My friend and self-professed “fellow title nerd”, Lacey Higginbotham, who practices in Myrtle Beach, sent to me a “Deed of Child” she found in the Horry County records. The document is dated May 10, 1930, recorded June 3. 1930, and purports to convey a child from a father to another family .
Because the document is difficult to read, I’ll squint for you and set it out here for your reading pleasure:
I can imagine Professor Spitz presenting this document to us as an exam in our first- year property law class. He might ask for us to spot all the issues concerning the enforceability of this document. Thanks, Lacey, for this diversion!
A recent blog about a South Carolina Supreme Court amendment to a comment following our UPL rule contained the following paragraph:
“Remember that our Supreme Court adamantly told us in In re Lester* that a lawyer must be physically present for a closing. Prior to Lester, a closing attorney might be on vacation and available by telephone to answer closing questions. Lester called a halt to that practice.”
A reader responded, “Claire, can you clarify the effects of In Re Lester on ‘mail away’ closings?” This is such a great question, and I responded that I would answer with a new blog. This is that blog!
In the South Carolina Bar’s publication, Handbook for South Carolina Dirt Lawyers, I included the following discussion of mail-away closings.
“Attorneys in resort areas have done “mail away” closings routinely for years. Titles are examined, closing packages are prepared and mailed to a remote location for signatures. Recent South Carolina Supreme Court disciplinary cases requiring attorneys to be present at closings have caused some attorneys to question whether mail away closings can be done ethically by South Carolina attorneys.
The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue specifically, so no one knows the answer to this question. However, in a seminar in 2005, a lawyer from the Office of Disciplinary Counsel was asked whether an attorney can ethically handle a closing by mail.
He responded that it was his opinion that the attorney should:
• Schedule a closing date, time and place;
• Advise the clients that they should attend the closing;
• Advise the clients that the attorney will be able to provide better representation if the clients attend the closing; and
• Require the clients to sign a document indicating they received the foregoing advice but chose not to attend the closing.
Another speaker at the seminar suggested that he would only handle mail away closings if the clients agreed to meet with a lawyer in the clients’ location to execute the documents.
On September 16, 2005, we received a more formal opinion in the form of Ethics Advisory Opinion 05-16. This opinion states that an attorney may ethically conduct a real estate closing by mail as long as it is done in a way that: (1) ensures that the attorney is providing competent representation to the client; (2) all aspects of the closing remain under the supervision of an attorney; and (3) the attorney complies with the duty to communicate with the client, so as to maintain the attorney-client relationship and be in a position to explain and answer any questions about the documents sent to the client for signature. To meet this test, according to the opinion, clients must have reasonable means to be in contact with the attorney, by telephone, facsimile, or electronic transmission.
The Opinion states that there is no legal requirement that a client attend the closing, but it must be the client’s decision not to attend the closing. The Opinion acknowledges today’s climate by this statement: “Given today’s technological advances in communications and funds transfer, to require a client living in one part of the country to attend a closing against the client’s own wishes is both unnecessary and punitive.” The Opinion makes the point that the duties of the attorney do not change when the closing is accomplished by mail in this statement: “The prudent attorney will conduct closings by mail in such a fashion that the client is fully informed and properly advised, that the client has a reasonable means to consult with the attorney, and that all personnel assisting the attorney are properly supervised.”
South Carolina closing attorneys are relieved to have this authority and appreciative of the efforts of the South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee.”
Of course, technology has drastically changed since these words were written, but the legal issues have not. A dirt lawyer can certainly handle mail away closings ethically. But dirt lawyers must still practice law in connection with those closings.
Please feel free to make comments and ask questions about these blogs!
The intent is to allow lawyers from other jurisdictions to work remotely here
I begin this blog by admitting that I wouldn’t have thought this Supreme Court Order was a big deal if the brilliant Teri Callen (Chicago Title lawyer and USC Law School Adjunct Professor) had not pointed out its significance.
On March 15, The South Carolina Supreme Court amended Comment 4 to Rule 5.5, South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, by adding the following sentence at the end of the comment:
“A lawyer admitted in another jurisdiction does not establish an office or other systematic presence in this jurisdiction for the practice of law by engaging in remote work in this jurisdiction, provided the lawyer’s legal services are limited to services the lawyer is authorized to perform by a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted, and the lawyer does not state, imply, or hold out to the public that the lawyer is a South Carolina lawyer or is admitted to practice law in South Carolina.”
This type of remote work in South Carolina by out-of-state lawyers was formerly only allowed in the event of a state of emergency, as in a global pandemic. Now, a lawyer admitted in New York can live, permanently or temporarily, in Hilton Head and practice law from her computer and telephone. The South Carolina Bar had requested an amendment to this comment, and the Court adopted a modified version of the Bar’s proposal.
Teri has previously taught us that a South Carolina lawyer working remotely in another state might be participating in the unauthorized practice of law. A Charleston lawyer who decides to live, permanently or temporarily, in the mountains, should check the court rules of that state to determine whether remote work is considered UPL in that state.
Remember that our Supreme Court adamantly told us in In re Lester* that a lawyer must be physically present for a closing. Prior to Lester, a closing attorney might be on vacation and available by telephone to answer closing questions. Lester called a halt to that practice.
The Court didn’t weigh in on whether a South Carolina lawyer is allowed under our rules to work remotely in another state where he is not licensed without running afoul of our rules. Our Court probably wouldn’t touch that issue because of the implications and unintended consequences that might occur. For example, if it is permissible for a South Carolina lawyer to work remotely in another state, is it also permissible to perform a South Carolina closing there?
There are land mines everywhere, lawyers. I feel as if I end 9 out of 10 blogs with the thought that everyone needs to be careful out there. This blog falls in the “be careful” category.
Maybe, but real estate practitioners should be careful!
A recent discussion on South Carolina Bar’s real estate section listserv surrounded whether and how to close “double closings” vs. “assignments of contracts”. This is not a novel topic in our market. In the very hot market that preceded the crash beginning in 2007, one of the biggest traps for real estate attorneys was closing flip transactions. Title insurance lawyers fielded questions involving flips on an hourly basis!
Flips have never been illegal per se. Buying low and selling high or buying low and making substantial improvements before selling high are great ways to make substantial profits in real estate.
Back in the day, we suggested that in situations where there were two contracts, the ultimate buyer and lender had to know the property was closing twice and the first closing had to stand on its own as to funding. In other words, the money from the second closing could not be used to fund the first closing. (Think: informed consent confirmed in writing!)
Where assignments of contracts were used, we suggested that the closing statements clearly reflect the cost and payee of the assignment.
The term real estate investors are using these days to define buying low and selling high is “wholesaling”. A quick Google search reveals many sites defining and educating (for a price, of course) the process of wholesaling. This is a paraphrase of a telling quote I found from one site:
If you’re looking for a simple way to get started in real estate without a lot of money, real estate wholesaling could be a viable option. Real estate wholesaling involves finding discounted properties and putting the properties under contract for a third-party buyer. Before closing, the wholesaler sells their interest in the property to a real estate investor or cash buyer.
One of the smart lawyers on our listserv, Ladson H. Beach, Jr., suggested that there does not appear to be a consensus among practitioners about how to close these transactions. He suggested reviewing several ethics cases* that set out fact-specific scenarios that may result in ethical issues for closing attorneys.
In addition to the ethics issues, Mr. Beach suggested there may be a licensing issue where an assignor is not a licensed broker or agent. A newsletter from South Carolina Real Estate Commission dated May 2022 which you can read in its entirety here addresses this issue. The article, entitled “License Law Spotlight: Wholesaling and License Law” begins:
“The practice of individuals or companies entering into assignable contracts to purchase a home from an owner, then marketing the contract for the purchase of the home to the public has become a hot topic, nationwide in the real estate industry in recent years. This is usually referred to as ‘wholesaling’. The question is often, “is wholesaling legal?’ The answer depends upon the specific laws of the state in which the marketing is occurring. In South Carolina, the practice may require licensure and compliance with South Carolina’s real estate licensing law.”
The article suggests that the Real Estate Commission has interpreted that the advertising of real property belonging to another with the expectation of compensation falls under the statutory definition of “broker” in S.C. Code §40-57-30(3) and requires licensure. Further, the newsletter suggests S.C. Code §40-57-240(1) sets up an exception; licensing is not required if an unlicensed owner is selling that owner’s property. The Commission has interpreted, according to this article, that having an equitable interest is not equivalent to a legal interest for the purpose of licensing. In other words, a person having an equitable interest acquired by a contract is not the property’s owner and has no legal interest in the property for the purposes of this licensing exemption.
So real estate practitioners have several concerns about closing transactions of this type. Be very careful out there and consult your friendly title insurance underwriter and perhaps your friendly ethics lawyer if you have concerns as these situations arise in your practice.
*In re Barbare (2004), In re Fayssoux (2009), In re Brown (2004) and In re Newton (2007)
Real estate law never bores me, but our cases may seem particularly mundane considering the Murdaugh prosecution that has gripped our state for more than a month. You may want to put this blog aside until the jury returns its verdict. I’ve seen so many photos on social media of groups of lawyers watching the case together that I am confident real estate is not top of mind!
Huskins v. Mungo Homes, LLC* is a South Carolina Court of Appeals case which was originally issued June 1, 2022, then withdrawn, substituted and refiled February 15, 2023.
The Huskins signed a Purchase Agreement with Mungo in June 2015 for a home in Westcott Ridge subdivision in Irmo. The document consisted of three pages. The first page contained a statutory notice of arbitration, the second page included a paragraph entitled “LIMITED WARRANTY”, and the third page included a paragraph entitled “ARBITRATION AND CLAIMS.”
In 2017, the Huskins filed an action against Mungo alleging the Purchase Agreement violated South Carolina law by disclaiming implied warranties without providing for a price reduction or other benefit to the purchaser for relinquishing those rights. The causes of action included: (1) breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, and (4) declaratory relief regarding the validity of the waiver and release of warranty rights and the validity of Mungo’s purported transfer of all remaining warranty obligations to a third party.
Mungo filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Huskins’ responsive memorandum argued that the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable. They asserted that the limitation of warranties provision should be considered as a part of the agreement to arbitrate. The Circuit Court issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration. In ruling the arbitration clause was not one-sided and unconscionable, the Circuit Court found that (1) the limited warranty provision must be read in isolation from the arbitration clause; and (2) terms in the arbitration clause pertaining to a 90-day time limit were not one-sided and oppressive because they did not waive any rights or remedies otherwise available by law.
The Court of Appeals initially held that the Circuit Court’s order was immediately appealable, stating that our state procedural rules, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act, govern appealability of arbitration orders. While arbitration orders are not typically immediately appealable under South Carolina law, this order had granted Mungo’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which is an appealable order.
The Court next held that the arbitration clause must be considered separately from the limited warranty provision, citing cases to the effect that arbitration provisions are separable from the contracts in which they are imbedded. A prior D.R. Horton South Carolina Supreme Court case** considered the arbitration and warranty provisions together, in part because the title of the paragraph, “Warranties and Dispute Resolution” signaled that the provisions should be read as a whole. Since the Mungo paragraphs were separated, the Court of Appeals said they should be read separately. In addition, the two provisions did not contain cross references.
The Court next addressed the Huskins’ argument that the limitation of claims provision restricted the statutory limitations period from three years to 90 days and was therefore not severable from the arbitration clause. The Court agreed that the provision that limited the statute of limitations is one-sided and oppressive, but held that the arbitration clause is enforceable because the unconscionable provision is severable.
After concluding that the Huskins lacked a meaningful choice in entering the arbitration clause, the Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause’s shortening of the statute of limitations violates South Carolina law and is therefore unconscionable and unenforceable.
The Circuit Court’s order was affirmed as modified.
Now …. back to the Murdaugh trial!
*South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5916 (June 1, 2022, Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled February 15, 2023.
Financial institutions have reporting obligations under the Bank Secrecy Act, and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) published an alert on January 25 warning financial institutions to be alert to potential investments in commercial real estate by sanctioned Russian elites, oligarchs, their family members, and the entities through which they act. Commercial real estate lawyers should also be alert to these dangers.
Use this link for a list of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.
Commercial real estate transactions are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by bad actors because of the complex financing methods and opaque ownership vehicles routinely employed. Because commercial properties are so high in value, buyers and sellers seek to use these methods and vehicles to limit their legal, tax and financial liability. In addition, foreign investors are common in commercial real estate.
The Alert points to the following types of transactions and vehicles that are so common that protection against invasion into them by bad actors would be difficult at best. The green, italicized words are mine:
The use of pooled investment vehicles, including offshore funds, to avoid due diligence and beneficial ownership protocols established by financial institutions. In other words, a bad actor may attempt to reduce its ownership percentage in a property to avoid normal due diligence for owners with higher percentages.
The use of shell companies and trusts to conceal ownership interests.
Involvement of third parties to invest in behalf of a criminal or corrupt actor.
Inconspicuous investments that provide stable returns. The properties may not be high end. They may be multi-family housing, retail, office, industrial or hotels in small and mid-size urban areas.
Thankfully, FinCEN’s Alert provides several red flags to assist in these difficult determinations.
The use of a private investment vehicle that is based offshore to purchase commercial real estate and that includes politically exposed persons or other foreign nationals (particularly family members or close associates of sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies) as investors. I had to Google the term “politically exposed person”. It means a person who has been entrusted with a prominent public function. These individuals generally represent a higher risk for potential involvement in bribery and corruption by virtue of their positions and influence.
When asked questions about the ultimate beneficial owners or controllers of a legal entity or arrangement, customers decline to provide information. In my former life in which I represented developers, when I asked questions about the identity of the beneficial owners, I got answers. It is a red flag if you are unable to obtain those answers.
Multiple limited liability companies, corporations, partnerships, or trusts are involved in a transaction with ties to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies, and the entities have slight name variations.
The use of legal entities or arrangements, such as trusts, to purchase commercial real estate that involves friends, associates, family members, or others with close connection to sanctioned Russian elites and their proxies.
Ownership of commercial real estate through legal entities in multiple jurisdictions (often involving a trust based outside the United States) without a clear business purpose. Again, if you can’t get good answers to your questions, this is a red flag.
Implementation of legal instruments that are intended to transfer an interest in commercial real estate from a politically exposed person or Russian elite to a family member, business associate or associated trust following a legal event such as an arrest or an OFAC designation of that person.
Private investment funds or other companies that submit revised ownership disclosures to financial institutions showing sanctioned individuals or politically exposed persons that previously owned more than 50 percent of a fund changing their ownership to less than 50 percent.
There is a limited discernable business value in the investment, or the investment is outside of the client’s normal business operations.
This is the fourth FinCEN alert on potential Russian illicit activity since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Federal government is serious about policing these activities. I recommend that you contact your favorite title insurance underwriter any time you determine that sanctioned persons or their proxies involved in your transactions. Be careful out there!
Several years ago, a prominent Myrtle Beach real estate lawyer called me to suggest that our (title insurance) company should develop a product like Home Title Lock. That company advertises that it alerts homeowners if fraudulent or forged deeds are recorded in their chains of title. I contacted corporate leaders to explore this idea, and it was quickly decided that the product was virtually meaningless.
Last week, another prominent Myrtle Beach-area lawyer emailed me with news that the Attorney General for Texas is investigating the company. Here the South Carolina dirt lawyer’s direct quote, “After the number of older clients I have had who come into a transaction confused and scared by the talking heads on conservative media who have been schilling for this company, I am glad to see law enforcement taking an interest.”
Ken Paxton, the Attorney General, apparently agrees. He issued a press release on January 24, stating, “I won’t tolerate false, misleading, or deceptive advertisements targeted to any Texas consumers—especially Texas seniors. If Home Title Lock is misrepresenting its services or the need for its services I will put a stop to its unlawful behavior.”
The AG announced an investigation of this company for potentially violating the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by misleading consumers with deceptive statements concerning the prevalence of home title theft and the need for this company’s services.
The press release states that Home Title Lock is a California-based entity that claims to provide 24/7 monitoring of a consumer’s home title. (How could that even be done?) The press release states that the company has received scrutiny in recent months over questionable advertisements, including its claim that the FBI calls home title theft “one of the fastest growing white-collar cyber-crimes in America.” Apparently, Home Title Lock admits that it markets to “older customers.”
The Texas AG’s office issued a Civil Investigative Demand on December 15 ordering the company to make documents available substantiating the following, among other matters:
Any home title theft resolution services;
Representative samples of customer contracts;
The claim that the Company monitors the title of consumers 24/7;
The claim that the Company provides nationwide monitoring;
The claim that like other white-collar crimes, title fraud remains under reported with losses totaling more than $5 million in 2015;”
The claim that a victim is responsible for payments incurred due to a fraudulent home equity loan. (“Now thieves take out massive loans using your home’s equity-leaving you with the payments and mountains of legal bills;”) and
The claim that the company offers “complete protection – including up to $250,000 in legal fees and expense coverage.”
I’m so glad to see this investigation is starting, and I hope other states follow.
This blog has previously discussed MV Realty PBC, LLC. South Carolina title examiners report they are discovering “Homeowner Benefit Agreements” or “Exclusive Listing Agreements” filed in the public records as mortgages or memoranda of agreement. The duration of the agreements purport to be forty years, and quick search revealed hundreds of these unusual documents filed in several South Carolina counties. The documents indicate that they create liens against the real estate in question.
The company behind these documents is MV Realty PBC, LLC which appears to be doing business in the Palmetto State as MV Realty of South Carolina, LLC. The company’s website indicates the company will pay a homeowner between $300 and $5,000 in connection with its Homeowner Benefit Program. In return for the payment, the homeowner agrees to use the company’s services as listing agent if the decision is made to sell the property during the term of the agreement. The agreements typically provide that the homeowner may elect to pay an early termination fee to avoid listing the property in question with MV Realty.
In response to numerous underwriting questions on the topic, Chicago Title sent an underwriting memorandum to its agents entitled “Exclusive Listing Agreements”. Chicago Title’s position on the topic was set out in its memorandum as follows: “Pending further guidance, Chicago Title requires that you treat recordings of this kind like any other lien or mortgage. You should obtain a release or satisfaction of the recording as part of the closing or take an exception to the recorded document in your commitments and final policies.”
Googling MV Realty results in a great deal of information. Real estate lawyers should familiarize themselves with this company and its program to advise clients who may question whether the program makes sense from a financial and legal perspective.
In December, Florida’s Attorney General sued the company calling the venture a “deceptive scheme”. The lawsuit seeks an injunction, preventing enforcement of the contracts with consumers, preventing future deceptive and unfair trade practices, and returning funds to consumers.
News sources report that the company is active in 23 states, including South Carolina, and that Attorneys General in several other states are investigating the activities of this company. News sources also report numerous lawsuits against consumers seeking to enforce these contracts. U.S. Senator Sharrod Brown (D-Ohio) has indicated the company could face scrutiny from the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Development.
Dirt lawyers, pay attention to this situation. We will certainly see updates.
SC Supreme Court discards arguments of ALTA and PLTA
Real estate cases can be absent from our Advance Sheets for months, but we have seen two cases already in 2023. In ArrowPoint Federal Credit Union v. Bailey* our Supreme Court was asked to adopt a novel replacement mortgage doctrine, but the Court deflected the question, deferring to the legislature, even though American Land Title Association and Palmetto Land Title Association filed amicus briefs in favor of the doctrine.
This is a real estate mortgage priority dispute between two institutional lenders concerning a residential property in Winnsboro. Jimmy and Laura Bailey mortgaged their residence at 247 Morninglow Drive to Quicken Loans in the amount of $256,500. The mortgage was recorded on October 20, 2009. One week later, the Baileys closed an equity line of credit with ArrowPoint Federal Credit Union in the amount of $99,500. The second mortgage was recorded on November 4. ArrowPoint had record notice of the Quicken mortgage. On November 23, the Baileys refinanced the Quicken mortgage with Quicken, this time in the amount of $296,000.
In connection with the refinance, the Baileys executed an interesting document entitled “Title Company Client Acknowledgment”, which stated the only outstanding lien on the property was the prior Quicken mortgage. This statement was false. The Court stated that there was no clear explanation as to whether Quicken had the title searched at this point.
The Baileys used $257,459 from the refinance to pay off the first mortgage. On December 15, Quicken released the first mortgage and recorded the refinance mortgage. Quicken assigned the mortgage to U.S. Bank, the petitioner in this case.
(If these facts make you break out into a cold sweat, then you were around doing real estate closings at the break-neck speed we suffered during this time frame.)
The Baileys defaulted on the line of credit, and ArrowPoint filed this action seeking a declaration that its line of credit had priority over the Quicken refinance mortgage. Both lenders moved for summary judgment. U.S. Bank claimed it had priority under the replacement mortgage doctrine. The special referee and Court of Appeals agreed with ArrowPoint, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Both appeals courts concluded that adopting the replacement mortgage doctrine is a question for the General Assembly.
Dirt lawyers are intimately familiar with South Carolina’s race-notice statute (S.C. Code §30-7-10) which prioritizes liens based on notice and the recording date.
The Supreme Court recited that it had recognized the equitable subordination doctrine as an exception to the race-notice statute. The Court noted the right of subrogation is essentially a creation of the court of equity, which allows a person who is secondarily liable for a debt, upon paying the debt, to assume by law the place of the creditor whose debt is paid. Decades later, the Court declined to recognize the doctrine for a lender that refinanced its own mortgage but failed to discover an intervening mortgage. The Court said in the case at hand that it had previously warned lenders of their duty to search titles!**
The Court noted that the replacement mortgage doctrine is another exception to the race-notice statute, and many jurisdictions either recognize the doctrine or follow its logic. Cases from other jurisdictions were cited, and the Restatement (Third) of Property was quoted. According to the Restatement, the replacement mortgage doctrine provides:
If a senior mortgage is released of record and, as a part of the same transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage retains the same priority as its predecessor, except
To the extent that any change in the terms of the mortgage or the obligation it secures is materially prejudicial to the holder of a junior interest in the real estate, or
To the extent that one who is protected by the recording act acquires an interest in the real estate at a time that the senior mortgage is not of record.
The Court said that it was required to respect the authority of the legislature on public policy matters and declined to sit as a “superlegislature” to second-guess the General Assembly’s decisions. The Court differentiated the equitable subrogation doctrine from the replacement mortgage doctrine by saying that the “race” begins with the original mortgage in the equitable subrogation situation, and the intervening lender suffers no loss. Under the replacement mortgage doctrine, on the other hand, the original first mortgage is satisfied of record and replaced with a new mortgage that is recorded after the intervening mortgage.
The Court also criticized the replacement mortgage doctrine because it dilutes the importance of title examinations. Lenders who seek to refinance their own mortgages, as Quicken did in this case, can easily search the title to discover the intervening lien. The last words of the case state, “Finally, we emphasize parties must conduct diligent title searches to protect their interests under the race-notice statute.”
I, for one, will not argue with that final statement. It now appears that if ALTA and PLTA want a replacement mortgage doctrine in South Carolina, they need to approach the legislature.
*South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28129, January 11, 2023.
**All the citations are omitted but are set out in detail in the subject case.
2023’s first real estate case is both humorous and sexy!
If real estate lawyers weren’t easily amused, our profession might live up to the common misconception that it’s boring. But the first South Carolina real estate case of 2023 is both funny and sexy. I’ll explain the funny part shortly. Sadly, the only thing sexy about this case* is that the property is occupied by two strip clubs. But let’s agree to be entertained where we can.
This is a specific performance case involving property in Charleston County. Clarke owned a strip club located at 2015 Pittsburgh Avenue in Charleston. The defendant’s predecessor in title owned a strip club across the street at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue. The Supreme Court called the property at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue the subject property, so we will, too. The subject property includes buildings and a parking lot.
In 1999, Clarke entered into a lease which permitted him to share the parking spaces on the subject property with the property owner. The lease contained the following language: “Right of First Refusal: Lessor grants the Lessee the right of first refusal should it wish to sell.”
Before we discuss what the Supreme Court had to say about this language, let me throw in my two cents. Don’t use the terms “lessor” and “lessee” when you draft leases. Use the terms everyone can understand, “landlord” and “tenant”. And please pay attention to prepositions. In this language, which party is “it”? A drafter of real estate documents cannot be too precise!
Back to the case. I often read cases by starting with the dissent or concurrence. With complicated cases, the minority opinion often explains the holding quickly. This case isn’t complicated, but Justice Few really cut to the chase in his concurrence. And this is the funny part. Justice Few quips, “This instrument says nothing, does nothing, restrains nothing.” (Remember I admit to being easily amused.)
Justice James’ majority opinion goes into more detail.
When Clarke learned that his landlord had conveyed to subject property to Fine Housing for $150,000, he initiated this action for specific performance. Interestingly, the closing attorney failed to raise the lease and the right of first refusal with the purchaser, but Fine Housing admitted it had record notice of both.
The trial court ruled the right of first refusal is enforceable as to the entire property and ordered Fine Housing to convey title to Clarke upon his payment of $350,000. There is no explanation for this figure. Appraisals must have been involved. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the right of first refusal is an unreasonable restraint on alienation and is therefore unenforceable.
The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that whether a right of first refusal is enforceable turns on whether the right unreasonably restrains alienation. The Court agreed with The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes §3.4 and held that the factors to be considered include: (1) the legitimacy of the purpose of the right; (2) the price at which the right may be exercised; and (3) the procedures for exercising the right. The Court further held that these factors are not exclusive, and in this case, agreed to address another point raised by Fine Housing—the lack of clarity as to what real property the right encumbers.
Clarke argued that the lease provides the right applies to all the property, the price should be determined by the seller, and South Carolina law requires that the right should be exercised within a reasonable time.
Fine Housing argued that the lease merely identifies the location of the leased parking spaces, and the remaining language does not provide the clarity needed to identify the property intended to be encumbered by the right. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the uncertainty as to what property is encumbered supports the conclusion that the right is an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The Court also agreed with Fine Housing that the failure of the right to determine a price and the procedures for its exercise also created an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
The bottom line is that the Court held the language to be so imprecise as to be unenforceable. While real estate lawyers are always interested in obtaining the best deal for clients, the second most important aim of drafting real estate documents should be clarity.
Always keep in mind how Justice Few dismissed the language that says nothing, does nothing and restrains nothing! You never want language you draft to be dismissed so easily!
*Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc., South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 28126 (January 4, 2023)
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