52 acres to his sister, Catherine Brooks. The stated consideration was $13,250, although Brooks testified she paid nothing. In 2002, Walker conveyed an additional 15.16 acres to Brooks for the stated consideration of $5.00.

According to Brooks, her brother conveyed the property to her because she supported him emotionally and financially. She testified that she paid his debts, paid his electric and telephone bills, bought his groceries, gave him cash for living expenses, helped him receive social security benefits and served as trustee for those benefits.

In 2004, at Walker’s request, Brooks wrote a note stating that Walker intended proceeds from sand removal and soil and waste water discharge onto the property would be paid to Brooks until she received $60,000. Walker and Brooks also generated a ledger that began with an entry of $60,000 and ended with an entry of $27,400.

It is clear that Brooks did not exercise control over the property.

deed - definitionBefore Walker died, his attorney sent a letter to Brooks referring to this note and ledger, and requesting her to tender a deed in exchange for $2,893.87. This amount was inexplicable, according to the Court.  After Walker’s death, his son and personal representative offered to pay Brooks $27,400 in exchange for a deed. Brooks refused, and this dispute arose.

The special referee held that the note and ledger showed that Walker was indebted to Brooks at the time of his death, and the conveyance was intended as security for the debt. He found the existence of an equitable mortgage, and held that the estate was entitled to the property upon payment of $27,400. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court, referring to a C.J.S. article and a prior case, indicated that the existence of an equitable mortgage must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, and that the intent of the parties must be evaluated at the time of the conveyance.  The court referred to the personal representative’s “self-serving testimony” and the fact that Brooks did not exercise control over the property as the only evidence that the parties intended to establish an equitable mortgage at the time the property was conveyed. The existence of the note and ledger were discounted as not being contemporaneous with the deeds.

Justice Kittredge would have reinstated the trial court’s finding of an equitable mortgage, denouncing the Court’s “categorical rule” in the face of these “equitable, fact intensive inquiries.” He found the existence of the note and ledger persuasive that the parties intended that the conveyance was, in legal effect, a mortgage.

Like dirt lawyers everywhere, I like certainty when it comes to deeds and find the Supreme Court’s holding comforting.

 

 

*Walker v. Brooks, Appellate Case No. 2013-001377

Dirt Lawyers Will Like This Mortgage Satisfaction Case

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S.C. Supreme Court holds equity lines are subject to the timely satisfaction statute.

In an opinion written by Justice Beatty, our Supreme Court held on August 5 that open-ended mortgages are satisfied in the same manner as conventional mortgages and under the same statutory requirement for timely satisfaction by lenders.

Regions Bank v. Strawn involved a mortgage foreclosure against Robert and Nancy Borchers. The Borchers counterclaimed seeking to recover from Regions Bank under §§29-3-310 and 29-3-320 of the South Carolina Code based on the bank’s failure to satisfy the mortgage within the three-month time period required.

mortgage jengaThe home had been purchased from Cammie Strawn, who had taken title from her then-husband, Richard Strawn. Mr. Strawn had previously obtained the home equity line of credit. At the time of the Borchers’ closing, the balance of the mortgage was $32,240.42. Immediately after the closing, the Borchers’ attorney, James Belk, had an employee deliver a payoff check and a mortgage satisfaction transmittal letter to Regions Bank. The check had the words “Payoff of first mortgage” typed on it.

Instead of satisfying the mortgage, the bank applied the check to the balance, bringing it to zero, and provided Richard Strawn with new checks even though he had not owned the home for more than two years. Mr. Strawn spent more than $72,000 on the equity line.

When Regions Bank attempted to collect on Mr. Strawn’s debt by foreclosing on the Borchers’ home, the Borchers answered, counterclaimed and moved for summary judgment. The bank argued that a revolving line of credit should be handled differently than conventional mortgages, and this particular mortgage could not be satisfied without instructions from Mr. Strawn.

The trial court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Borchers. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Regions Bank made two basic arguments: (1) open ended mortgages are an exception to the statutory satisfaction requirement because only the original borrower is authorized to request a satisfaction; and (2) the Borchers could not assert a violation of the mortgage satisfaction statutes because their attorney had the authority to satisfy the mortgage pursuant to the attorney satisfaction statute (§29-3-330).

The Court affirmed and held that the first argument failed because the mortgage itself contemplated that the property may be sold and specifically stated that it would be binding on the mortgagor’s successors and assigns. Also, the court stated that anyone with an interest in mortgaged property is allowed to request a satisfaction upon payment, and there is no exception for equity lines of credit.

Sale of a house. Object over whiteAs to the argument that the Borchers’ attorney could have satisfied the mortgage, the Court stated simply that this argument is without merit because the statutory framework does not exempt a mortgage holder of an equity line from the penalty provisions for failing to satisfy a mortgage within the required time frame.

This is a good opinion for South Carolina closing lawyers!