Claire Manning

Court of Appeals Refuses to ‘Horse Around’ with Zoning Appeals Decision.

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Will some Charleston carriage horses be evicted?

Condominium projects take on all shapes and sizes in beautiful, historic, downtown Charleston, where the population of tourists and residents increases daily.

An old historic house may maintain its white-columned exterior while housing four or six residential condominium units. The stately carriage house out back may be a separate unit. An office building may look like any other brick-façade four-story building from the exterior, but the interior may contain a courtyard complete with fountains, and each office may be an owned separately as a condominium unit. A residential lot may be subject to a restriction covenant that prohibits subdividing, but a creative developer may use a Horizontal Property Regime to create multiple units anyway.

But in a case decided on June 29, the Court of Appeals drew the line at a horse stable condo project that would have been created to resolve a zoning issue.*

horse carriageThe Charleston Board of Zoning Appeals had denied the application of Arkay for a special use exception to operate a carriage horse stable at 45 Pinckney Street in the historic City Market District. The property was located within 93.5 feet of a residential district, and the special exception required a separation of 100 feet.

To separate the “stabling activity” from the residential district, Arkay proposed an HPR to divide the building into two units. The rear portion of the building would house Unit A which would consist of six stalls in which the horses would be fed, groomed and stored. The front portion of the building would house Unit B which would consist of two offices and would be subject to an appurtenant easement for the benefit of Unit A for ingress and egress to Pinckney Street. Unit B would also be subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting the use of that space as a stable.

Units A and B would be separated in the middle of the building by a common area consisting of two tack rooms, two restrooms, an area for customer waiting, and an area for customer loading and unloading. Because its horse stalls would be located 119 feet from the nearest residential zone, Arkay contended the stabling activity complied with the zoning ordinances separation requirement.

Arkay’s argument was based on the premise that the zoning ordinance’s use of the word “stable” described a use and not a physical structure. In rejecting this argument, the Board noted that only one building occupies 45 Pinckney Street, and the proposed HPR did not alter that circumstance. On appeal, the Circuit Court held that the separation requirement applied to the use, not the physical structure.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the Board, stating that the ordinance did not describe “uses” for the property but rather established prerequisites on how a stable must be configured and how it must operate to receive a special use exception. Because the building that would keep the horses encompasses the entire lot, the Court found that it is a stable for the purposes of the ordinance. Even though the horses would be kept in the rear of the building—and would be separated from the street by areas for customers, tack rooms, restrooms and offices—this does not change the building’s status as a stable, according to the Court.

Maybe the Supreme Court will see it another way, because who doesn’t love a horse-drawn carriage ride in historic Charleston?

 

*Arkay, LLC. v. City of Charleston, South Carolina Court of Appeals Opinion 5419, June 29, 2016.

The SC Bar Warned Us!

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And then it happened to me.

phishing dangerJune 9th’s E-Blast from the SC Bar contained the following warning:

Alert: Phishing emails targeting lawyers
SC Bar members are cautioned to be aware of emails indicating that a complaint has been made against the lawyer or firm, or that they contain a special message from the Bar president. Such emails are not coming from the Bar and would be an attempt to phish members. Delete them immediately. Phishing emails are fraudulent emails that may contain links to phony websites or may request that you share personal or financial information by using a variety of techniques.

There may be clues, including a suspicious “from” email address. The email may include directions to click on a link, which purports to be a copy of the complaint or of the “special message.” Do not click this link, as it could be an attempt to put “ransomware” on the affected computer. Bar members are reminded that any official grievance would come via U.S. mail from the Supreme Court and that any important Bar announcement would appear in E-Blast or would be sent by an individual Bar staff member.

And on June 20, I received the following e-mail:Microsoft Outlook - Memo Style

A “complaint” is enough to strike fear in the heart of any lawyer. The scammers rely on a stress-induced knee-jerk reaction result in clicking on the link. Clicking on the link is the first reflex in our fast-paced world. Fortunately, we have received warning after warning about this kind of phishing activity.

The most obvious clues in this particular scam were:

  1. The e-mail was from “complaint Dept” and the address was complaint.depts@outlook.com. Nothing there reflects the SC Bar.
  2. The name of our bar association is the South Carolina Bar. The South Carolina Bar Association is a common misnomer.
  3. I don’t have a “law practice”. I work for Chicago Title Insurance Company.
  4. The South Carolina Supreme Court handles disciplinary complaints, not the SC Bar. And the Office of Disciplinary Counsel uses snail mail.

A huge thanks to the SC Bar for the warning!  Be careful out there!

The SC-NC Boundary Legislation Passed!

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SC law “clarifying” the boundary will be effective at the beginning of the year.

The long awaited and much debated legislation defining the boundary line between The Palmetto State and the Tar Heel State was signed by Governor Nikki Haley on June 10.  The effective date of the law is January 1, 2017.

The purpose of the law is “clarifying the original location of the boundary” with North Carolina along Horry, Dillon, Marlboro, Chesterfield, Lancaster, York, Cherokee and Spartanburg Counties and providing additional information about the plats describing the location along Greenville, Pickens and Oconee counties.  In other words, our legislature doesn’t believe the law establishes a new boundary line.

welcome to SC 2

As expected, much of the legislation deals with tax issues. The legislative intent is set out specifically, and includes the thought that no business or residence owner should be liable for back taxes to South Carolina nor refunds from South Carolina as a result of a change from one state to the other. And the Department of Revenue is given the authority to compromise taxes in cases that result in taxation in both states.

Several issues are of particular interest to dirt lawyers. For example, no deed recording fees or county filing fees may be charged for deeds recorded as a result of the boundary clarification.

On the effective date of the legislation, Registers of Deeds (and Clerks of Court in those affected counties that do not have ROD offices) will be required to file a Notice of State Boundary Clarification for each affected piece of property. The form is described specifically in the legislation and requires the legal description, tax map number, derivation (if available), the names of the owners of record and the “muniments of title”, a defined term meaning “documents of record setting forth a legal or equitable real property interest or incorporeal hereditament in affected lands of an owner”.

I’m a dirt lawyer of more years than I like to divulge, but I admit I had to investigate the meaning of that word. The learned source, Wikipedia, indicates a muniment of title is the written evidence a landowner can use to defend title, such as a deed, will, judgment or death certificate.

Apparently, lawyers in states with marketable title legislation may be familiar with this term. South Carolinians have neither the benefit of tidy legislation to correct our title problems nor the knowledge and widespread use of this nifty term, until now.  We will all need to use and pronounce the word, muniment, next year. A North Carolina colleague asked me where the RODs and Clerks of Court will obtain the information to supply the  muniments of title. My best guess is that somebody is going to have to do a lot of title work!

(Note to Professor Spitz:  I apologize if you taught me that term in law school. It’s been a long, long time!)

Also of interest to dirt lawyers are provisions relating to foreclosures. A foreclosing attorney will have to file and serve the summons and complaint along with the aforesaid Notice of Boundary Clarification and an attorneys’ certification “that title to the subject real property has been searched in the affected counties and the affected jurisdictions” on all parties having interest in the real property pursuant to the muniments of title.  Whew! The foreclosure can then proceed after thirty days. I’m not sure how all that will be sorted out. I assume South Carolina foreclosure lawyers will be hiring counterparts across the state line to assist in these title examinations.

How will dirt lawyers and title insurance companies deal with sales and mortgages for properties that change states?  I think we are going to take these issues on a case-by-case basis and work together to sort out the various issues that are surely to arise. Be sure to involve your title insurance underwriter in these decisions rather than going out on a limb alone!

Old McDonald Had a Farm

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South Carolina Court of Appeals says partition actions in probate court require an open estate; sends action back to circuit court.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals held last week that probate courts in South Carolina have subject matter jurisdiction over partition actions only where open estates are involved.*

The dispute involved a farm in Darlington County originally owned by S.W. Byrd. Mr. Byrd died in 1923, and his estate was probated in Darlington County and finally closed in 1948. The estates of several of Mr. Byrd’s heirs were not subsequently probated, and in April of 2012, E. Butler McDonald filed an action for partition and the determination of heirs in the Darlington County Probate Court.

At that time, more than ten years had passed since the deaths of Mr. Byrd’s original heirs. Since §62-3-108 of the South Carolina Code establishes a time limitation of ten years after death for the administration of an estate, these estates could not be probated at the time Mr. McDonald filed his action.

farmlandThe Probate Court determined the heirs of S.K Byrd and their percentages of ownership. The Probate Court also found that no interested party had expressed a desire to purchase the property and that physical partition of the farm was impractical. The farm was ordered to be sold at a public auction, and Mr. McDonald’s reasonable attorneys’ fees were ordered to be paid.

On appeal by the other heirs, the Circuit Court affirmed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellants made several arguments, but the Court of Appeals focused on subject matter jurisdiction. Section 62-3-911 of the South Carolina Code establishes the jurisdiction for probate courts and specifically states that an heir may petition the probate court for partition prior to the closing of an estate. Since it was clearly established at trial that S.K. Byrd’s estate was closed in 1948, an action to partition his farm should have been brought in the circuit court, according to the Court of Appeals. The probate court’s determination of heirs and their percentages of ownership was affirmed, but the order was vacated as to the remaining issues.

*Byrd v. McDonald, S.C. Court of Appeals Case 5409 (June, 8, 2016)

Upscale Mt. Pleasant Condo Project Subject of Arbitration Clause Dispute

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Court of Appeals sides with roofing supplier

The South Carolina Court of Appeals handed down a decision on June 1 that will delight the drafters of corporate contracts who imbed arbitration clauses within their warranty provisions.  Whether the South Carolina Supreme Court will approve remains to be seen.

The dispute arises over the construction of One Belle Hall, an upscale condominium community in Mt. Pleasant. Tamko Building Products, Inc. was the supplier of the asphalt shingles for the community’s four buildings, and placed a mandatory binding arbitration clause within its warranty provision. The warranty purported to exclude all express and implied warranties and to disclaim liability for all incidental and consequential damages.

roof shingles

At some point after construction was completed, the owners’ association determined that the buildings were affected by moisture damage, water intrusion and termite damage, all resulting from various alleged construction defects. The developer contacted Tamko to report a warranty claim on the roof shingles, contending they were blistering and defective.  Tamko sent the developer a “warranty kit”, requiring the claimant to provide proof of purchase, samples of the allegedly defective shingles and photographs. The developer failed to respond.

Two years later, the owners’ association filed a proposed class action lawsuit on behalf of all owners, alleging defective construction against the community’s various developers and contractors. Tamko filed for a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.

Circuit Court Judge J. C. Nicholson, Jr. denied the motion and ruled that Tamko’s sale of shingles was based on a contract of adhesion and that the condominium owners lacked any meaningful choice in negotiating the warranty and arbitration terms. The trial court held the arbitration clause to be unconscionable and unenforceable because of the cumulative effect of several oppressive and one-sided terms in the warranty.

The Court of Appeals begged to differ. It held that the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration clause in the warranty was unconscionable. It stated that our supreme court has made it clear that adhesion contracts are not per se unconscionable. The underlying sale of Tamko’s shingles was stated to be a typical modern transaction for goods in which the buyer never has direct contact with the manufacturer to negotiate warranty terms.

The court found it significant that the packaging contained a notation: “Important: Read Carefully Before Opening” providing that if the purchaser is not satisfied with the terms of the warranty, then all unopened boxes should be returned. The court pointed to the standard warranty in the marketplace that gives buyers the choice of keeping the goods or rejecting them by returning them for a refund.

The appellate court also found it significant that the arbitration clause did facilitate an unbiased decision by a neutral decision maker and that the arbitration clause was separable from the warranty.

Consider the exact opposite approach of the CFPB’s recently-announced proposed rule that would ban financial companies from using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses to deny consumers the right to join class action lawsuits. That proposed rule can be read here and is the subject of a May 12 blog entitled “CFPB’s proposed rule would allow consumers to sue banks”.

It’s interesting to see such different approaches by two authorities on an issue affecting consumers in the housing arena. I wouldn’t be surprised to see more to come from either ruling.

* One Belle Hall Property Owners Association, Inc. vs. Trammell Crow Residential Company, S.C. Ct. App. Opinion 5407 (June 1,2016)

SC Court Effectively Extends Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice

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Epstein case is overruled

SC Supreme Court LogoA car dealership case against a law firm provided the South Carolina Supreme Court the opportunity to reverse its prior ruling on the point in time the three-year statute of limitations begins to run in a legal malpractice case. Interestingly, retired Chief Justice Toal’s dissent in the earlier case was adopted. The new bright-line rule in South Carolina is that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice case that is appealed until the appellate court disposes of the action by sending a remittitur to the trial court.

The current case, Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson*, involved a negligence suit against a law firm that was dismissed at summary judgment based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.  The automobile dealership had been sued by a consumer who discovered the vehicle he purchased had sustained extensive undisclosed damage prior to his purchase.  After an adverse jury verdict which was affirmed on appeal, the dealership sued its lawyer, arguing that the lawyer, among other matters, failed to adequately investigate the facts in the case, failed to conduct adequate discovery, and failed to settle the case despite the admission by the dealership that it had “done something wrong”.

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The lower court, following precedent, found that the dealership knew or should have known it had a legal malpractice claim against its trial counsel on the date of the adverse jury verdict.  A 2005 South Carolina Supreme Court case, Epstein v. Brown **, had held just that, despite the fact that the claimant in the earlier case, like the current case, had filed an appeal.

Epstein represented a minority position in the country, according to the current case. A majority of states have adopted the “continuous-representation rule”, which permits the statute of limitations to be tolled during the period an attorney continues to represent the client on the matter out of which the alleged legal malpractice arose.  In Stokes-Craven, our Court continued to reject the continuous-representation rule, finding that rule to be problematic because its application may be unclear under some factual scenarios.  Our Court looked to existing appellate court rules to the effect that an appeal acts as an automatic stay as to the judgment in the lower court. In other words, if the claimant appeals the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred, any basis for the legal malpractice cause of action is stayed while the appeal is pending.

The Court stated that its new bright-line rule is consistent with the discovery rule which states that an action must be commenced within three years of the time a person knew or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he or she had a cause of action.  A client either knows or should know that a cause of action arises out of the attorney’s alleged malpractice if an appeal is unsuccessful.

Chief Justice Pleicones dissented, stating he would adhere to the discovery rule adopted in Epstein and reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment because there are unresolved genuine issues of material fact making that relief inappropriate.

* South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion 27572 (May 24, 2016)

** 363 S.C. 381, 610 S.E.2d 816 (2005)

Beware of Cyberattacks on Free E-mail Services

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Think a client won’t sue for misdirected funds?  Think again!

domain securityE-mail services, even those with the tightest security possible, can be hacked. We have heard local stories, as close as Rock Hill and Charleston, of funds being misdirected by cybercriminals through intercepting e-mails and sending out fraudulent wiring instructions.

Law firms have taken action: encrypting e-mails, adding tag lines to emails warning that wiring instructions will not be changed, adding warning paragraphs to engagement letters, in addition to normal security efforts. Many offices now require confirmation of all wiring instructions by a telephone calls initiated internally. No verbal verification?  No wires!

Last month, an attorney in New York was sued by her clients in a cybercrime situation. This time, the property was a Manhattan co-op, and the funds amounted to a $1.9 million deposit. The lawsuit alleged that the attorney used an AOL e-mail account that welcomed hackers. The complaint stated that had the attorney recognized the red flags or attempted to orally confirm the proper receipt of the deposit, the funds would have been protected.

The old phrase “you get what you pay for” is definitely applicable in these situation. Attorneys who continue to use free email services are putting themselves and their clients at greater risk for cyberattacks. Criminals understand that free email services have low security against cyber-intrusion, so they naturally gravitate to those accounts for their dirty work.

I heard one expert say that free e-mail services are not only not secure, they are also unprofessional! Surely, lenders will soon look at this issue as they decide who will handle their closings.

Buried in the Dirt

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Are you sure your IOLTA account was properly established?

A Charleston lawyer just shared a bit of an Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts (IOLTA) horror story with us, and I’m passing it along for the benefit of all South Carolina practitioners to prevent at least one surprise in future certification attempts.

businessman pennies

This lawyer was being vetted by a third-party vendor for the purposes of staying on the good side of a lender. The vetting company advised that the lawyer’s IOLTA account had been set up incorrectly using his firm’s Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN).  The lawyer called The South Carolina Bar Foundation and learned that the account should have been set up using the Foundation’s TIN: 23-7181552. In order to make this change, the bank required the lawyer to open a new account…with all that entails.

As a review, here are some IOLTA facts.

  • These accounts must be used for client funds that are small in amount or expected to be held for a short time, so that the funds cannot practically be invested for the client because they won’t provide a positive net return.
  • Funds that do not meet the nominal or short-term fund requirements of an IOLTA account should be deposited in a separate demand account to earn interest for the benefit of the client, and the client’s TIN should be used.
  • Some financial institutions waive all fees for IOLTA accounts. If reasonable and customary fees are charged, those fees may be deducted from interest. Other fees and service charges are the responsibility of the attorney.
  • There should be no tax consequences for the attorney or client for IOLTA accounts.
  • The Bar Foundation maintains a list of eligible financial institutions on its website.
  • Rule 1.15(h) of the SC Rules of Professional Responsibility mandates that all lawyers with trust accounts must file a written directive with their bank requiring the bank to report any non-sufficient funds (NSF) transactions. This mandate applies to IOLTA accounts.

Check your IOLTA accounts and make sure you’re in compliance before the vetting companies arrive on the scene!

CFPB’s Proposed Rule Would Allow Consumers to Sue Banks

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Arbitration clauses would be limited

At a hearing on May 5, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Richard Cordray announced that the agency has issued a proposed rule that would ban consumer financial companies from using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses to deny their customers the right to join class action lawsuits.

The proposed rule can be read here, and is also found on CFPB’s website. When the proposal is published in the Federal Register, the public will have 90 days to comment.

pen mightier than swordDirector Cordray stated in his comments last Thursday that this rule is a benefit to consumers because it will discontinue the practice of entities inserting arbitration clauses into contracts for consumer financial products and services and literally “with the stroke of a pen”, blocking any group of consumers from filing class actions. He said the CFPB’s research indicates that these “gotcha” clauses force consumers to litigate over small amounts ($35 – $100) acting alone against some of the largest financial companies in the world.

Some authorities are arguing that consumers will not be benefited by the proposal because of the high cost of class actions and the fact that it is often lawyers, not consumers, who benefit financially from them. The proposal does seems contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act and legal precedent and also demonstrates the power of the agency, the power that has already been challenged in several lawsuits nationwide. Some might suggest that the agency is the entity that acts “with the stroke of a pen.”

The proposed rule does not reach to title insurance and real estate settlement services. The rule applies to products and services that extend, service, report and collect credit.

One fact seems certain. The CFPB has not completed its efforts to shake up the market!

CFPB Announces TRID Clarity in the Works

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Cordray signals notice of new rule expected late July

cfpb-logoIn an April 28 letter addressed to several industry trade groups and their members, Director Richard Cordray of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, said his agency has begun drafting a notice intended to provide “greater certainty and clarity” in the Know Before you Owe Rule.

The letter stated the CFPB is working hard to understand industry concerns and recognized there are places in the regulation text and commentary where adjustments would be useful.

In a press release, also dated April 28, American Land Title Association said its primary goal for the proposed adjustments is to insure consumers receive clear information about their title insurance costs on the Closing Disclosure. As we have all experienced, TRID requires a very odd negative number as the cost for owner’s title insurance in most situations. ALTA has been arguing against this strange result for many months.

The Director’s letter stated that the Bureau has begun drafting a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that should be available for comments in late July. It also suggested that one or two meetings will be arranged with industry participants before the NPRM is issued. In the meantime, the letter encouraged continued feedback.

The text of the letter can be accessed here.