Real Estate Law

Could Efforts to Modernize Mortgage Practice Lead to Changes in SC Law?

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Reuters reports on a “patchwork of state laws” that hinder efforts.

In an article dated September 9, Reuters reports that the practice of notarizing documents, which dates back “at least to Ancient Rome” is becoming “passé” in the era of FaceTime, Skype and live-streamed social media. South Carolina real estate lawyers might want to take deep breaths and read the article, which is linked here. 

South Carolina practitioners are banking on State v. Buyers Service, our seminal case from 1987 holding that closings are the practice of law, to keep us in the closing business. Buyers Service is still good law in South Carolina and has been cited favorably many times and as late as this year.

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There have been some hints, however, in our long line of “UPL” cases that some of our current Supreme Court Justices may not be as committed to our strong rule as some of the prior Justices have been. (I hope that comment was vague enough to keep me out of trouble if I encounter any of the current or former Justices at a cocktail party. Please notice citations are purposefully missing.)

The South Carolina Supreme Court has repeated in almost every case on point that the purpose of requiring lawyers to be involved in closings is to protect consumers. The Reuters article suggests that the effort to modernize mortgages would also protect consumers. One borrower in the story, a civilian paramedic at a military base in Kuwait, was forced to fly 6,500 miles to buy a house in Virginia. Webcam notaries would cut expenses for lenders, notaries and borrowers, the article suggests.

Are the two efforts to protect consumers diametrically opposed? No doubt, South Carolina lawyers could be on one end of the webcams. I encourage all of us to read the news and to pay attention to how closings happen in other parts of the country and to continually think of ways to modernize our practices.  Keeping up with technology can only contribute toward keeping a real estate practitioner in the closing game.

Probate Problems: When Doing Things The Old-Fashioned Way Can Get Your Documents Rejected

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This is not news, but we hear recording offices are beginning to reject documents.

Effective June 2, 2014, South Carolina Code §26-1-120 (E) 4, dealing with notarial certificates, was amended to require that a subscribing witness in a probate form must attest that he or she is not a party to or beneficiary of the transaction.

This is a correct version of the new probate form:

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Probates are notoriously difficult to complete correctly, especially for documents sent out-of-state. It is probably always a better idea to use a simple acknowledgement form, particularly in light of the statutory change:Screenshot 2Note that South Carolina Code §26-1-90(B) now requires that the notary legibly type or print his or her name near the signature.

This is a technicality, but a technicality that can cause your documents to be rejected by recording offices. Don’t let that happen!

The SC-NC Boundary Legislation Passed!

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SC law “clarifying” the boundary will be effective at the beginning of the year.

The long awaited and much debated legislation defining the boundary line between The Palmetto State and the Tar Heel State was signed by Governor Nikki Haley on June 10.  The effective date of the law is January 1, 2017.

The purpose of the law is “clarifying the original location of the boundary” with North Carolina along Horry, Dillon, Marlboro, Chesterfield, Lancaster, York, Cherokee and Spartanburg Counties and providing additional information about the plats describing the location along Greenville, Pickens and Oconee counties.  In other words, our legislature doesn’t believe the law establishes a new boundary line.

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As expected, much of the legislation deals with tax issues. The legislative intent is set out specifically, and includes the thought that no business or residence owner should be liable for back taxes to South Carolina nor refunds from South Carolina as a result of a change from one state to the other. And the Department of Revenue is given the authority to compromise taxes in cases that result in taxation in both states.

Several issues are of particular interest to dirt lawyers. For example, no deed recording fees or county filing fees may be charged for deeds recorded as a result of the boundary clarification.

On the effective date of the legislation, Registers of Deeds (and Clerks of Court in those affected counties that do not have ROD offices) will be required to file a Notice of State Boundary Clarification for each affected piece of property. The form is described specifically in the legislation and requires the legal description, tax map number, derivation (if available), the names of the owners of record and the “muniments of title”, a defined term meaning “documents of record setting forth a legal or equitable real property interest or incorporeal hereditament in affected lands of an owner”.

I’m a dirt lawyer of more years than I like to divulge, but I admit I had to investigate the meaning of that word. The learned source, Wikipedia, indicates a muniment of title is the written evidence a landowner can use to defend title, such as a deed, will, judgment or death certificate.

Apparently, lawyers in states with marketable title legislation may be familiar with this term. South Carolinians have neither the benefit of tidy legislation to correct our title problems nor the knowledge and widespread use of this nifty term, until now.  We will all need to use and pronounce the word, muniment, next year. A North Carolina colleague asked me where the RODs and Clerks of Court will obtain the information to supply the  muniments of title. My best guess is that somebody is going to have to do a lot of title work!

(Note to Professor Spitz:  I apologize if you taught me that term in law school. It’s been a long, long time!)

Also of interest to dirt lawyers are provisions relating to foreclosures. A foreclosing attorney will have to file and serve the summons and complaint along with the aforesaid Notice of Boundary Clarification and an attorneys’ certification “that title to the subject real property has been searched in the affected counties and the affected jurisdictions” on all parties having interest in the real property pursuant to the muniments of title.  Whew! The foreclosure can then proceed after thirty days. I’m not sure how all that will be sorted out. I assume South Carolina foreclosure lawyers will be hiring counterparts across the state line to assist in these title examinations.

How will dirt lawyers and title insurance companies deal with sales and mortgages for properties that change states?  I think we are going to take these issues on a case-by-case basis and work together to sort out the various issues that are surely to arise. Be sure to involve your title insurance underwriter in these decisions rather than going out on a limb alone!

Old McDonald Had a Farm

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South Carolina Court of Appeals says partition actions in probate court require an open estate; sends action back to circuit court.

The South Carolina Court of Appeals held last week that probate courts in South Carolina have subject matter jurisdiction over partition actions only where open estates are involved.*

The dispute involved a farm in Darlington County originally owned by S.W. Byrd. Mr. Byrd died in 1923, and his estate was probated in Darlington County and finally closed in 1948. The estates of several of Mr. Byrd’s heirs were not subsequently probated, and in April of 2012, E. Butler McDonald filed an action for partition and the determination of heirs in the Darlington County Probate Court.

At that time, more than ten years had passed since the deaths of Mr. Byrd’s original heirs. Since §62-3-108 of the South Carolina Code establishes a time limitation of ten years after death for the administration of an estate, these estates could not be probated at the time Mr. McDonald filed his action.

farmlandThe Probate Court determined the heirs of S.K Byrd and their percentages of ownership. The Probate Court also found that no interested party had expressed a desire to purchase the property and that physical partition of the farm was impractical. The farm was ordered to be sold at a public auction, and Mr. McDonald’s reasonable attorneys’ fees were ordered to be paid.

On appeal by the other heirs, the Circuit Court affirmed. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellants made several arguments, but the Court of Appeals focused on subject matter jurisdiction. Section 62-3-911 of the South Carolina Code establishes the jurisdiction for probate courts and specifically states that an heir may petition the probate court for partition prior to the closing of an estate. Since it was clearly established at trial that S.K. Byrd’s estate was closed in 1948, an action to partition his farm should have been brought in the circuit court, according to the Court of Appeals. The probate court’s determination of heirs and their percentages of ownership was affirmed, but the order was vacated as to the remaining issues.

*Byrd v. McDonald, S.C. Court of Appeals Case 5409 (June, 8, 2016)

Upscale Mt. Pleasant Condo Project Subject of Arbitration Clause Dispute

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Court of Appeals sides with roofing supplier

The South Carolina Court of Appeals handed down a decision on June 1 that will delight the drafters of corporate contracts who imbed arbitration clauses within their warranty provisions.  Whether the South Carolina Supreme Court will approve remains to be seen.

The dispute arises over the construction of One Belle Hall, an upscale condominium community in Mt. Pleasant. Tamko Building Products, Inc. was the supplier of the asphalt shingles for the community’s four buildings, and placed a mandatory binding arbitration clause within its warranty provision. The warranty purported to exclude all express and implied warranties and to disclaim liability for all incidental and consequential damages.

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At some point after construction was completed, the owners’ association determined that the buildings were affected by moisture damage, water intrusion and termite damage, all resulting from various alleged construction defects. The developer contacted Tamko to report a warranty claim on the roof shingles, contending they were blistering and defective.  Tamko sent the developer a “warranty kit”, requiring the claimant to provide proof of purchase, samples of the allegedly defective shingles and photographs. The developer failed to respond.

Two years later, the owners’ association filed a proposed class action lawsuit on behalf of all owners, alleging defective construction against the community’s various developers and contractors. Tamko filed for a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.

Circuit Court Judge J. C. Nicholson, Jr. denied the motion and ruled that Tamko’s sale of shingles was based on a contract of adhesion and that the condominium owners lacked any meaningful choice in negotiating the warranty and arbitration terms. The trial court held the arbitration clause to be unconscionable and unenforceable because of the cumulative effect of several oppressive and one-sided terms in the warranty.

The Court of Appeals begged to differ. It held that the circuit court erred in finding the arbitration clause in the warranty was unconscionable. It stated that our supreme court has made it clear that adhesion contracts are not per se unconscionable. The underlying sale of Tamko’s shingles was stated to be a typical modern transaction for goods in which the buyer never has direct contact with the manufacturer to negotiate warranty terms.

The court found it significant that the packaging contained a notation: “Important: Read Carefully Before Opening” providing that if the purchaser is not satisfied with the terms of the warranty, then all unopened boxes should be returned. The court pointed to the standard warranty in the marketplace that gives buyers the choice of keeping the goods or rejecting them by returning them for a refund.

The appellate court also found it significant that the arbitration clause did facilitate an unbiased decision by a neutral decision maker and that the arbitration clause was separable from the warranty.

Consider the exact opposite approach of the CFPB’s recently-announced proposed rule that would ban financial companies from using mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses to deny consumers the right to join class action lawsuits. That proposed rule can be read here and is the subject of a May 12 blog entitled “CFPB’s proposed rule would allow consumers to sue banks”.

It’s interesting to see such different approaches by two authorities on an issue affecting consumers in the housing arena. I wouldn’t be surprised to see more to come from either ruling.

* One Belle Hall Property Owners Association, Inc. vs. Trammell Crow Residential Company, S.C. Ct. App. Opinion 5407 (June 1,2016)

SC Supreme Court Warns Closing Attorneys

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Don’t be used as a “rubber stamp” or “rent” your name and status as an attorney!

businessman nametag for rentIn a disciplinary case filed on April 20,* the South Carolina Supreme Court publicly reprimanded an attorney for failing to properly supervise the disbursement aspect of a residential refinance closing. In a three-two decision, the Court pointedly seized the opportunity to warn residential closing lawyers.

The disciplined attorney worked as an independent contractor for Carolina Attorney Network, a management service located in Lexington, that provides its services to, among other entities, Vantage Point Title, Inc.  Vantage Point Title was described as a non-lawyer owned title company based in Florida. The attorney testified that 99.9% of his business comes from Carolina Attorney Network and that he had no direct contact with Vantage Point Title.

The attorney had previously been suspended for thirty days by the Court for failing to properly maintain his trust account. He stated in oral arguments in the current case that the suspension caused him to lose his ability to perform closings in the normal manner because he lost his status as an agent for a title insurance company. As a result, he said he was forced to handle closings through the management service.

The attorney testified that he didn’t recall the closing at issue, but he described the process. He said he receives closing documents via e-mail and reviews the title opinions. He verifies that a South Carolina licensed attorney completed the title opinions. He also reviews the closing instructions and the closing statements. He does not review the title commitments nor verify the loan payoff amounts. He conducts the closings and returns the closing packages with authorizations to disburse. Vantage Point disburses the funds, records the documents and issues the title insurance policies. Vantage Point then sends the lawyer disbursement logs showing how closing funds are disbursed. The lawyer reviews the disbursement logs to ensure they have a zero balance. He or an employee of Carolina Attorney Network reviews the online records of the ROD to verify that the mortgages are properly recorded.

The loan at issue had been “net funded” and the disbursement log did not “zero out”. The log showed a credit of approximately $100,000, and a disbursement of approximately $800. The Court stated that the disbursement log was inaccurate, and that the lawyer did not even know at the time of closing that the loan had been net funded.

The HUD-1 Settlement Statement in the closing at issue showed Vantage Point received approximately $800 for “title services and lender’s title insurance”, but attorney’s fees were not reflected. In fact, Vantage Point paid Carolina Attorney Network $250, and Carolina Attorney Network paid the attorney $150.

Vantage Point maintains a national trust account for all fifty states, but at some point, it opened “for unknown reasons”, according to the Court, a SC IOLTA account. Two checks were written on the IOLTA account for the closing at issue. When those two checks were returned for insufficient funds, the investigation by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel was triggered. Ultimately, all checks cleared, and no one sustained harm.

Doe v. Richardson is the controlling case. In this 2006 seminal case, the S.C. Supreme Court held that disbursement of funds in a residential refinance is an integral step in the closing and constitutes the practice of law. Richardson further held that although the attorney must supervise disbursements in residential closings, the funds do not have to pass through the supervising attorney’s trust account.

The Court stated the current case presents a situation where the lawyer conducted his duty to supervise disbursement in name only. He “rented” his name and status as an attorney to attempt to satisfy the attorney supervision requirement. There is no question, according to the Court, that the lawyer’s cursory review of the disbursement log did not satisfy the duty to supervise disbursement. The Court stated in furtherance of its concern that attorneys are being used as “rubber stamps” to satisfy the attorney supervision requirement in low cost real estate closings, and it took the opportunity in this case to expand upon Richardson.

The Court clarified that an attorney’s duty to oversee the disbursement of loan proceeds in residential closings is nondelegable. To fulfil this duty, the attorney must ensure: (a) that he or she has control over the disbursement of loan proceeds; or (b) at a minimum, that he or she receives detailed verification that the disbursement was correct.

The Court stated that, in practice, an attorney may find that utilizing his or her trust account and personally disbursing funds provides the most effective means to fulfil this duty. The Court stood by the Richardson holding, however, that residential closing funds are not required to pass through the supervising attorney’s trust account. It held that the attorney’s verification of proper disbursement, via sufficient documentation or information received from the appropriate banking institution, in addition to the disbursement log, is acceptable to fulfil this duty.

In essence, according to the Court, the lawyer was used as a “rubber stamp” for a non-lawyer, out-of-state organization with no office in South Carolina, whose involvement was not disclosed to the clients. The Court stated that it has insisted on lawyer-directed real estate closings in order to protect the public. The lawyer’s method of handling his client’s business was stated to provide no real protection and was held to be a “gross abandonment” of his supervisory authority.

Former Chief Justice Toal wrote the opinion for the Court. Justices Kittredge and Moore concurred. Current Chief Justice Pleicones dissented in a separate opinion in which Justice Hearn concurred.

The dissent characterized the case as a situation that through an error by a title company, the ODC became aware of a single closing where the attorney failed to explain the nature of a “net funding” transaction to clients who suffered no harm. Nothing in this single instance justifies a public reprimand, according to the dissent, nor justifies a modification of Richardson, adopting a non-delegable duty to oversee loan disbursements through “detailed verification” or through the receipt of “sufficient documentation or information” in addition to the disbursement log.

The dissent said that the majority neither explains what this means nor how more oversight could have prevented the title company from issuing checks drawn on the wrong account. In a footnote, the dissent accused the majority of imposing a “new, vague requirement on residential real estate closings”.

The real question becomes….what in the world will the next case on this topic hold?

*In the Matter of Breckenridge, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion No. 27625, April 20, 2016.

SC Supreme Court Assesses “Sick” Pawleys Island Condo Project

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A 30+-year saga of leaky buildings continues to be litigated

watery apartmentFisher v. Shipyard Village Council of Co-Owners, Inc.,* involves a four-building condominium project in Pawleys Island that experienced leaks as early as 1983. The leaks began around the windows and sliding glass doors, which were defined as a part of each “unit” by the master deed, making the respective owners responsible for repairs rather than the owners’ association.

The bylaws require the Board to act if an owner fails to maintain a unit and that failure adversely affects other units or the common areas. Reducing the facts in this case to one sentence, the issue is whether the owners of units in all four buildings must be responsible for extensive repairs required in two of the buildings.

The cause of the water intrusion is still in question, but the evidence indicates the Board may have known about the leaks for years before it took action.

In 1999, the Board notified owners that they should waterproof balcony thresholds and window frames. In 2002, the Board hired a consultant who found safety issues with the windows and told the Board to pursue legal action. In 2003, the Board hired a construction company that concluded water was leaking through stucco, not windows.

In 2004, Ben and Katie Morrow, owners of a unit in Building B, replaced their windows but continued to experience water intrusion. They engaged an engineer who identified stucco cracks as the source of the problem and stated that Building B was “sick and about to become cancerous” because of the severe moisture intrusion.

And the saga continued.

In 2006, the Board received a $2.4 million proposal to replace windows in Buildings A and B and attempted to amend the Bylaws to designate the windows as common elements, which would have placed the responsibility on the Board. After two attempts to pass the amendment, the Board crafted a letter stating the amendment had passed. The letter did not address the voting procedure and, in fact, incorrectly said a special meeting had been held. The amendment did not address the sliding glass doors.

In 2007, the Board hired a consultant who identified an “open joint” directly under the doors’ thresholds which allowed water to leak to units below.  In 2008, the Board said Buildings A and B required repairs to the tune of $12 – 13 million. The Board hired yet another consultant who identified two primary problems in Buildings A and B: (1) failures in the structural concrete, including corrosion of the reinforcing steel; and (2) the building envelope was not “weather tight”. Another inspection revealed this startling list of defects in Buildings A and B:  roof, façade, edge beam, soffit, concrete, expansion joint, horizontal surface and HVAC anchorage failures, and poor to non-existent flashing in the windows and doors.

In 2008, the owners of units in Buildings C and D hired an attorney, who sent a letter to the Board asserting that a proposed special assessment was invalid because the amendment had not been property adopted, and the cost of repairs should be the responsibility of the owners in Buildings A and B. In 2009, a majority of the owners of units in Buildings C and D brought suit challenging the validity of the amendment. Later that year, the Board notified the owners that the windows and doors in Buildings A and B would be replaced through a special assessment of up to $88,398 per unit. The owners voted against the special assessment, and the Board incorporated the repair costs into the 2010 and 2011 operating budgets.

Later in 2009, the Petitioners (50 owners in Building C and D) filed a new suit, alleging negligence, gross negligence, negligent and gross negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the master deed and bylaws. This two suits were consolidated, and in May of 2012, the Petitioners moved for summary judgment on their negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action.

The trial court granted summary judgment on the issues of duty and breach, finding the bylaws and master deed imposed affirmative duties on the Board to enforce, investigate and correct known violations, and to investigate evidence of the owners’ neglect of maintenance responsibilities. The trial court also found that the Board was precluded from asserting the business judgment rule because of its ultra vires conduct, as well as its lack of good faith and failure to use reasonable care in discharging its duties.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the existence of a duty to investigate but reversed on the business judgment rule and the issue of breach. The case was remanded for trial, but the Supreme Court granted Certiorari.

The Supreme Court stated that the business judgment rule applies only to intra vires acts. In other words, the rule protects a board that exercises its best judgment within the scope of its authority. The Court held that a corporation that acts within its authority, without corrupt motives and in good faith, is protected by the rule, and remanded the case for jury consideration of whether the Board violated its obligations.

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As to the issue of summary judgment on breach of duty, the Court found that the record contains at least a scintilla of evidence that the Board did not breach its duty to investigate. The Court stated that the record contains some evidence to support a conclusion that the water leaks occurred because of water intrusion through the common elements.  Thus, the trial court should not have decided the question of whether the Board breached its duty to investigate as a matter of law.

The parties are now free to litigate for years to come!

* S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 27603, January 27, 2016

County May Owe Duty to Lot Owners in Failed Subdivision

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Infrastructure regulations were not followed

scales - blue backgroundOn January 6, the S.C. Court of Appeals reversed the Georgetown County Circuit Court’s directed verdict and remanded a case involving failed West Stewart Subdivision.* The developer, Harmony Holdings, LLC, went belly up in 2007, leaving the lot owners without roads and utilities after the County failed to follow its own regulations that provided a safety net for such catastrophes.

The plaintiff owned two lots in the subdivision, and filed a negligence action, arguing that Georgetown County had a “tort-like” duty to lot owners under the plain language of its development regulations. The County denied that it owed a duty to lot owners.

The County attorney explained the administrative issues at trial. He testified that in South Carolina, a developer is generally not allowed to sell lots that do not have infrastructure (roads, water and sewer). County regulations, however, allow the County to accept cash, bonds, financial guarantees or letters of credit to ensure money is available to complete infrastructure in case a developer fails.

Under the regulations in question, the County had discretion to accept a letter of credit equal to 125% of the cost estimate to complete the infrastructure. In this case, the developer posted a letter of credit on May 23, 2006 in the amount of $1,301,705 based on a cost estimate of $1,040,000.

Also under the regulations, the County had the power to approve reductions in the letter of credit upon receipt of an engineer’s certification that a certain amount of the work had been completed and sufficient funds were available for the remaining work. Other technical procedures were also required. The County allowed for a reduction in the letter of credit on July 20, 2006, October 9, 2006 and November 8, 2006, reducing the letter of credit to $553,370. In December of 2006, the County was advised that the estimated cost to complete the infrastructure was $1,153,205, which was higher than the original estimate. Despite this information, the letter of credit was reduced again on March 9, 2007 to $156,704.

The letter of credit expired in May of 2007, and the developer gave the county a check for $140,000. In August of 2007, the developer informed the County that it no longer had the financial means to complete the construction. Then the developer declared bankruptcy.

Repko described his lot as “woods” accessible by a path but inaccessible by a road. He testified that he believes his property is valued at “zero”. He said he pays property taxes on his lot, but the County will not allow him to build because of the absence of basic utilities.

The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the County on the grounds that the regulations do not create a private duty to lot owners. (Other issues were argued that will not be discussed here.) The Court of Appeals agreed with the lot owner that the County owed a special duty to him with respect to the County’s management of the financial guaranty that allowed the developer to sell lots.

inigo montoya memeThe County had relied on a 1993 Hilton Head case.** In that case, the preamble to the development ordinances stated, “The town council finds that the health, safety and welfare of the public is in actual danger….if development is allowed to continue without limitation.” When the development failed, a lot owner sued the Town, claiming it had negligently administered its ordinances. The Supreme Court held that the ordinances did not create a special duty to lot owners because their essential purpose, according to the preamble, was to protect the public from overdevelopment.

The Court of Appeals in the current case held that, unlike the Hilton Head ordinances, the Georgetown County regulations contained no express language declaring their purpose, but reviewing them as a whole, the purpose is to protect lot owners in the event the developer does not complete infrastructure.

I expect we have not seen the end of this case!

* Repko v. County of Georgetown, Opinion 5374, January 6, 2016.

** Brady Development Co. v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 312 S.C. 73, 439 S.E.2d 266 (1993).

A Short Time Ago in a Revenue Office Not Far Away …

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Check them out in DOR Information Letter #15-20

The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) issued a Revenue Ruling and an Information Letter in 2015 addressing deed recording fees and the affidavits that must accompany deeds.

Revenue Ruling #15-3, issued earlier this year, contains a comprehensive treatment of the subject, and Information Letter #15-20, issued on December 11, creates new affidavit forms, the Affidavit for Taxable or Exempt Transfers and the Affidavit for Exempt Transfers. Former affidavits, created in 1996, and using the term “arm’s length transaction” were decertified.

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“Luke … I am your lawyer.”

Deed recording fees of $1.35 (state) and $.55 (county) per $500 or any fractional part of $500 of the value of the real estate are imposed by §12-24-10 of the South Carolina Code for the “privilege” of recording a deed. This has not changed. Also unchanged is the list of 15 exemptions, and the statement that deeds of distribution and deeds transferring property from a trust to a trust distributee upon the settlor’s death are not subject to the fees.

One statutory change from 2015 was addressed in the Information Letter. Code §2-59-140 was amended in June to provide in subjection (E) that deductions from “value” include “any lien or encumbrance on realty in the possession of a forfeited land commission which may subsequently be waived or reduced after the transfer under a signed contract or agreement between the lienholder and the buyer existing before the transfer.” This change was added to Item 5 of the Affidavit for Taxable and Exempt Transfers.

Real estate practitioners can find the Revenue Ruling and the Information Letter at www.dor.sc.gov. Be sure to use the new forms!

SC Court of Appeals Upholds Developer’s Plan for Tailgate Condo Project

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The SPUR avoids kiddie condo status.

In a case decided in the midst of a wretched Carolina football season, the South Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a restriction against rentals to students in a condominium project that was clearly built to accommodate terrific tailgate parties.

williams brice condoLalla v. The SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Association, Inc.* involved a three bedroom condominium in the shadow of Williams Brice stadium purchased in 2007 for $470,000. Mr. and Mrs. Lalla purchased the condo intending to enjoy football games and to allow their daughter and two roommates to live there during college.  However, the great market decline beginning in 2008 spoiled their plans.

The Master Deed contained a prohibition against renting to any student enrolled in a two or four year college. But owners could allow their children or grandchildren to reside in or rent a unit along with rent-paying roommates.

When the market declined, the value of the condominium substantially decreased in value, and the Lallas unsuccessfully attempted to sell it. At the time of the appellate court hearing in 2014, the condo had been on the market for four years.

During the summer of 2010, the Lallas notified the owners’ association of their decision to rent to college students and began to do so. In June of 2010, the board of the association met and considered a comment card from a unit owner complaining that the association was allowing the project to turn into a dormitory.  Following this meeting, the board sent out a notice to each owner indicating the restrictions would be enforced and giving owners until May of 2011 to terminate any violating leases.

When the rules were not followed by Mr. and Mrs. Lalla, the association filed a declaratory judgment action seeking interpretation and enforcement of the master deed. The Lallas answered and counterclaimed, seeking a ruling that the restrictions were null and void because of changed circumstances. The association prevailed in the circuit court, and the Lallas appealed, asserting that the restrictions discriminated against a specific class of individuals (college students) and are unreasonable because the violation caused no damage to other property owners.

football tailgateThe discrimination argument failed because ”college students have not faced a long history of discrimination, are not an insular minority, and have not been classified according to an immutable trait acquired at birth.” In other words “college students” is not an inherently suspect class. The purpose of the restriction, to insure the comfort and safety of the residents and to protect the investment of the property owners by minimizing the risk of creating a dormitory-like atmosphere, was held to be rational.

The Court of Appeals also held that the economic change in circumstances failed to support the termination of the restriction because the declining market had no effect on the association’s need to minimize the risk that the project might develop a dormitory-like atmosphere.

South Carolina dirt lawyers like to see restrictive covenants enforced as written, so this case matches our world view.  And the Carolina fans among us dream of an outstanding replacement for Steve Spurrier so those terrific tailgate parties can resume!