Real Estate Law

Sometimes the sky isn’t so blue in Malibu

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California case might spell trouble for real estate agents and brokers across the country

The California Supreme Court decided a case in late 2016 that may have wide-ranging effect for real estate companies in that state.* The case involves a Chinese millionaire’s 2007 purchase of a mansion in Malibu for $12.25 million.

The seller, a trust, engaged Chris Cortazzo, a salesman in Coldwell Banker’s Malibu West office to sell the property.  As Cortazzo prepared to list the property, he obtained information from the tax assessor’s office that indicated the property’s living area was 9,434 square feet. The building permit described a single-family residence of 9,224 square feet, a guest house of 746 square feet, a garage of 1,080 square feet and a basement of unspecified area. The MLS listing stated that the property “offers approximately 15,000 square feet of living area”. Cortazzo also prepared and distributed a flyer making the same square footage representation.house measuring tape

In 2007, a couple made an offer to purchase the property. By handwritten note, Cortazzo informed them that Coldwell Banker did not “guarantee or warrant” the square footage, and advised them to “hire a qualified specialist to verify the square footage”. When the couple requested documentation of the square footage, Cortazzo gave them a letter from the property’s architect stating the “size of the house, as defined by the current Malibu building department ordinance is approximately 15,000 square feet.”  In a cover note, Cortazzo again cautioned them to hire a specialist. This sale fell through.

Horishi Horiike had been working for several years with Chizuko Namba, a sales person in Coldwell Banker’s Beverly Hills office, to find a residential property to buy. Namba showed Horiike the residence in question. Cortazzo gave Horiike the marketing flyer advertising approximately 15,000 square feet and an MLS printout that did not specify the square footage and contained note in small print that “Broker/Agent does not guarantee the accuracy of the square footage.” Horiike and the selling trust entered into a contract.

Before the closing, Horiike signed three disclosure forms confirming that Coldwell Banker represented both the buyer and the seller in the transaction. Under California law, a real estate broker may act as a dual agent for both parties, provided both parties consent to the arrangement after full disclosure.  The broker may act through one or more “associate licensees”, typically the salespeople who operate under the broker’s license and supervision. The governing statute provides that when an associate licensee owes a duty to any party in a real estate transaction, that duty is equivalent to the duty owed to that party by the broker.

Cortazzo did not state in writing to Horiike that there may be a discrepancy in the square footage, as he had done with the previous potential buyer. He also did not advise Horiike to retain an expert to verify the square footage. After the closing, Horiike learned that the property had less than 12,000 square feet of living area (although Coldwell Banker experts testified at trial that the living area was 14,186 square feet.)

In 2010, Horiike filed suit against Cortazzo and Coldwell Banker for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair business practices and false advertising. He did not sue the selling agent, Namba.

In a unanimous decision, California’s Supreme Court stated that the case presented a single, narrow question:  whether the associate licensee who represented the seller owed a duty to learn and disclose all information materially affecting the property, including the discrepancy in the square footage. The Court held that Coldwell Banker, as broker, owed a fiduciary duty to both parties and that Cortazzo, as associate licensee, had the responsibility to properly investigate and disclose all important information related to the transaction. The Court concluded Cortazzo owed a duty to Horiike equivalent to the duty owed to him by Coldwell Banker.

Several trade associations filed amicus briefs in the case. One concern is that an agent working with a buyer has no idea what property that buyer will ultimately purchase. Whether the same broker will represent the seller can’t be predicted. Another concern is that this decision may also reach commercial transactions. It is also possible that this case may open selling agents open to lawsuits from their clients for over-disclosure.

Could this happen in South Carolina? A provision in our statutory scheme may save brokers from the fate set out in this case, at least where different branch offices of a real estate firm are involved. Here, each branch office must be managed by a broker-in-charge. South Carolina Code §40-57-350 (I)(2) states that a broker-in-charge and associated licensees in one office of a real estate brokerage firm may conduct business with a client of another office of the real estate brokerage firm without creating a dual agency relationship, so long as the branch offices each have separate brokers-in-charge and do not share the same associated licensees.

I can’t find similar protection for listing and selling agents who work in the same branch office, nor for companies with listing and selling agents in the same location.  And, as we all know, there is no predicting what our court might say in connection with real estate matters. We will have to pay attention to see whether other courts, and particularly South Carolina courts, follow the lead of the California Supreme Court.

*Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 1 C5th 1024 (2016)

How to cure a defective deed

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Why South Carolina should consider a legal specialty in real estate.

The Real Estate Practices Council of the South Carolina Bar is considering petitioning our Supreme Court to create a specialty for the practice of real estate law. Two committees have been formed, one to consider residential real estate as a specialty and the other to consider commercial real estate as a practice specialty. If you have ideas that may help, please pass them along to me!

One reason for consulting a real estate lawyer might be for assistance in curing a defective deed. It is impossible to list all the types of defects that appear in deeds of record. The list grows every day! Some of the most common defects are property description discrepancies, grantor and grantee name discrepancies, out-of-state forms that do not comply with South Carolina statutory requirements, right of survivorship attempts that fail, discrepancies in ownership percentages, failure to recite consideration, grantor signature discrepancies, and authority issues of seller entities.

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Curing defective deeds will often require corrective deeds or quitclaim deeds from parties with outstanding interests. Note that corrective deeds are exempt from the deed recording fees imposed by §12-24-10 et seq. of the Carolina Code. See, specifically, §12-24-40(12). With corrective deeds, it may be necessary to obtain a deed back from the grantee. An example would be a deed from the developer to Richard Roe for lot 35, where Mr. Roe actually bought and occupied lot 34. To cure this problem, in addition to obtaining a deed from the developer to Mr. Roe of lot 34, Mr. Roe would need to convey lot 35 back to the developer. I continue to be amazed at the number of real estate professionals who think this step can be skipped, and that a corrective deed will somehow get the title back for the other lot. Also remember that mortgages may have to be re-executed or otherwise corrected once the deed issue is cured.

I am often asked whether the lawyer can “fix” the problem on the original deed and re-record it without the involvement of the parties. The answer is a strong “no”. The grantor must at least initial any changes. The more serious the problem, the more likely it will be that a corrective deed will be needed and that the grantor as well as the grantee will have to be involved.

When a deed discrepancy is discovered after the title has been conveyed again, the question often arises whether the corrective deed should run to the original grantee, and whether that would create the necessity for deeds from each grantor to each grantee in the chain of title after the problem. I often suggest that the corrective deed be given to the current property owner. The participation of intervening property owners is not needed.

Deed reformation actions are possible, and foreclosures often include additional causes of action for deed reformation to correct legal descriptions and other mistakes. Title insurance companies are often responsible to pay for these additional causes of action.

With these difficulties to be faced, don’t you think real estate practice as a specialty is a good idea?

Court decides timeshare owners can sue developers

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Real Estate Commission does not have exclusive jurisdiction

The South Carolina Supreme Court, answering questions certified to it by the Federal District Court, held last week that the South Carolina Real Estate Commission (REC) does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine violations of the South Carolina Vacation Time Sharing Plans Act.*

The Court also stated that the REC’s determination of a violation of the Time Act** is not a condition precedent to a private cause of action to enforce the Act and that the determinations of the REC are not binding on the courts.

These questions arose from two sets of litigation in the federal court involving individuals who entered into contracts with developers to purchase timeshare interests.

One set of plaintiffs, the Fullbrights, brought a purported class action against a timeshare developer, Spinnaker Resorts, Inc., seeking the return of money paid under a contract to purchase, plus interest, as well as a declaration that the contract was invalid.

The other set of plaintiffs, the Chenards, brought suit against another timeshare developer, Hilton Head Island Development Co., LLC, alleging fraud, negligent representation and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act as well as violations of the Timeshare Act.

In answering the questions, the Supreme Court stated that it was not taking any positions on the merits of the cases, which remain under the jurisdiction of the federal court.

The Court found that §27-32-130 unambiguously allows for lawsuits by stating that the provisions of the Act do not limit the right of a purchaser to bring a private cause of action. The developers had argued that this statute is ambiguous and that public policy evidenced by the Timeshare Act as a whole requires the REC’s jurisdiction to be exclusive.

These determinations will no doubt clear the way for class action lawsuits against timeshare developers.

 

* Fullbright v. Hilton Head Island Development Co., LLC, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion No. 27220 (May 17, 2017).

** S.C Code §27-32-10 et seq.

Multi-state mortgage modification practice may be hazardous to your law license!

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Last week, this blog discussed two April 19 South Carolina Supreme Court cases* in the context of the social media issues they raised. This week, I want to point out the mortgage modification issues, which were, no doubt, the impetus for the discipline in both cases.

Let’s look at the facts in the first case, In the Matter of Bacon. In November of 2012, attorney Brunty hired INMN, Inc., a marketing company, to solicit out-of-state clients interested in modifying their home mortgages. Brunty hired Integrity Partners, LLC to process the loan modifications. Brunty was suspended and later disbarred.

Brunty introduced Bacon to a principal in Integrity, who assured Bacon that Integrity and INMN were complying with federal laws and regulations and had a network of attorneys licensed to practice in every state where clients were accepted. Bacon accepted those assurances and hired INMN and Integrity. (Two people who’ve read this blog asked me about the relationship between Bacon and Brunty. I don’t know. The Court did not specify.)

Handling the former Brunty cases did not go smoothly, to say the least. Integrity continued to work on those cases without attorney involvement. Integrity employees incorrectly advised many of Brunty’s clients that their files had been assigned to Bacon. Some of Brunty’s clients became Bacon’s clients, but some did not. Some of Brunty’s clients’ credit cards were charged fees that were paid to Bacon.

Bacon admitted that he violated federal rules against unfair or deceptive acts or practices in respect to the mortgage modification matters.

The FTC’s “Regulation O” places a number of restrictions on mortgage modification services. For example, a provider may accept a fee only after the client has executed a written agreement with the lender or servicer. Attorneys are exempt from this rule if they are licensed to practice in the state where the home is located as long as they hold advance fees in trust accounts and comply with trust accounting rules.

Bacon was not licensed to practice in all jurisdictions, so he was not authorized to accept any up-front fees. He also failed to deposit the fees into a trust account, failed to maintain separate ledgers for these clients, and failed to properly supervise the individuals who had access to the accounts.

The Court stated Bacon was involved in the unauthorized practice of law in several states. He was suspended from the practice for six months and ordered to pay restitution to clients.

In the second case, In the Matter of Emery, the attorney received a public reprimand. In 2013 Emery signed a contract with Friedman Law, a New York law firm, to accept referrals for mortgage modification cases. Emery received client referrals from an internet marketing company and paid for the service based on the potential number of clients referred to her. Regardless of the residence of potential clients, cases would be assigned to Emery as a part of the Friedman Law network.

Non-lawyers employed by Friedman Law or two paralegal services worked the cases. The non-lawyers included Emery Law in their signature blocks and used Emery Law letterhead. Other than the fact that some of the non-lawyers employed by one of the paralegal services worked in Emery’s office, she did not directly supervise the work.

For the most part, the non-lawyers worked diligently, but six clients filed disciplinary cases because of some issue or complication resulting in client dissatisfaction.

The Court stated that the written fee agreements in these cases were confusing and self-congratulatory and often contradicted the verbal communications of the non-lawyers.

The non-lawyers sometimes wrongly held themselves out as employees of Emery Law. Clients never knew whether they were dealing with employees of Emery Law, Friedman Law, a firm in the Friedman Law network or one of the paralegal services.

Interestingly, in 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that lenders do not engage in the practice of law when they handle mortgage modification transactions.** In the present case, however, the Court stated that assisting clients in mortgage modification matters is the practice of law in South Carolina when performed by a lawyer.

Friedman Law represented to Emery that assisting clients in mortgage modifications is not the practice of law and that its network of lawyers in other states satisfied the requirements of multijurisdictional practice.

The Court stated that regardless of whether a particular state had adopted a rule permitting multijurisdictional practice and regardless of whether the particular state had determined that loan modification assistance was the practice of law, the fee agreements repeatedly referred to the services as “legal services”. In other words, the clients believed they were being represented by an attorney.

The Court said that Emery was involved in the systematic and continuous presence in other states, which constituted the unauthorized practice of law.

Accepting mortgage modification cases across state lines may be possible in certain circumstances, but these cases are obviously fraught with hazards. DO NOT accept these cases without carefully examining the federal and state laws involved in each situation and without carefully supervising each person who touches the cases. The best advice may be to never accept these cases when they involve properties located outside of South Carolina.

 

*In the Matter of Bacon, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27710, April 19, 2017; In the Matter of Emery, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27712, April 19, 2017.

**Crawford v. Central Mortgage Co. and Warrington v. Bank of America, 404 S.C. 39, 744 S.E.2d 538 (2013)

Dirt lawyers: guard your clients and your offices against sloppy title search practices

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Our Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that searching titles is the practice of law. For every real estate closing, the closing attorney should perform or supervise the title examination. Theoretically, all title insurance and malpractice claims caused by title search errors can be prevented. Having safe title examination practices in real estate closing offices would go a long way toward minimizing claims and protecting clients and their properties!

The following are some dangerous practices that lead to claims:

  • Hiring title examiners who are inexperienced, who cut corners and who are not covered by errors and omissions insurance coverage.
  • Failing to properly instruct title examiners as to how titles should be searched. Whether law firm employees or outside abstractors are used, the closing attorney should develop and use his or her own set of title examining procedures.
  • Failing to require title examiners to pull documents. It is not sufficient to search titles using indexes. Doing so puts the lawyer and client at the mercy of the county employee who typed the index.
  • Failing to review chain documents. The attorney should review chain documents. Attorneys spot issues that are missed by abstractors. If a link in the chain of title is a foreclosure or an estate, the foreclosure file or the estate file should be reviewed.
  • Failing to use proper search periods. The long-standing search period standard in South Carolina is sixty years. Title insurance companies have shortened this standard to forty years, particularly for residential transactions. But some title insurance companies and sloppy practitioners are allowing for much shorter periods of time, like ten years, or “up from the developer” or “up from the deed into the borrower” without informing the client that the title has not been examined. Title examinations are the practice of law in South Carolina, and  title companies do not have the power to permit a lawyer to shorten search periods without the informed consent of the attorney’s client.
  • Relying on prior title insurance policies that are not worthy of reliance. In “tacking on” to prior policies, closing attorneys should use common sense and good judgment. Determine who issued the prior policy and decide whether that person’s work should be substituted for your own. Review the prior policy to determine whether it looks normal on its face. Some title insurance companies are issuing products that are not backed by title examinations or are backed by very short title examinations. Those policies are not worthy of reliance in an atmosphere where title examinations are the practice of law. As in the case of other short searches, informed consent confirmed in writing from clients should be obtained for employing a short search based on a prior policy.
  • Failing to pull back title notes where a short search is used. It does not help that the attorney’s office has closed properties in the same chain of title if that prior title work is not used. Exceptions and requirements from the prior title work should be used in the current title insurance commitment and policy.
  • Failing to search for a longer period of time where the shorter search does not reveal normal easements and restrictions for the type of property being searched. A search involving a residential subdivision created in the 1950’s should not stop in the 1960’s.

At least two sets of eyes should review every title examination. And one of those sets of eyes should belong to an attorney who was taught in law school to spot issues!

The Carolinas are basketball states!

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(And states dealing with a “clarified” boundary)

Congratulations to the University of North Carolina on last night’s win in the Men’s College Basketball National Championship!  North Carolina has always been a basketball state, and our hats are off to you!  Our Gamecocks made it to the Final Four for the first time ever, so both states are proud of their men’s basketball teams!  And congratulations to our Gamecock women who won their National Championship on Sunday!  We love seeing that flag fly over our statehouse! Both Carolinas are apparently now basketball states!

We are also states with a newly defined boundary line between us. The long awaited and much debated legislation “clarifying the original location the boundary” became effective on January 1, 2017, and both states are dealing with the ramifications of the legislation.

Some parcels previously believed to be in South Carolina are now confirmed to be in North Carolina and vice versa. Both legislatures insist that the boundary has not changed, but that since markers have been lost or destroyed by the elements, it was necessary to have the boundary researched and resurveyed. (If they had taken the position that the boundary line was being moved, they would have had to involve Congress.)

South Carolina real estate lawyers have been advised to consult with their title insurance companies for guidance as they deal with affected properties. In North Carolina, however, the Real Property Section of the Bar and the Land Title Association have issued a lengthy memorandum, dated March 20, 2017, to provide guidance to North Carolina lawyers. I thought this memorandum might be useful to point out the various issues to South Carolina lawyers and link it here.

The best advice I can give all of us dealing with issues surrounding this change is to proceed slowly and with due diligence, consulting your title insurance company underwriters every step of the way!

Dirt Lawyers: Make sure you conform(a) with your pro forma policies

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Commercial real estate lawyers are routinely asked to issue pro forma title insurance policies. A friend who routinely acts as lenders’ counsel recently told me he sees lots of pro forma policies coming from borrowers’ counsel, and they are not being handled appropriately. For that reason, I thought I’d list a few reminders for all of us.

What is a pro forma policy? It is a sample policy provided to the customer and customer’s counsel in advance of closing. It outlines the actual language and format the final policy will contain, in the event the transaction actually closes and the policy is actually issued. A pro forma policy is not intended to serve as a promise to issue the final policy. And it is definitely not a substitute for a commitment.

One excellent process is to never send out a pro-forma policy independently. When I was in private practice, I issued a pro forma as an attachment to a letter which said, basically, “A policy in the form attached may be issued when the requirements in Commitment #_____, dated _____ have been satisfied.” My lenders’ counsel friend nails this matter down further by issuing the pro-forma policy as an attachment to the commitment with a note in the requirements section to the effect that upon satisfaction of all applicable requirements, a policy in the form set forth in Exhibit ___ will be issued.

A note to this effect be added to the policy:  “NOTE: This is a Pro Forma Policy. It does not reflect the present state of title and is not a commitment to insure the title or to issue any of the attached endorsements. Any such commitment must be an express written undertaking on appropriate forms.”

The pro-forma policy and all endorsements should be clearly marked “Pro-Forma Specimen” or “Sample” and should not be signed.  Many lawyers have a large “Specimen” stamp to use in these situations. My lenders’ counsel friend told me he actually stamps pro forma policies coming from borrowers’ counsel. Not all lenders’ counsel are that accommodating.

Where the policy date and policy number are requested on the form, supply the note “None”.

These rules are very simple and comply with common sense. A pro-forma policy is not a policy and should be clearly shown in every instance as a sample. Following these very straightforward rules will keep you and your title company out of trouble. And, as always, call you underwriter if you have questions or concerns!

Hot off the presses UPL case!

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(But it only affects real estate peripherally)

The South Carolina Supreme Court handed down a UPL decision in a declaratory judgment action in its original jurisdiction on February 22.*

The Court accepted the action to determine whether Community Management Group, LLC and its employees engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while managing homeowners’ associations. The Court found that the respondents did, in fact, engage in UPL. At the outset of the case, the Court had issued a temporary injunction halting the offending activities.

Community Management Group, without the involvement of an attorney, prepared and recorded notices of liens and related documents; brought actions in magistrates’ courts to collect debts; and filed the resulting judgments in circuit courts. The entity also advertised that it would perform these services “in house”.

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In a 1992 administrative order entitled In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules Proposed by South Carolina Bar**,  the Court had modified prior case law to allow a business to be represented by a non-lawyer officer, agent or employee. The Court had also promulgated South Carolina Magistrate Court Rule 21, which provides, “A business…may be represented in a civil magistrates’ court by a non-lawyer officer, agent or employee…”

The central question in the action at hand was whether the word “agent” in these authorities includes third party entities and individuals like Community Management Group and its employees. The Court held it does not and was never intended to.

The Court had earlier held that filing claims in probate courts does not amount to UPL, but stated in the present case that it is the character of the services rendered that determines whether the services constitute the practice of law. Filing claims in Probate Court, according to the Court, does not require the professional judgment, specialized knowledge or ability of an attorney. The Court found that the services required to represent a business in magistrates’ courts are not comparable to filing claims in probate courts.

Community Management Group conceded that it prepared a lien document for the purpose of putting a cloud on title so property could not be sold unless the homeowner paid overdue assessments. This stated purpose demonstrated to the Court that the lien documents were “instruments”, that is, written legal documents that define rights, duties, entitlements or liabilities.

Citing a 1987 case near and dear to the hearts of all South Carolina dirt lawyers, State v. Buyers Service***, the Court reminded us that preparing and recording legal documents is the practice of law.

This current case is a Per Curiam decision, but acting Justice Pleicones did not participate. We are holding our collective breath to learn the results of a Quicken Loan case pending in the original jurisdiction of the Court, and the present case may give us at least a small hint.

stay tunedWe have already received an underwriting question about this case in our office. We were asked whether our attorney agents can ignore the liens filed in contravention of this case. The answer is that we can discuss the specifics on a case-by-case basis, but it appears that although the liens may be invalidated by a court, dirt lawyers and title companies should not generally take this risk without the involvement of a court. If you run into this issue in connection with your closings, call your title insurance underwriter to discuss your options!

*Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC v. Peck, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27707 (February 22, 2017)

**309 S.C. 304, 422 S.E.2d 123 (1992)

***292 S.C. 286, 468 S.E.2d 290 (1987)

SC Dirt lawyers: check your documents

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SC Supreme Court issues opinion that may keep us up at night!

Are the words “developed” and “improved” used interchangeably in your form real estate documents?  You might want to pull your documents to check based on a recent South Carolina Supreme Court case.*

The Supreme Court affirmed a Court of Appeals decision finding property had not been developed into discrete lots entitling them to voting rights under a set of restrictive covenants. While the two courts agreed on that determinative point, the Supreme Court felt the need to clarify the Court of Appeals’ opinion that may be read to “conflate” the terms “developed” and “improved”. (The only word that was unclear to me was “conflate”, which I now know means to combine two or more concepts into one.)

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The Supreme Court cited a 2007 Washington state opinion for the definition of “developed”: conversion of raw land into an area suiting for building, residential or business purposes. Improving land is subject to a higher threshold, according to the Court, and would require such actions as installing utilities or buildings.

Chief Justice Pleicones and Justice Few concurred, and the Chief wrote a separate opinion for the sole purpose of expressing concern that dictating the meanings of the terms “developed” and “improved” may inadvertently alter the meaning of documents or create a conflict with legislative enactments. He used a subsection of a statute dealing with mechanics’ liens as an example.

South Carolina Code Section 29-6-10 (2) contains the following definition of “Improve”:

 “Improve means to build, effect, alter, repair, or demolish any improvement upon, connected with, or on or beneath the surface of any real property, or to excavate, clear, grade, fill or landscape any real property, or to construct driveways and roadways, or to furnish materials, including trees and shrubbery, for any of these purposes, or to perform any labor upon these improvements, and also means and includes any design or other professional or skilled services furnished by architects, engineers, land surveyors and landscape architects.”

That definition is written as broadly as possible to protect the interests of any professional who provides labor or services in connection with developing, I mean improving, real estate.

The underlying Court of Appeals opinion** indicated that platting separate lots on paper without further steps did not rise to the level of the term “develop”, which, according to the Supreme Court, is a lower threshold than the term “improve”, which, according to the statute, includes platting. Do you see the Chief’s concern? I certainly do! Good luck with those documents!

*Hanold v. Watson’s Orchard Property Owners Association, Inc, South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27702 (February 15, 2017)

**Hanold v. Watson’s Orchard Property Owner’s Association, 412 S.C. 387, 772 S.E.2d 528 (2016)

Court of Appeals Revises Opinion, but not Result, in Arbitration Case

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It seems the arbitration cases are all over the place in 2016. We’ve discussed three cases so far this year*, and the opinion in one of these cases has been withdrawn, substituted and refiled**, but the result did not change.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals decided to make a few changes in its opinion in One Belle Hall. The earlier opinion, filed June 1, held that an arbitration clause in a roofing supplier’s warranty provision was not unconscionable. The trial court had ruled that the supplier’s sale of shingles was based on a contract of adhesion and that the injured property owners lacked any meaningful choice in negotiating the warranty and arbitration terms, which were contained in the packaging for the shingles.

The Court of Appeals indicated that the underlying sale was a typical modern transaction for goods in which the buyer never has direct contact with the manufacturer to negotiate terms. The Court found it significant that the packaging contained the notation: “Important: Read Carefully before Opening” providing that if the purchaser is not satisfied with the terms of the warranty, then all unopened boxes should be returned. The Court pointed to the standard warranty in the marketplace that gives buyers the choice of keeping the goods or rejecting them by returning them for a refund, and blessed the arbitration provision.

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In the later opinion, filed September 28, the Court of Appeals addressed the South Carolina Supreme Court’s July 6, 2016 opinion in Smith v. D.R. Horton (cited in the footnote, below). In D.R. Horton, which this blog discussed on July, 14 the Supreme Court held that a national residential company’s contract contained a number of “oppressive and one-sided provisions”, including an attempted waiver of the implied warranty of habitability and a prohibition of awarding money damages of any kind. The Supreme Court held that the home purchasers lacked a meaningful ability to negotiate their contract, the only remedy through which appeared to be repair and replacement.

The difference in the two cases appears to be the location of the offending provisions. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that an arbitration agreement is separable from the contract in which it is embedded, and the issue of its validity is distinct from the substantive validity of the contract as a whole.*** The arbitration provision in D.R. Horton was construed in its entirety because various subparagraphs addressed warranty information and contained cross-references to each other. In addition, the contract did not contain a severability clause.

In the second opinion in One Belle Hall, the Court of Appeals admitted, as the supplier had conceded, that the agreement at issue was a contract of adhesion, but noted that our Supreme Court has stated that adhesion contracts are not per se unconscionable. The Court recognized that the roofing supplier’s contract continuously used language to the effect that any attempted disclaimer or limitation did not apply to purchasers in jurisdictions that disallowed them. The Court also found it significant that the agreement contained a severability clause.

In other words, since the objectionable provisions of the contract were outside the arbitration provision, and the arbitration provision is severable from the objectionable provisions, the arbitration clause is enforceable. The Court repeated its earlier point that the arbitration provision facilitates an unbiased decision by a neutral decision maker in the event of a dispute.

I believe we will see more of these cases, and I caution lawyers to be extremely careful in their drafting endeavors.

 

*  One Belle Hall Property Association v. Trammel Crow Residential Company, S.C. Ct. App. Opinion 5407 (June 1, 2016); Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc., S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27642 (July 6, 2016); and Parsons v. John Wieland Homes, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27655 (August 17, 2016).

**  One Belle Hall Property Association v. Trammel Crow Residential Company, S.C. Ct. App. Opinion 5407 (September 28, 2016)

***  Prima Paint Corporation v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)